Methods and systems for secure and reliable identity-based computing

ABSTRACT

The embodiments herein provide a secure computing resource set identification, evaluation, and management arrangement, employing in various embodiments some or all of the following highly reliable identity related means to establish, register, publish and securely employ user computing arrangement resources in satisfaction of user set target contextual purposes. Systems and methods may include, as applicable, software and hardware implementations for Identity Firewalls; Awareness Managers; Contextual Purpose Firewall Frameworks for situationally germane resource usage related security, provisioning, isolation, constraining, and operational management; liveness biometric, and assiduous environmental, evaluation and authentication techniques; Repute systems and methods assertion and fact ecosphere; standardized and interoperable contextual purpose related expression systems and methods; purpose related computing arrangement resource and related information management systems and methods, including situational contextual identity management systems and methods; and/or the like.

RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No.17/147,373 and U.S. application Ser. No. 17/147,366, each filed Jan. 12,2021, and titled METHODS AND SYSTEMS FOR SECURE AND RELIABLEIDENTITY-BASED COMPUTING, and each of which is a divisional of U.S.application Ser. No. 16/662,351, filed Oct. 24, 2019, titled METHODS ANDSYSTEMS FOR SECURE AND RELIABLE IDENTITY-BASED COMPUTING, which is acontinuation of U.S. application Ser. No. 15/946,067 (now U.S. Pat. No.10,509,907), filed Apr. 5, 2018, titled METHODS AND SYSTEMS FOR SECUREAND RELIABLE IDENTITY-BASED COMPUTING, which is a continuation of U.S.application Ser. No. 15/628,228 (now U.S. Pat. No. 9,971,894), filedJun. 20, 2017, titled METHODS AND SYSTEMS FOR SECURE AND RELIABLEIDENTITY-BASED COMPUTING, which is a divisional of U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 14/485,707 (now U.S. Pat. No. 9,721,086), filedSep. 13, 2014, titled METHODS AND SYSTEMS FOR SECURE AND RELIABLEIDENTITY-BASED COMPUTING, which claims priority to and is acontinuation-in-part of PCT Application No. PCT/US2014/026912, filedMar. 14, 2014, titled METHODS AND SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSEFUL COMPUTING,which is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent application Ser. No.13/928,301 (now U.S. Pat. No. 9,378,065), filed Jun. 26, 2013, titledPURPOSEFUL COMPUTING, which is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 13/815,934 (now U.S. Pat. No. 10,075,384), filedMar. 15, 2013, titled “PURPOSEFUL COMPUTING” and all of which areincorporated herein by reference in their entirety, and referred tocollectively as the Parent Application Set.

BACKGROUND

Aspects of the disclosure relate in general to computer security andresource integrity systems. Aspects include apparatus, methods andsystems configured to facilitate computer security and resourceintegrity in a computer architecture.

SUMMARY

Embodiments include systems, devices, methods and computer-readablemedia to facilitate reliability of identity, flexibility of identityinformation arrangements, and security related to resource identity andpurposeful computing in computing architectures.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a non-limiting illustrative example of timing anomaly servicemonitoring user and environment through assiduous images.

FIG. 2 is a non-limiting illustrative example of multi-modalsensor/emitter operations in support of reliable identity verification.

FIG. 3 is a non-limiting illustrative example of Participantregistration.

FIG. 4 is a non-limiting illustrative example of user initiatingauthentication processing.

FIG. 5 is a non-limiting illustrative example of existential and/orassiduous authentication involving pseudo-random emissions sets.

FIG. 6 is a non-limiting illustrative example of a trusted clocksupporting existential authentication.

FIG. 7 is a non-limiting illustrative example of trusted clock withproof of delivery.

FIG. 8 is a non-limiting illustrative example of Repute setcombinations.

FIG. 9 is a non-limiting illustrative example of purpose managedParticipant ecosphere.

FIG. 10 is a non-limiting illustrative example for meta socialnetworking context.

FIG. 11 is a non-limiting illustrative example of creation of purposebased communities using published PERCos Frameworks.

FIG. 12 is a non-limiting illustrative example of standardized andinteroperable Framework common interface.

FIG. 13 is a non-limiting illustrative example of contextual purposesituational interfaces and common interface adaptation.

FIG. 14 is a non-limiting illustrative example of granting of rightsbased on situational adaptation.

FIG. 15 is a non-limiting illustrative example variable, policycontrolled update process between cloud services and PERCos commoninterface.

FIG. 16 is a non-limiting illustrative example of identity attributearrangements.

FIG. 17 is a non-limiting illustrative example of employing attributesets to frame purposes and match resource sets.

FIG. 18 is a non-limiting illustrative example of PERCos organization ofattributes.

FIG. 19 is a non-limiting example illustrating attribute status,comprising complete, incomplete, and resolvable attribute sets.

FIG. 20 is a non-limiting illustrative example of relationships betweenattribute sets and resource sets.

FIG. 21 is a non-limiting illustrative example of publication andre-publication.

FIG. 22 is a non-limiting illustrative example of attribute and resourceassociations.

FIG. 23 is a non-limiting illustrative example of evaluation and/ordiscovery through attributes.

FIG. 24 is a non-limiting illustrative example of resource set discoverythrough the use of combined attribute sets, including CDS, CDS CPE, andsimple attributes.

FIG. 25 is a non-limiting illustrative example of relevant attributesets for a given resource set, Participant, CPE, and/or the like.

FIG. 26 is a non-limiting illustrative example of a PIDMX embodiment.

FIG. 27 is a non-limiting illustrative example of communicationsinteractions processing based on, in part, associated resource tokens.

FIG. 28 is a non-limiting illustrative example resource managerarrangement including PIDMX.

FIG. 29 is a non-limiting illustrative example of resource PIDMX andResource Arrangement (RA) PIDMX.

FIG. 30 is a non-limiting illustrative example of a single resource withmultiple resource interfaces and associated identity attribute sets.

FIG. 31 is a non-limiting illustrative example of components of a securearrangement for purposeful computing using a reliable identity-basedresource system.

FIG. 32 is a non-limiting illustrative example of CPFF role manifest andinstance(s).

FIG. 33 is a non-limiting illustrative example of seamless generalpurpose operations while operating CPFF sets.

FIG. 34 is a non-limiting illustrative example of isolation provided bya hypervisor.

FIG. 35 is a non-limiting high level illustrative example of trustworthyconfiguration of an operating session.

FIG. 36 is a non-limiting illustrative example of isolation managed byparticularity management employing hibernation.

FIG. 37 is a non-limiting illustration of a user registering such user'sbiometric and/or contextual information sets in multiple locations.

FIG. 38 is a non-limiting illustrative example of AMs and IFscommunicating with each other to monitor a user set.

FIG. 39 is a non-limiting illustrative example of multiple contextualpurpose resolutions on a single device.

FIG. 40 is a non-limiting illustrative example of an operating CPFF thatemploys a unified hardware appliance.

FIG. 41 is a non-limiting illustrative example of a CPFF operatingsession that uses a hardware PPE set in a CPU set to manage intendedand/or unintended consequences.

FIG. 42 is a non-limiting illustrative example of a hardware unifiedappliance.

FIG. 43 is a non-limiting illustrative example of an operating CPFF thatemploys a hardened device and a secured software computing environment.

FIG. 44 is a non-limiting illustrative example of an Identity Firewall(IF) in a CPU set.

FIG. 45 is a non-limiting illustrative example of a hardware resourceset and associated identities and attributes.

FIG. 46 is a non-limiting illustrative example of an authenticated andevaluated device in operation.

FIG. 47 is a non-limiting illustrative example of evaluation andauthentication of one or more load module sets.

FIG. 48 is a non-limiting illustrative example of an Identity Firewallembodiment with PPE.

FIG. 49 is a non-limiting illustrative example of an Awareness Manager(AM) embodiment.

FIG. 50 is a non-limiting illustrative embodiment of an I/O bus with AMs(Awareness Managers), IFs (Identity Firewalls) and PPEs.

FIG. 51 is a non-limiting illustrative example of an Identity Firewallrunning on top of a trusted operating session.

FIG. 52 is a non-limiting illustrative example of an Identity Firewalloperating as part of a trusted to user purpose operating session.

FIG. 53 is a non-limiting illustrative example of an IF enhancingcapabilities of a physical sensor/emitter set.

FIG. 54 is a non-limiting illustrative example of PPE providing firewallsupport.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

In many circumstances, the identification and use of computingarrangement resources have complex implications and repercussions.Computing session consequences involve not only immediate usersatisfaction, but may well involve longer term ramifications involvingeffectiveness and impact, for example, the compromising of security ofsession operations and/or related information. A key consideration setis whether the use of resource sets produces comparatively competitiveresults, and what are the longer term security, information privacy,reliability, and rights management consequences. If the use of resourceswas not comparatively equivalent to what was reasonably possible, then auser set may have wasted time, capital, lost the forward goingadvantages of being best positioned, lost the greater enjoyment and/orsatisfaction of superior results, and/or the like. Moreover, in additionto the direct results of poorer, purposeful computing outcomes,ill-informed use of resources may result in serious security, privacy,reliability, and/or like consequences that may have great impact on bothresource user sets, and those who are otherwise impacted by user setusage of such resources.

Computing arrangement users are often effectively adrift when confrontedwith the challenge of identifying, reliably evaluating, and applyinginternet based (and other) resources in pursuit of understanding,defining, navigating, and/or fulfilling computing arrangement targetpurpose sets. This is at least substantially the result of the vastnessof the resource population available through the internet, thecomplicated evaluative considerations of their associated differingattribute sets, the vulnerability of computing arrangement software,information, and processes to unforeseen characteristics of resourcesets, and the motives of some parties to conceal at least a portion ofresource attributes such that user sets are unaware of their variousimplications, such as the presence of malware, at the time of resourceprovisioning.

This application is a continuation-in-part of the earlier ParentApplication Set for PERCos technologies, which is incorporated byreference herein, describing a collection of computing technologycapability sets addressing resource identification, evaluation, andusage, as well as resource usage consequence optimization andmanagement. Generally speaking, these applications address challengesthat arise directly out of the historically unique, recent humanenvironment produced by the intersecting nature and evolution ofcontemporary communications, networking, and computing technologies.There are no historical precedents for many of these human activitychallenges dating prior to the emergence and ubiquity of the internet.This application addresses computing security, reliability, resourceintegrity, and situational attribute adaptiveness, particularly asrelated to user set purpose fulfillment.

The internet's resource population is a huge body of highly diverse anddifferently sourced items that are comprised of instances having subtleto vastly different individual and combinatorial qualities andimplications when used by user sets in pursuit of user set purposefulfillment. These resource instance sets can be bewildering in theirscope, security considerations, sourcing, complexity, integrity,combinatorial implications, usage consequences, provenance, and/orStakeholder interests and motives. This huge, inchoate world ofresources is spread across a vast, multi-billion participantpeer-to-peer and client server universe, where at each moment eachcomputing user set may have its own unique contextual purposeconsiderations, but frequently no practical means to connect to optimalresource one or more sets and to ensure secure and reliable computingoperations and results.

Individually, and enhanced by combination, various PERCos innovationshelp computing arrangement users ensure that their purposeful computing(as well as, in some embodiments, more traditional computing) is moreefficiently and effectively directed towards not only assuring userselection of, relatively speaking, the most purposefully productiveresource sets, but also in ensuring user computing arrangement relatedsecurity, privacy, and efficiency considerations. Given the profoundlyserious, and seemingly intractable trustworthy computing dilemma thatcurrently plagues modern computing, certain PERCos capabilities providenew approaches to resolving such deeply entrenched problems.

There is no historical precedent for today's vast—often inchoate topurpose—distribution of many to overwhelming masses of potentialresources. The internet's resource arrangement often appears tocomputing arrangement users as an immense, and at least in part or attimes, indecipherable compendium of both known resources, which in manycases are poorly understood by some or all of their potential users, andunknown resources, those that extend beyond user set awareness. Thesevariously known and unknown resources populate a vast, and to a largeextent, randomly distributed, internet repository environment.

The availability of such a huge array of disparately sourced, varied,and frequently highly specific to purpose class resource sets, presentsa new genre of human resource opportunities and identification,evaluation, and security challenges. These challenges include how usersand/or their computing arrangements identify, objectively evaluate,select, and deploy the highest quality, best performing, and least riskyresources for satisfying user contextual purpose conditions andintentions. These challenges further involve informing user sets and/ortheir computing arrangements concerning, as well as managing, the hiddenand/or initially subtle, but subsequently often highly consequential,realities of resource usage consequences. Such consequences span amulti-dimensional spectrum of implications and effects, including, forexample, the usage hazards resulting from such varied resources ascomputer emails and attachments to documents to reliance on othercomputing users to software plugins to software applications to websites to live video conferencing to attached devices, and/or the like.Unsolved by current computing technologies, this new challenge setinvolving an, at times, overwhelming abundance of resourceopportunities, from the very small, such as whether to open an emailfrom a stranger, to the large, whether a given software application maycompromise the integrity of a computing environment, raises thefollowing issue set: how do user sets identify and apply apparentlyoptimal to user purpose resource sets, while also contextually andappropriately balancing the risks (and where tolerance may be zero) ofusing such resources, when such user sets often lack target purposerelated expertise and/or are unaware of relevant resources and/orrelated user purpose relevant resource qualities and usage consequences.

In the absence of new resource identification, deployment, provisioning,and operating management capabilities, today's computing arrangementusers are, with current technologies, often unable to achieve bestpractical resource deployment results. Resources from the vast andrapidly growing internet universe are often poorly exploited from a userpurpose fulfillment standpoint and poorly managed from a usageconsequence protection perspective.

With modern computing and the internet, humanity has been endowed withthe potential value inherent in the internet's vast storehouse of itemsand other opportunities. This storehouse is comprised of softwareapplications, cloud services, documents and records, knowledge andknowledge organizations, expressions, perspectives, facts, discussions,messages and other communications, social network instances, experienceproducers, expert advisors, potential and current friends, interfaces totangible things, and the like. These resources are accessible/useable ifidentified, selected, usage authorized and/or otherwise allowed, andprovisioned and/or otherwise enabled. This vast array of resourceinstances is available substantially as a result of the synergisticqualities of recently developed computing, communications, and devicetechnologies. These resources represent a disordered compendium ofcapabilities proffered not only by commercial enterprises and societalorganizations, but by people, individually and in groups, who offer upfacets of their knowledge, opinion, personality, social interactions,and/or the like.

While the internet and related computing capabilities comprise anenvironment that has spawned this massive, unprecedented expansion ofuser purpose related resource possibilities comprising, for example,knowledge, entertainment, social, commercial, and/or the likeopportunities, modern computing has failed to provide effective, broadlyapplicable tools for user identification and understanding of, as wellas, accessibility to, and provisioning and other management of,trustworthy, optimal user purpose fulfilling resource sets.

Today's computing tools for finding, evaluating, and employing resourcesoffer the often useful, but limited, capabilities of, for example:

-   -   search and retrieval systems (which under some circumstances        paradoxically require sufficient knowledge to find relevant        instances when one is looking for, and needs, sufficient        knowledge to be able to identify and retrieve),    -   semantic interpretation and organization/classification        arrangements, that may, for example, aid search and retrieval        systems, and may employ user set based, historical usage        information derived, suggestion options,    -   keyword/phrase tagging,    -   faceting interfaces and other expert system implementations,    -   cloud service information and recommender systems,    -   computer and network firewalls, website trust evaluators, and        diligent, security oriented operating system designs,    -   and the like.

In certain circumstances, particularly when well-informed users use suchtools and when they have sufficient domain knowledge to direct thesecapability sets, such resources can provide user sets with efficient,effective results. But when circumstances call for broader discovery andanalysis of resource opportunities, particularly when involving unknownand unseen to user significant knowledge variables, these tools oftenfail to provide flexible, effective, user purpose optimized (or evensatisfactory) results. In sum, a great cloud of resources has emerged,but without practical means to organize and explore, identify, andsafely use its content. Users are often unable to efficiently oreffectively parse appropriate member resources into target purposefulfilling, and in particular, target purpose optimized, trustworthyresource sets.

When users use computing arrangements and need to select and/or deploycomputing resources from internet based sources, they often haveconstrained or otherwise insufficient knowledge and/or experiencerelated to their current or intended activities. User sets often fail tofully understand their associated target purposes and related topicdomain issues, and frequently are unaware of the extent and/orimplications of their nescience. Such insufficiency means that user setsoften don't have the ability to identify, evaluate, and/or safelyprovision resource sets in a manner that produces an optimal, practical,purpose fulfillment result set.

User sets are both routinely poorly informed or uninformed regarding theexistence, location, nature, and/or usage consequences of internet basedresource sets and are frequently ill-equipped for tasks related toidentifying, understanding, evaluating, selecting, provisioning, and/ormanaging user target purpose applicable resource sets. As a result, usersets are often unable to effectuate best result sets for theirpurposeful computing activities, since, under many circumstances, theyare unable to identify, evaluate, and bring to bear resource sets thatwill at least one of:

-   -   (a) from internet or other network available resources, provide,        in combination with user set computing arrangements, the most        satisfying (relative to other one or more resource sets) user        purpose fulfillment, and/or    -   (b) concomitantly avoid unintended consequences that, for        example, produce operating inefficiencies, financial and/or data        losses, and/or malware related results including the stealing of        private information, the causing of inappropriate communications        to other computing arrangements, and/or the like.

Most people are far from expert relative to a large variety of theircomputing activity domains and contextual purposes; this is a commonproblem in professional and commercial contexts, though this problem setis particularly evident in “personal” computing.

Absent sufficient relevant expertise, users are often either unaware ofthe existence of, and/or unable to evaluate, at least key aspects ofresource usage qualities relative to any specific computing arrangementsituational user purpose set. Such absence of expertise normallyinvolves inadequate understanding of purpose related domainconsiderations, which may well include various considerations regardingwhat available resource sets may be situationally available for, and/orparticularly applicable to, specific user set target contextual purposefulfillment. Users are often either unable to locate resources and/orare unaware of the existence of superior quality and/or safer to use,user target purpose specific resource sets. Such user states ofawareness may include, for example, not only a lack of knowledgeregarding the existence or location of purpose germane resources, butwhen a user set has apparent domain relevant knowledge regarding a givenresource, even if such knowledge appears well developed, it may not becurrent, for example, such knowledge set may not reflect recent updatesto any such resource instances, such as recently published technicalpapers, relevant expert set recent comments (including regardingassociated malware considerations), user one or more sets' opinions,software application version updates, and/or the like.

Present day computing arrangement capabilities and design don't include,support, and/or otherwise anticipate, PERCos like standardized,interoperable contextual purpose specifying tools that can, incombination with other novel PERCos capabilities, inform user sets ofoptimally useful, safest to use, resource sets for user target purposefulfillment. For internet based resource set identification, evaluation,and management, such PERCos contextual purpose capabilities can, forexample, in combination with identity related PERCos innovations,effectively and efficiently identify internet based resources that arelikely to fulfill, in an optimal manner, a nearly boundlessly disparaterange of situationally specific user contextual purpose objectives. SuchPERCos purposeful computing capabilities, in various embodiments, alsosupport significant innovations that, depending on their embodiments andcircumstances of use, can greatly impact modern day computing securityand privacy assurance performance. By combining with traditionalcomputing security tools, such PERCos capabilities can transform usercomputing session resource identification integrity, as well as thequality and security of resource operational environments. Through theuse of such PERCos capabilities, which include, for example, PERCosAwareness Managers, Identity Firewalls, Contextual Purpose FirewallFrameworks (CPFFs), and innovative existential biometric and assiduousenvironmental evaluative and authentication techniques, user sets canexperience improved quality related to resource provisioning andoperational management and more easily and effectively balance theavailability of resource set capabilities with security and privacyconsiderations to ensure appropriate conditions regarding computerarrangement security for sensitive information and processes.

PERCos security, privacy, and identity assurance tools involve variouscapability sets in various embodiments. These sets include, for exampleand without limitation, the following:

-   -   Ensuring more reliable, persistent, and relevant resource        identification means than are available using current technology        capabilities. This emphasis includes new capabilities, for        example, for ensuring that internet and/or other network        resource sets continue to comprise their unmodified composition,        except as may be otherwise securely and reliably specified.    -   Supporting assiduous identity techniques, including PERCos        existential biometric identity establishment, and related        registration, for example with a cloud service arrangement, in        the form, for example, in some embodiments, of Participant        instance resource publishing and associated resource        authentication activities.    -   Reliably identifying, evaluating, and, as applicable,        provisioning, situationally germane specific resource sets,        based at least in part on identity attribute sets associated        with user contextual purposes and/or related classes, and/or        with computing arrangements, computing arrangement environments,        user sets, resource sets, and/or the like (for example, with        classes and/or instances of the foregoing).    -   Improved, including providing substantially more user friendly,        secure, and situationally germane, means for supporting user        computing sessions through the—for example, automatically and        transparently to user sets—provisioning of constrained to target        contextual purpose computing arrangement session resource sets,        where such sets are comprised of one or more resource sets, such        as CPFF sets, specifically applicable to session user set target        purpose fulfillment related specifications (and where the        foregoing may allow non-directly purpose related resource sets        and/or set capabilities, if supported by such specification        information and/or user selection).    -   Providing security and privacy capabilities that include the        ability to automatically and transparently—based on input at        least in part from user set target contextual purpose        expressions and/or the like—situationally isolate computing        session target contextual purpose fulfillment resource sets,        such as applicable purpose class applications and/or other        Frameworks and/or other resource sets, from underlying operating        system and/or other resource sets, so as to ensure appropriate        to circumstance, given target contextual purpose set(s) and        associated conditions, reliable security and/or other trusted        computing management. Such dynamic, contextual purpose related        target purpose session resource set and/or session isolation and        provisioning constraints can help ensure the integrity of target        contextual purpose operations, as well as assure that target        contextual purpose session consequences do not have extraneous,        and in particular, undesirable, impact on, or otherwise misuse,        user set and/or Stakeholder set sensitive information and/or        related processes and resources, while maintaining, for typical        computing arrangement users, a high level of ease of use and        security operations transparency.    -   Providing PERCos security, privacy, and identity assurance        security hardening capabilities to ensure that certain PERCos        security, privacy, and identity reliability capability sets        operate in protected contexts, secured against unauthorized        observation and/or other inspection, decomposition,        misdirection, and/or other subordination of user and/or        Stakeholder interests and/or PERCos related processes, and where        such hardening techniques, in some embodiments, are applied, for        example, to PERCos Identity Firewall, Awareness Manager, and/or        Contextual Purpose Firewall Framework arrangements.        Modern Computing's Unique and Unprecedented Resource Management        Scenario

The history of human resource utilization—from Stone Age bands andtribal units to pastoral societies to recent agrarian communities toindustrial age pre-computing modern society—comprised environmentsinvolving resources that almost all humans in a given community werefamiliar with. All, or almost all, available for use resources,including people, work implements, and/or the like, were well known tohuman community members who might be involved with such resource“instances.” Historically, for almost all people until quite recently,the use of resources that weren't agrarian, pastoral, and/orhunter/gatherer in nature was quite rare and limited. In more recent,but pre-modern human history, the very limited population of specializedresource users, such as the community members in more developedsocieties who formed the small groups of frequently privilegedindividuals, such as priests, scribes, nobles, medicine men, clerks,traders, builders, warriors, advocates (e.g., lawyers, politicians), andthe like, normally had special training as “novices” or apprentices orcadets or the like, and were trained specifically to be experts asregards the resources available to be applied in their domains.

In general, in pre-computerized societies, human familiarity withresources used by communities and their members was such that most alladults had expert level knowledge regarding most of their directlyavailable resources, including a thorough familiarity with people whomight assist them or otherwise cooperatively work with them. A farmerknew his implements and supplies, and with whom he traded his crops, andindividuals and groups normally had intimate knowledge of all fellowresidents of their community group, whether nomadic, pastoral,agricultural, and/or the like. As a result, people were normallycompletely familiar with any given individual they might use as a localsocietal or otherwise personally available resource.

For almost all of its history, humanity lived in this resource familiarworld that can be characterized as “familiarity with almost everything.”It was essentially all-inclusive, excepting as might relate to theunpredictable components of stress and crisis related to health,weather, warfare, and the like. Even with the emergence of cities andtheir metropolitan areas as a primary living environment for developedworld population, people until mid-twentieth century largely kept totheir own neighborhoods, except to work in factories or offices withtask resources for which they had received training. As a result, thechoices regarding almost all resources contemplated to be used in anaverage person's life were well understood by most adults—in fact, therewas, by and large, until recent times, generally a rejection of theunfamiliar; when it arose, it frequently caused discomfort, avoidance,ostracism, other discrimination, and/or the like. Even in nearcontemporary times, resource options available to individuals werelargely confined to options and devices that were physically presentedto the potential user and familiar in nature, such as items available ina store or from a street vendor, or items cataloged and available tothose who might use a library. These potential resources could normallybe evaluated directly and/or by the assistance of one's compatriots orprofessional assisters, such as a family member, a friend, a storeclerk, or a librarian.

There have been a few exceptions in recent, pre-internet modern life tothe knowledge of, or direct evaluation of, physically present, diversecandidate resources where large varieties of resources were presented,for example, in mail order catalogs from purveyors of goods, such aspioneered by Montgomery Ward and later by Sears. But these resourceoffering compendiums were organized by simple item type and category,and while large in number and variety (Ward's catalog in 1895 had some25,000 items), these numbers were negligible in their aggregate,variety, and sourcing, when compared to resources comprising theinternet resource universe. Such catalog books used name and typeorganization systems, an item normally resided in only one place in acatalog, grouped with its like items and described as a thing, having aprice and certain attributes.

With the very recent advent of certain internet and cloud servicearrangements, such as eBay, Amazon, Craigslist, Match.com, YouTube,eHarmony, Facebook, Weibo, Tencent, Netflix, Zillow, Twitter, LinkedIn,Pandora, and the like, there has been a development of environments thathave significant numbers of resource items, but the items representedwithin these “silo” service “islands” constitute but tiny portions ofthe available resources on the internet and normally are presented tousers through, and operate using, different organizational formulations.Tools to access their resource instances are oriented to theirrespective task set types—access approaches tend to use, for example,one or more of Boolean search, assister drop down lists of optionsrelated to search contents, relatively simple recommender valuations ofthe resource instances (e.g., individual and aggregates one to five starratings and crowd, user, and user like history based recommender input,for example, of “like” types—e.g., movies from Netflix, music fromPandora), and other user, crowd history, preference metrics, and/or thelike capabilities that may influence or determine matching and/or otherfiltering processes, such as used by Match.com, OkCupid, and the like.While such systems have significant numbers of items listed, e.g., eBayrecently had 112+million items (according to wiki.answers.com), andAmazon recently had over 200 million product items for sale in the USA(according to export-x.com), their relative consistency of form and typeand the singular nature of their silo service emporium environments, andtheir relatively tiny population of instances versus the totality ofinternet available resource instances and types, present quitedifferent, and less demanding, challenges relative to user access to an“internet of resources”.

For example, there are estimated to be over 2 billion human“participant” internet users, over 14.3 trillion “live” internetwebpages (as of 2013 by one estimate at factshunt.com) where Google isestimated by factshunt.com to have indexed only 48 billion of suchpages. Further, there were 759 million websites and 328 millionregistered domains (2013, factshunt.com), and seemingly endless numbersof tweets, opinions, and other comments, indeterminate numbers ofemails, billions of internet participants (including friends, potentialfriends, associates, and experts), huge numbers of software applicationsand plugins, hardware components and devices, and vast numbers ofinformation items (including component information items within largerinformation resources, such component items supporting differing purposerelated uses and comprising element(s) within documents), andsubstantial numbers of services, to say nothing of an incalculablenumber of combinatorial possibilities of these resources when beingapplied, as optimal target purpose fulfillment resource sets.

While, for example, Google's indexing of many billions of pagesrepresent huge numbers of available for user use web page contentresource items, and OCLC's WordCat Local provides access to more than922 million items (primarily articles and books from librarycollections) and Ex Libris offers a meta-aggregation of hundreds ofmillions of scholarly resources (OCLC and Ex Libris info frominfotoday.com, 2012), the use of novel PERCos purposeful computingcapabilities described herein can support a much larger, and far moresecure, global internet purpose aligning, evaluating, provisioning, andprocess management infrastructure encompassing all computing operableand interacting human resource instance sets. Opportunities resultingfrom a PERCos environment can encourage much larger numbers ofindividuals and groups (Stakeholders) to publish resources in the formof, for example, purpose fulfillment contributing resources. Suchpublishing should significantly increase the available quantity of manytypes of resources, and result in the incorporation of their associatedresource information sets into information bases for user set resourcepurpose fulfillment identification, evaluation, provisioning, andmanagement. Such information bases and their associated resourceinstances can at least in part take the form of, for example, PERCosFormal and/or Informal resources and/or the like stores, identity database arrangements, Effective Fact, Faith Fact, and Quality to Purposeevaluative/recommender data base arrangements, and the like. Some PERCoscosmos embodiments can support expanding and self-organizing tangibleand intangible resource item and framework ecospheres that could greatlyenhance the identification, evaluation, provisioning, and secure andreliable usage of resource sets optimized to user (and/or Stakeholder)set current contextual purpose sets.

Such a PERCos embodiment resource ecosphere can comprise an immensepopulation and diversity of internet information instances (representingintangible instances, tangible items and/or combinations thereof) whoseresource types have been often untappable by users who lack significantexpertise in a given domain. Candidate such resources can be organizedto reflect a prioritized listing according to respective resource and/orresource portion set Quality to Purpose metrics, which can be expressedas a general Quality to Purpose value, for example, to a contextualpurpose set, and/or more specifically to one or more certain Facetsimplifications, such as Quality to Purpose Trustworthiness, Efficiency,Cost, Reliability, Focus (e.g., concentration within resource on targetpurpose), Complexity, Length (e.g., time to play, pages/words/bytes,and/or the like), quality of interface, quality of Stakeholderpublisher, quality of Stakeholder creator/author(s), quality ofStakeholder employer/institution, resource and/or resource Stakeholderprovenance and/or other historical related information (including, forexample, Stakeholder assessing past Quality to Purpose aggregate Creds),and/or similar metrics. A PERCos resource cosmos embodiment would be insharp contrast to today's largely disordered and unmanageable(particularly where a user set is not significantly expert) internetresource environment (excepting to at least some extent certain targetedpurpose set silo services) where the inability to efficiently and/oreffectively identify, deploy, and manage optimal resource arrays inservice specifically of user target contextual purpose objectivesreflects the substantial limits of today's computing resource managementcapabilities.

The Purposeful Interfacing of Two Tangible Systems, Human RelationalThinking Users and Computing Arrangement Processing

Various PERCos embodiments comprise, at least in part, capabilitiessupporting the operative union of at least two tangible processingenvironments, (a) human, and (b) computing arrangement, whereby PERCos'contextual purpose related communication and interfacing between suchhuman/computing environments can lead to more informed, secure,efficient, satisfying, productive, and reliable computing arrangementusage and user purpose fulfillment results. For example, an importantconsideration in many of such PERCos embodiments are capabilities thatinterface human relational thinking and computing arrangement digitallogic and operations. This interfacing, for example, involves, invarious PERCos embodiments, standardized and interoperable contextualpurpose and identity related specification, identity sensing,authentication, evaluation, storage, process management (e.g., eventbased and/or purpose based resource deployment and/or operating resourceminimilization, transformation, isolation, function management, and/orthe like), communication, and/or approximation and/or relationalsimplification. Such capabilities are, in various PERCos embodiments,designed at least in part to be efficiently processable by both usersets and applicable computing arrangements. In combination, for examplein some embodiments, with PERCos novel resource organizingapproximation, purpose related relationship, and user interface toolsfacilitating human resource comprehension and decision, PERCosstandardized, interoperable purpose expression capabilities can be usedduring unfolding user/computing arrangement human/computer purposefulinteractions in processes leading to resource identification, selection,provisioning, and/or purpose fulfillment.

Such PERCos capabilities can transform the interfacing of tangible humanand computing arrangements, enabling both environments to operate asmore effective purpose fulfillment cooperating sets. This can lead to,under many circumstances, improved computer arrangement resourceutilization, improved computing security and reliability, and enhanceduser target purpose satisfaction.

PERCos embodiments may depend, in part, on standardized, interoperablecapabilities for humans to express—and computing arrangements to processand, as applicable, store—computing arrangement user and/or Stakeholdercontextual purpose related information elements and combinations. Thesestandardized capabilities may include, for example, PERCos specializedcontextual purpose specification elements and forms, purpose relatedinformation (including, for example, resource related) stores,interoperable devices and services, and purpose related approximationsand simplifications schema. The preceding may employ PERCosprescriptive/descriptive organizational and functional elements, suchas, for example, prescriptive and descriptive CPEs (Contextual PurposeExpressions), Purpose Statements, CDSs (Concept Description Schemas)which may comprise other one or more applicable elements, Foundations,purpose class applications and other Frameworks, Dimensions, Facets,purpose classes, Resonances, situational identities and other attributerelated set forms and types and management, and/or the like.

PERCos provides capabilities that can enable computing arrangement usersto efficiently relate to modern computing's nearly boundless resourcepossibilities and sift out those resource sets that will mosteffectively contribute to user contextual purpose fulfillment and/orotherwise have usage consequences consistent with user set interests,both optimizing purposeful results and minimizing risks (such asmalware) and inefficiencies. This, for example, can be in part achievedthrough contextual purpose specification matching to potentially “mostuseful,” situationally appropriate, resource (including, for example,information results) one or more sets having sufficiently correspondingcontextual purpose related specification information. These PERCoscapabilities can significantly contribute to improved resourceaccessibility, assessment, and/or provisionability. Such PERCoscapabilities support users, Stakeholders, and/or their computingarrangements (including, as applicable, cloud service arrangements)declaring contextual purpose considerations and objectives, and wheresuch contextual purpose related standardization capabilities enhancehuman and computing arrangement interfacing and operation. Such user setcontextual purpose at least in part standardized and interoperable setscan be matched to resource sets (and/or results) at least in partthrough similarity matching of such human target contextual purpose setswith PERCos descriptive contextual purpose specification sets, and/orthe like attribute information, associated with target purpose relatedresources such as services, devices, networks, software applications,operating environments, other sets of people, and/or the like.

One or more PERCos implementations embodying this purposeful cooperativearrangement between users and their computing arrangements and relatedservices can support one or more global human/computing arrangementarchitectures. These architectures may be, for example, designed asintegral expansions of the role of operating systems and environments sothey may serve as functional arrangements, for example, for user andStakeholder purpose related resource organization, identity awareness,evaluation, selection, support, provisioning, constraining, isolation,cooperative/complementary functionality matching, aggregating,interoperability, computing environment/user communicating, and/or thelike.

In various embodiments, PERCos in part comprises broadly appliedinteroperable one or more systems for connecting the intents,capabilities, and other considerations of disparate, and frequentlyindependently operating and/or located users, Stakeholders, and resourcestores. To support such interconnections in a purpose optimized manner,various PERCos embodiments include new forms of computing arrangementcapabilities that provide innovative contextual purpose expression andpurpose related resource identity, applicability (qualities) to purpose,classification, publishing, provisioning, process reliability andefficiency management, and other purpose related information storage,organization, analysis, and management tools. These capabilitiescontrast with current computing's user and resource interconnectingcapabilities which emphasize estimating/predicting what a user'sinterests may be, based on user and/or crowd historical actions andlocation; interpreting what a resource may mean by semantic analysisand/or traditional domain class organization; item tagging with keyterms supporting tag and/or other metadata matching; and/or employingsearch and retrieval tools which respond, for example, to user free formBoolean expressions matched against indexes (with PERCos, such tools maybe used in various embodiments to augment, for example, PERCoscontextual purpose expression, resource and purpose organization,situational identity management, standardized assertion and factframing, coherence resolution, and processing and/or other consequencecommunication and outcome management).

With various PERCos embodiments, user and/or computing arrangementresource assessments can, as germane, involve identifying and/orprioritizing (and/or otherwise evaluating and/or communicating to a userset) purpose relevant resource sets, along with, as germane,situationally informing resource attribute information (Repute, othercontextual applicable information, and/or the like).

PERCos identification and/or evaluation can, in various embodiments, bebased at least in part, for example, on matching for congruence betweenuser set and resource associated Contextual Purpose Expressions and/orPurpose Statements and/or the like, which such information may becomplemented by information regarding resource one or more Qualities toPurpose (for example, using Repute metrics), and/or by input, forexample, from user set preference, profile, relevant resource usagehistory, search history (such as search string variables), crowdbehavior history, other conventional contextual computing information(e.g., physical location), and/or the like.

Most users have only partial understanding of situationally relevantaspects of their respective purposes, and have difficulty expressingtheir situational requirements, particularly, when there is insufficientuser knowledge regarding their purposeful intent, possible implicationsand outcomes. How does one characterize that which one does notunderstand (fully or partially)? No reasonable, interoperable and atleast substantially in part standardized, application independent meanscurrently exists for supporting the dynamics of user purpose fulfillmentprocesses and the unfolding aspects of purpose fulfillment development.Further no broadly applicable, user friendly, interoperable standardizedmeans exists for evaluating and performing trade-offs between differentcontextual purpose aspects, such as, for example, functionality,security, privacy, reliability, and/or the like. Current computingdomain general purpose tools do not offer the average computing userapparatus or methods to assess resource attributes that are specific toa given target purpose situation, so they can achieve optimal interimresults and outcomes.

PERCos embodiments can extend basic operating system/environment designin support of user set and computing arrangement operations, including,as applicable, users directing/experiencing unfolding target purposefulfillment refinement. Such PERCos operating system/environmentcapabilities can support, for example, enhanced resource discovery,Quality to Purpose resource assessment (individual and/or comparative),enhanced resource provisioning, resource situational identity attributeapplication, assiduous resource related identity assessment andpersistent reliability, as well as combinatorial resource evaluation,provisioning, and purposeful resource operations management (e.g.,Coherence Services, CPFF session provisioning and operating, and/or thelike) capabilities. These and other PERCos capabilities can at least inpart be delivered through one or more of PERCos based operating systemreformulations and/or employment of PERCos based operatingenvironment/system layers; virtual machines; identity devices includingIdentity Firewall and/or Awareness Manager hardened hardware and/orsoftware, and/or services; PERCos purpose (which may be combined withIdentity Firewall or Awareness Manager) firewall devices which mayemploy hardened hardware and/or software (e.g., supporting secured CPFFrelated processes and information); PERCos purpose fulfillmentapplications such as purpose class applications or other Frameworkpurpose fulfillment environments; purpose fulfillment plugins; and/orother computing arrangement operating session and/or environmentenhancing techniques such as PERCos system local, network, and/or cloudservices.

Identifying, evaluating, selecting, provisioning, and managing computerarrangement resources involves, at its root, the basic notion thatresource identities must be reliable, that what is declared to be aunique instance of something, a resource, is actually that thing. Whenresource identity factors are persistent, for example, available overtime and testable as to validity, such reliability can be particularlyimportant, since evaluation of an instance that isn't what it isrepresented to be means such evaluation may be specious. There are manypossible undesirable consequences if a resource isn't the resource itclaims to be, and/or if its associated, pertinent attribute relatedinformation is not consistently, reliably available and accurate. Withmany PERCos embodiments, reliability of identity of a resource set (asmay be specified in any given context) is a key capability.

With some PERCos embodiments, identity is not simply a resource's nameand/or unique locator (and/or the like) that distinctively references aconceptual, electronically stored, and/or tangible instance ofsomething—e.g., a resource set, including, for example, one or moreresource portions. Such identifier, along with its associated generalattribute set, may further be coupled with an array of available to userset, situationally significant attribute arrangements. Situationalattribute sets may be associated with one or more contextual purposespecifications such as CPEs, Purpose Statements, operating purposespecifications, and/or the like, as well as with resource sets, usersets, computing environment arrangement sets, and/or the like. Suchattribute sets can supply useful information for user sets and/or theircomputing arrangements regarding information concerning the “relevance”of respective resource sets in given usage situations, including, forexample, informing regarding resource set material situationally relatedpossible and/or predicted usage consequences.

Various PERCos embodiments involve a variety of capability sets that maybe employed in securely creating and/or managing reliable resourceidentity information. These include, for example:

-   -   secure and reliable resource identity instances, including, for        example, employing assiduous identity capabilities involving        existential Stakeholder biometric information (for example,        pattern information) acquisition and validation capabilities,        where such biometric information may be liveness evaluated,        including, for example, performing emitter and/or other        challenge and response testing/assessment set. Such biometric        information, or information derived therefrom, may be        cryptographically secured and bound to their associated resource        set descriptive information sets. Such binding of Stakeholder        assiduous biometric information with such descriptive resource        information may involve securely combining or otherwise securely        associating such information sets, which may then be        cryptographically hashed to ensure information integrity. Such        information sets may provide, along with such resource        descriptive identity information set, one or more at least in        part Stakeholder biometrically signed certifications of the        genuineness of such resource descriptive information, such that        such resource information may be known as unaltered and        Stakeholder party certified. Such resource identity information        set may be a summarized and/or otherwise be available as an at        least in part transformed information set. Such resource        identity information set may be used to reliably and explicitly        authenticate a resource set instance as valid, by for example,        checking such resource set information against corresponding        identity or resource cloud service corresponding resource        identity information set for a match. Resource Stakeholder        biometric information may be authenticated, which may include        validating that a resource information set Stakeholder biometric        information set corresponds, for example, to same stored,        reference biometric information set managed by a cloud service        identity utility, and stored, for example, as attribute        information of a Stakeholder corresponding Participant resource        instance.    -   reliable, purposefully managed resource provisioning and/or        processing management in a manner consistent with, and at least        in part ensuring the security of, user set target contextual        purpose related process and information sets, including, for        example, securing against unintended one or more consequences        that may result from using a given one or more resource sets in        a given set of user set purposeful circumstances, and which may        further include, for example, the use of PERCos CPFF, Identity        Firewall, Awareness Manager, and/or the like secure hardware        and/or software implementations. Such reliable, purposefully        managed resource operations may employ purpose related        standardized and interoperable security and/or efficiency rigor        levels to help ensure computing purpose fulfillment processes        and/or communications are performed consistent with user and/or        Stakeholder target contextual purpose objectives and interests        and are free of, or otherwise managed to minimize, unintended        consequences.

At least in part, in some embodiments, situational identity and relatedcontextual attribute sets can reflect resource set places and degrees ofappositeness (e.g., relevance), such as, reflecting one or moreindividuals' and/or groups' perception of, and/or one or more userand/or Stakeholder related computing arrangements interpretation of, oneor more resource sets, user sets, computing arrangement tangibleenvironment sets, and/or the like relevance related to one or morecontextual purposes. Such relevance interpretation may involveStakeholder set relevance assertions expressed through the use of, forexample, Repute Creds quality of relevance to purpose information (e.g.,Quality to Purpose relevance value expressions), also as described inU.S. application Ser. No. 13/815,934, incorporated herein by reference.Such human perception set and/or computer based logically determinedattribute information may, in some embodiments, identify a givenresource set in situ, that is, relative to the situationally applicable,such as specified contextual purpose, relevance of a resource setregarding its use and/or contemplated use, relative to other resources,users and/or other factor sets, and/or relative to material consequencesthat may result from such resource sets' use. Such in siturepresentations may be expressed through the use of Repute Cred Qualityto Purpose assertions and/or the like user purpose related interoperableand standardized arrangements. Some PERCos embodiments support suchsituational in situ characterization by informing user and/or theircomputing arrangement sets regarding (or otherwise including) suchidentified resource sets' direct situationally relevant attributes,whether directly descriptive and/or consequential.

In some embodiments, relevance of situationally significant identityattributes to user set contextual purpose fulfillment may be key toevaluating a given resource set's relative usefulness, as well as tounderstanding the consequences resulting from such resource set use. Aresource set usage consequence set is often substantially influenced,and may be determined, by the nature and circumstances of such resourceset use. Important circumstance situationally relevant considerationsmay have a great deal to do with interpreting the relative usefulness ofa resource, that is, for example, if a resource is good for one person,it may be bad, or at least not optimal, for another person in thecontext of a specific user target contextual purpose, given the totalityof circumstances. As a result, and given the emergence of the vastdistributed resource store set supported by the internet and moderncomputing, some PERCos embodiments can enable users and/or theircomputing arrangements to perceive, given their specific set ofcircumstances, which resource one or more sets will best serve user setsgiven their target contextual purpose expressions combined with otherrelevant situational conditions, which may, for example, be expressed atleast in part through Purpose Statement specifications.

PERCos, in some embodiments, uses its user set contextual purposeexpression matching to resource associated contextual purpose expressionrelated information to determine (or contribute to determine) theidentities of candidate, useful to user purpose fulfillment, resourceset one or more instances. In such circumstances, resource setpersistent reliable identity attributes may include Repute Quality toPurpose attribute values that assist users and/or their computingarrangements in providing resource identity one or more attributeinstances germane to (e.g., consistent with) user target contextualpurpose fulfillment. Repute, (e.g., Cred metric) Quality to Purposeattribute value sets, and/or the like, may be included in theirassociated resource instances, may be associated by reference to suchresource instances, and/or may be determined in a manner responsive touser situational target contextual purpose circumstances and/orcontextual purpose expression sets, that is, for example, be accessed asassociated with one or more contextual purpose specifications and/or becreated dynamically in response to situational resource identificationand resource evaluation for purposeful operations.

In such PERCos embodiments, resource identity and associated attribute(and/or other contextual) information related computing arrangementcapabilities may support user pursuit of user purposes, where suchpurposes comprise, for example:

-   -   1. Obtaining knowledge enhancement (including, for example,        information determination and/or discovery),    -   2. Experiencing entertainment,    -   3. Social networking,    -   4. Receiving tangible world results (such as manufacturing        results, delivery of goods, and/or the like),    -   5. Receiving intangible world results (such as realizing        financial profit, and/or accumulating other intangible items,        and/or the like),    -   6. Effecting computing process set completion (e.g., transaction        and/or communication execution/completion), and/or    -   7. Any other form of user computing arrangement        related—purposefully sought—interim results and/or concluding        Outcomes.        Secure and Reliable Identity

There are two root sets in a computing arrangement computer session set:a user set that is directly participating and/or is participatingthrough instructions otherwise provided to such computing arrangement,and the computing arrangement composition. When a user set initiates acomputing session, the user set is reliant on the composition of thecomputing arrangement to behave as expected in service of the user set.As a result, under many circumstances, priority factors in assuring thereliability of a computing session comprise:

the resource composition is comprised of precisely the constituentresources that are claimed to be present,

such resource composition is consistent with providing the computingarrangement services desired by its user set, and

the resource set respective attributes, in their respective parts and asa whole, are consistent with the computing arrangement services desiredby its user set, and further that such attributes do not includecharacteristics that will produce unintended, or at least materiallyundesirable, consequences.

Underlying the above listed priority factors is the basic principle thatthe identity of a resource must be reliable—it must persistentlyrepresent its corresponding subject matter, whether intangible and/ortangible, real-world explicit instance and/or abstract. At the root ofusers and computing arrangements relating to possible resource sets,whether people, software, information, communications, devices,services, and/or the like, is the reliability of identity of resourceinstances and other sets—if a resource identity set is not persistent,that is, not securely reliable and materially consistent over time, thenthere is no way to evaluate a resource's relevant essence, that is, itsnature as relates to user purpose and possible unintended consequences.

If a resource set's identity is persistent and consistently correspondsprecisely to its instance, and if the resource sets that are materiallyapplicable to user set computing arrangement performance are availablefor user set and/or computing arrangement inspection, then if user setsand/or their computing arrangements have the tools and/or experiencethat enable them to interpret resource set attributes in context of userdesired computing arrangement services, such user sets and/or theircomputing arrangements can selectively apply or restrict resource setsbased on resource set reliable identity and associated, situationallyapplicable attributes. Such selective use of resource sets can determineresource provisioning, resource collective session environment, andallowed resource operations. Using such processes, user sets and theircomputing arrangements can experience significantly more securecomputing.

As is clear from the above, identity is at the root of security. If thename of a “thing” unreliably changes, one can't refer to the thing in asensible and consistent manner. Unfortunately, much of today's securecomputing technology relies on behavior recognition (e.g., signaturerecognition) or otherwise on interpretation of identity and attributesin manners that may not be comprehensive or otherwise reliable. There isno notion of root identity assurance for a resource, and nointeroperable, standardized knowledge ecosphere applying to all resourcetypes and associated with user contextual purposes, for situationallyinterpreting resource identity attributes to determine theappropriateness, including risks, of employing any given resource setand/or set combination. Further, there are no means for dynamicallyinstantiating at least in part interoperable and standardized computingtarget purpose session specific resource capabilities and environmentformulation.

The problem of identity management should be examined from theperspective of how identity information is to be used, who is using suchinformation, the reliability of such identity information, and howresponsive such information may be from the standpoint of user purposefulfillment. The identity system capabilities described in variousPERCos embodiments are specifically designed to serve user interests(versus an often singular emphasis on commercial resource stakeholderinterests). PERCos identity capabilities, and associated PERCosparticularity resource processing management will, in contrast to, forexample, conventional federated identity management, fundamentallyexpand and enhance the root significance of identity information as aprimary, foundational input set for the identification, evaluation, andemployment of computing resources in the rapidly expanding, emergingdigitally connected resource universe.

Some PERCos embodiments address these largely unaddressed computingenvironment security and performance considerations with the following:

-   -   1. Root identity, established through assiduous existential        biometric and/or other assiduous, contextually sufficient means,        where a set of identifying information is securely associated        with a resource set information set in a manner that is        supported by:        -   a. A desired combination of resource set information and            associated root identity information (for example including            existential biometric Stakeholder information), bound or            otherwise securely associated together, directly and/or            virtually, to produce information sets that are unalterable            without such alteration being recognizable using reasonable            testing means,        -   b. A desired testing arrangement for such combined            information sets that can reliably determine whether such            bound information sets are genuine, that is such testing can            test any respective resource set instance to determine            whether it was “artificially” produced to spoof at least            some portion of a resource set's genuine information set.    -   2. Situational identity involving situational attribute sets,        where contextual purpose related specifications (including        preference, profile, crowd behavior, and/or the like information        sets), which may be augmented by user selection, provides input        used to determine attribute set information applicable to a user        set target purpose contextual specification and/or the like, and        where such purpose specification information may be employed to        identify and/or provision purpose class applications and/or        other Frameworks that may provide specific resource sets, and/or        otherwise provide resource organizing scaffolding for,        contextual purpose specific computing sessions.    -   3. Cosmos wide interoperable and standardized Repute and/or the        like, Cred assertion, Effective Fact (and may further include        Faith Facts), knowledge base arrangement enabling the        association of assessment information regarding persistently and        reliably identified resource sets to be accumulated and        reliably, flexibly, and in some circumstances automatically,        employed to provide informing and decision supporting input        regarding contextual purpose corresponding resource instances,        such as Repute and/or the like capabilities employed with PERCos        compliant resources (Formal resources, Informal resources,        and/or other employable resources),    -   4. Exceptionally reliable means to establish root identity for        humans through the assessment and associated information        extraction of identity information corresponding to individual        humans using existential biometric assessment means, for        example, through the use of tamper resistant, securely hardened        Identity Firewall components and/or Awareness Manager        appliances, and/or the like, and associated local and/or        network, such as cloud based, services.    -   5. Exceptionally reliable means to enable computing users to        securely control resource provisioning and/or operational        management through contextual purpose based control of resource        provisioning constraints and/or functional management (e.g.,        situational particularity management, such as resource isolation        and/or operations control) through the use of tamper resistant,        securely hardened, Contextual Purpose Firewall Framework        component sets and/or appliances.

Some embodiments, employing a combination of the above, as well as otherPERCos complementary capability sets, assure that:

-   -   1. Resource identities are at least in part reliable through the        use of hardened Identity Firewalls and/or Awareness Managers,        and resource instances are what they claim to be.    -   2. Resource identity attributes can reliably, situationally        reflect the impact a given resource set, or combination thereof,        will have on a given user computing arrangement, through the use        of PERCos situational attribute arrangement, and Repute Cred,        EF, FF, and/or the like capabilities,    -   3. Only resource sets with identity attributes consistent with        user target contextual purposes will operate in computing        session instances that employ user set and/or Stakeholder set        sensitive information and/or processes, assured by CPFF related        arrangements, such as hardware/software CPFF implementations        employing, at least in part, contextual purpose standardized and        interoperable specification information.

An objective served by identity-related capabilities described herein isto enhance, supplement, and/or otherwise support a user set's capacityto identify, evaluate, select, and/or use resources consonant with thebest, practical pursuit of, and/or other achievement of, user purposefulfillment. This objective is supported by, and the capabilities hereinsupport, contextually balanced resource identification and evaluationframed and/or informed by practical priorities associated withsituationally specific purpose fulfillment circumstances. Suchcontextual purpose situationally specific fulfillment depends on whethera user set (and/or a user set's computing arrangement) has the toolsand/or knowledge for identifying and evaluating resources. Other than auser set's past knowledge and any associated experiences, this tool andknowledge requirement can substantially rely on selected and/orotherwise provided crowd, expert(s), and/or other filtered, selectedsets input regarding purpose relevant qualities of purpose fulfillmentresource potential instances and/or combinations. As a result, users canevaluate and conceive their application of resources towards purposefulfillment and/or users can simply apply a resource arrangementrecommended by one or more trusted purpose related expert sets, andwhere the foregoing may include identifying and evaluating expert setsand then applying their formulations to resolve towards purposefulfillment.

In the evaluation of any resource set, an identity and its associatedattributes together comprise the set, essentially an individual“identity cosmos”. They can collectively convey both the distinguishingname and/or pointer/sets and its/their associated identity facetcharacterizations. In a purpose associated context, from a universe ofpossible attributes or set of described attributes, a name as aconceptual place holder and its situationally germane attributesmeaningfully contribute to human and/or computing system specificunderstanding related to contextual purpose assessments. Generally, thepossible attributes of an instance comprise a potentially immense set,but it is the attributes that are germane to one or more purposes orother situations that primarily comprise the conceptual pattern thatpeople hold in their minds as their perception of things, abstractand/or concrete.

In some embodiments, the name set of a “thing” is its anchor, aboutwhich its satellite attributes are arranged in one or more conceptualpattern sets normally interpretable by people as characteristics andperceptual pattern arrangements that are associable with, and oftenbound to, user purpose classes. An optimized resource identification,evaluation, and selection architecture should substantially contributeto an individual user's (and/or their computing arrangements')perception/understanding of a resource. Such perception/understandingand its situationally relevant “layout arrangement,” in someembodiments, comprise in part an attribute aggregation/distributionbased at least in part on a target purpose set situational context(purpose and any other employed contextual variables). Suchperception/understanding layout may include relative weighting andpattern arrangement of attribute instances and other sets as theycorrespond to a user set's and/or associated computing systems'perceived perceptual significance applied to respective attributesrelative to purpose. Thus, resource instances, from the perspective oftheir relevance to a purpose set, may be comprised of resource instancesand general and/or situationally specific attributes and therelationships among such identity associated attribute set members,where the latter may be pre-stored in association with any one or moresuch purpose sets and/or dynamically generated in accordance withsituational contextual purpose specification related filtering and/orother processing.

Situationally relevant attribute sets may at least in part be cataloguedin identity systems associated with one or more classic categorydomains. With PERCos, in some embodiments, attributes can representsituationally relevant attribute aggregations associated with contextualpurpose specifications (CPEs, purpose classes, and/or the like), wheresuch attributes may be a subset of a set of resource set instanceattributes (such set may be a global listing of attributes denoted asassociated with a resource set). Such subsets may be stored explicitlyassociated with, and/or dynamically generated in response to, purposespecification instances.

Since in most topic and purpose domains users have limited expertise andresource awareness, that is, in most areas of life individual people arenot true, or even relatively, domain experts, the efficient andeffective selecting and/or otherwise assembling of target purposeapplicable/desirable resource sets is a great challenge, and often in apractical sense, insurmountable. With the new human reality of billionsof people interfacing with potentially trillions of internet availableresource sets, PERCos embodiments provide new capability sets for theindividual to interface with the effectively boundless resourcepossibilities. PERCos capabilities provide technologies that supportsystematized, interoperable, and standardized global resource identity,and associated attributes, one or more environments. These environmentscan profoundly simplify, under many circumstances, user identification,selection, and analysis of resource sets. Such environments can helporder the vast, diverse, inchoate resource possibilities available tousers in our modern digitally networked world into responsive purposesolution, or otherwise contributing to purpose solution, resource sets.These ordered sets can, at least in many circumstances, indicate and/orotherwise determine the best information and tools available for a givensituation, a given purpose set, from the many billions, and incombination, relatively incalculable resource opportunities.

Identity reliability serves, under certain circumstances, as anessential anchor related to the evaluation of resource instances.Further, any one or more provenance related identities associated with aresource identity may be, in certain circumstances, essential evaluationanchors. Therefore, capabilities for reliably providing one or moremethods by which an identity of a resource instance and/or the identityof one or more resource related provenance instances, can be assured, inrelation to one or more levels of identity reliability rigor, is a keyset of capabilities available in certain PERCos embodiments.

From the standpoint of a user attempting to employ resources with whichsuch user is substantially to entirely unfamiliar and/or otherwiseunable to sufficiently evaluate, anonymity attributes regarding keyprovenance and related inferred or explicit certifications by provenanceparties (Stakeholders) severely undermines the ability of users toassess any given resource's Qualities to Purpose, includingeffectiveness, positive to malicious one or more intents of one or moreStakeholder sets in regards to at least certain one or more userinterests, and/or the like.

PERCos Capabilities: A Response to a Nearly Boundlessly Diverse andPurpose Uncalibrated Resource Universe

In response to the unprecedented scale and diversity of internet basedresource possibilities, some PERCos embodiments include, for example,features supporting new forms of complementary, synergistic capabilitysets for human/computing arrangement contextual purposeexpression/specification, including contextual purpose relationalapproximation user/computing interface/communications formulations,wherein, for example, user purpose class related specificationinformation can be correlated to purposefully organized resources(including resources associated with at least in part standardizedcontextual purpose expressions). Correlating such user contextualpurpose specifications to purposefully organized resource sets, such as,for example, those in (e.g., as members of) one or more purpose relatedresource contextual purpose classes, can provide constrained,practically sized information one or more sets for furthermanipulation/prioritization through use of, for example, informationfrom resource purpose and attribute spheres of knowledge informationarrangement(s) (such as can be made available through use accumulationand organization of Repute Cred, EF, and FF instances and aggregations)and/or, for example, through matching resource metadata against PERCosauxiliary dimension user contextual purpose specification, PurposeStatement, and/or the like information. Such an organizing of resource(and/or resource one or more portions) information regardingcontextually relevant, including resource Quality to Purpose attributessuch as Repute assertions, facts, and/or the like, can supportefficient, highly manipulable and situationally adaptable to user targetpurpose resource filtering of optimal to situational user targetcontextual purposes from vast, distributed resource and relatedinformation stores.

PERCos capabilities can encourage a greater flourishing of web-basedresource publishing by greatly improving resource availability andresource accessibility, as well as supporting a far more“evenhanded/fair” interface between users and resource possibilities, byallowing users to find, and Stakeholders to be motivated to create, morefinely tuned and/or optimized to user contextual purpose resources. Sucha capability set, in various embodiments, inherently supports theavailability and proffering and/or provisioning of Quality to Purposeidentified/assessed resource sets as they relate to active usercontextual purpose sets. This can offset, to some extent, the hegemonyof traditional, familiar brands, which in many instances may both nothave the particular optimizations appropriate for a specific usercontextual purpose fulfillment and further will not offer resources inthe context of a, for example, global array of independently sourced,contextual purpose organized and assessed offering sets.

PERCos capabilities can encourage the formation of a “self-organizing”knowledge, contextual purpose centric, resource cosmos. For example,some PERCos embodiments of such an, at least in part, self-organizing(e.g., global or domain set focused) cosmos can be organized, forexample, at least in part, according to contextual purpose related,assiduous resource identity instances, and at least a portion of theirrespective associated attribute information, including, for example,Repute information and/or the like associated resource sets (where suchRepute instances, and/or information extracted or otherwise derivedtherefrom, may serve as contributing attribute information for resourcesets having associated contextual purpose specification information thatcorrespond to specific Repute contextual purpose set subject sets). Suchorganizing of contributing attribute information, for example, mayinclude resource associated contextual purpose specificationinformation, such as contextual purpose class and/or other contextualpurpose relational information.

Such resource cosmos embodiments can be employed in knowledge and otherinformation networking in support, at least in part, of the identifying,evaluating, selecting, provisioning, and/or operationally managing ofresources in accordance with best fit to user purpose where, forexample, such operations can apply, responsive to user contextualpurpose considerations, cosmos knowledge expert input resourceinformation regarding resource opportunities having optimal resource oneor more qualities to user set contextual purpose characteristics. Suchexpert input may be embodied in, for example, expert purpose classapplications and/or other Frameworks. Such expert input may also beprovided, for example, in the form of Repute Cred assessments andarrangements such as aggregate Creds that can be, for example in somePERCos embodiments, applied when desirable, for example, whenappropriate Repute Cred Stakeholders have one or more Effective Factadvantageous attributes related to providing Qualities to Purposeresource evaluation input relevant to given user set contextual purposerelated specifications. Complexities related to organizing and/orotherwise specifying Stakeholder desirable EF and/or other attributes(such as high Quality to Purpose aggregate Cred scores), can beautomated, that is hidden from users, when, for example, user sets cansimply select “apply expert Repute mode”. This can allow, for example,sophisticated, tailored to user values and/or otherwise contextuallyappropriate shaping of the contributor set that provides Quality toPurpose and/or the like resource and/or resource portion identification,evaluation, selection, prioritization and/or other organizing,provisioning, and/or operational management, including informing CPFFsession resource deployment and operational management, such asasserting that a given resource set has a low Quality to PurposeTrustworthiness, Reliability, and/or the like. Such input can beemployed in expert mode operations—for example, selected by user setpreference settings as may be set for general computing use, orassociated with one or more purpose specifications, such as with CPEsand/or purpose classes, and/or with resource and/or domain classes. Forexample, expert and/or other filtering based attribute shaping (e.g.,determination) of Quality to Purpose and/or the like input sourceproviders can, for users, operate transparently across one or morecontextual purpose class related sessions involving differing purposeobjectives and resource arrangements/elements.

PERCos, in various embodiments, provides capabilities that uniquelysupport resource identification, evaluation, selection, purpose relatedknowledge enhancement, and/or the like, from the standpoint of thequality of a potential resource set as it may contribute to fulfilling auser target purpose set. Such support informs the user as tosituationally practical and advantageous resource sets and/or otherwiseenables situationally applicable, practical, and/or otherwise desirableresource sets to be provisioned. Such informing and/or provisioning, invarious PERCos embodiments, can take into consideration user targetpurpose objectives as mediated by non-Core Purpose contextualconsiderations such that user sets are informed regarding, and/or arecomputing arrangement supported by taking into account, the purposefulfillment impact of resource sets in relationship to multi-dimensionalcontexts, such that users can apply, and/or have applied for them, thebest purpose resource tool solution sets in pursuit of user set targetpurpose fulfillment. This informing of user sets includes enlighteninguser sets so that they have fuller understandings of Quality to Purposeconsiderations, both positive as relates to purpose fulfillment, and anynegative, such as unreliability, efficiency impact, and/or malwareconcerns, regarding resource set anticipated impact on purposefulfillment, which processes may involve expressing Quality to Purposeone or more values to users regarding the results implications flowingfrom the use, or anticipated use, of given resource sets (and/or theirconstituent components).

Resource Quality to Purpose Creds and/or the like, and associatedStakeholder identity (e.g., declared EF) and Cred information (regardinga resource set and/or specifically a Stakeholder set of such resourceset), can, in some PERCos embodiments, be aggregated, combined, and/orotherwise employed to produce highly specific, or as appropriate,approximately relevant, resource set(s), depending, for example, ontarget contextual purpose set and related situational conditions (e.g.,employed as frame(s) of reference). Such contextual purpose basedresults can reflect, at least in part, relevant one or moresituationally applied Quality to Purpose metrics used to assess and, forexample, prioritize resources (and/or resource associated one or moreStakeholders). Such Quality to Purpose metric assessment processes canreflect the perception set of at least a portion of a computingcommunity as regards a given target contextual purpose set and itsimpact on perceived applicability, such as Quality to Purpose, of givenresource sets to such given user set target contextual purpose sets.Such representation of purpose fulfillment applicable resource sets caninclude, for example, reflecting resource relative value as relates toother resource sets and/or ranking expressed as degrees of relativeapproximations and/or precise matching to target contextual purposesets.

In some PERCos embodiments, sets of the above capabilities, including,for example, their associated specifications and/or processes, may beintegrated together (e.g., synthesized), at least in part, through theoperations of PERCos novel contextual purpose Coherence and userinterface services. These services may at least in part manage theintegration of disparately sourced specifications and/or other inputdata comprising the merging of various user target purpose and/orresource situational input considerations into one or more integratedoperating specification sets, where such operating sets may be based atleast in part on relevant contextual purpose and computing environmentconsiderations, and assiduous identity and associated identity attributespecifications (including, for example, attributes associated withcontextual purpose classification and/or other purpose specificationinstances). Specifications involving user selection sets, contextualpurpose specifications, user computing arrangement environmentalinformation, resource identity related considerations, and augmentingsources (profiles, preferences, user and/or historical crowd resourceevaluation and/or usage behavior), can provide input for the creation ofpurpose fulfillment operational specifications provisioned at least inpart as a result of PERCos Coherence, Identity, and/or like PERCosservices. Processing such input results in PERCos services generatingand/or responding to, for example, CPEs, Purpose Statements, and/orother purpose specification building block and/or operatingspecifications.

The Role of Reliable Identities in PERCos

Capabilities for reliably establishing and discerning identity are keyto productive human and other resource interactions. Whether in therealm of commerce, social interactions, government, and/or otherdomains, abilities to reliably identify and otherwise characterizeindividuals and their inter-relationships with one another and withdocuments, information stores, tangible objects and their interfaces,electronic files, networks and other environments, organizationadministrative services, cloud services, and/or the like, arefundamental to reliable functioning of human activities andinstitutions. Such reliability of identity is necessary for user and/orStakeholder sets to determine which resource and resource portion setsare best suited to their given target purpose, as well as to be able to,in an informed manner, anticipate the outcomes of resource usage.Reliability of identity becomes particularly important in the new, humanuniverse of an internet of resource instances of extraordinary size anddiversity, including, for example, of content, sourcing, and/or thelike. Without reliability of identity and associated resource setattributes, users are unable to apply best purpose suited resources fromsuch nearly boundless computing supported global environment, since suchan environment is largely populated by a vast multitude of unknown, orpoorly understood by user set, diverse and diversely sourced, spectrumof things and their portions. In such an unprecedentedly new anddisordered universe, persistent, reliable identity instance identifiersand associated attributes serve as foundation information sets for userset evaluation of the unfamiliar or not fully comprehended, as well as abasis for the comparative analysis of resource instances regarding theirrelative Quality to Purpose user set fulfillment attributes. Suchinstances can comprise any uniquely identifiable potential tool instanceincluding, for example, information sets representing any applicabletangible and intangible item sets such as software, databases, documentsand other published information instances, services, devices, networks,Participants and/or the like.

PERCos embodiments provide variably diverse sets of capabilitiessupporting reliable, assiduous identity assurance. Such assiduousidentity capability sets, at least in part, fulfill previously unmetnetwork based resource identification, evaluation, selection,provisioning, and usage management, including contextual purpose relatedsecurity, efficiency, reliability, consequence management, and sessionenvironment assembly. As a result, PERCos technologies are, in part, aresponse to the challenges introduced as a result of global adoption of,and benefits accruing from, the complementary combination of moderncomputing, communications, and networking advances. Such novel PERCostechnology sets can, in various combinations, materially contribute totransforming the current state of the internet from an immense,disordered resource repository of nearly boundless diversity and size,into a coherently purpose-ordered array of dependably identified,reliably evaluable, resource cosmos.

Reliable identification and/or evaluation of resource instances dependsupon fundamentally reliable association of identity instances, andassociated germane attributes, with their corresponding tangible andintangible resource instances and their varying situational relevance.As a result, in many PERCos computing embodiments, resource associatedidentities are assiduously determined (e.g., in the case of humanidentities, through the use of existential biometric techniques) andbound directly and/or virtually to their intangible correspondingresource instances, and/or to interface and/or attribute informationand/or transformations thereof, of resource tangible and/or intangibleinstances. Such binding may involve, for example, binding such reliable,assiduously determined and assured identifier set of a resource and/orresource portion set to situationally germane resource attributes, suchas those, for example, that are descriptive of a resource set and whichmay include associated Repute set, e.g. Cred, EF, FF, and/or the likeinformation instances, for example, and/or may comprise informationderived therefrom and, for example, represented in some metadata and/orother data storage arrangement. Such identifier information may, atleast in part, for example, be bound to other attribute information ofrelevant associated user contextual purpose and/or the like instancesets, relevant computing environment sets, and/or relevant human partyand/or group sets.

PERCos technologies can, for example, enable efficient and effectiveidentification, evaluation, filtering, prioritization, selection,provisioning, managing, and/or the like of resource sets, that mayoptimally similarity match users' target contextual purposes, PurposeStatements, and/or the like sets through the use, at least in part, of:

-   -   Assiduous establishment of reliable persistent “root”        identities, digital representatives for any instance having a        digital presence that can be uniquely described—such as, for        example, tangible and/or intangible resource sets that may        include: Participants (such as published Stakeholder sets),        users, services, process sets, information sets, software        applications sets, resource logical portion sets (for example,        parts of one or more resource sets, such as, for example, one or        more chapters and/or drawings in a book, a CPU processor of a        laptop), and/or any combination of the foregoing and/or the        like, including, for example, Foundations and Frameworks (e.g.        purpose class applications)—and can be individually        characterized in the form of an operatively unique name set        and/or a reliable locator. Such root identities may further        include, in some embodiments, one or more resource descriptive        attributes, such as Stakeholder identity sets, Stakeholder        Effective Fact sets, one or more environment set descriptive        attributes, one or more user set descriptive attributes, one or        more contextual purpose attribute sets, and/or the like. Such        establishment of assiduous identity may include, for example,        registration capabilities that individuals may use to provide        their one or more existential and/or other biometric, interface,        contextual purpose, other contextual attribute set, and/or other        relevant information (either explicitly organized as registered        resource instance attributes and/or organized as resource        attribute information in a data store such as a database        arrangement). At least a portion of such information sets may,        for example, be captured, analyzed, fused, and/or securely        stored to subsequently be used to assiduously authenticate, or        otherwise contribute to authentication of, such registered        instance sets during, for example, user set evaluation,        selection, and/or provisioning, and/or use, of        situation-specific target contextual purpose fulfillment, where        such authentication may involve authenticating one or more user        sets that are functioning as resources for other user sets.    -   Publication capabilities whereby, for example, a Stakeholder        set, STK₁, may associate an assiduous, reliable identity set—for        example, Stakeholder publisher set existential biometric        identity information employed as certifying a resource set—with        resource set information, RS₁. For example, such Stakeholder set        may provide one or more assiduous identity information sets,        and/or otherwise be tested to authentically be (e.g., provided        through biometric testing results), information corresponding to        previously registered STK₁ assiduous identity information.        Further, one or more resource and/or Stakeholder identity        attribute information sets, such as a resource information        corresponding hash, can be in some PERCos embodiments, for        example, securely bound to at least a portion of such identity        set. In some embodiments, STK₁ may enable users and user systems        to evaluate and/or validate RS₁'s provenance by attributes that        provide, for example: i) information sets that bind one or more        of STK₁'s reliable identifier sets with RS₁'s identity        information set, and further bind the bound information set to        certain of such resource sets characterizing attribute        information sets; ii) purpose-related information sets, such as,        for example, one or more description sets, and/or the like; iii)        one or more Reputes of STK₁ of such resource; and/or iv) the        like. One or more secure processing environments, such as, for        example, protected processing environments (PPEs), comprising        hardware and/or software for associating an instance set's        persistent identities with one or more formal (i.e.,        standardized and interoperable) and/or informal (such as, for        example, free text metadata) identity attributes. Such identity        attributes may, for example, refer to and/or contain operatively        and/or potentially relevant specification sets describing target        contextual purpose specification sets. In some embodiments,        formal identity attributes may be standardized and        interoperable, in part to support efficient and effective        discovery and exploration of resource sets for achieving optimal        interim results and Outcomes, by enabling efficient, for        example, similarity matching, identification, selection,        prioritization, filtering, evaluation, validation, provisioning,        management, and/or the like.    -   One or more authentication mechanisms for assiduously binding        user sets, Stakeholder sets, and/or other cross-Edge objects        with one or more portions, and/or at least in part        transformations (e.g., through application of an algorithm), of        their corresponding computational reliable identity information        (such as, for example, computing arrangement identities of        tangible users and/or Stakeholders with their corresponding        Participant sets, information in and/or derived from therein,        and/or the like, and with other resource and/or resource portion        sets, respectively). In some embodiments, identity frameworks        may enable user sets and Stakeholder sets to establish to a        sufficient degree of rigor in accordance with a target        contextual purpose set a Participant identity, through, in part,        registering Participant information, comprising their assiduous,        for example existential biometric, information Participant        identities using, for example, their existential biometrics        and/or other relevant information (such as, for example, their        names, addresses, preferences, profiles, federated identities,        and/or the like).

In some embodiments, authentication mechanisms may use one or morePERCos Identity Firewalls comprising one or more hardened hardwareand/or software capability sets for supporting assiduous identitycharacterization and/or recognition including, for example, existentialbiometric and environment attribute determination and/or testing. Suchcapabilities may involve, at least in part, securing the performance ofbiometric and/or environmental sensors and/or emitters to help ensurethat one or more of their process arrangement functions are notinfluenced inappropriately by instructions and/or other data introducedto produce inaccurate, unreliable, mislabeled and/or otherwisemis-associated with an attribute set (including, for example, a resourceinstance identifier set), and/or at least in some manner inefficient(as, for example, relates to user and/or Stakeholder contextualpurpose), identity-related sensor and/or emitter processes, resultinginformation, one or more resulting processes (for example, purpose andresource usage related), and/or at least in part one or more informationtransformations thereof. Such sensor and/or emitter related processesmay include secure, for example, encrypted, communications capabilities,further information encryption capabilities, misdirection and/orobfuscation capabilities, external to the firewall received data and/orinstruction inspection and/or management, identity-related informationstorage, identity-information similarity matching including, forexample, pattern (e.g., biometric template) matching, malware and/orefficiency event management, and/or the like. Such firewall technologycapability sets may be, in some embodiments, integrated at least in partwith PERCos CPFF capabilities and/or the like, for example, in compositeCPFF and Awareness Manager appliance firewalls comprising deviceappliance and/or hardware component (e.g. computer bus compatiblechipset) capability arrangements.

-   -   Identity management supporting the identifying, selecting,        collecting, evaluating, accepting, accumulating, aggregating,        organizing, storing, retrieving, and/or otherwise enabling the        use of tangible and/or intangible resource and/or resource        portion sets through such set's interface and description (e.g.        attribute) sets. Such identity management capabilities may        enable users, Stakeholders, process sets, resource sets, and/or        the like to inform and/or be informed and/or provision and/or        the like resource and/or resource portion sets based upon, for        example, reliable situational identities. Such situational        identities may comprise identifier and associated resource        instance target purpose germane attributes, which such        attributes may be stored associated with any such target        contextual purpose set, computing arrangement environment set,        and/or computing arrangement user set, and as relevant, may be,        through Coherence, PERCos at least in part compiled and/or        transformed into, an information set comprising a situational        identity identifier set and other attribute information set        which may be employed in performing PERCos purposeful operation        sets in pursuit of situation-specific target purpose sets, such        as, for example, perform online investment, access and/or        create/edit sensitive—such as valuable trade secret—documents,        reliably participate in social networks, publish resource sets,        and/or the like.    -   A variety of means, at least in some embodiments, to organize        contextual purpose germane identity-related information sets,        for example, using certain HMS and/or PERID services, and        providing support for, for example:        -   Identity database arrangements and/or other database            arrangement functional capabilities associating resource            identifiers with corresponding resource attribute sets, and            where, for example, certain contextual attribute sets may            describe resource contextual purpose set information, for            example in the form of one or more CPEs, and/or, resource            associated concept characterization information, for            example, in the form at least in part of Concept Description            Schemas (CDSs).        -   Contextual purpose database arrangements and/or other            database arrangement functional capabilities, wherein            resource attributes such as, for example, resource instance            sets (for example, resource class) simplification Facets,            attribute classes, and/or resource identifiers, are            associated with CPEs, Purpose Statements, stored operating            purpose specifications, and/or the like.        -   User set database arrangements and/or other database            arrangement functional capabilities associating user set            identifiers with corresponding resource set identifiers            and/or attributes, and where, for example, user set            attributes may be associated with such resource set            identifiers and/or attributes, including, for example, CPE            attribute sets and/or components.        -   Expert and/or standards body/utility pre-defined purpose            class neighborhood resource groupings, wherein such            groupings are associated with contextual purpose            specifications, including contextual attributes, and at            least in part organize, for example, assiduously identified            resources and resource portions for use in purpose            fulfillment of such class purpose expressions (CPEs, and/or            the like),        -   Resource (including, for example, resource portions) and/or            user set identification, evaluation, ordering, and/or the            like means, including resource storage arrangement set, that            in response at least in part to contextual purpose            specifications, Purpose Statements, contextual purpose            operating specifications, and/or the like, generate, for            example, at least in part contextual purpose logically            related and/or otherwise estimated Quality to Purpose            fulfillment ordered resource set for further evaluation by            user set and/or their computing arrangements, and wherein            such resource sets may, for example, include assiduous            resource and/or portion unique identifiers and contextually            germane attribute sets.        -   Semiotic and Logical graph representations, for example in            some PERCos embodiments employing existential graphs,            conceptual graph interchange format (CGIF), and/or semiotic            CDS representations of resource set, conceptual contextual            purpose, and/or user set topologies, which, for example, may            be at least in part in accordance with, and/or have some            other specified relationship set relative to, user and/or            expert specified target contextual purpose specification            sets and/or corresponding Purpose Statements and/or other            contextual purpose specifications, for use, for example, in            resource, user, Stakeholder, environment, and/or contextual            purpose evaluation and/or relationship representations, such            as, for example, in support of resource, user, and/or            environment set target contextual purpose related selection.        -   And/or the like.    -   Standardized and interoperable capabilities for expressing at        least a portion of resource set identifiers and corresponding        attributes, enabling users and/or Stakeholders to stipulate        Contextual Purpose Expressions. Such capabilities can, in some        PERCos embodiments, support, for example, expressing Master        Dimension and Facet and/or CDS (which may overlap with the        former) at least in part attribute concept approximations and        any associated values. Such standardized and interoperable        capabilities support efficient approximation computing through        employing such concept simplification capabilities in support of        identifying and/or selecting resource and/or resource portions.        Expression elements may include, for example, Formal and/or        Informal resources and/or portions thereof, CDS, CPE, user,        and/or other constructs.    -   And/or the like.

In some embodiments, sufficiency of reliability of identities may varybased at least in part on user and/or Stakeholder contextual purpose.For example, users who know each other well may not need highly reliableidentities to setup and operate an online networking session such as avideo chat. In contrast, a bank receiving a request to transfer a largeamount of funds from a client's account to another individual's accountmay require that the client assiduously authenticates by presenting alive, existential biometric match, augmented by contextual locationinformation, to his or her high reliability assiduously producedParticipant identity. The client, in turn, may require the bank topresent sufficiently reliable identity ensuring the client is securelycommunicating with the client's bank and appropriate cloud service,instead of some interloper trying to steal the client's funds and/orconfidential information. In such a case, such bank cloud service mayprovide, for example, an associated certified identity set correspondingto a bank authorized personnel set that presented themselves forexistential biometric certification during the setup of the bankcommunications. Further, if the amount of the transaction exceeds acertain level, for example, such bank employee set may certify thetransaction as it occurs through a matching of such assiduous biometricof such bank authorized to certify employee set with their, for example,corresponding Participant registered identity set. Such Participantidentity matching of “live” (e.g., procedure contemporaneous) biometriccertification may be performed by a third-party identity utility/cloudservice similarity matching the bank provided certification set withstored Participant identity biometric attribute set, and where livenesstesting, including for example, time anomaly and challenge and response(may be, for example, transparent) is performed, and where suchutility/cloud service could ascertain whether such matching achieved asufficient match correlation result.

In some embodiments, PERCos may provide means to cohere, using, forexample, PERCos Coherence Service capabilities, both the client'srequirements and bank's interests, which may potentially conflict.

In some embodiments, PERCos identity capabilities may support assuranceof authenticity and integrity of identities, at least in part, by using“hardened” security enhancing identity hardware and/or software (e.g.,IF and/or AM, that may support techniques, for example, that employcryptography, information hiding, sandboxing, hypervisor virtual machineisolation, as well as, for example, security related obfuscation,misdirection and other probing and/or reverse engineering hardenedenvironment countermeasure techniques). At least a portion of variousPERCos embodiment hardened environments may take the form of PERCosIdentity Firewalls (and/or take the form of combination hardenedAwareness Manager or Identity Firewall arrangements with CPFF firewallarrangements) and include, for example:

-   -   Communication capabilities that authorized and/or otherwise        relevant parties may use to securely transmit, for example,        sensor and/or emitter, identity-related and/or control        information sets, from user, administrator, and/or Stakeholder        computing arrangement locations to and/or between cloud and/or        network service(s) and/or administrative nodes.    -   Processing elements for: i) assessing and/or managing the        qualities of operations of at least a portion of device        arrangement processing information and/or environment-based        input (e.g., from assiduous biometric and/or environment        sensing); ii) performing other sensitive, for example remote to        user computing arrangement, identity operations, such as, for        example, registration, authentication and any other validation,        evaluation, event identification (e.g., for sensor input        information related timing anomalies, communication anomalies,        processing anomalies, and/or the like), event response,        cooperative processing with remote PERCos services (cloud,        network, and/or administrative such as corporate/organization),        and/or the like, in a tamper-resistant manner; and/or iii) local        identity information management of one or more operations.    -   Encryption technology for protecting sensitive information,        including, for example, identity attribute information sets,        from tampering.    -   Software and/or information obfuscation and/or misdirection        techniques, so as to support tamper resistance of internal        Awareness Manager/Identity Firewall related information and/or        processes.    -   Techniques for at least in part ensuring the security of PERCos        hardware packaging (e.g., using epoxy and/or tripwires) and        other countermeasure technologies for enhancing tamper        resistance by, for example, employing techniques embedding        electromagnetic spectrum and/or other shielding capabilities        into, and/or as a layer of, the hardware package of, for        example, a secure Awareness Manager/Identity Firewall component        and/or appliance set and employing integrated circuit reverse        engineering countermeasure techniques, such as, for example,        employing diffusion programmable device techniques.        Countermeasures may include technologies for managing/preventing        decapsulation, optical imaging, microprobing, ElectroMagnetic        Analysis (EMA), and fault injection, and/or the like, as well as        anti-power analysis countermeasure capabilities for simple        power, differential power, high-order differential power        analysis, and/or the like analysis techniques.    -   Tamper resistant storage structure arrangements for storing        identity-related information sets and/or methods including        Identity Firewall memory arrangements. Such arrangements can        support secure ephemeral identity processing related information        and for maintaining local and/or administrative and/or cloud        service based identity related information storage such as        Identity Firewall processing, input, communications, and/or        other related information storage. These arrangements may        support, for example, resource identifier set processing related        Identity Firewall processing, communications, and/or the like        audit information, including for example, Awareness Manager        identifier instance sets and/or grouping (e.g., class)        information (for example, auditing target contextual purpose        unique identifier and associated germane attribute information,        such as identity associated contextual purpose specifications,        emitter instructions for biometric and/or environmental        assessment, absolute and/or relative timing event related        information (e.g., biometric assessment timing information)        and/or other existential biometric sensed information). Such        tamper-resistant storage arrangements may include local Identity        Firewall, network based administrator, and/or cloud service        instances, which such instances may, in some embodiments, store        information in distributed, independently managed tamper        resistant arrangement set(s) (e.g., different service,        administrative, and/or user computing arrangement instances and        locations).

Such distributed storage arrangements, at least in part, may supportredundant (for security and/or reliability), and/or cooperativearrangements where such may be based upon, for example, frequency ofstored instance usage and related efficiency considerations, and/ordifferent security, commercial interests, privacy, and/or other storedinformation instance specifications/considerations.

-   -   Sensors and/or signal emitters to securely establish the        identity parameterization of, authenticate the presence of,        and/or monitor and/or interact with users and/or Stakeholders        and/or their physical environments to obtain corresponding to        such parties' respective biometric (for example, existential        time anomaly and/or other liveness tested) and/or other        contextual information sets. Such sensors and/or emitters may be        employed within at least a portion of such hardened hardware        arrangement, such as an Awareness Manager, and/or they may be,        or variously be, deployed “downstream” from Identity Firewall        hardware arrangement instance one or more sets such that        communications, such as instructions to, and sensing and/or        emitting information from, one or more of such sensors and/or        emitters, are provided, respectively, from and to an Identity        Firewall protected location set, such that sensor and/or emitter        set operations and/or information sets are at least in part        protected by such Identity Firewall capabilities, and, for        example, are, at least in part, operatively isolated from        malware input and/or unauthorized probing/testing. For example,        such Identity Firewall capabilities may be positioned on a        computer bus such that PERCos embodiment related control        information at least in part “flows” downstream to such emitter        and/or sensor sensing information along a bus pathway        arrangement, and at least in part, for example, such PERCos        embodiment related environmental and/or biometric emitter and/or        sensing information flows upstream to such Identity Firewall        capability set.

Some embodiments of PERCos identity framework arrangements may provideone or more PERCos Information Managers (PIMs), which, in someembodiments, may operate as part of PERCos Platform Coherence Services,to, for example, in part dynamically manage sensor-related operations inaccordance with situation-specific contexts, such as provided bycontextual purpose specifications and/or other target purpose relevantinformation sets, where operations may include, for example:

-   -   Sensor and emitting processing, such as, for example, deploying        and configuring one or more sensor and emitter arrangement        arrays to establish identity parameters (such as biometric        pattern information), including, for example, authenticating the        presence of, monitor, and/or actively test (e.g., liveness test        with timing anomaly analysis) users and/or Stakeholders to        obtain, for example, existential biometric and/or environmental        (e.g., including position/location, tangible item environment        arrangement, and/or user identity related movement/travel)        contextual information, including for example, information        pattern sets.    -   Extracting and fusing (including temporal fusing) relevant        sensor identity information sets into relevant identity        information sets such as biometric pattern sets.    -   Analyzing extracted information sets.    -   Establishing communications media and/or protocols used by        identity processing elements to communicate with each other.    -   Interacting with relevant managers (such as, for example,        identity managers, registration managers, external managers,        utility managers, repository managers, and/or the like).    -   Cooperatively operating with other PERCos PIM, Coherence, and/or        other relevant Service sets including performing PIM operations,        at least in part, in a distributed manner involving a plurality        of separately operating user, resource related cloud service,        administrative, and/or the like PIM storage and processing        instances (including, for example, employing distributed PIM        analyzing and/or decision capability sets).

In some instances, PIM arrangements may, for example, obtain, cohere andresolve relevant specification sets that express, for example:

-   -   Policies, rules and/or the like for performing PIM operations.    -   Degree(s) of rigor, including, for example, authentication        requirements, associated with a contextual purpose expression,        Purpose Statement, and/or other purpose specifications set        and/or component set of any such set.    -   Stored authentication template sets needed to, or available to        be applied to, perform sufficient to contextual purpose        authentication processing, and which such template        specifications may include authentication based authorization        parameters (e.g., pass/fail conditions/values) and/or event        identification metrics and/or other relevant parameters.    -   Sensor capabilities available for observing and/or capturing        human and/or environmental biometric and/or contextual        information sets.    -   Emitter capabilities available for providing signal information.        Such emitter capabilities may, for example, emit electromagnetic        energy and/or sound waves radiated in the form of visible light,        infrared, ultrasound, and/or the like, to provide testing and/or        evaluation signals that may produce sensor sensing—such as        biometric—information that may test, for example, liveness over        time, support interpretation of retinal and/or iris and/or        cardiovascular circulatory biometrics, and/or provide controlled        and specified exposure of tangible objects for various sensing        observations, and/or the like. Such exposure (“light up”) of a        biological (and/or other physical instance set) may provide        signal input that, when combined with any other relevant, same        time same type inputs (environmental lighting, other sound        input, and/or the like), produces reflection information which        may be measured, for example across a time interval, as a        sequence of observed item and/or environment set information. A        test set of sensing such item and/or environment set may first        acquire baseline information (and/or such information may be        stored as item and/or environment set attribute information),        such as pattern information, and when such emitter set provides        output to light up such item and/or environment set, background        information may then be removed, and/or otherwise accounted for,        if desired, to provide remaining, exposure produced (e.g.,        reflection) characterizing information sets. Given knowledge of        background information in the absence of emitter projection of        sound and/or electromagnetic signals, and given knowledge, for        example, of emitter characterizing information (signal strength,        frequency, and/or other characteristics), exposure produced        information can be distinguished from information created by        sensing background light and/or background sound such item sets        and/or environment set. Sensor information sets may be encrypted        and/or bound to and/or otherwise securely associated with user        set computing arrangement and/or Identity Firewall (and/or the        like) unique identifier information, time stamped emitter        descriptive information (e.g., frequencies, amplitudes,        wavelengths, burst durations, and/or the like), and/or such        computing arrangement and/or Identity Firewall arrangement        information. Further, since administrative and/or cloud service        identity service arrangements may share unique secrets with        corresponding user computing arrangements, such computing        arrangements (including Identity Firewall sets and/or Awareness        Manager arrangements), may share, for example, unique        pseudo-random generation secrets (keys) with corresponding        instances of their remote service arrangement sets, which may        have, or may be able to therefore produce, the pseudo-randomly        generated emitter instance set specific emitter descriptive        information so as to facilitate analysis of corresponding sensor        information associated with such identifiers.    -   Extraction capabilities comprising one or more algorithms for        extracting, and/or correlating and/or otherwise analyzing,        relevant biometric and/or contextual features.    -   Analysis capabilities for analyzing extracted biometric and/or        contextual features to compare them with stored authentication        templates.    -   Communications capabilities, such as integrating and/or        otherwise resolving encryption methodologies, transmission        capabilities, secure handshaking protocols, signing        capabilities, and/or the like, into communications frameworks        employed in identity related communications between Purpose        Information Management Systems (PIMS), Coherence, and/or other        PERCos service arrangements in support of identification,        identity processing, authentication, and/or related analysis        related to PERCos and/or other system users, Stakeholders,        resources, and/or the like.

Some PERCos embodiments may associate (in some cases, dynamically and/orassiduously generated) chains of authority within Stakeholder sets withone or more registered human “root” Stakeholders (and/or agents thereof,such as any applicable Stakeholder employees, authorized consultantsets, other sets contracting with Stakeholder sets, and/or the like).For example, suppose a department of an organization publishes aresource set. That department may exist within a hierarchy of divisionswithin the organization, with one or more of said divisions representedby Stakeholder Participants that are assiduously bound to one or morehuman Stakeholders and/or other, more “senior,” for example, managing,Stakeholder Participants, who are authorized to represent departments ator below a given level in a Stakeholder organization (and/or Stakeholderagent) chain of authority. In some circumstances, such human rootprovenance authority may be essential enabling practical systems thatsupport an effective relationship between users and a nearly limitlessarray of potential resource sets in pursuit of target purposes.

In some embodiments, when a human agent in a Stakeholder chain ofauthority associated with a resource set has a change in status (suchas, for example, his/her Stakeholder authority (e.g., right to certify)is removed), there may be an identity attribute set associated with theresource set that characterizes such a change in a standardized andinteroperable manner, and may, for example, provide specificationinformation for a method set governing any such change. Suchcharacterization set may provide information such as “Stakeholderremoved for improper conduct,” “Stakeholder agent removed because of achange in position,” “Stakeholder agent removed but in good standing,”“Stakeholder agent removed upon the authority of “senior” Stakeholderagent X (which was signed, as required for removal, by agent X usinghis/her existential biometrics)” and/or the like. Such provenance andmethod information, supported by such simplified interoperableinterpretable attribute sets, may have associated Boolean and/or otheralgorithm and/or other applicable informational supplementary resourcesets. Such explanatory, and method related, information sets can provideusers and other parties with the means to access explanatory resourceStakeholder related authorization provenance relevant information,and/or methods, for the removing of one or more authorities in aresource set's provenance history and/or changing such Stakeholderinstance authority's status (e.g., a summary of circumstances of removaland/or a change of provenance information from “active” Stakeholder to“expired” and/or “authority removed” Stakeholder and/or Stakeholderagent). As a result, even when creators, publishers, and/or distributorsof a resource set are organizations and/or enterprises, knowledge of theresource set's human chain(s) of authority, as well as relevant currentstatus information, may enable users to obtain assurance of a resourceset's authenticity with sufficient reliability and informativeproperties so as to at least in part support target purpose set user,Stakeholder, and/or other party informed provenance perspective,evaluation, and/or usage of resource sets, whether, for example, beforeinitial usage of a resource set, and/or during and/or after such set hasbeen applied. Such provenance information, and related methods, mayfurther be employed in circumstances where a “senior” Stakeholderauthority, such as an original publisher of a resource, removes or“suspends” the certification, or otherwise the certification authority,of a Stakeholder set comprising a subsequent, for example, follow-onmember (for example, a modifier, retailer, owner and/or the like) of aresource chain of handling and control.

Some PERCos embodiments may enable (and some may require) users and/orStakeholders to establish one or more reliable, published persistentParticipant identities to represent their respective digital personas(and may further represent their organizations) by associating one ormore “sufficient” (e.g., as specified and/or otherwise required)identity attributes and any associated metrics with each Participantidentity. In some PERCos embodiments, Participant identities areresource sets, and like other PERCos resource sets, may have attributesthat characterize them, such as, for example, associated CPEs and/orother purpose expressions, any associated CDSs, authenticationinformation sets, provenance and/or other contextual information sets(including Reputes), and/or the like.

In some embodiments, Participant identities may have varying degrees ofreliability, and may be classified into separate groups having a shared“level” of reliability. Any given level can have an associated rigorspecification set, including associated methods, such as tests, forexample, validations and/or establishment methods, for producingParticipant attribute information for a tangible instance of acontemplated Participant (e.g., specific person) undergoing existentialbiometric assessment to provide assiduously reliable, existentialquality, biometric pattern information. Such Participant identityinformation—associated with one or more Participant persistentidentifiers (which may include a root identifier) can, for example, betested and/or otherwise assessed, based upon attribute information,including: i) the reliability of authentication information sets (e.g.,Participant attribute biometric templates) and ii) authenticity andintegrity of other, for example, germane attribute information sets,such as provenance and/or other contextual information sets (forexample, Reputes such as Creds, EFs, and FFs, environment informationsuch as location, user and/or user class behavioral pattern information,and/or the like). The value of the foregoing is at least in partdependent on the persistent reliability of methods for binding, throughsecure inclusion in the same Participant instance and/or by secure andreliable reference, Participant identifiers and Participant attributesin a manner that further can be reliably and persistently employed totest the correspondence of Participant existential and/or otherattribute information with their respective tangible users and/orStakeholder sets and/or agents thereof. Such testing can, for example,employ capabilities, such as similarity matching using timing anomalyand/or other liveness comparison of registered, published Participantexistential biometric information with user and/or Stakeholder setsubsequent resource publishing, evaluation, and/or usage process sets.

FIG. 1 is a non-limiting illustrative example of timing anomaly servicemonitoring user and environment through assiduous images.

In some embodiments, users and Stakeholders may establish bindingbetween themselves and their respective Participant identities that havevarying degree of reliability and strength. For example, time-basedbiometric authentication methods that support liveness analysis and/ortiming anomaly detection techniques may be stronger than authenticationmethods that use static information sets (e.g., passwords, photosnapshots, and/or the like) since static information frequently isexposed to misappropriation, while liveness, and in particular,across-time (i.e., dynamic) biometric behavior, may be very difficult toimpossible to situationally “construct,” responsive to situationalconditions, without construction of timing anomalies inconsistent withnormal biometric behavior, for example as shown in FIG. 1 . In differentPERCos embodiments and/or selectable within a given embodiment,different authentication methods may have varying rates of “falseacceptance” and/or “false rejection,” and adoption of authenticationmethods in support of purpose fulfillment may reflect, in part, thesituational consequences of obtaining false acceptances and falserejections. The employment of cross-time biometric user and Stakeholderrepresentations and testing may, with certain biometric assessmenttypes, such as 3D facial recognition, which may be augmented and/orreplaced, for example, by other biometric liveness testing (retina,thermal vascular/pulse, and/or the like) and/or by transparent and/orlow burden challenge and response techniques (such as transparent visuallocations on screens for user visual focus, Identity Firewallarrangement emitter based lighting frequency and/or intensity variationreflection information, electromagnetic and/or sound wave tangibleobject assessment, and/or the like) and may produce biometricauthentication capability sets that may not be subject to biometricsignal substitution and/or other biometric spoofing, subject to properlymanaging other possible system vulnerabilities, and may therefore bemore reliably employed to certify and authenticate computing arrangementresources when compared to existing technologies.

In some embodiments, the assessment of reliability of Participantidentities may, at least in part, depend on provenance of at least aportion of identifier associated identity attributes. For example,consider a Participant identity, PId₁, associated with a Stakeholderorganization which has been granted authority by such Stakeholder set torepresent a division of the organization. Evaluation of reliability ofPld₁ may, at least in part, depend on one or more identity attributes,including, for example, attributes that refer to and/or contain PId₁'sauthorizations as specified by one or more human members in a chain ofauthority. In particular, reliability of a given PId₁ may at least inpart depend on existence of a chain of authority containing one or moreroot identities representing, for example, senior root certifyingauthorities who may authorize one or more further parties, such as PId₁,to act as agent(s) for such Stakeholder party (Company X represented byParticipant X). A root certifying party may be specified through aprocess involving the publishing of such a Participant instance, forexample, a PERCos Formal resource Participant instance, whereby thepublisher of such Participant resource instance is declared the rootcertifying Stakeholder. Publishing Stakeholder of Company X may declarethrough specification by, for example, employing its Company X'sParticipant X instance attribute, that “individual PId₁ is an (or the)authorizing party for certifying resources on behalf of Participant X(and/or otherwise represents Participant X for some or all of CompanyX's certifications)”, or “individual PId₁ may be specified, andfunction, as the root certifying administrator for Participant X and mayfurther delegate such certifying authority (and/or other authority set)to further individuals and/or organizations” (represented as, forexample, PERCos Formal (and/or Informal) Resource Participant instances,in various PERCos embodiments. Such hierarchies of individuals and/ororganizations may be authorized by an attribute specification set ofParticipant X and/or PId₁, as a root hierarchy instance, where eachlevel may have certifying authority, as may be specified, for general orany specified limited subclass of certifying responsibilities. Suchchains of authority may be limited, for example, as to the number ofdelegated “levels,” domain and/or purpose types (e.g., classes)including, for example organizing at least in part by resource instancestypes (e.g., classes, lengths, media types, and/or the like). Suchchains of authority may, for example, in some embodiments, limit thenumber of allowed certifications by a given individual participant, suchas a person and/or organization, and/or limit certification number pertime interval and/or calendar period and/or limit at least in part byspecification criteria through to a certain calendar date/time.

Such declaration of such authorized role for PId₁ may be specified aslimited to one or more PERCos contextual purpose classes, such ascertifying publications published by department Y of Company(Participant) X. Such declaration, regarding chain of authorityauthorization for one or more other parties, for example, by a senior,for example, root Participant authority, may also, in some PERCosembodiments, be embedded and/or securely referenced as a controlattribute of a PERCos published resource. A declaration, for exampleusing a PERCos resource instance (and/or class set, such as a purposeclass set) attribute, can specify, for example, another organization (oran individual), such as Participant Z, as a party that is acting, or mayact, as a delegate resource certifying agent (as a publisher or othercertifier) generally, or in a manner limited as described above (throughat least in part the use of an attribute set specification set). In sucha case, Participant Z, in some embodiments, may be authorized to allowParticipant Z agents to certify, for example, PERCos Participant Z'sresource sets. In such instances, in some embodiments, Participantinstances corresponding to such respective Participant Z agents may havebeen previously published using, in part, existential biometrictechniques, and when a resource instance (e.g., a document) iscertified, for example, as published by Participant Z wherein thecertifying/signing agent's existential biometric information is embeddedand/or otherwise associated with the published resource instance (e.g.,in the form of encrypted hash biometric information bound/combined witha hash of relevant document information, such as size, date, andorganization information). Where such Participant instance waspreviously published by such agent with, for example, a PERCos and/orthe like identity cloud service as a Participant resource set, suchagent Participant's existential biometric information (or a portionand/or transformed set thereof) can be similarity matched with theagent's existential biometric information supplied during such CompanyX's Participant Z document publishing process. At the same time, suchroot authority identification information, for example, at least in partat least sufficient portions of such root authority's existentialbiometric information, may be bound to such same resource documentinstance, may also be similarity matched against such root authorityindividual's Participant existential biometric information instance(representing a root certifying authority), and wherein publishing ofand/or authorizing a PERCos resource, involving, for example, publishingdocuments for Company X as PERCos Formal resource instances, requires,and for example, is satisfied when such chain of authority senior partycertification may be tested by, for example, a cloud resource managementutility and/or other service provider as similarity matching theParticipant identity liveness, including, for example, timing anomalyevaluated/tested biometric one or more attributes. Multiple existentialbiometrics role types may comprise sets that are bound together asplural and/or chain of authority certification representations. Suchrepresentation schemas may be distinctive to different respectiveorganizations, and may be maintained by one or more cloud authorities,e.g., utilities, resource providers and/or the like. Such authorityidentity authorization sequence arrangements may employ hashesrepresenting a hierarchy, or other arrangement, of resource provenanceauthority for plural people. Such authority schemas, whether complete orat least in part comprised of role types (VP, resource certification,department resource certifier, and/or their respective explicit humanidentifiers) can be maintained for checking at a later time and/or dateduring a resource publishing process set, and/or resource evaluationand/or usage process set.

Some PERCos embodiments may enable users and Stakeholders to registerreliable Participant identities by providing sufficient information thatcan be used to subsequently bind users and Stakeholders assiduously totheir respective Participant identities, where the strength of bindingdepends, at least in part, on the quality and/or rigor of providedregistration information sets and subsequent authentication methods.Human users and Stakeholders may, depending on situation specific and/orembodiment requirements, enable creation of assiduous identity templatesby securely registering their physical and/or behavioralcharacteristics, such as, for example, keystroke properties, gesturepatterns, gait movements, eye movement patterns, facial related patternsand/or other characteristics, iris and/or retina patterns and/or othercharacteristics, vocal related patterns, cardiovascular system relatedpatterns (e.g., involving capillaries, veins, arteries, and/or bloodpressure information), and/or the like. Such characteristics may becaptured and analyzed, in some circumstances, over a period of time toextract time-dependent feature sets such correlation of facial featuresduring changes in facial expression, where the foregoing and/or the likemay be securely stored as templates and/or reference data sets for lateruse singly and/or in combinations of two or more feature sets. In somecircumstances, such multiple information sets may be analyzed so as toextract time correlated patterns among various modal features. Forexample, speech phonemes in voice and corresponding lip movements may beanalyzed to generate one or more correlated patterns that could be usedin a template.

Non-human users including, for example, non-human Stakeholders, such asorganizations of any type, also may enable creation of assiduousidentity templates by referring to and/or providing highly reliableregistration information sets (such as, for example, existentialbiometric registration of organization agents such as authorizedemployees, consultants, and/or the like and/or PKI certificates signedby trusted authorities).

In some embodiments, people may provide multiple biometric informationsets to improve the reliability of templates that result from aregistration process, a method that may, for example, increase analready high level of registration rigor by providing information thatmay subsequently be used for multimodal authentication. For example, anadditional one or more authorities and/or other parties may, at sometime after the publishing of a resource instance, present themselves forexistential biometric certification of integrity, applicability, and/orCred Quality to Purpose assertion for a PERCos and/or the like resourceand/or resource portion.

In some embodiments, multiple modal reference sets may support adaptiveauthentication using one or more biometric data sets, by, for example,providing a means to authenticate using different sets or weightings ofbiometric data when one or more modal biometric data sets are noisy,sporadic and/or otherwise have unacceptable error rates and/orreliability/accuracy concerns. In a relatively simple example, a humanStakeholder, S₁, (or a stakeholder agent set for a Stakeholderorganization) may have undergone tests for three modal biometricattributes during registration, comprising S₁'s fingerprints,voiceprints, and 3D video one or more sequences. Ideally all threebiometric data sets may subsequently be used in an assiduous, multimodalauthentication one or more processes. However, when S₁ is in a noisyenvironment, such as an apartment next to railroad tracks,authentication of S₁ in some cases may be performed using onlyfingerprints and 3D imaging. Although authentication of S₁ in suchinstances may be less assiduous than when high-quality voiceprints canbe obtained in support of authentication, it nevertheless may bepossible to authenticate with rigor sufficient for certain purposeswhile avoiding unacceptable rates of false negatives caused by poorvoiceprint data. Further, when, in such an example where such voiceprintanalysis is not practical, timing anomaly analysis on the 3D imagingdata acquired for authentication may be performed at the local computingarrangement, for example in a hardened Awareness Manager appliance,and/or such analysis may be performed at an identity cloud servicearrangement to evaluate for anomalies indicative that the apparentbiometric information is not provided in real-time in a mannerconsistent with it being veritable biometric information. Alternatively,or in addition, an emitter at such user testing location/computingarrangement may employ an emitter set that radiates ultrasound and/orelectromagnetic signals in the direction of the S₁ Stakeholder and thesignal set produced as a result of exposure of S₁'s face to emitteroutput is used to provide further information regarding the details anddynamics of S₁'s face, and where the use of, for example, transparent toS₁ emitted signal types may produce greater detail, providing a higherlevel of biometric information acquisition reliability. Furthermore,information produced by exposure of S₁'s physical computingarrangement/testing environment to emitter signals may also, in someinstances, be used to generate environment physical object arrangementand feature information (which may be stored as at least in part patterninformation) and such information can be used in similarity patternmatching against historical stored S₁ physical environment informationto provide additional assurance as to the integrity of asserted identityof S₁, for example as shown in FIG. 2 .

FIG. 2 is a non-limiting example of multi-modal sensor/emitteroperations in support of reliable identity verification.

In some embodiments, user and/or Stakeholder sets may associate one ormore authentication identity attribute sets and associated methods withtheir Participant identities. Such attributes and methods may enablediffering levels of rigor of binding, of rigors of testing, and/or ofcompositions of Participant attribute information, for example, as anysuch level and/or other organization designation are associated withcontextual purpose expression specification sets and/or other purposespecifications. Certain Participant attribute information may not beavailable for any given certain level/designation set so as to protectprivacy regarding such information and/or certain Participant attributeinformation may be conditionally available, such as in return forconsideration, such as financial payment, provisioning of a service,and/or satisfying some other explicitly identified type of considerationor requirement.

For example, in some embodiments, a Stakeholder set, Stk₁, may comprisea publisher of software programs. In differing circumstances, Stk₁ mayassociate two different authentication attribute with method sets, attr₁and attr₂, with Stk₁'s Participant identity where attr₁ relates toand/or contains Stk₁'s video image representation information set forauthentication image matching processes and such a representation mayenable authentication to be performed at a modest level. In contrast,attr₂ contains a more rigorous existential facial biometric set withpattern matching and timing analysis and requires, or provides, arigorous multimodal reference biometric data set. If such Stk₁ wishes toprovide software that will be provided with high levels of reliability,that is, in a manner that users can be assured that such a softwareresource is what it is claimed to be, and, as a result, can be reliablyevaluated as to the Quality to Purpose, then such second modality ofauthentication may be used.

In some instances, when a session or otherwise participating party is,for example, an individual or small group, such participating party mayevaluate a contemplated or actual user set for participation in a commonpurpose computing session such as a plural party social networkingand/or communications scenario (e.g., a video conference). Suchevaluation may involve disclosing an identity associated participantattribute set, including, for example, an ability to test such userset's existential biometric sets information using liveness, includingtiming anomaly, testing and analysis, using, for example, IdentityFirewall and sensor and emitter capabilities at an evaluated user set'scomputing arrangement. Such biometric signal acquisition might beperformed at the computing arrangements of each user in a common purposesession and might be required by some one or more user sets as aprerequisite condition set to engage with one or more other user sets.Further, such evaluation information requirement may be associated with,and/or included within, a contextual purpose expression and/or otherpurpose specification set and/or preference setting.

A Stakeholder (and/or other user) set may be authorized to, and/or mayrequire, the right to, acquire usage provenance information goingforward for a PERCos resource, such as for Stk₁'s software application.For example, aspects of such provenance information may include usage,for example, information regarding user actions and/or user usagehistory and/or forward going user activities, such as, for example websites visited, contact lists and information, selections made, purchasesmade, and/or the like. Such requirements may be associated withdiffering or different authentication methods, including identityvalidity testing, schemas, such as, for example, described in PERCosembodiments, and/or may be further associated with differing and/ordifferent attribute availability, privacy, and/or other usage schemas asmay be responsive to the use of a Stakeholder set's resource setcontextual purpose related specifications (such as associated withStk₁'s software application) and/or a user set's descriptive, contextualpurpose expressions, Purpose Statements, and/or the like.

FIG. 3 is a non-limiting illustrative example of Participantregistration.

FIG. 3 illustrates a non-limiting example embodiment of existentialbiometric registration. Step 1 in FIG. 3 shows an individual interactingwith a registration manager (local, network administrative based, and/orcloud) instance to initiate an assiduous registration of Participantand/or the like process set. Registration manager arrangement instancein turn interacts with a local, network, and/or cloud PERCos InformationManager (PIM) arrangement to decide the sufficient level of rigor (step2) and associated method set, where such decision may be based, in partor whole, on instructions from any one of, or cooperative pluralarrangement of, local user computing arrangement, administrative networkbased, and/or cloud service identity management entity. Based in part onsuch decision, the PIM instance may coordinate with identity-relatedfunctional elements (such as, as situationally applicable, emitterelectromagnetic radiation and/or sound wave element sets, sensorprocessing element sets, extraction/correlation processing element sets,repository element sets, and/or the like) to step 3. In someembodiments, the PIM instance (and/or like capabilities in one or moreother PERCos embodiment managers) may interact with external systemsthat may manage environmental systems, such as closing the blinds,dimming the lights, and/or the like. In some embodiments, one or moresuch PIM instances may operate as component managers within local,administrative organization, and/or cloud based service sets, such aswith PERCos Coherence and/or identity manager sets of capabilities, andsome or all of such capabilities may operate within a PERCos IdentityFirewall/Awareness Manager arrangement, such as one or more secured,hardened, for example, against intrusion, disruption, and/orsubstitution component one or more devices resident on thecommunications bus of a user and/or Stakeholder computing arrangement,and/or located within an Identity Firewall/Awareness Manager appliancethat operates within or in conjunction with such user and/or Stakeholdercomputing arrangement.

Step 4 illustrates sensor processing deploying one or more emitter andsensor sets to capture an individual's existential biometric and/orenvironmental contextual information sets, transmitting the capturedinformation set to extraction/fusion processing elements, which may, forexample, process and/or correlate the captured biometric and/orcontextual information set so as to correlate feature sets betweencaptured biometric features to extract temporal patterns, indicative ofveritable human “liveness”. This includes PIM monitoringidentity-related processing elements to ensure that they adhere to theirrespective specification sets.

In step 5, analyzed biometric information sets that have been hashedusing one or more cryptographic hash functions and securely bound to theindividual's identity for storage in one or more locations in accordancewith a storage specification set (such storage may be located at aremote cloud service set). In some circumstances, information sets maybe stored to provide robustness by deploying one or more fault tolerancealgorithms, such as, for example, Byzantine algorithms. An informationset may be also decomposed and each decomposed data set may beindividually hashed and arranged in a hash tree, such as a Merkle tree.

In some embodiments, one or more biometric templates may be extracted byfeature data sequence matching to support differing situation-specificcontexts, including differing target purpose sets, including, forexample, organizing situation-specific contexts that at least in partcomprise contextual purpose classes.

In some embodiments, Participant identities representing humans may makereference to and/or contain attributes derived from non-biometricinformation, such as, for example, authorizations, personal information(such as a person's name, address, academic credentials, skill sets,preferences in one or more domains, profiles, historical data, and/orthe like), contextual information (such as one or more contextualpurposes, purpose classes and/or other purpose neighborhoods, Reputessuch as Cred Quality to Purpose Facets, and/or other Master Dimensionvariables such as Facet resource information (for example, in the formof complexity plus a rating, such as 6 on a scale of 1-10,sophistication plus a rating, educational level plus a rating, and/orthe like, as may be described by a direct Stakeholder such as a resourcepublisher)), and/or the like. For example, consider a professor ofphysics at a well-known university. The professor may have a Participantidentity that represents the professor's professional identity and oneor more attributes that express the professor's level of expertise inhis/her specialization, one or more Effective Facts expressing his/heracademic credentials and affiliations and peer-reviewed publications,Cred assertions published by indirect Stakeholders expressing theQuality to Purpose of his/her work, and/or the like.

In some embodiments, Participant identities may contain attribute setsoutlining and/or enumerating a person's computing resource one or morearrangements, such as PERCos one or more Foundations (which may includeuser computing arrangement interface information), for interactingacross an Edge between the tangible world and the digital domain, suchas home network equipment/configuration and devices (such as computers,laptops, smart phones, tablets and/or the like), each of which maycomprise a set of hardware and software systems that both enable theirinteractions and have one or more identifying characteristics that maybe instantiated as identity attributes associated with them, and/or asrepresented by resource class and/or other type identifying information.For example, IP network devices are provided with a unique MAC addressthat is used as part of network operations, and each smart phone thathas a cellular network connection is provided with, for example, aunique IMEI number. Many of the devices a user may employ, for example alaptop, have unique identity attributes, which for example may comprisea specific “fingerprint” set representing a subset of individualelements that comprise that specific laptop (hardware and software) andsuch set may have situationally based attributes, such as attributesrelevant while using a device for one's business activities such asemployee functions for a corporation, and a differing set of attributesfor personal activities, and where either of the foregoing may havesituational attribute sets associated with different contextualpurposes.

In some embodiments, user and Stakeholder Participant identities maycontain attributes that express qualities of their surroundings, such ascolors, shapes, sounds, geographical location, population of tangibleitems, other humans (and/or non-human animals) in the background, and/orthe like. For example, when working on a proprietary corporate document,if an individual's voice is heard in the user set's computingarrangement room and the detected individual isn't identified by voicerecognition protocols as matching a name on both contextual purpose andcomputing environment lists, then the computer may automatically hide orotherwise event manage content, such as not displaying a document,hiding a webpage, playing video and/or audio, halting output (on aprinter), and/or the like. Such actions to protect privacy and/or otherrights may be highly selective, such that one displayed document, video,webpage, and/or the like may continue to be displayed, while anotherdocument, video, webpage, and/or the like may be restricted, concealed,displayed only in summary form, not printed or otherwise outputted,and/or the like.

In some embodiments, such reliable Participant identities may beregistered with one or more identity management services, such astrusted utilities, by, in part, securely binding one or more biometricand/or non-biometric identity attribute sets with tangible identityinformation (e.g., a name, address, and/or the like). Such registeredParticipant identities may be associated with one or more contextualpurpose class sets and/or individual instances and may includestandardized metrics, such as values reflecting importance toParticipant on an absolute scale and/or prioritized importance relativeto other contextual purposes as extracted from usage information and/orresulting from user specification. For example, a user set may specifysuch attribute information as part of user profile information wheresuch information reflects importance values for respective contextualpurpose classes that are associated with user set Participant identities(including, for example, organization identities), and/or user computingenvironment (e.g., room at an address, on a floor, at a GPS, cellular,and internet address/location). Such information characterizes usageand/or importance of, and/or interest in, any specific purpose classCPEs, other purpose related specifications, and/or any other of theforegoing information types, at least in part user based/extractedand/or user setting, where such information may be included as, and/orotherwise contribute to, attribute information (e.g., CPEs aggregatedinto a contextual purpose class set value representation of importance)of such Participant identities. As with other Participant sets, usersets, and/or computing arrangement sets, such information may bemaintained in an information storage arrangement that may bediscoverable and/or otherwise associated with such identities, forexample, in response to target purpose situational requirements and/orother conditions. Such Participant identities may also include, at leastin part, transformations of user historical behavior (for example,contextual purpose and/or resource related usage aggregations and/orother associations) presented, for example, as user Participantassociations with respective contextual purpose classes, user classesand/or other user sets, and/or resource sets (including, for example,resource classes and/or persistently, reliably identifiable resourceportions).

In some embodiments, registered reference templates (stored templateinformation) may be dynamically updated to adapt to changing biometricand/or environmental characteristics. For example, most people haveregular habits which can be represented as pattern information that maybe associated with one or more of their situational identities and/orassociated with one or more groups with which they are associated and/orcan be determined that they share attributes in common. For example, anindividual may stop by a coffee shop on the way to work, call homebefore leaving work, talk to his/her spouse when he/she calls home(which pattern can be biometrically assessed and validated, for example,through use of biometric voice recognition capabilities of such spouse),connect several times a day to certain news services (such as the NewYork Times, CNN, BBC), update information on their shared familyFacebook page an average of five times per day and almost never lessthan two times a day, have certain common routes of travel that occur oncertain days (taking subway and/or car commute routes), shop at certainstores on a regular basis and/or at certain times of day, and/or acertain number of times a week, maintain one or more blogs and/orpublish comments on Twitter, and/or the like, all of which may be inaccordance to timing patterns (by day, hour/minute, week) as describedherein. Registration processing may be provided with one or more controlspecifications that specify that a registrant is monitored over a periodof time to capture such habitual characteristics and/or the like andupdate their reference data sets as appropriate and, if specified,communicate some portion of such information to, for example,organization and/or cloud service locations for participant attributeinformation storage, similarity matching, authentication and/or otherevent management. PERCos based operations may perform similaritymatching within local user computing arrangements, at administrativenetwork locations, and/or at cloud services, and/or the like, todetermine that the user set using a computing arrangement set is, islikely to be, and/or may be, required or requested to be further testedto assess, identify, securely validate, and/or the like. Such processesmay be transparent or apparent to user sets, and may vary by embodimentand/or be based at least in part on security rigor sought, computingand/or other efficiency overhead, desired transparency to user, and/orbe based at least in part on other considerations, and may involve oneor more factor challenge and response, using, for example, PERCosexistential biometric liveness (including emission) testing withemitters/sensors, and timing anomaly analysis.

For example, suppose a person, P₁, habitually is accompanied by a groupof specific people in the room when P₁ assumes a Participant identity,Pld₁, to pursue one or more target purpose sets (such as publishingresource sets). Registration processing may capture biometricinformation of these “background” people and store the capturedinformation as part of P₁'s one or more templates with the set ofactivities, and, for example, associated with one or more contextualpurpose class CPEs, Purpose Statements, and/or the like. In someembodiments, registration processing may invoke biometric recognitiontechniques to identify people in the background. Regardless, when P₁assumes Pld₁, authentication procedures may capture biometrics ofbackground people and attempt to match biometric data sets with storedtemplates derived at least in part from previously captured biometrics.If they do not match, then authentication processing may in someinstances initiate and perform additional testing to authenticate P₁.Such identity processing may further involve assessing privilegesassociated with given individual participant identifications andassociated biometric information and, for example, apply flexiblesecurity and/or privacy management rules. For example, when a givenindividual is detected entering such a room, PERCos identity managementmay determine that certain content being displayed on a user setcomputing arrangement can continue to be displayed, but may conceal oneor more documents, videos, teleconferencing participants, audio fromcertain one or more parties or regarding certain one or more topics(which may, for example, be voice and semantically recognized for topicrelationship), for example, from such teleconferencing session, and/orthe like, by either presenting “blank” and/or “silent” spaces in placeof such content, replacing such content with situationally innocuouscontent (such as a pastoral picture), and/or expand the screen space ofother, allowed content, to conceal that content is not being displayedand/or otherwise make best use. Such techniques can also be employedwith other output means, such as differentially controlling contentcommunications to different parties participating in teleconferencingand/or controlling printer output such that a person without theappropriate privileges wouldn't be present when a given set of contentis being outputted.

In some embodiments, users and/or Stakeholders may register theirrespective Participant identities by publishing them with one or morethird parties (such as, for example, identity management services suchas cloud service identity utilities) by providing information setssufficient for subsequent, rigorous authentication by, or supported by,said third parties and, when applicable, by employing sufficientlysecure and reliable identity information acquisition means such as usinga PERCos Identity Firewall, an Awareness Manager with PERCos IdentityFirewall capabilities, and/or elsewise using a user set computingarrangement with integrated and hardened and/or otherwise securedbiometric sensor, emitter, and/or identity control informationimplementations. Such identity managed services, in some embodiments,employ secured communication pathways from such identity controlimplementations (e.g., Identity Firewall) to remote administrativeorganization services and/or, for example, cloud identity managementservices. Securing such identity communication pathways and processesmay involve, for example, an isolation of such communication means fromthe non-biometric and/or non-environment sensing related processes ofsuch user set, non-Identity Firewall arrangement computing environment.Such Identity Firewall embodiments can help ensure the reliability ofbiometrically and/or environmentally sensed user identifier informationused in the registering and publishing of Participant identityinformation. Such Participant information may then be employed inensuring the reliability and integrity of resource set informationthrough, at least in part, matching Participant biometric and/orenvironmental pattern information, including, for example, employingliveness testing to authenticate such information, to correspondinginformation employed in the biometric, for example, existentialbiometric, signing of information comprising, and/or otherwiseestablishing the identity of, user relevant signed resources. SuchParticipant information can also be employed, for example, in evaluatingand/or authenticating for social networking purposes, current and/orcandidate users (and their identity related qualities) that a first userset (e.g., an individual, a parent of a child, a group) is consideringto interact, or is actively interacting, with. Such current and/orcandidate users may be, for example, existentially biometricallyevaluated, including, using for example, timing anomaly analysis, toestablish, for example, through comparison to a registered Participantinformation set, who such current and/or candidate party sets are,and/or to ensure that any such parties are whom they claim to be, and,through the use, for example, of PERCos Repute Cred, EF, FF, and/or thelike Participant set related capabilities, ensure that such party setmeets acceptable criteria for establishing and/or continuing any suchsocial network (or commercial networking, expert advising, and/or thelike) relationship.

In some embodiments, the reliability and integrity of biometric and/orenvironment analysis related identity attribute information, forexample, information employed in publishing Participant informationsets, may be further ensured through the use of one or more dedicatedand/or otherwise assiduously managed identity related communicationspathways, such as communications pathways to and from such IdentityFirewall capabilities. Such Identity Firewall at least in part securelymanaged communications capabilities may allow only minimal, firewallsupervised information communications from such user set other “local”computing arrangement meeting specifically identity assessment andreporting related instructions, for example, instructions to activate ordeactivate any sensor and/or emitter set, and may alternatively or inaddition allow secure remote identity services from network basedadministrative and/or cloud identity service arrangements to communicatesoftware and/or driver and/or security, auditing, information transfer,Participant information (such as biometric pattern) and/or the likeinformation, using a secure communications arrangement, such as aseparate communications link.

For example, a PERCos Identity Firewall may take the form of a hardenedcomponent connected to a user computing arrangement bus between suchuser set local computing environments processing and storage activitiesand one or more of such computing arrangement's identity relatedbiometric and/or environment sensors and/or emitters, and controlcommunications. Such hardened component may also manage certainprocesses related to securing the reliability, integrity, and evaluationof sensor and/or emitter biometric and/or environment identity and eventinformation and communications, including storing and employing patternsignature and other information related to the foregoing, as well asproviding secure timing services. Such Identity Firewall can ensure thereliability of Participant related authentication processes by providingtime anomaly related biometric and/or environment signal analysis, suchas signal information analysis based upon emitter signal specifications,detection by sensors of interactions between emitter signals and humanand/or non-human environmental elements, and related timingcorrespondence and unfolding sequence analysis. In some embodiments, insupport of such Participant identification and/or authenticationprocesses, an Identity Firewall may turn on a sensor A and/or employ arandom instruction generator to instruct emitter B (for example, anultrasound emitter) to emit a, for example, pseudo-randomly chosenchanging frequency and energy radiation set over one or more timeintervals, such that representation information of such emitted signalcan be bound with received sensor and/or other received biometric and/orenvironment information and cross-correlated according to time, emitteroutput and sensor input signal and timing characteristics so as tosupport the evaluation and identification of other anomaliesrepresenting, for example, untrusted information provisioning resultscaused, for example, by outputted signal set reflection (and/or otherredirected and/or otherwise modified) information logical (to expectednorms) inconsistencies, and/or, as applicable, other biometric and/orenvironment sensed information. In some embodiments, this methodologysupports users, user systems, and/or Stakeholders interacting with otherparties to ascertain and/or authenticate other registered parties'Participant identities, and such identification and/or validation cannormally be performed with great reliability, when employed with PERCosassiduous biometric (and environment) analysis and authenticationarrangements (for example, existential biometrics, Identity Firewallcapabilities, timing and other pattern anomaly biometric liveness signalanalysis, and/or the like).

In some cases, a third party, such as a cloud identity service, mayissue a token certifying the authenticity of the binding between theParticipant identities and associated users or Stakeholders. Forexample, suppose a Stakeholder, Stk₁, registers a Participant identity,PId₁ with a trusted identity manager by securely acquiring andcommunicating an existential biometric information set. The trustedidentity manager may issue a token that Stk₁ in some cases may use toperform PERCos activities (such as, for example, publishing a resourceset) for which the authentication is deemed to have been sufficientlyassiduous. Users interested in using the resource set can evaluateand/or validate provenance of the resource set by validating the issuedtoken.

Authentication methods can be used to assess the validity of claimedidentities of people and/or things, and may involve various strategiesand tactics. Strategies for authenticating a user may involve avalidation of what the user has or has access to (e.g., secure token,biometric certificate, mobile device and/or e-mail account sets), whatthe user knows (e.g., password set, their favorite color and/or otherapplicable challenge and response) and/or what the user is (e.g.,authentication through biometrics such as, for example, facial,fingerprint, iris, retina, cardiovascular, and/or the like recognition).Often an authentication process may involve a matching of informationsets (e.g., password sets, biometric measurements, and/or the like) thatwere provided by, or obtained from, a user at the time of, for example,identity registration, against information that may be provided byand/or obtained from a user when they are authenticated, such asbiometric information. Biometric authentication methods, especiallyassiduous existential authentication methods that prove liveness of aspecific human by, at least in part, recognizing inaccurate, fraudulent,and/or otherwise misrepresentative, biometric information sets as ameans to prevent, for example, such as, to identify, spoofing and/orother improper authentication attempts, so as to, in many instances,provide significant advantages in computing arrangement relatedsecurity, reliability, integrity, and/or the like.

Existential authentication may enable individuals to authenticatethemselves by using one or more liveness detection techniques to capturetheir physical and/or behavioral characteristics and compare themagainst corresponding stored biometric reference information sets. Insome embodiments, existential authentication of an individual mayinclude using challenge response techniques that may or may not requirethe individual's cooperation, that is, they may or may not betransparent to user recognition. For example, authentication processingmay request an individual to blink a specified random number of times,hold up the individual's hands, point their forefinger to the right,and/or read a word or phrase out loud, and/or the like. In othercircumstances, authentication processing may subtly illuminate using anemitting arrangement such as one that emits electromagnetic radiation,with ultrasound, and/or the like, an individual's face to capturehis/her physiognomy, particularly its dynamics over some period of time,and/or any other tangible, physical reactions, including, for example,facial emotional reactions to audio and/or visual user computingarrangement emissions. Such challenge-response protocols may beextremely difficult (and, in many circumstances, either not possible orvery impractical) for aspiring disrupters to fabricate an apparentlyadequate response because of the enormous computational resources thatwould be necessary to even approximate an appropriate response inrelatively real time. Given the situationally specific nature of emitteremitted radiation and the complexity of building real-time biometricallyauthentic appearing responses, parties with malicious intent may beunable to prevent the creation of observable and/or otherwise analyzableanomalies in physical feature dynamics.

Even if, at some point, malicious parties were able to somehow assemblesufficient resources to spoof appropriately detailed human featuredynamics of a biometrically observed individual, they would have togenerate in real time, for example, a video clip that matches theindividual's expected response and then insert it in a manner that doesnot result in unnatural discontinuities and/or other timing anomalies,for example, at the beginning, during, and/or the end of a clip.Discontinuities in the individual's apparent position and/or motioncould be detected, for example, by authentication processing.

Authentication security and/or reliability, can, in many circumstances,be enhanced through the use of situationally unique (e.g.,pseudo-randomly generated) emitter electromagnetic radiation sets and/orsound wave sets, in some instances transparently radiated towards auser. The use of such essentially unpredictable sound and/orelectromagnetic emission sets to expose users and/or their tangibleenvironments can yield biometric liveness and/or other signal sets thatgreatly compound the difficulties facing parties with malicious intentwho attempt to spoof identity authentication by presenting biometricmisrepresentations. In such cases, PERCos supported sensors, such asthose protected by PERCos Identity Firewall sets and/or securelyencapsulated within PERCos Awareness Manager sets, can employreflections (and/or other changes in emitter signals) caused by userinteractions with known (and, in some embodiments, controlled) patternsof emission to demonstrate key aspects of a test subject's tangiblefacial contours and/or other features. Further, with the implementationof PERCos Identity Firewall capability sets, depending on embodiments, alarge portion, to all, remote computing spoofing attacks on a user“local” computing arrangement could be prevented and malicious partieswould have to be physically present in the user computing arrangementlocal environment to successfully carry out an attack.

Existential authentication may further be used in the signing ofpre-published resources, that, for example, remain directly under aStakeholder set's and/or Stakeholder set's agent's (where the agent maybe a Stakeholder Authorized Agent (SAA), such as an authorized employeeof a corporation) control, whereby a resource in preparation may, forpurposes of decryption, access, variably controlled use, may require amatch between a party set attempting to work with such a pre-publicationresource, and their corresponding local administrative network location,and/or cloud identity service, Participant corresponding informationset. In some embodiments, for example, such access and/or modificationrights for a given authorized Employee M in Corporation X's Department Yto work on intellectual property documents may derive from a matchagainst a Corporation X root authority party's (Authority N's)Participant identity, where Authority N has signed or otherwisecertified using (directly or through a service arrangement), at least inpart their assiduous, existentially tested biometric information (forexample, which may be an attribute identifying component of theirParticipant identity set) that such Employee M, as a result, at least inpart of such signing or otherwise certifying, has the right to work onintellectual property in development and research in Department Y andwith such Department Y's documents. Employee M is identified, forexample, through an at least in part existential biometricauthentication of such employee's identity and rights by matchingrelatively real-time—when attempting to access a Department Ydocument—acquired existential biometric information of Employee Magainst his/her Participant identity information, including assiduousbiometric information. Such Employee M can be further authenticated by,for example, a network service, such as Corporation X's and/or CloudService Q's, checking a certificate issued by such corporations rootauthority party Authority N and attached or included in Employee M'sParticipant information set, for example, checking such certification (anetwork service based certificate ensuring such certification has beenperformed) against their stored Authority N Participant assiduousbiometric pattern information and/or performing a “real-time”existential biometric test where Authority N asserts or reasserts suchEmployee M Department Y document usage rights. Assiduous authenticationmay use one or more methods to authenticate users and Stakeholders toprovide sufficient degrees of rigor in accordance with situationspecific context sets, including for example, target purpose sets. Insome embodiments, assiduous authentication may operate over a period oftime wherein the degree of authentication may improve as the assiduousauthentication process proceeds and may include assiduous evaluationand/or validation of the party's target contextual purpose relatedhistorical behavior and related qualities information sets, including,for example, relevant Reputes (such as Creds (including, for example,Creds on Creds), EFs, FFs, and/or the like).

In some embodiments, assiduous authentication of an individual mayinvolve using one or more emitters and/or sensors over differingtimelines and/or periodicity to monitor and/or observe the individualover extended periods of time and may use, for example, one or moreaccumulation techniques to build information sets suitable for rigorousprocessing and evaluation. For example, data capturing monitoring and/orobservations of an individual may be time-stamped and analyzed toextract time-based biometric features and/or patterns, such astime-based gait, and/or physiognomy dynamics, over time patternsextracted from analysis of sequential motion video frames.

User and/or Stakeholder authentication may be performed at a variety oflocations relative to an individual, including within a secure AwarenessManager device in the individual's local computing arrangement,particularly if said device is able to provide assurances to variousparties of its trustworthiness at levels sufficient to satisfy, forexample potentially assiduous, requirements for authenticating humanidentity. In many instances, for example, a cloud-based authenticationmay be provided by a third party that authenticates users and/orStakeholders and, in some embodiments, may issue one or morecertificates, other tokens, and/or the like, expressing quality ofauthentication related information. In some embodiments, theauthentication rigor level for a user and/or Stakeholder set, such as anindividual, P₁, associated with a Participant identity, Pld₁, may, atleast in part, result from:

-   -   Reliability, security, performance and/or trustworthiness of one        or more of P₁'s emitter, sensor, and/or computing arrangements,    -   Reliability, security, performance and/or trustworthiness of        service providers who provide authentication acquisition,        evaluation, and/or validation services associated with Pld₁.    -   Reliability, security, performance and/or trustworthiness of        relevant aspects of “local” to user set computing arrangements,        including, for example, communications between such user set        local computing arrangements and identity identification        related, e.g., authentication, and/or the like, administrative        and/or cloud services.    -   Integrity, timeliness, situational adaptivity and/or        appropriateness, with liveness testing and analysis, of        relevant, for example, Participant and/or the like        associated/incorporated identity biometric templates and/or        related biometric attribute information that can be used as        reference data to perform authentication. Such reference        biometric information, and/or at least in part transformations        thereof, may be employed in user and/or Stakeholder        authentication in conjunction with Identity Firewall related        emitter radiation reflection and/or other user interaction        related information and/or when performing liveness testing,        including when performing timing anomaly analysis using, at        least in part, Participant and/or the like registered and        published assiduous biometric information against such stored        template information.    -   Quality, reliability, security, and/or information        integrity/accuracy of registration services with which P₁        registered Pld₁.    -   The quality of similarity matching and anomaly analysis in        matching user and/or Stakeholder Participant and/or the like        registered assiduous biometric information sets against        situationally differing, subsequently acquired, user and/or        Stakeholder biometric information.

Based at least in part on an evaluation of one or more of the above, thethird party may authenticate p₁ and issue one or more certificates,other tokens, and/or the like, expressing the reliability of, and/or oneor more other qualities regarding the binding between p₁ and Pld₁.

In some embodiments, a registration service that registers human usersand/or Stakeholders may ensure integrity of relevant biometric templatesby providing secure end-to-end arrangements including secure sensor andemitter sets, secure communications means, and/or other elements of userand/or Stakeholder set computing platform arrangements to providebiometric templates and, as applicable, other attributes, which may thenbe analyzed to extract relevant features that are then cryptographicallysigned.

FIG. 4 is a non-limiting illustrative example of user initiatingauthentication processing.

FIG. 4 shows an illustrative example of an existential authentication inwhich a conventional biometric authentication process is enhanced byexplicit or implicit liveness detection challenges that neutralizepotential subversions of a conventional biometric authentication. Inthis example, sensor processing may time stamp captured sensor data toleverage accurate time measurements to establish the time correspondenceand/or alignment of biometric features to extract temporal patterns andfeature correlation analysis which are compared against correspondingbiometric templates in the feature data sequence matching.

In this example, when an individual requests to authenticate himself inpursuit of a target contextual purpose, an identity manager instance mayretrieve the individual's stored reference biometric and contextualtemplates (step 2). Based in part on the retrieved reference templates,the identity manager instance interacts with a PIM instance to determinethe biometric and/or contextual information sets the individual needs toprovide (step 3). The PIM instance, in turn, coordinates with sensorprocessing to agree on biometric and/or contextual information it needsto capture and with extraction/correlation processing to agree on theanalyses of the captured information set (step 4), which are provided instep 5.

FIG. 5 is a non-limiting illustrative example of existential and/orassiduous authentication involving pseudo-random emissions sets.

In some circumstances, the identity manager instance may decide that thebiometric and/or contextual information set provided by the individual,and/or otherwise observed, is not sufficient. In such circumstances, asshown in FIG. 5 , the identity manager instance can initiate a challengeand response protocol by retrieving from the repositories theindividual's biometric and/or contextual information sets (Step 1) andthen interacting with the PIM instance to determine the challenge (Step2). The PIM instance, in turn, initializes pseudo random generator (togenerate unpredictable, randomly generated emission instruction set),sensor and emission processing, extraction/correlation processing, timeanalyzer, pattern matching processing (Step 3). Sensor and emitterprocessing, in turn, instructs the emitter set to paint the individualand at least a portion set of the individual's computing arrangementenvironments and the sensor set to subsequently capture the reflectionand/or responses of the individual and/or individual's environment,which is then processed and matched against the stored biometric and/orcontextual information set and transmitted to the identity managerinstance (Step 4).

The combination of biometric feature extraction and liveness detectionsupported by an accurate time base, such as that provided by one or moresecure clocks, may in various instances, make it more difficult fordisrupters to subvert reliability and/or integrity of identities. Aparticular liveness determination may, for example, comprise capturingand analyzing changes to certain facial features in response to visiblelight exposure from an emitter, where emitter illumination intensityalternates between two levels with level durations determined by valuescreated by a pseudo random generator. In some embodiments, such changesmay result in corresponding (approximately) time synchronous changes inthe size of the user's pupil which may be easily evaluated by biometricauthentication techniques (and, in some instances, by using timinganomaly analysis), but nearly impossible to replicate by an imposterusing a video representation of the user. In fact, the changes inillumination could be subtle enough such that the imposter may not evenbe aware that liveness detection is taking place.

In some embodiments, users, and Stakeholders, may establish, and/orotherwise specify, associated with a Participant identity set, that suchParticipant identity set is provided with an authority to act on behalf,at least in some manner for some activity set, for such authorizingParticipant and/or like party set, where such authorized set has, atleast, for example, under certain specified conditions, such authorizedauthority. Under such circumstances, such user and/or Stakeholderidentity related information can be associated with one or moreParticipant identities such that such Participant identities includeappropriate authorization information enabling such as applicable usersand Stakeholders to fulfill, for example, certain target contextualpurpose sets, and/or otherwise, including, for example, delegating atleast a portion of such authority to one or more other parties. Forexample, suppose a Stakeholder agent is a division manager of Company Z,and is responsible for publishing software packages. The divisionmanager may bind himself to a Formal resource instance by registeringand publishing a Participant identity that satisfies such conditions asnecessary to provide such Participant resource with sufficient authorityfor the division manager to delegate publishing to another Stakeholderemployee or to a secure computing arrangement to perform softwarepublishing for such division for such company.

In some embodiments, differing authentication methods may providevarying degrees of security, reliability, trustworthiness, and/or thelike, and hence, may be assessed as having sufficient rigor for a userto authenticate a Participant identity so as to acquire differentauthorization privileges, and/or the like. In instances wheresubstantial sums of money may be at risk—for example, when an individualwishes to transfer a large sum of money from one bank, B₁, to anotherbank, B₂—the individual may need to be authenticated using an assiduousmethod that provides a very high degree of security and reliability,such as, for example, authentication based at least in part onassiduously generated multimodal biometric information sets.

In some embodiments, authentication of individuals using multimodalbiometrics may provide a higher degree of security and reliability thanusing a single modal biometric. In such authentication processing,individuals are observed using multiple sensors to capture multimodalbiometric characteristics and corresponding biometric information setsare fused and/or otherwise integrated and/or evaluated using a commontime base, so as to extract time correlated patterns among various modalfeatures. Non-limiting examples of such types of embodiments include:

-   -   Recognition of speech phonemes in voice and corresponding lip        movements    -   Speech phoneme recognition, lip movement, and facial expression        analysis    -   And/or the like.

For example, authentication processes that use multimodal biometricsbased on captured video and voice information sets may correlate facialexpressions with speech and compare dynamics across said informationsets against previously registered templates that correlate speechphonemes with facial expressions for a given individual.

Other biometric functions that may be correlated, include, for example,breath analysis, auditory techniques for evaluation of cardiovascularfunction, other cardio information (for example, data derived fromaudio, video, pressure, and/or other sensors), various other sensing ofvein patterns, sub skin pattern detection and the like, all of whichmay, further, be associated with a time base so that time based anomalydetection methods may be employed.

In some embodiments, security and/or reliability of authentication maybe enhanced by tracking one or more biometric features over time. Forexample, image analysis of facial expression characteristics may becarried out continually (or continuously) over a period of time viavideo sequence acquisition. Such multiple sensing event basedauthentication methods insures that an individual's Participant identityis not hijacked during that time, through for example, evaluation of thesensing event sequence for continuity and/or “normal” patterns ofexpression and/or behavior and/or the like. Such continual/continuousmonitoring protocols in many instances may substantially limitopportunities for a disrupter to intercede, undetected, into anindividual's initially legitimate operating session.

Individuals may also have rhythms when interacting with their computingenvironment, such as, for example, keyboard typing patterns (such as,for example, rhythm, speed, and/or the like), speech characteristics(such as, for example, timbre, intonation, and other speech phoneme)pen/finger movements as they move about computer screens (such as, forexample, stroke, pressure, shape, and/or the like). Thesecharacteristics may include one or more timing-related computationalinformation sets, such as, for example, representing frame rates,network timings, local and/or remote clocks and/or other timing-relatedcomputer domain information.

Historically, biometric techniques support capturing, analyzing and/orextracting representations of one or more anatomical, physiological,and/or behavioral characteristics, singly or in combination, in supportof registration, authentication, and/or in otherwise acquiring identityinformation for an individual and/or group of people. Biometrictechniques may provide support, for example, for individualized accesscontrol to environments, services, content, and/or the like, and/orotherwise identifying individuals and/or sets of people who have beenmonitored by, or initiated, biometric testing procedures. Generallyspeaking, different techniques provide varying degrees of integrity,rigor, security and/or reliability, qualities that may depend on theconditions of the environment in which a biometric measurement is made,that is, different biometric techniques may have differing degrees ofsuitability for differing circumstance sets.

In some embodiments, liveness detection techniques may deter and/orotherwise impede imposters from masquerading as legitimate, for example,other specific, human users and Stakeholders, by inserting forgeries ofphysical and/or behavioral biometric characteristics into a biometricinformation determination (capturing and extracting), authentication,and/or related event management and/or communication process set.

In some embodiments, liveness detection tests may expose a personundergoing authentication to dynamically, such as pseudo-randomly, settime-varying patterns of external challenges, and/or exposures toemitter emissions, to elicit corresponding time-varying changes in oneor more of the person's biometric corresponding sensor receivedinformation sets. Such liveness detection tests may or may not requireconscious response. In some embodiments, such pseudo-random patternand/or emitter signal set may employ a shared secret—which may beuniquely shared by specific user sensor and/or emitter sets and may beprotected within an Awareness Manager or Identity Firewall hardenedenvironment—with one or more administrative and/or cloud services,enabling secure instructions and/or updates to be transmitted to suchemitter set and enabling at least one of such service set to uniquelyidentify the specific, dynamically selected pseudo-random emitterparameters as may be, for example, encrypted and securely bound with itsassociated sensor including information set, and where, for example,such pseudo-random selection and management emitter processes may be, atleast in part, conditioned by one or more services that support, forexample, one or more of the following:

-   -   selecting one or more specific emitters,    -   specifying signal strength sets which may be situationally        relevant as to, for example, user computing arrangement physical        environment considerations for any given such biometric signal        acquisition process set,    -   security rigor level, power consumption and/or other efficiency        considerations,    -   establishing the duration and/or periodicity and/or random        sequence of emitting process sets,    -   and/or the like.

In some circumstances, it may be desirable to perform liveness detectiontesting either transparently to a user set, or in as unobtrusive and/ornatural manner as possible, such that the subjects of liveness detectiontests may not be aware or fully aware that the tests are taking placeand/or may not need to consciously cooperate with at least one or moreportions of such testing.

In some embodiments, as with the foregoing, a liveness detectionprocessing element may receive a control specification set from anauthorized manager and/or at least in part managing service (such as,for example, an identity manager cloud service) expressing one or moreparameters and/or conditions for performing a given liveness detectiontest set. For example, suppose an individual, I₁, is the subject of aliveness detection test. A control specification set may specify to anemitter set located, for example, in a PERCos Awareness Manager, tochange the illumination emitted towards (and/or otherwise in theenvironment of) I₁ to cause measurable changes in his pupil diameter,iris characteristics, and/or other facial properties. Such lightingchanges may evoke changes that can then be evaluated as to theirconsistency with known, related assiduously acquired I₁ biometricfacially related information, for example, evaluating consistency withI₁'s known response pattern information. This form of liveness test, onethat is supported by a “challenge” (in this case, the illuminationpattern set) may be very difficult to impossible for animposter/malicious party to predict and/or replicate, particularly whenthe timing and/or extent of, for example, illumination, conditions aredynamically determined in an essentially unpredictable fashion by, forexample, a pseudo random generator. Further, such liveness tests mayoffer situationally sufficient assiduousness in defining and/or testingbiometric identity attribute sets, particularly when combined withPERCos timing anomaly analysis and secure, and in some cases hardened,components and/or devices such as Identity Firewalls, AwarenessManagers, and/or other hardware and/or software based methods forsupporting acquisition, processing, and/or communication of identityrelated information sets.

In some PERCos embodiments, a combination of one or more of livenessdetection approaches may be used in support of assiduous, at least inpart biometrics based registration and/or authentication of individuals.A non-limiting set of example approaches includes:

-   -   Instructing an individual to read a set of words that are        dynamically selected from a data base, a subset of which may        have been spoken previously by the tested individual and stored        by the testing authority, providing means to capture and analyze        voice timbre, intonation, and/or other speech phoneme patterns.    -   Using a user set computing arrangement display set and employing        content display positioning and/or other content composition        arrangements (based, for example, on content location, lighting        and/or contrast intensity, color use, and/or the like) so as to        induce reflection and/or other emission interaction information        indicative of true, real-time response to an emitter output set,        such as eye location and other responses, such as retina sizing        and change dynamics, color reflection patterns from human facial        features, and/or the like.    -   Using techniques that establish 3D physical presence of an        individual, such as 3D scanning and/or video protocols and/or 2D        image acquisition over time, with a calculation of a reliable,        corresponding 3D image pattern set, and testing movement in time        of such 2D and/or 3D sets for dynamic sequence biometric        liveness integrity, where such testing may assess, for example,        progressive unfolding of a test subject's facial changes and        analyzing for its correspondence to normal, and/or such        individual's registered, biometric across-time facial change        attributes, including, for example, testing for timing anomalies        indicating attempts to insert misrepresentation information.    -   Using 2D video acquisition, particularly in combination with        secure data transmission, and/or challenge/response protocols.    -   Assessing gait characteristics using, for example, gyroscopic        and/or accelerometer sensors on a mobile device.    -   Fingerprint and/or wrist surface (e.g., as may be acquired by        wearing a wrist band set) and/or the like detection that        includes measurements “local” to detecting arrangement        including, for example, body surface temperature, heart and/or        blood flow activity (e.g., pulse and/or blood flow        dynamics/distribution characteristics indicative of distinctive        to unique specific human identifying information), other        cardiovascular information sets such as distinctive and/or        unique vascular patterns, and/or the like.    -   Using sensing systems that recognize general human presence,        such as those that make use of thermography and NIR (near        infrared) radiation, in some embodiments in support of biometric        tests capable of assessing properties indicative of specific        individuals.    -   And/or the like.

In general, subversion of liveness tests by external attack may be atleast in part impeded through secure data transmission protocols and/orby secure sensor environments, such as provided by Awareness Managerand/or the like components and/or appliances, that in some embodimentsmay cryptographically sign data streams produced by an authentic sensorset and/or emitter set. Attempts to subvert liveness tests locally by anindividual who has direct physical access to the normal testingenvironment may present at least in part other challenges. Such localsubversion attempts, for example, may be, in some embodiments, unimpededby secure data transmission or by secure sensing environments and/orprotocols, but may be, for example, disrupted or prevented bychallenge/response protocols, multi-modal biometric acquisition and/orauthentication, biometrically produced, situationally specific, acrosstime sensor information timing anomaly analysis, and/or identity relatedcomponent and/or device and/or appliance physical hardening methods.

In some embodiments, one or more features of a human set's tangiblepresentation, through activity, tangible physical characteristics,behavioral characteristics, response to stimuli (evident and/ortransparent), and/or environmental conditions (e.g., the quality ofnoise in a given user computing arrangement's room) that occur(s) overone or more periods of time, may be captured and analyzed to extractpatterns, and examined for anomalies, that, can be employed inauthentication, reality integrity analysis, and/or the like processes.In some circumstances, such PERCos capabilities can significantlycontribute to establishing existential biometric authentication, where,in combination with other PERCos capabilities, a user and/or Stakeholderset can have a very high level of confidence, after the performance oftiming anomaly authentication procedures, in the authenticrepresentations of other parties, not only for Participant and/or thelike representations, but for all forms of resources which areexistentially biometrically vouched for by, for example, theirpublishing human Stakeholder (including, for example, Stakeholder agent)set, and/or the like.

Time-based testing, in some embodiments, may involve capturing andanalyzing activities/behaviors and, in some embodiments, matching themagainst previously established one or more time-based identity referencesets. In some instances, situationally specific contexts may requirevarious types of time-based tests, including those that, depending onembodiments, and/or circumstances (including, for example, specificationrequirements), may or may not involve liveness detection.

In some embodiments, timing anomaly detection may support livenessdetection by assiduously observing a user set and/or other party set inthe vicinity of at least a portion of such user set computingarrangement, across one or more time intervals, in “real time” toextract relevant biometric and/or contextual features and patterns. Suchinformation may then be compared, including for example, similaritymatched, against features and/or patterns that have been previouslyestablished and/or calculated (including, for example,contemporaneously) for such same user set, and/or for “normal” behaviorfor a person and/or at least a portion of such user set, and/or fortangibly and/or behaviorally similar persons as represented by feature,feature transition over time, and/or other pattern information. Suchinformation may further include employing operating session patterns todetect one or more variations in features that differ from normal and/orexpected results by a degree that exceeds, for example, some specifiedparameter set, such as, a threshold set, deemed to be indicative of thepossibility or determination that said results represent inauthentic,spoofed, or otherwise misrepresented biometric information. Feature andpattern sets may, at least in part, for example, be determined byexperts, by one or more algorithms (which may include, for example,estimation of network or other communication variances, for exampleusing packet inspection or other techniques) image, audio and/or otherbiometric sensor input evaluations and/or any combination of theforegoing.

For example, suppose an interloper, ilp₁, tries to substitute apre-recorded video segment of a previously authenticated person, psn₁,to transfer funds from psn₁'s bank account to ilp₁'s bank account, orstudents taking an online closed-book examination try to subvert theirown biometric video streams to cover inappropriate behavior, such aslooking at reference materials for answers. Such disrupters (e.g., ilp₁and students) would have to interject their content seamlessly, whichwould require that they were able to ensure that their recorded video,and any other sensor information (which for example may be transmittedin an encrypted form as part of that stream and/or through a furthercommunications means) matched the live video feed, and any associatedinformation sets, at the point of insertion and thereafter. Doing thisin the time available, without creating a detectable (by either humansand/or machines) discrepancy is extremely challenging and likely notpossible, at least given current technology knowledge.

In some embodiments, temporal anomaly detection services may besupported, in part, by a trusted clock that appends cryptographicallysigned timestamps to sensor data. Such timestamps may enable anauthentication process to detect potential inconsistencies, includingtime sequence delays presented as timing anomalies in a sequence “flow”of video information events. For example, suppose that a biometricliveness testing procedure uses a sensor to capture a testedindividual's movement, such as lifting the individual's hand, over aperiod of time. An interloper attempting to insert inauthenticinformation in place of true sensor data must generate and insert into adata stream the individual's movement in a temporally consistent mannerthat doesn't create anomalies in the sequence of time stamps.

FIG. 6 is a non-limiting illustrative example of a trusted clocksupporting existential authentication.

For example, as shown in FIG. 6 , suppose a user set, U₁, interacts witha remote resource set, RS₁, over a slow internet connection and thattypical latencies for the connection between the two parties are between40 and 80 milliseconds. If RS₁ includes a process that involvesreal-time authentication of U₁, such latency would result in significantand varying delays between the times when biometric sensor data isgenerated by U₁'s computing arrangement and when it is received by aremote authenticating process. This uncertainty of approximately 40milliseconds in the receipt of sensor data may, in some instances, besufficient imprecision for an interloper to avoid detection wheninserting false content into an authentication data stream process.However, use of a trusted clock in, for example, a hardened buscomponent or computing arrangement attached component set or appliancein the form of an Identity Firewall, or an Awareness Manager withIdentity Firewall and/or in a CPFF firewall, that is in close proximityto the sensors (e.g., less than 1 millisecond round-trip latency) mayallow sequential elements in a data stream to be timestamped withsubstantially smaller imprecisions, thereby greatly enhancing thecapabilities of authentication processes for detecting potential timinganomalies.

FIG. 7 is a non-limiting illustrative example of trusted clock withproof of delivery.

To further support efforts to counter attacks from interlopers, someembodiments may make use of trusted clocks that are able to: i) decryptencrypted challenges issued from authenticating processes; and/or ii)generate cryptographically signed proof of delivery of such challenges.For example, as shown in FIG. 7 , such proof of delivery maysignificantly reduce the amount of time that an attacker has to respondto an authentication challenge. FIG. 7 shows one non-limiting embodimentof an authentication challenge and response that proceeds through thefollowing steps:

-   -   1. An authenticating process, for example, in the cloud, sends        an encrypted authentication challenge, such as, for example, an        instruction to emitters in an Awareness Manager (and/or other        identity related system protecting one or more biometric        sensor/emitter sets), where non-limiting examples of        instructions may include:        -   a. Instructions and/or directives to be understood by, and            expected to draw a response from, a user, such as, for            example, written instructions on an LED display, an audio            command output through a speaker, and/or the like. In some            embodiments, such visual and/or audio instructions may be            selected from an extensive database, and/or the like, using            pseudo random and/or other essentially unpredictable            methodologies.        -   b. Instructions to “paint” the user environment with, for            example, electromagnetic radiation and/or sonic emissions,            in a manner that, in some embodiments, may be transparent to            users. Such emissions may be intended to elicit sensor            detectable one or more, in many instances user specific,            human physical reactions (e.g., dynamics and extent of iris            size changes) and/or to assist in acquiring images of a            user, for example, over a time period in which, for example,            lighting conditions may be varied in an essentially            unpredictable manner.    -   Such encrypted challenge may be produced by a cryptographically        secure pseudo random generator and/or may be otherwise        essentially unknowable to a potentially disruptive human and/or        process before its conversion to plaintext, and as a        consequence, an attacker may not be able to determine the nature        of the challenge during a time period that may be available for        effectively spoofing an authentication event.    -   2. On receipt of an encrypted authentication challenge, the        trusted clock sends a time-stamped proof of delivery message        back to the authenticating process. This time-stamp precedes the        first opportunity that the attacker has, as described in the        next step, to see the plaintext contents of the encrypted        challenge.    -   3. The trusted clock forwards the authentication challenge as a        plaintext, encrypted, and/or mixed set message to the user's        computing arrangement and such challenge may be instantiated by        an Awareness Manager and/or the like within and/or in proximity        to such computing arrangement. Such challenge may be enacted by        one or more emitter sets which may, for example,        -   a. comprise an HMI device set such as, for example, a            speaker and/or an LED that delivers a message, such as, for            example, “raise your right hand”, to the user, and/or that            directs the user to communicate a second factor, for example            biometric, identity associated password, and/or the like.        -   b. trigger emission of electromagnetic radiation and/or            ultra-sound to paint a user environment, in a pattern that            may have spatial and/or temporal components.        -   c. And/or the like    -   If a displayed to user message is provided, then this may, in        some instances, be the first point where such a challenge can be        interpreted as plaintext, and therefore the first point at which        a potential interloper might gain sufficient knowledge to        generate false biometric information sets. In such processes,        malicious parties and/or processes may have no possible or at        least practical means to gain knowledge of biometric and/or        other challenges with sufficient time to effectively spoof such        authentication, and/or the like identity related, processes        unless such interloper set has gained physical access to the        user computing arrangement environment and/or has at least in        part control of sensor devices not protected by an Awareness        Manager and/or the like.    -   4. The sensors measure the human and/or physical response to the        user interpretable challenge and/or the emitted signal set one        or more reflection and/or other interaction based information        sets and send corresponding response information back to the        trusted clock which adds appropriate one or more timestamps and        signatures to, for example, the one or more sensor information        sets.    -   5. The trusted clock forwards the securely time-stamped, signed        biometric information set to the authenticating process as, for        example, an encrypted, bound together, virtually, and/or in the        same information package set, information set of time-date one        or more stamps, emitter composition information (e.g., pattern        information and/or the like, such as “employed ultrasound        Pattern XYZ156 for 5 seconds after time stamp 0 until time stamp        20, and Pattern BTU198 for 5 seconds after time stamp 20 until        time stamp 40”; or “action taken, initiate ultrasound, employed        pseudo-randomly generated sound wave pattern set with x to y        then y to x continuously varying amplitude at time 1 and time        2”) and/or sensor information sets. The authenticating process        may then correlate and/or otherwise analyze the combination of        the time-stamped sensor/emitter information sets to check, for        example that:        -   a. Sensor detected electromagnetic and/or sonic radiation            indicative of user set and/or physical environment elements            is consistent, and based on, for example, physical laws,            with the radiation that emitters were instructed to            generate. For example, electromagnetic and/or ultra-sound            emissions may be expected to be reflected off a human face            in a way that is consistent with results obtained from            facial recognition processing.        -   b. Human responses to emissions are normal and/or as            expected. For example, if a user set is exposed to a            transparent-to-user change in lighting, authentication            processing may examine the sensor information set to detect            an expected response in the human user's pupils, and one            that may be consistent with known (e.g., those obtained            during a registration process) specific user set responses.        -   c. Human responses to HMI directives are as expected. For            example, if a human gets a directive to raise his or her            right hand, the authenticating process may analyze the            response to detect the appropriate human response.    -   In some embodiments, such analysis processes may be based, at        least in part, on determinations of temporal accuracy and/or        consistency. For example, emitters may have been instructed to        change the frequency of emitted radiation in a particular        temporal pattern and the authenticating process may then check        that the corresponding sensor set have detected the same (or        otherwise correlating) temporal pattern in the reflected        emissions and that this pattern has consistent time-stamps with        no timing anomalies.

In some embodiments and circumstances, for example if a user computingarrangement display arrangement has been compromised, or if a sensorarray is physically in the user computing arrangement environment andoriented to effectively acquire needed information, an attacker may havea chance to observe a challenge after a trusted clock has sent, forexample, to a remote cloud or administrative identity servicearrangement, a time-stamped proof of delivery, and such relatedcryptographic capabilities have decrypted an associated challenge. Butthe attacker then must generate deceptive one or more false responses inthe time that it would take for the challenge to be delivered to theuser and for the sensors to measure the response of the user. Moreover,the authenticating process has access to accurate timestamps of thetimes when the challenge was delivered and when the user's responsesoccurred, and, if a time stamp processing arrangement is sufficientlysecure, an attacker will not be able to produce corresponding timestamps that spoof such relevant biometric arrangement.

In some embodiments, monitoring for timing anomalies may be undertaken,for example, by a PERCos monitoring service instance, which may then,for example, on detection of an event, pattern or other information thatvaries sufficiently from the specifications being operated upon by thatmonitoring service, generate an event, exception and/or other message toone or more other resources, for example to a PERCos exception handlinginstance. This process may result in a user being warned as to theevent/exception, and/or one or more other resources being invoked to,for example, undertake further evaluations and/or take one or moreactions, such as suspending the current operating session.

In some embodiments, a variety of identity-related testing methodologiesand/or techniques may supplement biometric techniques to provideenhanced assiduous authentication in accordance with situationallyspecific context. Such methodologies and techniques may be used to, forexample:

-   -   Evaluate and/or validate the provenance of identity information        sets (including biometric and contextual information sets) and        algorithms used to perform authentication. For example, suppose        an individual such as a user or Stakeholder registers the        individual's biometric Participant identity with an identity        manager, IM₁, using an emitter/sensor set, SPK₁.        Identity-related testing methodologies may enable assessment of        the reliability of the individual's identity information set by        assessing IM₁'s identity attributes such as associated Repute        and/or the like Creds, EFs, and/or FFs, as well as attribute        filtered Cred and Aggregate Creds asserter contributing parties        (for example for contributing to creating, or filtering, to find        specification matching existing Aggregate Creds) in accordance        with user set EF and/or FF attribute priorities expressing        SPK₁'s reliability (e.g., consistency, trustworthiness, and/or        the like), reliability of the communications path between SPK₁        and IM₁, reliability of system components, such as CPFF and/or        identity manager arrangements, and/or the like.    -   Acquire environment related pattern information, for example,        including analyzing consistency of environment and/or activity        related information sets, such as, for example, information sets        provided by motion sensors in a phone held by a user, and/or        background information sets in a video clip of a user, such as,        people, animals and/or other objects in the background. The        foregoing may include, for example, acquiring pattern        information related to a portable user computing arrangement's        motion movement patterns, personal location route movement        patterns (routes walked and/or other physical movement, for        example at work and/or at home) including vehicular travel        routes, and/or the like, altitude, temperature, humidity, other        weather pattern information which may be acquired transparently,        as background and/or otherwise incognizant to user sets. In some        instances, analysis may involve determination of consistent        motion of objects (e.g., a moving car) or, for example, changes        in object brightness when subject to, for example, dynamically        set changes in illumination.    -   In some embodiments, a user's computing arrangement may be        instructed by an authentication process to acquire environment        information by producing sounds and/or electromagnetic radiation        that are dynamically set, for example, by pseudo-random emitter        instruction generator, and that can be measured by the user's        computing arrangement sensor microphone, time stamped, and        relayed back to the authentication process, and sound        reflections, for example, in a room or a vehicle or other        environments that have reasonably consistent acoustic        signatures, can be stored and periodically (or continuously)        monitored by using sound emissions from a controlled emitter to        identify differences identified between, for example, current        tested sound reflection pattern sets and stored, corresponding        to such location and/or other environment reference sound        patterns. User set computing arrangement sensor acquired        reflected sound or electromagnetic radiation, when compared to        stored, signature for such environment reflection sets, may        present anomaly sets indicating or demonstrating malicious        spoofing. Such attempts, for example, at malware and/or signal        (reflected) substitution, may demonstrate environment changes        compared to expected environment characteristics, as represented        by registered, stored environment attribute information sets.        Such changes from expected reflected information sets may        indicate that corresponding user computing arrangements are not        located at their respective claimed location and/or are not        associated with a claimed user set. Further, timing anomalies        resulting from, for example, failure to, in a timely manner,        provide appropriate sound (and/or electromagnetic radiation)        reflection information to appropriate user computing arrangement        subsystems, such as an Identity Firewall and/or to a remote        identity administrative and/or cloud services, may demonstrate        an attempt to employ unauthentic user and/or resource sets.        When, for example, a transparent, pseudo-randomly generated        signal set (such as electromagnetic or inaudible sound wave) is        projected to a computing arrangement user set, any attempts, for        example, to build an information set that would appear to be,        for example, a 3D video representation of an authorized party        with the appropriate transparent reflection information sets        superimposed as reflected sound and/or such radiation, would        take material time from a video sequence standpoint and cause        delays in such spoofing activity sufficient to cause an anomaly        set indicative of a spoofing attempt.    -   Validate the presence and/or identify the absence of human        habitual characteristics. Humans are normally behaviorally and        physiologically at least in part consistent, that is, humans        are, by and large, habitual beings. There are many activities        that, varying by individual, form patterns of considerable        consistency and frequency. Employing and accumulating human set        usage patterns and relationships such as employing human motion        and route detection techniques to formulate representations of        individual and/or group human gait, and using GPS and/or        cellular and/or the like positioning technologies (e.g., as may        be found in smart phones, watches, computers, game sets, and/or        the like) for monitoring and pattern accumulation and pattern        relationship analysis and attribute mapping providing map        locations (e.g., frequent trips to two different coffee shops,        one near work, one near home), movement tempos, specific routes        and repeated variations thereon, and/or the like, as behavioral        identity attributes, as well as employing spoken (i.e.,        vocalized) word and phrase patterns accumulated as patterns        having varying frequencies and relationships. Such monitoring of        user set vocabulary usage, semantic and syntactic usage patterns        can employ microphones in many portable, electronic devices        (e.g., acquired by using microphones in smart phones, computers,        and/or the like) and, as with other behavioral identifying        attribute sets described herein, can be monitored and        accumulated as marker attribute patterns for human sets. In some        embodiments, such sets can be used in any applicable combination        as use identifying information sets, along with other        identifying information, such as user and/or Stakeholder        existential biometric information. In some embodiments, user or        Stakeholder set human habitual attributes may be monitored and        compared with known habits registered and published as attribute        information associated with, and/or included within, Participant        information sets.

In some embodiments, identity-related testing methodologies may involvemultiple devices and communication channels, which may requiresuccessful attackers to compromise multiple devices and/or communicationchannels in order to falsify identity-related testing, such as testingfor registration and/or authentication. For example, biometricauthentication of a person based at least in part on video data providedby an internet or otherwise cellular and/or other communicationtechnique set connected camera may be supplemented by an analysis ofmotion sensor data provided by a phone that the person is holding, wheresuch phone user computing arrangement serves as an independent, secondfactor authentication channel. In some embodiments, identity-relatedtesting methodologies may enable analysis of video streams forindications of how, where, and when the person's user may haveinteracted with the phone, that is, patterns of mobility andcorresponding usage, such as specific calls and patterns extractedtherefrom, and validate that this information is consistent withinformation provided by the sensors in the phone during some currenttime period. In some instances, if the person is not holding a phone,such checks may be initiated by challenging the person to pick up thephone. It may be that the camera capturing video input is on a differentdevice than the phone and may use a different communication channel. Anattacker attempting to falsify sensor data may have to adapt data fromone sensor to match with data being provided from another sensor,compromise both devices, and/or compromise communication channels—thatis, redundant, independent cameras and communication channels may beused simultaneously to validate, and mutually confirm, that informationreceived sufficiently matches information stored, for example, at acloud identity service in the form of, for example, a Participantregistered and published information set.

In some embodiments, identity-related testing methodologies may includeByzantine fault tolerance algorithms to provide correct results evenwhen one or more identity testing techniques (such as independentauthentication processes) fail in isolation. For example, authenticationprocessing may use four different assiduous techniques to compensate fora single failure, use seven assiduous techniques to compensate for twofailures, and so on. For example, suppose a user, John Doe, a governmentemployee, is working on a highly classified project. For Mr. Doe toenter into a sensitive compartmentalized information facility afterhours, the facility's master Awareness Manager (AM) may employ foursubordinate AM sets, where each AM set has its own sensor setscomprising one or more of a fingerprint scanner, microphone to capturevoice patterns, iris scanner, and/or video camera to capture gait andfacial movements Each AM set has its own authentication process set thatuses differing algorithms to process its sensor captured informationsets (including, for example, algorithms for performing multimodalanalysis) and compare them using an associated repository that containsthe reference information set. In this example, even if one subordinateAM set is compromised or fails for whatever reason, the master AM canuse Byzantine fault tolerance algorithms to correctly and assiduouslyauthenticate Mr. Doe.

PERCos resource and/or resource portions may be supported in someembodiments by some or all of differing resource interface and/ordescriptive information attribute format and/or components. PERCosresources may be provided in the form, for example, of Formal resources,Implied resources, Ephemeral resources, and Compound resources, whereall resources except Ephemeral resources have persistent, operativelyunique identities (e.g., they should not be ephemeral or intentionallytemporary and unreliable as an identity, along with any enforcement ofthis criteria depending upon the embodiment). PERCos resource portionsmay inherit the form(s) of their parents. For example, a PERCos resourceportion may be of the form, Formal resource portion, if its parent is aFormal resource. Resource portion sets, which may be part of the sameparent or of differing parents, may be arranged into composite resourceportion sets.

In some embodiments, resource portions may have attributes comparable,at least in part, to published PERCos resources such as Formalresources. For example, an author of a chapter of a reference book canbe registered as an author Stakeholder for a resource portion of suchreference book.

In some embodiments, resource portions may be published as parts of aresource set. If published in their own right as resources as declaredby specification, they become resources in their own right so long assuch publishing satisfies any minimum requirements to qualify as aresource. In some embodiments, resources may be published as compoundresource sets comprising a master/senior resource set, and constituentresources that are identified both as component resources and resourcesin their own right. In some embodiments, if a resource portion ismodified, it becomes a new resource and may have provenance informationregarding its modification, though if published separately from itsparent, it may share identifier information with its parent source andmay, if having been modified, share such identifier information, forexample, in the form of having an, in part, new version number. Such newversion number indicates such resource portion is a revised version ofits previous form, as a portion of its original resource set. If theparent was XYZ book, and the portion was Chapter 10, and it was modifiedand separately published, Chapter 10 may now have dates for publishingof the parent and the revised portion, and its identifier might, forexample, be XYZ4/2008Chapter10V2-6/2013 where XYZ4/2008 represents theidentifier for the parent and the portion Chapter10V-6/2013 representsthe revised portion of the parent. In such a case, resource portions mayhave a provenance information set comprising, for example, in part:

-   -   A unique identifier for identifying the specific resource        portion.    -   Reference to parent resource provenance identity information.    -   Navigation interface for accessing resource portions within        their respective parent resource one or more sets.

In some embodiments, identities of resource and resource portion setsmay, for example, provide for the following one or more identity relatedattribute capabilities and/or other considerations:

-   -   Root assiduous identity information sets, which may include        assiduous biometric identity information sets and associated        methods, such as liveness tested, including time anomaly        assessed, existential biometrics (e.g., iris, retina, vascular,        eye tracking, cardiovascular functions such as circulatory        pattern and heart rhythm information, and/or 3D facial movement)        representing/describing one or more attributes of one or more        Stakeholders associated with a resource set and/or one or more        attributes of Stakeholder employee or consultants, agents,        and/or the like of a Company X. For example, John Doe is Company        X's Vice President Resource Authenticity, and may act as an        agent for Company X through the use of his Participant biometric        and other identity information employed in biometric        authentication processes for matching against biometric        evaluation of his live participation in Company X Formal        resource publishing instances. Mr. Doe can certify and register        Company X PERCos published Formal resource instances. John Doe        has further biometrically certified employee John Smith's        registered, published Participant identification set as        conveying that John Smith may also certify publications for        Company X, but limited to Department Y publications.    -   For example, suppose a mathematics professor at MIT authors a        book on group theory. The book's assiduous information set        attribute information may contain and/or reference one or more        attribute sets of the professor. Such attribute sets of the        professor may be resource sets and as such, may have one or more        attribute sets, such as, Cred and/or Effective Fact attribute        sets, containing and/or referencing one or more Creds (published        by other mathematics professors), asserting and/or otherwise        establishing or indicating the professor's expertise in group        theory. In some embodiments, attribute sets, AS₁, such as, for        example, Cred attribute sets, may have one or more Cred        attributes (i.e., Cred on Cred) asserting, for example, AS₁'s        Quality to Purpose (i.e., Cred assertions asserting Quality to        Purpose of other professors' opinion of the MIT professor in        relationship to group theory expertise).    -   This close binding of resource sets with their identifiers and        other identity attributes of such Stakeholders supports users'        and user systems' abilities to effectively evaluate and/or        validate, including explore from various perspectives and        attribute combinations and see aggregations of such Quality to        Purpose assessments as regards a potentially boundless resource        opportunities cosmos. This cosmos may be, for example, populated        by purpose class, domain, user and/or class associated, and/or        dynamically specified resource sets, in a manner that can        greatly reduce the access obstacles, including obscurities and        risks, that are currently associated with interacting with        resource sets of unknown or previously unknown existence,        provenance, and/or usage consequence implications, including        Quality to Purpose considerations, by enabling users and user        systems to reliably use novel standardized and interoperable        approximation, contextual purpose, and resource and resource        attribute capabilities and capability combinations, to identify,        evaluate, provision, and/or operationally manage internet        supplied resource sets.    -   In some embodiments, assiduous biometric information sets of one        or more human Stakeholders may be bound directly together with        secure metrics, such as cryptographic hash functions, where such        binding, for example, may involve plural arrangements of hashes,        such as, for example, Merkle tree implementations, and may        encompass, for example, cryptographically protected information        that represents existential liveness tested biometric        Participant template information representing one or more        Stakeholders, and, for example, further comprising one or more        digital hashes representing at least one or more portions of a        resource set's constituent elements. Such techniques may be        used, for example, with a PERCos Formal or Informal resource        set, or the like (where, for example, Stakeholder certification        may be declared, for example, with Informal resource sets, where        such Stakeholder and such inferred certification, such as an        inferred Stakeholder publisher certification based at least in        part on the Stakeholder's publisher related information, may        further employ publisher reputation information).    -   In some embodiments, for example, “hashed” resource identity        attribute constituent elements may include Formal or Informal        resource and/or the like subject attribute information        comprising, for example, a hash of a software program that is        the subject of such resource, as well as a hash of at least a        portion, respectively, of the resource's purpose class        information, metadata, certain associated Repute information        sets, including, for example, Stakeholder Effective Fact        information, and/or the like, and wherein such hash information        set can bind constituent component information together        (directly and/or virtually, e.g., by pointers) and both reliably        identify and operationally secure/ensure any such resource. As a        result, in combination, for example, with appropriate resource        validating cloud service(s) and PERCos Identity Firewall        capabilities, the resource and/or its constituent component        information can be reliably authenticated, in part, for example,        as a result of use of PERCos assiduous existential “liveness”        biometric and time anomaly tested identity information being        hashed and bound to other such resource elements secured        information. As a result, under many circumstances, a user set        can be assured that the resource set being used is reliably the        unaltered resource set intended to be used, since the user set        is relying on the direct assertion of one or more reputationally        respected and/or otherwise considered appropriate authorizing        parties as proffered by liveness tested existential biometrics        of their respective one or more Stakeholders and/or authorized        (which may themselves be existentially certified) agents, and/or        sufficient to the purpose multi-factor challenge and response        and/or the like validation techniques.    -   Initial information set provided by one or more direct        Stakeholders at the time of their publication, which may        include, for example:        -   i) one or more descriptive CPEs and/or the like purpose            specification sets, which may, for example, include            contextual purpose classes and/or other purpose            neighborhoods, contextually relevant other specification            sets such as CDSs, Foundations, Frameworks, and other            Constructs and/or other specification information,            including, for example, Stakeholder Repute resource sets            expressing, in part, one or more assertions as to a resource            set's Quality to Purpose, for example, to one or more            contextual purpose class specifications, Repute Facets (for            example, quality to one or more CPEs as to reliability,            efficiency, complexity, cost, and/or the like), and/or the            like;        -   ii) descriptions of resource characteristic sets, which in            some embodiments may, at least in part, include Master            Dimension and/or auxiliary specification information sets,            metadata, and/or the like;        -   iii) one or more control specifications, such as, for            example, policy sets and/or rule sets for resource set            usage;        -   iv) one or more attributes referring to and/or containing            Stakeholder information set and/or other provenance            information, such as, for example, the publishers, creators,            distributors, owners/users, modifiers, and/or the like of            resource sets;        -   v) relevant Reputes of Stakeholders, reflecting, for            example, one or more expressions of the quality to specified            purpose of any one or more provenance Stakeholders. Such            information may include, for example, other party Cred            and/or Aggregate Cred Quality to Purpose assertions            regarding Stakeholder sets, Effective Facts, Faith Facts,            and/or the like, including, for example, Creds asserting            Quality to Purpose metrics relevant to Stakeholders'            competency in producing quality subject matter for a            resource contextual purpose class (e.g., a high quality            reference resource for a certain contextual purpose class or            other, persistently referable, purposeful resource            neighborhoods);        -   vi) and/or the like.    -   Inferred resource information set, such as, for example:        -   Information set that may be inferred by being a member of            one or more contextual purpose classes and/or other purpose            neighborhoods, and/or otherwise being directly inferred from            information regarding shared attribute one or more sets,            associations with past user sets and/or attributes of any            such user sets, and/or past operating performance attributes            of any such resource set, such as efficiency, cost of            operation, reliability, conflicts with other resources            (e.g., compatibility), and/or the like. For example, suppose            a resource set is a member of a purpose class P₁, which is            related to another purpose class, Q₁. In some embodiments,            the resource set may have an inferred information set            comprising for example class attributes of class Q₁, class            P₁, superclasses of class P₁, and superclasses of class Q₁,            which may be employed in generating a contextual purpose            neighborhood based at least in part on such attributes where            resource “members” are, at least in part, weighted in            prioritizing of overall Quality to Purpose by the relative            closeness of such class attribute sets similarity matching            to a user CPE set or Purpose Statement, which may be further            weighted in prioritization by, for example, Repute Creds            and/or other prioritization considerations.        -   Information set that may be inferred from the relationships            a resource set, RS₁, may have with other resource sets            and/or objects during fulfillment of a purpose set, such as,            for example, RS₁'s any environment sets, other resource            and/or resource portion sets that may fulfill, or otherwise            contribute to the fulfilling of, a user contextual purpose            set, and/or the like. In some embodiments, a resource set            may have relationships with other resource sets whose            provenances include Stakeholder Participant resource sets            that may affect the resource set's Quality to Purpose            generally, and/or Quality to Purpose reliability,            efficiency, cost-effectiveness, user complexity, and/or the            like considerations. In some embodiments, provenance            information sets associated with a resource set may            represent a dynamic network of identities (which may be            existential biometric identity sets, situationally            associated identity sets such as including previous owners            who used a resource set for a given contextual purpose set,            and/or the like), and identity attribute sets of interacting            resources and/or resource components, for example, as            associated with a given target contextual purpose and/or            contextual purpose class and/or other purpose neighborhood.        -   And/or the like.    -   Repute and/or the like (such as, Creds, EFs, FFs, aggregate        Creds, compound Creds, Creds on Creds, regarding resource sets        and/or any applicable form of Creds on Stakeholders of resource        sets (which may be Participant sets), and/or the like)        attributes that may be accumulated and/or aggregated over time        in a periodically, to effectively continually, expanding,        resource set organized Quality to Purpose attribute information        ecosphere. In some embodiments, one or more acknowledged Domain        experts for a resource set may evaluate and/or validate a        resource set and publish a Repute instance asserting Quality to        Purpose, generally, and/or to specific Facet types; users who        have used a resource set may also publish their Quality to        Purpose perspectives and/or EFs and/or FFs (the latter in        accordance with embodiment policies) regarding published as one        or more Creds and/or aggregate Creds; and/or the like, creating        information ecosphere Creds and Aggregate Creds and Creds on        Creds. When such a Repute expression set, Rep₁, is incorporated        as one or more identity attributes of a resource set, RS₁, the        direct Stakeholders of Rep₁ are considered to be indirect        Stakeholders of RS₁.    -   Historical attributes related to resource set usage may, in some        embodiments, accumulate over time and reference usage associated        contextual purpose classes and/or CPEs and/or the like,        Participants and/or other resource sets and/or user sets and/or        conditions. For example, consider a resource set, RS₁. As users        use RS₁ to fulfill their respective contextual purpose sets, RS₁        may accumulate historical information sets, such as RS₁'s Repute        Quality to Purpose metrics in fulfilling user purpose sets,        relationships RS₁ may have with other resource sets (including,        for example, Participants), for example, in support of one or        more target contextual purpose sets, and/or the like.    -   One or more resonance algorithms and/or other resonance        specification sets that, in some embodiments may, in conjunction        with associated resource one or more sets and/or one or more        resource sets that may serve as one or more component sets of a        resource set, support any such resource set and/or contributing        resource set in contributing input regarding optimization of a        target contextual purpose specification set so as to contribute        to optimized interim one or more result sets and/or user set        purpose fulfillment Outcomes.    -   Information sets regarding storage of resource sets, such as        storage locations of resource sets and associated storage        schemas, including resource set access operating constraints        (e.g., time to retrieve, associated costs, and/or provisioning        considerations), interface information, and/or other access        considerations, such as access rights for accessing a resource        set (and which may, for example, include restrictions associated        with storage of the resource set), the protection of storage        and/or resource sets and/or portions thereof (such as, for        example, a resource and/or portion set may be encrypted and        signed), distribution of storage (for example, a resource set        may be stored in multiple locations to provide fault tolerance),        and/or the like. For example, storage information set may        include the usage of one or more cryptographic hash functions to        protect one or more attributes of resource sets, one or more        specification sets that define policies and/or rules for        accessing the stored resource sets and/or parts of thereof,        and/or policies for secure communications between user sets and        storage sets, and/or the like.    -   Metadata information specified, and/or inferred and/or otherwise        interpreted, so as to produce or declare attributes and/or        ephemeral attribute information. For example, consider a CPFF,        CPFF₁ that specifies operating considerations for, and enables        users to, explore fixed income investments. One of CPFF₁'s        metadata elements describes that CPFF₁ specializes in, and        covers, exploring convertible bonds for its users where value        amounts do not exceed $100,000.00 per transaction. As CPFF₁ is        used, it may accumulate historical usage pattern information        showing preferences associated with CPFF₁ based at least in part        on the similarity matching of this metadata to user target        purpose set activities. One or more attributes may represent        such accumulated historical pattern of a resource set's        metadata.    -   And/or the like.

In some embodiments, identity attributes, such as, for example,contextual purpose expression variables, such as purpose class verband/or category domain types, attributes expressing contextual purposeexpression Facet elements and metrics (such as Quality to Purpose,Quality to Reliability, and/or the like) and/or CDS sets, may bestandardized and interoperable to support, in part, efficient andeffective approximation, identification, evaluation and/or validation,similarity matching, selection, prioritization, management, and/or thelike of resource sets in fulfillment of target contextual purpose sets.Other attributes, such as attributes containing and/or referring to freetext metadata, may be informal and/or in some embodiments, may beexplicitly formalized for standardization and interoperability,including where relevant, for example, being combined with values and/orother metrics as expressions of attribute qualities. In someembodiments, informal attribute sets may over time become formalized(i.e., standardized and interoperable) so that they can be moreeffective in corresponding to user classes and supporting humanapproximation relational thinking, and the expression, for example, ofCDSs and the identification of resource sets that may optimallycontribute to fulfillment of target contextual purpose sets. Forexample, suppose a resource set, RS₂, a purpose class application thathelps users explore fixed income investments, has a metadata identityattribute that states that it specializes in convertible bonds of greenenergy companies. In some embodiments, identity attributes may bemodified over time, including, for example, expansion, reduction, and/orediting of attribute types, metrics, types and expression elements forrelated metadata, and/or the like, by one or more direct Stakeholders,which may further include information provided by new directStakeholders. For example, biometric attributes may change asindividuals get older; Stakeholders may modify policy sets and/or rulesets that define access to their resource sets and/or parts thereof,and/or the like. Further, standardization for interoperability standardsfor resource sets, for example, for contextual purpose classes, may bemodified over time, including, for example, expansion, reduction, and/orediting of standardization of resource expression types and elements,where such modifications may be implemented by experts working with oneor more standards bodies, including, for example, identity, resourcemanagement, and/or purpose expression cloud service providers (forexample, utility service providers), and/or by authorities associatedwith one or more affinity groups where such standardizationmodifications, including enhancements and specialized, applicablestandardizations for respective groups, may be, for example, implementedfor its members, group operations, and/or interfacing therewith.

In some embodiments, there may be a diverse range of centralized and/ordistributed registration/publishing publication service arrangements,from “large” highly reputable services to “small” boutique services toorganizations (such as large Corporation X) to affinity groups (NationalAssociation of Y). A large publication service may be willing to publisha wide range, potentially all forms, of resource types, whereas aboutique publication service, SERV₁, may specialize in resource setsthat fulfill purpose sets in Domains of the SERV₁'s focus area(s), whilean affinity group and or organization service serves their constituentsand perhaps external parties interacting with such organizations and/ortheir constituents. For example, a small boutique publication servicemay specialize in publishing resource sets that fulfill purposes relatedto green energy. In some embodiments, a unifying service arrangementmay, for example, establish and/or otherwise support one or more of:

-   -   1. interoperability contextual purpose expression standards, for        example for Master Dimensions, Facets, and metrics for        expressing values associated therewith.    -   2. purpose classes by, for example, having experts associated        with domains related to human knowledge and activity areas        define contextual purpose classes and where service arrangement        further supports the population of such classes with “member”        resource sets.    -   3. a consistent root unique identifier schema enabling unique        reliable, persistent identifiers for each respective resource        instance (and may further establish and support a persistent,        reliable resource portion identification schema, and allocate or        otherwise make available name ranges and/or other sub-domain        and/or explicit instance sets of identifiers that it allocates        and/or delegates to other parties, such as name/identifier        services and/or to organizations, either as a component of,        and/or in response to, a publishing service publishing process        set, and/or during a registration/publication service        arrangement implementation and/or maintenance updating process        set.    -   4. a diverse set of registering/publishing arrangements, which        it supports as a unifying service arrangement, performing the        functions of an underlying global utility and/or standards body        service set for one or more services described above in items        1-3, and supporting plural separate service arrangements        providing Stakeholder and/or user sets with choices and        competitive service offerings. Such unifying service arrangement        may license such service providers to Stakeholder and/or user        set organizations.    -   5. resource information knowledge bases comprising one or more        of:        -   a. resource information indexes of resource attribute and/or            other metadata information, including, for example,            contextual purpose expression information;        -   b. purpose class, domain category class, persisted            neighborhood, user class, environment class, and/or resource            class information structures, including, for example,            enumerating resource members of the foregoing, relationships            among elements such as resource members of the foregoing            and/or between the foregoing class instances,        -   c. maintenance, operating, and expression capability sets            including, for example, associated programming language(s);            updating mechanisms (add, delete, modify, combine, inherit            and/or the like); information access interfaces, for            example, supporting technologies such as faceting,            thesaurus, semantic (e.g., semantic search), knowledge            graph, and/or the like operations and representations; and            associated relational capabilities, for example, in support            of relationships between class instances and/or class member            instances of such publishing related classes; for example,            the foregoing used for user and/or Stakeholder interface            arrangements for resource information organization,            identification, exploration, evaluation, purpose application            formulation, provisioning, management, and/or like            capabilities.    -   6. publishing service arrangements that provide, for example,        user contextual purpose specification associated resource        subscription, purchase/acquisition, rental, and user set and        related affinity group membership rights management related        support.    -   7. storage and/or linkage to storage locations information and        interface knowledge bases for PERCos embodiment operative        resource stores that correspond to resource information sets        (PERCos and/or the like resource sets such as Formal and/or        Informal resource sets).

In some embodiments, different publication services may providediffering sets of services and tools and apply differing publicationstandards depending on rights, cost-related factors, efficiency,operational overhead, and/or the like. For example, publication servicesmay provide a wide range of capabilities that Stakeholders may use, inaccordance with their contextual requirements, such as, for example:

-   -   Validation that a resource set complies with one or more        relevant publication standards.    -   Secure binding of root identity information set of resource set        with assiduous biometric identity information sets and        associated methods, such as, liveness tested existential        biometrics of one or more direct resource Stakeholders.    -   Formulation of identity attribute information sets associated        with their resource sets, such as root identity information set,        which such attribute information sets may, for example, include        provenance information, purpose-related information sets (such        as one or more descriptive CPE sets, purpose classes and/or        other purpose neighborhoods, and/or the like), Reputes of        resource sets and/or direct Stakeholder sets, and/or the like.    -   Organization, publication, distribution, and/or management of        identities, identity attributes, and/or other identity-related        information sets. Such organization, publication, distribution        and/or management may facilitate effective and efficient        discovery of resource sets in fulfillment of one or more purpose        sets. Some publication services may, for example provide        fault-tolerant distributed publishing services by using        strategies supporting independent operations (such as Byzantine        algorithms).    -   Protection of sensitive and/or otherwise valuable resource sets        and their associated applicable information store portions from        unauthorized access, tampering, substitution, misrepresentation,        and/or the like, for example, through the use of,        -   Stakeholder identity attribute set validation, such as, at            least in part, existential biometric validated access            control,        -   information encryption,        -   other certification of resource sets and communications            information,        -   resource and information storage redundancy,        -   contextual purpose fulfillment related operational fault            tolerance and network caching and other efficiency            optimization designs.        -   and/or the like.    -   Evaluation and/or validation of identifier and applicable        identity attributes of resource sets, for example, at least in        part through validation of resource Stakeholder existential        biometric information certifying resource sets (and/or        attributes thereof) and binding such biometric attribute        certification information to corresponding resource sets and/or        attribute information in a manner supporting subsequent such        resource sets certification and/or other validation techniques.    -   And/or the like

In some embodiments, publication services may have one or more Reputes,such as Aggregate Creds, representing assertions regarding suchpublication services and/or their Stakeholder one or more agents (suchas owners, principal executives, and/or the like), various Qualities toPurpose, as well as Effective Facts, relevant to evaluating suchpublication services, that potential resource creator Stakeholders mayevaluate and/or validate to select a publication service set (andStakeholder publishers) that may be optimal for their requirements basedat least in part on such information. For example, such Quality toPurpose information may include Quality to Purpose values fordistribution of home energy efficiency improvement softwareapplications. For example, suppose C₁ is a creator of a purpose classapplication, PCA₁, that enables users to explore green energy solutionsfor their homes, such as solar panels, insulating windows, and/or thelike. C₁ may evaluate and/or validate various publication services toidentify and select a publication service that specializes in publishinggreen energy related resource sets. In contrast, a creator of a moregeneral purpose resource set may wish to evaluate and select based upona wider audience and software publishing application area, by selectinga publication service that has a larger and less specialized user base,such as distributing home construction, maintenance, landscaping,liability, permitting, and related applications. Such a broaderpublishing firm may be evaluated with a Cred and Aggregate Creds fordistributing home energy efficiency improvement software, which may beimportant to such Stakeholder C₁ for evaluation purposes, but whereStakeholder C₁ sees that such broader publication service organizationis less focused on their specific contextual purpose class, and wants apublisher with a primary focus on C₁'s market.

In some embodiments, publishers (and/or other Stakeholders, resourceservice providers such as identity/attribute service organizations orother arrangements) of a resource set that is a member in a plurality ofpurpose classes, for example, different, relational, parent, and/orchild classes, may or will (as may be policy and/or otherwise specifiedby a publication service's standards body and/or utility) publish aclass membership listing of declared, by direct, and/or by indirect,Stakeholders, resource set class membership lists and/or othermembership representations, for the perusal of users and/or otherStakeholders to support evaluation of the focus emphasis of a givenresource set, and/or associated direct Stakeholder relevant party set(e.g., a Stakeholder publisher such as a publishing entity), as regardsa user set target contextual purpose (e.g., a resource Stakeholdercreator). Such listing may indicate revenue, interest, work productpercentage (number of offerings), internet activity such as postingsand/or the like, focus of discussion materials, investment in supportservices (e.g., relative support), and/or the like priorities and/orother priority information for one contextual purpose class and/or otherclass set versus, and/or otherwise relative to, other contextual purposeclasses for said same Stakeholder set, and/or a reliably, persistentlyidentifiable portion thereof (such as a Stakeholder division,department, subsidiary, and/or the like). Such information mayillustrate approximate Stakeholder interest, focus, activity, commercialresults from, and/or the like, relative to a PERCos embodiment one ormore classes, such as Purpose and/or Domain classes. Such informationmay also be ascribed to Stakeholders by indirect Stakeholders, such asRepute Cred asserters and/or the like.

In some embodiments, publication services may apply standards thatdirect resource Stakeholders of a resource set may need to comply with,such as, for example:

-   -   Providing sufficient assurance of assiduous authentication of        direct Stakeholders, where in cases where Stakeholders are        organizations rather than humans, there may be chain of        authority that includes one or more individual authenticating        humans. One or more direct Stakeholders may provide assurance        by, for example: i) assiduously authenticating themselves as        associated with the publication services; ii) providing one or        more cryptographic tokens signed by a trusted third party        certifying the assiduous authentication of one or more direct        Stakeholders, and where such assiduous authentication may, for        example, involve providing assiduously produced existential        biometric identification information for such purposes.    -   Purpose-related information sets, such as, for example, one or        more descriptive CPE sets, descriptive characteristics (which        may include one or more particularity management attribute        and/or Resonance and/or the like specification sets), one or        more control specifications, and/or the like. Such        purpose-related information sets may include one or more methods        that users may use to:        -   Evaluate and/or validate a resource set Quality to Purpose,            as purpose is specified by associated contextual purpose            specification information (e.g., specific purpose), such as            Quality to Ease-of-use, Performance, Reliability,            Trustworthiness, Cost value, and/or the like.        -   Evaluate and/or validate a resource set's ability to adapt            to situation-specific conditions, such as its ability to            meet situational operating specification requirements for            trustworthiness, reliability, authenticity, performance,            cost, compatibility, and/or the like under varying            conditions such as, for example, specific user CPE,            Foundation, and Framework combinations and/or resulting            events such as subsequent operating requirements, threat            conditions, and/or the like.        -   And/or the like.

In some embodiments, Stakeholders—which include herein, as applicablefor biometric assessment, Stakeholder agents such as employees,consultants, and/or the like—may provide certain information for aresource set, RS₁, by using one or more standardized and interoperableidentity attributes (where an attribute may be a tuple comprising name,value(s), and zero or more methods for confirming the value), which may,in any of the examples below, take the form of an attribute setcomprising a value set being associated with an attribute type and/ormay include assertion information as, for example, expressed in the formof Repute Creds, and/or the like, associated with a contextual purpose:

-   -   Quality of Biometric Identity Attribute (i.e., Quality to        Purpose Biometric Identity as associated with one or more        purpose specifications), whose value represents the degree of        assurance of the binding of Stakeholders regarding claimed        tangible world presence, for example, derived from, at least in        part, the number, type, and/or quality of biometric sensor tests        (where such tests may or may not be existential). For example,        suppose a Stakeholder of a resource set undergoes biometric        sensor tests based at least in part on retinal scan, fingerprint        analysis, and voice analysis. A utility may provide a composite        value of 6 out of 10 for Quality of Existential Biometric        Identity Attribute. Alternatively, if the Stakeholder undergoes,        in addition to the foregoing tests, liveness testing based at        least in part on, for example, blood flow monitoring, sub skin        analysis, and thermography, the utility may provide a higher        score, for example, 9 out of 10. The utility may further        provide, if an assiduous PERCos Identity Firewall arrangement        was employed, along with associated biometric information timing        anomaly analysis, an even higher score of 9.9 out of 10 (or 10        out of 10, at least, for example, over a going forward time        period such as 60 months, which could be renewed or        alternatively reassessed automatically on a periodic basis and        altered sooner if appropriate, or retested using, for example,        upgraded biometric testing, firewall, and/or timing anomaly        analysis capabilities as may be required, as well, with other        Creds). In some embodiments, the Quality of Existential        Biometric Identity Attribute may have one or more methods that        can be used to assiduously confirm its value, and which methods        may be respectively applied at least in part according to        required or desired reliability/trustworthiness rigor level        and/or other situational considerations.    -   Quality of Liveness Attribute (i.e., Quality to Purpose        Liveness), whose value may be based at least in part on the        degree of assurance of the liveness of a Stakeholder within a        defined period of time based at least in part on timing and        unfolding biometric dynamic feature characteristics. Such timing        may involve a time period, and/or set of time periods (which may        be pseudo-randomly selected and applied), and performed within        the boundaries of the time period which RS₁ is published. Having        the degree of assurance of the Stakeholder's existential        physical presence at RS₁'s publication time can, under many        circumstances, provide additional information on the integrity        of RS₁. In some embodiments, the Quality of Liveness Attribute,        for example, timing anomaly analysis, can be incorporated into a        Quality of Biometric Identity Attribute. Such Quality of        Biometric Identity Attribute (or Quality of Liveness Attribute),        may be tested against stored, for example, Stakeholder        Participant information, to establish that the Stakeholder (or        Stakeholder's agent) in fact corresponds to the asserted        Participant identity, and wherein such, for example, published        Participant identity information set employed the same or        substantially comparable, or at least comparably rigorous,        Quality of Liveness timing techniques for assuring the presence        of the biometrically assessed party.    -   A specification requirement and/or user set selection or        decision to authenticate the bound resource and Stakeholder        biometric information set, by user set and/or user set computing        arrangement and/or identity/resource cloud utility initiating a        liveness-tested recertification. Such process may be conducted,        for example, in response to a direct user set and/or computing        arrangement request and/or with user set computing arrangement        participating, and/or otherwise monitoring, the authentication        process, where such liveness tested bound resource        set/Stakeholder biometric information is matched against such        resource set information (including biometrics) available to        such user set.    -   Quality of Resource Provenance Attribute (i.e., Quality to        Purpose Resource Provenance), whose value(s) may comprise the        degree of assurance of RS₁'s provenance information or subsets        thereof (the Quality of Resource Provenance may vary between,        for example, a Stakeholder resource publisher, a Stakeholder        resource creator, and Stakeholder resource owners. In some        embodiments, RS₁'s Quality of Resource Provenance Attribute sets        may contribute to RS₁'s Quality to Purpose, including, for        example, Quality to Purpose Reliability, Quality to Purpose        Trustworthiness, and/or the like.

Publication services may publish a resource set by providing, forexample, means to produce (and maintain) for use with, and securelyassociated to, PERCos resource sets, resource provenance informationwhere such information may include, at minimum, for example, Stakeholderpublisher identification information. For example, suppose a publicationservice publishes a resource set. Such publication service may provide,through an assiduously publisher produced identifier set, means forobtaining, or otherwise provides directly with the resource, Stakeholderattribute identification information sets, which at minimum includes thepublisher identification information set, but may also include one ormore other direct Stakeholder identification information sets (such ascreators, distributors, and/or the like). In some embodiments, any suchStakeholder information set may be complemented by one or more Cred, EF,and/or FF information references, such as, for example, information inthe form of, or extracted from, PERCos Formal resource instance Reputesets, and where such information is employed as an attribute set in userand/or user computing arrangement resource set resource evaluationand/or for otherwise informing one or more metrics, such as, forexample, a calculation of a resource set's Quality to Purpose, and/orthe like.

In some embodiments, Stakeholders may express situation-specificconditions regarding resource sets by associating one or more identityattributes in terms of contextual variables that express aspects of anyspecifiable, relevant, and employed contextual information, such as, forexample, verb oriented (published as effective for students of basicphysics, not instructors of basic physics (that is learn basic physicsversus teach basic physics)), functionality, efficiency, complexity,length, sophistication, productivity, financial cost, reliability,security, integrity, minimality, adherence to specifications,combinatorial consequences (with other resource sets) such asreliability and efficiency and including, for example, use with usercomputing arrangement Foundations, Frameworks, and/or the like. Forexample, in some embodiments, a publisher of a financial purpose classapplication, Fin-PCA₁, may provide identity attributes, including forexample, a “security” attribute with a value of “high,” a “reliability”attribute with a value of “medium-high” using qualitative values, “low,”“low-medium,” “medium,” “medium-high,” and “high,” and/or the like.Indirect Stakeholders, such as, for example, financial securitiesexperts, may publish one or more Repute Creds, representing theirassessments of the publisher Stakeholder's attribute assertions and/orprovide assertions for the same Quality to Purpose attribute and/orother contextual attribute variables, and may have, or see, theirassertions being combined into average, aggregate values employingavailable such assertions and/or such aggregations of asserterStakeholder assertions (e.g., indirect) where Stakeholder's and/or theiragents (authorized employees, consultants, and/or other agents) meetcertain criteria, such as having EF degrees in finance and/or yearsemployed as financial analysts (e.g., with major investment banks,mutual fund companies, and hedge funds), popularity in total numbers of“friends,” visits to their website(s), age range, nationality, and/orthe like qualities. Users, who have used Fin-PCA₁, can publish one ormore such Creds using their Participant identity as their Stakeholderidentity, expressing their own assessment of Fin-PCA₁ in terms of, forexample, Quality to Purpose metrics, such as, for example, overallusefulness, its reliability, ease of use, and/or the like. Suchpublished Cred assertions may be processed and associated with Fin-PCA₁as one or more identity attributes, and/or may be otherwise discoverableby users as relevant commentary on at least one or more aspects ofFin-PCA1.

In some embodiments, expressing contextual variables as resourceidentity attributes, and/or as values of identity attributes, maysupport one or more capabilities of one or more identityinfrastructures, that, for example, may:

-   -   Assert contextual relevance of a resource set as relates to one        or more contextual purpose sets and/or Purpose Statements and/or        the like;    -   Associate one or more methods for evaluating and/or validating,        including, for example, testing and/or, as consistent with        purpose related specifications, updating, attribute contextual        variables;    -   Aggregating one or more contextual variables (e.g., attributes)        into a composite contextual variable, which may be, for example,        represented as a resource attribute in the form of a CDS;    -   Define relationships between contextual variables and        identities, identity attributes, and/or the like;    -   Organize resource sets based at least in part on their        contextual variables;    -   And/or the like.

In some embodiments, experts, trusted utility services, and/or otherStakeholders (indirect, unless also publisher of the subject of theRepute instance, such as Cred) may publish one or more Reputes and/orthe like that express their validation/assessment of identities and/oridentity attributes of a resource set, such as its reliability,functionality, performance, and/or other situational relevance aspectsfor one or more purpose sets. Stakeholders of such Repute set, R₁, mayassociate one or more Repute sets (such as, for example, EffectiveFacts) with R₁, asserting their expertise and/or trustworthiness. Forexample, consider a purpose class application, PCA₁, for exploringnuclear physics. An acknowledged Domain expert, ADE₁, after evaluatingPCA₁, may publish a Repute, Rep₁, expressing ADE₁'s assessment of PCA₁'sfunctionality and also associate one or more of ADE₁'s Repute set withRep₁, such as Effective Facts expressing ADE₁'s qualifications, such as,for example, ADE₁ is a full professor of physics at an Ivy Leagueuniversity. In some embodiments, an association of, for example, ADE₁Effective Facts to Rep₁—as well as, for example authenticationinformation for such R₁—may be provided by including and/or otherwisereferencing ADE₁'s registered and published Participant resource set,P₁, which may contain such Effective Fact information, as well as, forexample, existential biometric authentication information certifyingboth Rep₁ and P₁. P₁ may further include Aggregate Cred, ARep₁, fromfull and associate tenured professors of physics at accredited NorthAmerican universities ranking their aggregated, averaged view of thequality of university physics and applying a ranking Cred according tosuch group's ranking determination algorithm employed involving theassertions of such professors and producing an Aggregate Cred, ARep,wherein such Aggregate Cred value, ARep₁, is associated with ADE₁Stakeholder declared university's Department of Physics as an associatedreputation value set for a Stakeholder Effective Fact and associatedthrough, for example, a Stakeholder Effective Fact and, for example, anassociated Repute Cred for the subject matter of the Effective Fact, andassociated reputation value set may stipulate for ADE₁ to specify thatEffective Fact and ADE₁'s university, where ADE₁ is a full professor asan aggregate filtered Cred value for Quality to Purpose educationaluniversity of 9.5 out of 10.

In some embodiments, a resource set may have one or more methodsassociated with its identities and/or identity attributes, for enablingdynamic evaluation/determination of the extent to which a resource set,in whole or in part, satisfies an associated prescriptive one or moreCPE sets, for example, as declared as contextual purpose class sets,and/or the like. Such dynamic determination may be obtained through theuse of one or more PERCos Platform Services, such as, for example,Evaluation and Arbitration Services, Test and Result Services, and/orthe like. For example, a resource set, RS₁, may have an identityattribute comprising a contextual variable, CV₁, for expressing RS₁'sdegree of reliability of authenticity, where CV₁ is a tuple comprisingtwo elements, (V₁, method M₁) and (V₂, method M₂), in which method M₁enables evaluators to check the credentials of a trust utility servicethat asserted value V₁, and method M₂ enables users and/or PERCosprocesses on their behalf to perform assiduous evaluation of thesituational identities of RS₁'s Stakeholders, such as, for example,RS₁'s creator(s), publisher(s), distributor(s), and/or the like, wheresuch assiduous evaluation of situational identities of RS₁'sStakeholders may have recursive properties. For example, suppose S₁ is aStakeholder of RS₁. Assiduous evaluation of S₁'s situational identity,SID₁, may include evaluation of relevant Repute sets associated with S₁,which, in turn, may involve evaluation of the identities and identityattributes of the asserters, publishers, distributors, and/or the likeof the relevant Repute sets.

Based at least in part on the evaluation of such methods, an evaluatormay publish one or more Repute Creds asserting the validity of thesevalues. For example, an acknowledged Domain expert, ADE₁, havingevaluated method M₂, may publish a Repute set, Rep₂, certifying thevalidity of V₂ and associate one or more methods that evaluators can useto evaluate ADE₁'s assessment. In such a case, users and/or user systemsmay accept such certification at face value, assess Creds or AggregateCreds on Rep₂, and/or evaluate methods ADE₁ provided regardingperforming Rep₂ to validate ADE₁'s assessment.

FIG. 8 is a non-limiting example of Repute set combinations.

In some embodiments, one or more contextual variables may be aggregatedinto a composite contextual variable. For example, a trust contextualvariable may be a composition of the following contextual variables:

-   -   Non-bypassability: A non-bypassability contextual variable that        expresses the degree of non-bypassability of a resource set for        enforcing its specification, such as, for example, privacy,        integrity, reliability, and/or the like. For example, suppose a        resource set, such as a gateway/firewall, RS₁, has a        specification set asserting that it blocks all unauthorized        traffic coming into its protected environment. The degree of        RS₁'s effectiveness in satisfying its specification set depends        on the degree of non-bypassability of its protection mechanisms.        Such degree of RS₁'s effectiveness may be expressed as a        contextual variable    -   Resource and/or process isolation: An isolation contextual        variable that expresses the degree of isolation a resource set        and/or a process set may provide. For example, an operating        system may include apparatus and methods for isolating resource        sets and/or process sets to prevent them from interfering with        one another.    -   Encryption: An encryption contextual variable that expresses the        strength of encryption algorithms in terms of, for example, the        types of encryption algorithms (such as, for example, 3-DES,        AES), the length of the key, and/or other representations of the        strength of the algorithm.    -   And/or the like.

In some embodiments, contextual variables may have relationships withidentities, identity attributes (including other contextual variablesthus forming compound contextual variables) comprising, at least inpart, discretely identified sets of plural contextual variables, and/orthe like. For example, consider the contextual variable, CV₁, describedabove, that is associated with resource set RS₁. Identity infrastructuremanagement may be used to maintain relationships, such as, for example,

-   -   Relationship between contextual variable CV₁ and acknowledged        Domain expert ADE₁, who published the Repute set Rep₁, asserting        the validity of V₂ using method M₂; and    -   Relationship between contextual variable CV₁ and a Repute set,        Rep₂, describing, for example, ADE₁'s credentials, which ADE₁        had associated with Rep₁. For example, suppose an acknowledged        security Domain expert, ADE₁, evaluates the effectiveness of an        Awareness Manager, AM₁, in supporting assiduous acquisition of        existential biometric identities of users and/or Stakeholders.        ADE₁ may publish a Repute, Rep₁ that expresses AM₁'s        effectiveness in terms of one or more contextual variable sets.        Such contextual variable sets may have a relationship with one        or more Reputes associated with ADE₁, such as Rep₂, asserting        ADE₁'s expertise in evaluating Awareness Managers.

Some embodiments may use identity capabilities to arrange and/orotherwise organize resource sets based at least in part on theircontextual variables. For example, consider gateways/firewalls. TheirStakeholders may have published one or more Repute sets asserting theirfunctionality, security, efficiency, and/or the like in terms of one ormore contextual purpose information sets. For example, a softwarearrangement uses a security method, and such security method isdescribed as an attribute of the software, and an aggregate Repute byexperts on that attribute gives it 8/10 Quality to Purpose for securelymaintaining information. Identity organization management service mayprovide a multi-dimensional infrastructure to organize firewalls, whichmay include in some embodiments, PERCos CPFF and/or Identity Firewalls,based, at least in part, on their contextual variables, such as,functionality, security, and the performance they may provide. Forexample, one dimension may organize firewalls based at least in part ontheir functionality, another dimension on their security, and/or thelike.

In some embodiments, contextual variables may be associated with one ormore metrics that express the degree of situationally relevantcapabilities, e.g., as associated with CPE, Purpose Statement, and/orpurpose operating specification set, that a resource set, process setand/or operating session set may provide, be capable of, assert, and/orthe like. In some embodiments, identity organization management servicemay enable a combination and/or simplification of these metrics tofacilitate comparison of situational relevance conditions. For example,in one embodiment, there may be a trust metric that summarizes aresource's non-bypassability, resource isolation, and encryptionmetrics, and returns a composite result expressed as a number on adefined scale (such as a scale from 1 to 10). Quality to PurposeParticularity, whose value(s) may comprise the degree to which RS₁supports minimality, Coherence, isolation, efficiency and/or the like.For example, there may be two CPFFs, CPFF₁ and CPFF₂, that fulfill thesame target purpose sets, such as secure social networking, but mayprovide differing Quality to Purpose Particularity. CPFF₁ may providevirtual machine isolation by depending on a Foundation set may have ahigher Quality to Purpose Particularity than CPFF₂ that provides sandboxisolation using underlying operating system.

In some PERCos embodiments, identities and identity attributes may haveone or more methods that can be used to evaluate and/or validate theirQuality to Purpose in fulfillment of one or more target purpose sets.Users and user systems may use such associated methods to evaluateand/or validate identities and identity attributes to assess a resourceset's quality in fulfilling contextual purpose sets. Creators of aresource arrangement set, such as, for example, a CPFF, may also wish toevaluate and/or validate the minimality, authenticity, suitability,combinatorial consequence set of use with other resource sets, and/orthe like of one or more candidate resource component sets contemplatedas comprising and/or serving as component elements of a resourcearrangement set.

In some embodiments, the degree of rigor of evaluation and/or validationof a resource set's Quality to Purpose, Quality to PurposeTrustworthiness (may be identified as a subset consideration for Qualityto Purpose), and/or the like, may depend on the user'ssituation-specific contextual purpose, Purpose Statement, purposeoperating specification contextual relevance specification sets, and/orthe like. In some cases, users interested in pursuing high valuefinancial transactions may require a high degree of assurance of thereliability and trustworthiness of a resource set, such as may resultfrom an assiduous evaluation of the resource set's available provenanceinformation, which may involve, for example, evaluating and/orvalidating identities of relevant Stakeholders in real time by accessingtheir, for example, existential biometric reference data, and associatedStakeholder evaluating (assertions concerning) Creds, available andrelevant Effective Fact set, and Creds upon such fact set.

In some cases, evaluation and validation may be recursive. For exampleand without limitation:

-   -   The evaluation of the Participant identities of Stakeholders may        include the evaluation of relevant Reputes such as Creds, EFs,        and/or FFs. In some cases, the evaluation may go up a        Participant chain of authority to employ a human more senior,        for such circumstance, Participant identity (such as, for        example, executive who is a root authority for Corporation X in        charge of certifying the certifier agents acting for the        organization that published RS₁) and a user set may wish to        evaluate a given resource and its aggregate to user purpose set        Cred(s), the identity of the certifying Stakeholder or        Stakeholder agent, the identity, if any, of a certifier of such        certifier, Effective Facts regarding such Stakeholder, and/or        their agents, Creds sets, such as Cred instances and/or        Aggregate Creds on such Stakeholder and/or regarding relevant to        purpose EF variables, and/or the like. Further, information        resources that have Quality to Purpose satisfying criteria that        rate, otherwise evaluate, and/or provide useful information for        evaluation, may be employed in the evaluation of any such        Stakeholders, their one or more agents (if any), their related        EFs, and/or the like.    -   The evaluation of a Repute set, RepSet₁, whose subject matter is        RS₁, may involve the evaluation of RepSet₁'s creator, publisher,        distributor, and/or the like as well as any Reputes whose        subject matter is RepSet₁ (i.e., evaluation of Reputes on        Repute).

The depth and/or breadth of this analysis may depend onsituation-specific context. For example, a purpose of an astrophysicistexpert may involve a patient time-consuming process set, and acommitment to spend hours or days in evaluating the accuracy andreliability of assessment of a resource set which may involve a deep andcareful thinking, and evaluation a variety of inputs. On the other hand,a high school or college level student interested in gaining anintroductory high level picture of what is astrophysics may look for aquick link to a summary resource that may be highly rated by AggregateCreds, generally, and/or as to a summary article on astrophysics, suchas may be found on Wikipedia.

Users and user systems can perform such assiduous evaluation in avariety of ways. One way is to deploy one or more sensor arrangements tocapture biometric and/or contextual information sets of relevantStakeholders and compare them against their stored biometric referencesets, for example, in the form of registered with a cloud servicearrangement and published for authentication purposes Participant and/orthe like resource sets. Another way is for users and user systems todelegate the authentication task to a trusted third party (such as atrusted, for example, cloud service identity utility) that aftervalidating the relevant Stakeholders, may send a digital certificate orsome other such proof of validation of relevant Stakeholder identities,for example, during a “live” online connection process set wherein suchcloud utility is securely communicating, for example, with a PERCosembodiment Identity Firewall, and/or the like.

User sets evaluating, otherwise contemplating, and/or attempting to usea resource set for their situational contextual purpose sets may need totest, and/or verify, that the resource set's descriptive specificationset meets or otherwise sufficiently satisfies user set's requirementsfor quality, functionality, confidentiality, integrity, reliability,performance, and/or any other measures of fitness to purpose. In someembodiments, some of these requirements may be verified directly byapplying standard software and/or hardware testing methods, such as, inpart, by using test suites that are designed to check the resource set'sdesired performance and/or functionality under various stressconditions. In another embodiment, testing and verification of thewhole, or a portion, of the resource set's specification sets may relyon authenticating reputable Participants, and/or the like, who can opineand/or attest to the validity, and/or veracity, and/or fitness, and/orother relevant Quality to Purpose information set of the resource set'ssituationally relevant descriptive specification sets, includingoperational characteristics such as perceived performance, ease-of-use,minimality, intended and unintended consequences, for example, incombined use with other resource sets, and/or the like.

In some embodiments, resource sets may be pre-evaluated and/orpre-validated, the result of which may be securely stored associatedwith such resource sets, for example, in storage arrangements of one ormore cloud service resource identity and/or otherwise user contextualpurpose assisting and/or resource provisioning services.

In some embodiments, Reality Integrity (RI) analyses are used to assess,or support assessment of, the degree to which an event set (real timeand/or past), user set, environment sets, Stakeholder set, object set(including specifications, content) and/or any other subject set thatresides on the tangible side of an Edge is what it claims to be. RIanalyses may implement various mechanisms and/or methods for evaluatingthe validity of a subject set's descriptive specifications and otheroperational features. RI analysis may use Repute expressions, which maycomprise Cred and/or the like assertions about one or more aspects of aresource operation and/or otherwise express qualities of reliability,trustworthiness, and/or the like. RI analysis may also or alternativelyemploy other observations of the operation of a subject (including, forexample, across-time physical and/or behavioral characteristics), and insome instances such subject's environment, so as to extract RI related“Fingerprints” and/or “Patterns.” These Fingerprints/Patterns may resultfrom multiple real time and/or non-real time observations of eventsand/or elements used to create signature matrix establishing asserteddegrees of Reality Integrity (e.g., levels 1 to 10), and in someembodiments, for example, such Reality Integrity determinations mayemploy hardened PERCos Identity Firewall capabilities, with suchdegrees, for example, being at least in part determined in accordancewith any applicable tests, such as liveness testing using such firewallprotected emitter transparent challenge and response pseudo-randompattern emission reflections acquisition, PERCos timing anomalyanalysis, unfolding across-time physiognomy pattern shifting, tangibleimage, video, audio, radio frequency, and/or the like environmentanalysis, and/or other techniques.

In some embodiments, such fingerprints/patterns may become an integralpart of a resource's identity attributes. For example, using RIfingerprint/patterns, an embodiment may employ an RI method to identifywhether a user of a smart phone is, or is likely to be, its rightfulowner. RI pattern measurement could estimate, for example, the frequencyand length of calls and texts to and from specific numbers; it couldperform voice analysis on call parties and compare various callinformation sets with historical pattern information sets, including,for example, call party identities and respective times and durations ofparty respective calls, semantic analysis of call content types, as wellas patterns associated with the foregoing of call GPS, cellular, and/orthe like location determinations, route movement, and/or the like. Insome embodiments, such RI pattern analysis may also measure when, where,and/or how often applications such as Google maps, bus schedules,Facebook, and/or the like are accessed in a typical day of the week bythe presumed rightful owner, as well as “listen to” or “see”environmental information, acquire pattern information for such, andevaluate potential environmental anomalies and possible spoofing relatedtiming anomalies, including, for example, employing transparent pseudorandom electromagnetic radiation and/or sound wave emissions challengesand response (e.g., reflection) analysis, and where the foregoing may,in some instances, be secured by PERCos Identity Firewall capabilities.If an RI analysis method detects that a measured pattern of use changesin an event triggering (e.g., to a specified extent) manner in any givenday, it may determine that the mobile phone may have been stolen andrequest that the user be re-authenticated. Alternately, or in addition,RI analysis may, based at least in part on any one or more such events,and/or on instruction sets from one or more authorities, such as throughinstruction sets from administrative and/or cloud service identityand/or RI services, where the foregoing may initiate further RI testing(e.g., as described) to more reliably determine device status and/orstatus sequence(s), and/or it may at least in part disable, asapplicable, devices in response to events and/or instructions from oneor more such authorities.

As discussed above, RI analyses may include methods for establishing theintegrity of one or more subjects based at least in part on identityattribute information sets associated with that subject; such methodsmay also be incorporated as part of the relevant resource identityattributes. This may include, for example, evaluations of, withoutlimitation, identity attribute sets which may incorporate provenance,contextual, biometric and/or other relevant informational attributessuch as Repute information, for example, Creds and/or the like. Asdescribed earlier, such evaluations may result in metrics indicating thedegree of assurance of the validity of assertions regarding an event setand/or environment related set (real time and/or past), user, and/orStakeholder, the foregoing including any type of applicable tangibleobject and/or subject set.

RI analyses and testing may be used in, for example, assessingindividuals and/or events. For example, RI may be used in, at least inpart, evaluating and authenticating users, Stakeholders, “background”humans in a user tangible computing environment, user set computingarrangement resources (through evaluating user and/or Stakeholder setsand/or their environments and/or their respective resource sets),through, for example, assiduous biometric and environmental evaluations,including, for example, through application of one or more assiduousexistential and/or multimodal biometric and/or environment testing andanalysis techniques. RI may be used, for example, in combination withPERCos Awareness Managers, including their sensor/emitter sets, indetecting and validating events, such as user gestures, other voices inthe room, changes in room illumination, movement of a mobile device toanother room (for example along a known path to a known other room)and/or the like.

In some embodiments, users, Stakeholders, process sets, and/or resourcesets may employ situational identities for identifying resources and/oridentifying, evaluating, preparing for, performing, and/or managingPERCos purposeful operations, such as, for example, pursuing targetcontextual purpose sets, publishing resource sets, evaluatingand/validating resource sets, and/or the like. A situational identitycomprises contextual purpose-related identity, specified and/orcalculated as relevant in a given set of circumstances, and where suchcircumstances, and/or appropriately corresponding operationalrepresentative information, may be input to and/or components of CPEs,Purpose Statements, and/or purpose operating specification sets. Suchsituational identities may have one or more identity attributes thatrefer to and/or contain operatively relevant information sets for agiven set of purposeful operations in accordance with one or morecontrol specification sets.

In some embodiments, situational identities of users and Stakeholders,such as their Participant instances and other resource types, maycomprise situation-specific identity attributes that may include anyenvironmental, temporal, computing arrangement operational, and/or othercontextual, considerations that may be relevant for performing PERCosoperations in pursuit of one or more situation-specific targetcontextual purpose sets, including, for example, sets specifyingcontextual purpose classes of target purpose considerations andobjectives. For example, consider a user, Professor A, a professor ofmedicine at an Ivy League medical school, who registers and publishesfor general reference, a Participant identity information set. She mayestablish a situational identity for her students, one for her academiccolleagues, one for her teaching responsibility activities and anotherfor her research activities including her work with graduate students,one for media interaction on medical matters, one for family memberinteractions, and another for her social networking activities, witheach comprising attributes, such as some or all of her academiccredentials; situationally applicable Reputes published by fellowcolleagues, including those integrally familiar with her research;friends, and/or family, asserting the quality of her sense of humor;personal interactions, personality traits, personal information such ashobbies, social, athletic, and/or political interests; childhoodbackground information, and/or the like. Professor A may use anappropriate one of her situational identities (which may be appliedautomatically through interpretation of the target purpose of a givencomputing arrangement activity set) for identity components ofcommunications with her fellow medical researchers, and she may modifyattribute sets of said situational identity over time, such as updatingand/or confirming her biometric information and other situationalattributes that may be situationally appropriate, so that colleagues shehas never met can authenticate her identity before, for example, sharingtheir research results with her. Professor A's situational academicidentity attributes may include an existential biometric authorizationfrom a root university authority, for example, an Associate Dean ofStudents for resource rights management certification, that certifiesthat Professor A can access her Student's academic records. It may alsoauthorize, for example, Professor A to authorize up to five furtherparties, such as her instructors, to access such records. Hersituational identity may be dynamically updated, based for example on anevent, such as a time period expiration unless reauthorized, to include,exclude, otherwise terminate or reauthorize, her authorization identityattribute, based at least in part on temporal attributes (such as, onlybe included during the academic year), environmental attributes (suchas, only while she is at a secure location, such as, her universityoffice), and/or the like.

In some embodiments, situational identities of a resource set maycomprise identity attributes that contain and/or refer to operativelyrelevant information sets, such as providing instructions foroperational processes including, for example, providing methods that,for example, seek current, updated values for an attribute type. Asituational identity of a resource set may initially comprise relevantidentity attributes of resource sets, such as, for example, identityattributes provided by one or more direct Stakeholders such as, forexample, root identity and related biometric assiduous information sets,purpose-related resource characterizing specifications, and/or the like,as well as, for example, one or more Reputes, such as expert Creds,including, for example, specific Cred instances and Aggregate Credsregarding, for example, Professor A's Quality to Purpose for researchingdermatological conditions (such as an 8 out of possible 10 rating),another attribute regarding Professor A's Quality to Purpose as aclinician in dermatology, and a further attribute regarding ProfessorA's Quality to Purpose in providing mentor services to non-MD graduatestudents in dermatological research, published by one or more indirectand/or contributing Stakeholders. Over time, such situational identitysets of a resource set may accumulate additional identity attributes,such as, for example, identity attributes expressing satisfaction usersmay have experienced using the resource set in, or otherwisecontributing towards, fulfillment of their target purpose set. Suchexpressions of satisfaction may be aggregated and published as one ormore Reputes (for example, Cred assertions, Compound Creds, AggregateCreds, Creds on Creds, and/or the like), which may be associated withone or more identity attributes of one or more situational identities ofthe resource set.

In some embodiments, process sets at least in part based upon targetpurpose situationally applicable specifications (and input, as may beapplicable) may establish situational identities to perform targetpurpose set (and/or purpose class) PERCos operations. Such situationalidentities may have a cohered set of identity attributes, such as, forexample:

-   -   One or more authorization process sets needed to achieve their        results.    -   One or more interface specifications that define the operations        of process sets (such as, intended and unintended consequences,        and/or the like).    -   One or more control specification sets that define for example,        policies, rules, and/or the like that process sets need to        enforce.    -   And/or the like.

For example, consider a neurologist, Doc₁, who needs to diagnose apatient, P₂, and needs to access P₂'s medical records at a hospital, H₄,using a process set, PS₃. The attributes of PS₃'s situational identitymay have attributes, such as,

-   -   Attributes that express a resolution of Doc₁'s authorizations to        access H₄'s patient records with P₂'s permission to allow Doc₁        to access P₂'s patient records. For example, Doc₁ may not have        the authorization to access H₄'s patient records.    -   PS₃'s purpose related attributes, such as, for example, to        perform a diagnosis of P₂'s neurological problems. In such a        case, PS₃ may be allowed to access only those portions of P₂'s        medical records that may pertain to diagnosing neurological        problems.

In some embodiments, process sets that are mobile objects and/or otherorganized instances that may be employed in one situation-specificcomputing environment set, then another, may dynamically self-organizetheir respective situational identities to be purpose processing readyfor their new situation-specific computing environment set. For example,consider an operating CPFF instance, OCPFF₁, that, at least in part,enables such mobility by:

-   -   Utilizing particularity management layer sets that provide, at        least in part, standardized and interoperable interfaces        that: i) hide the particulars of underlying OCPFF₁        implementations; and ii) include one or more method sets that        support migration of resource sets from one platform to another.        Such particularity management layer may facilitate migration        between situation specific computing environments by minimizing        the need for re-provisioning of OCPFF₁ as it migrates from one        situation-specific computing environment to another. This is        based at least in part on one or more events reflecting the        transition from one computing environment set to another—any, as        appropriate, one or more of such method sets that are applied        to, and/or “withdrawn” or “inactivated,” by no longer being        applicable for, such attribute one or more sets, and        provisioning, that is “activating” such newly applicable to        subsequent computing environment attribute sets. Further, as a        result of such a transition, one or more attribute sets may have        new, different value sets (including, for example, value        ranges), or may be triggered after further event and/or new        state information evaluation in accordance with associated        specifications, such as contextual purpose information. Such        mobility between different contextual purpose specifications may        similarly cause differing attributes to be applicable and such        purpose transition to new contextual purpose set may be        processed in the same or a similar manner as transferring to a        new computing environment and the event of such transition to a        new contextual purpose set may cause some attributes to be        “withdrawn” (e.g., cancelled or no longer applied) and others to        be “activated.”    -   At least in part, self-organize its, and/or one or more of its        component resource set's, identity attributes by using one or        more techniques to select, collect, aggregate, update, derive,        cohere, and/or otherwise transform relevant identity attributes,        including, for example, Reputes, such as Creds, EFs, and/or FFs        and/or the like, to enable its situational identity to be        purpose processing ready.

In some embodiments, situational identities and/or some or all of theirinformation may be variously stored, (e.g., stored with situationallyapplicable attribute arrays) at least in part in accordance with, forexample, frequency and/or importance of usage with their relationshipsto contextual purpose specification and/or purpose class and/or otherpurpose neighborhood sets (for example, associating them with CPEs,Purpose Statements, operating specifications, and/or the like ofrespective such instances), and/or as associated with other resourceand/or information sets (including, for example, resource classes),associated with user computing arrangement environments (e.g.,participant N's mobile device A and notebook home computing Benvironment settings), and/or as associated with user sets (including,for example user classes, Participant sets, and/or the like).

In some embodiments, for example, an operating CPFF instance, OCPFF₂,may dynamically self-organize its situational identity, SId₂, as itmigrates from one situation-specific computing arrangement, such as forexample, the home office of a user, U₁, to another, such as, forexample, U₁'s mobile tablet, which latter mobile tablet may migrateamong situation-specific computing arrangements as the location of suchtablet alters security management and/or other considerations. Forexample, OCPFF₂'s situational identity, SId₂ at U₁'s office may includethe situational identities of U₁'s home office computing arrangements.When OCPFF₂ is moved to U₁'s tablet, the set of identity attributes ofSId₂ may be modified to reflect OCPFF₂'s U₁'s tablet. For example, SId₂of OCPFF₂ operating on U₁'s home office may include an authorizationidentity attribute that enables OCPFF₂ to communicate with the user'scompany servers. But when OCPFF₂ is moved to the tablet, SId₂ may nolonger have that authorization. In some embodiments, such differing CPFFinstances are managed as separate CPFF resource sets, that is they don'tmorph from one composition of attributes to another, but ratherdifferent CPFF resource sets, for example, may be applied as conditionsexist that no longer apply to an old OCPFF, and a CPFF that applies to anew condition set, if available, is user and/or user computingarrangement selected for the applicable contextual purpose setfulfillment.

In some embodiments, PERCos capabilities can extract or redeploy CPFFframework information set along with applicable operating conditionstate information. Such information is evaluated, and as applicable,cohered, if in the context of receiving one or more environments'Foundations and/or other germane user computing arrangement environmentinformation, such resolving is practical in light of such specificationand operating information. Such cohering/resolving establishes areadiness of operating state of such receiving environment or initiatessuch receiving state, with the foregoing in compliance with CPFF relatedsituational specifications. If conflicts arise, or if other adaptationsare desired, the initiating environment or receiving environment mayinteract with one or more user sets and/or authority sets (which, insome instances, may be remote administrative organization and/or cloudservice arrangements) for user and/or such administrative set inputselections and/or evaluations in support of, if desired, provisioning,and, in some instances, storing operable states.

CPFFs may include, for example, rights management instructions whereby,for example, image, video stream, audio, and/or textual content, duringa video conferencing session is restricted from being stored and/orcopied and/or has associated time outs for retention periods applied tothe receiving party set. Such control restrictions and/or modificationsto content handling may be applied differently to different contentresources, and/or to user sets that come into the field of “perception”of a user set computing arrangement, for example, an at least in part,Identity Firewall secured, pseudo-random emission challenge andresponse, emitter/sensor arrangement.

In some embodiments, for example, an operating CPFF instance, OCPFF₂,operating in user U₁'s tablet is provisioned with a resource arrangementRA₁. When OCPFF₂ migrates to a new situation-specific user computingarrangement environment belonging to a new user, U₂, it may migrate someof its resources and/or their constituent parts and re-provision otherresource sets and/or their constituent parts (such as applicablecondition state information set) to form a new resource arrangement,RA₂. In such a case, the composition of such situational identity SId₂'sidentity attributes may change to reflect this re-provisioning, such as,for example:

-   -   the deletion of Repute information attributes and/or the like of        the direct Stakeholders and relevant situational identity        attributes of RA₁'s replaced resource sets,    -   the addition of relevant Repute information attributes and/or        the like of the direct Stakeholders and relevant situational        identity attributes of new resource sets.

In some embodiments, when users, Stakeholders, and/or resource setsrequest to perform a purpose operation, the process set associated withthe purpose operation may assiduously evaluate and/or validate theirrespective situational identities. For example, consider a CPFF, CPFF₁,that enables users to explore fixed income investment strategies. Whensituational identity, SId₁, associated with Participant A, is used toexplore a particular fixed income strategy that requires subscription,such as a subscription to an online investment information cloudservice, CPFF₁ may evaluate SId₁ to ensure that SId₁ has sufficientauthorization. If not, CPFF₁ may request additional authorization, suchas, for example, the evidence that Participant A is a subscriber of suchinvestment information cloud service.

Situational identities may be ephemeral or persistent. Persistentsituational identities may be stored in one or more locations (such asdatabases, cloud services, and/or the like) and may be published asPERCos resource sets. For example, a resource set may have itssituational identities stored in multiple locations, based at least inpart on situation-specific context. For example, a PERCos IdentityMatrix (PIDMX), an organizational structure used, for example, formanaging identities, identity attributes and/or other identity-relatedinformation sets associated with a resource set, may have a controlspecification set expressing storage locations for storing thesituational identities of the resource set.

In some embodiments, a user set may form and/or interact with one ormore social and/or commercial groupings in which an individual set, atleast in part controls at least certain provisioned resource sets, forexample, as to privacy, selective availability, function, and/or usageconsequence. Such resource sets may include portions of resources and/ortheir information sets, such as selectively making available attributes,including, for example, their reliable identity attribute sets (eithersituational, and/or as available, global (general attribute)), and oneor more policy sets regarding their privacy, use and/or deployment. Inthis manner, in some embodiments, participants or, as applicable, otherusers, for example, may retain, at least in part, control of at least aportion of their resource sets rather than delegate those rights to, forexample, one or more service providers. Such service providersrespective one or more sets of privacy and/or use policy sets regardingprovisioned resource sets, are normally structured so as to optimizesuch providers commercial interests, but don't provide generalcapabilities for structuring policies to reflect specific user set, andsocial and/or commercial group common interests and/or requirementsthrough at least in part standardized and interoperable policystructuring and enforcement sets of capabilities.

For example, an individual may decide to join a group based upon itsrespective qualities, including, for example, resource sets available toand/or otherwise under the control of a group user set, one or more ofthe contextual purpose expressions set by such user set and/or otherwiseassociated with such group, and/or one or more policies that arerequirements and/or other related considerations for participating withother member sets. Such consideration of social and/or commercialinteractions based at least in part on such resource and respectivecontextual purpose sets gives participants the opportunity to enhanceinteractions by personalizing their representations and/or membershipsin policies of such a group and providing capabilities for forming anoptimal balance of interests and preferences of multiple parties thatmay yield potentially much more enjoyable, efficient, profitable, and/orotherwise satisfying experiences and/or other results.

Social network members can propose and/or contribute resource sets to agroup and identify themselves as situationally having rights to use suchresource sets (which may vary respective to given resource one or moresets) by publishing encrypted and/or otherwise sufficiently secured“address” arrangements that represent which groups, and/or participantssets within groups, may use, and, for example, how they may use, whichresources, and also allows only authorized group members to retrieveresource rights holder's sets applicable situational identityattributes. To access a resource, group member sets may be required tofirst test/prove that he/she/they is/are authorized to use the resourceset.

In some embodiments, a purpose managed participation ecosphere maycomprise both local and cloud based capabilities such that participantsmay determine, through, for example, specifications and/or user setdecisions and selections, the degrees of information, collaboration,sharing and/or other interactions of resource sets under their controlwith other participants. For example participants may determine thatthey are prepared, for one purpose, for example as members of aninterest group, to share with those group members a resource set, forexample a document that will be only be available to those members, butsubject to any rights and restrictions as may have been applied by anoriginal document Stakeholder to users of such document.

In some embodiments many such groupings may be based at least in part onone or more purposes, for example a participant may specify share withgroups labeled “neighbors”, “family”, “auto racing”, “trading”, “homeimprovement” and/or any other purpose, including for example “learnchess”, “teach yoga” or any other purpose for which they wish toestablish social networked relationships. These purpose managedparticipations may involve participants, for example, as represented byParticipants, providing, through, for example, use of their PERCosPIDMX, one or more sets of appropriate identity information that issufficient for the interactions for such participation. Suchinformation, may in some embodiments, for example, remain under thecontrol of the participant, but such control may be subject to theextent of any other party sets specified rights. Providing participantswith purpose-oriented granularity for their identity informationdistribution, situational deployment, and associated resourcesinteractions enables them to, in general, more effectively, flexibly,and in a contextually responsive manner, manage and control theircross-Edge digital representations, whilst enabling those with whom theyare interacting to benefit from their reliable identities, for exampleusing existential biometric identity information, which may underpinsuch purpose oriented identity information sets with a very stronglyreliable identifier set.

FIG. 9 is a non-limiting illustrative example of purpose managedParticipant ecosphere.

In some embodiments, this may, as shown in FIG. 9 , involve users usingcommon resource sets, including, for example, one or more cloud-hostedservice sets, and/or their own localized resources, for example,including partial access to their networks, devices, systems and/or thelike. Such a shift in participant interaction resource availabilitydynamics may include the use of, for example, one or more isolationtechniques, such that members of a group may provide each other with aportion of their storage (and/or other capabilities such as processing,applications and/or the like) capability sets on their machines (and/ornetworks, cloud service sets, and/or other delegated resource sets),such that resources, which may include for example, messages, documents,images, videos, software applications, and/or the like, may bedistributed to these environments for use by (control of which may beunder one or more, for example, purpose and/or other specification sets)one or more recipients, and/or shared among a plurality of distributedusers, either synchronously, for example, in a common purpose session,and/or asynchronously, for example, in a common purpose session set, orotherwise. As with many other PERCos related computing activities, suchsituational resource allocation may be, at least in part, under thecontrol of a PERCos embodiment CPFF specification set.

In some embodiments, such CPFF and/or the like sharing may employ, forexample a VM set, hosted by, for example, one of the participants, cloudservices, distributed sets, and/or other arrangements. These sharedresource environments and their associated policies may be persistedthrough one or more methods, such as a file which is then securedthrough encryption in an appropriate storage medium.

Some PERCos embodiments support uniquely distributed personal andenterprise social and/or other networking arrangements which differ incertain basic configuration and functionality formulations fromcurrently available, essentially silo vertically configured, commercialofferings (Facebook, Twitter, Google Groups and Google+, Yahoo Groups,LinkedIn, and the like). In some embodiments, PERCos capabilities maysupport contextual purpose based formulations of environments configuredto reflect the objectives, personalities/character, policies and/orrelated priorities, and/or the like of user communities such as affinitygroups, enterprises, ad hoc arrangements of people, as well as those ofindividual sets. With PERCos capabilities, proffering of information on,for example, community social interaction “walls,” can capture and/orotherwise convey the gestalt of groups, as well as organizationinformation, experience processes, and privacy and other policyvariables. With such PERCos capabilities, policy variables can becontrolled by such respective groups (and/or individuals) and socialand/or commercial interaction can take place on the basis of individualand group priority set, and reflect the nature of individual and groupcharacter, rather than reflect the commercially controlled, largelyself-serving policies, of a centralized service provider. As withpurpose class applications and other PERCos frameworks, purpose baseduser and/or computing arrangement set community policy design andoperating criteria may be formulated as common purpose environmentframeworks, representing one common, for example, affinity groupenvironment built upon an underlying standardized and interoperable atleast in part contextual purpose foundation and supporting commonpurpose interaction on an affinity group level, as well as supportinguser set, including affinity group, interoperability by employing suchunderlying standardized framework schemas, including contextual purposespecification and environment framework standardized and interoperablestructures.

Enabling purpose based, “personalized” community and individual setsocial and commercial networking can involve various features support byone or more PERCos embodiments, including, for example, some set of:

-   -   1. Contextual Purpose interoperable, standardized specification        capabilities for social and commercial interaction policy        organization, matching, and/or multi-party common purpose        resolution.    -   2. Distributed means to enforce and, as may be necessary,        reconcile, independently supplied specifications and/or actions        of disparate communities and/or individuals, such as through the        use of Coherence capabilities.    -   3. Capabilities supporting portable PERCos resource instances,        such as Formal PERCos Resources, whereby identity information,        including for example Repute Cred, EF, and FF, and/or the like        and/or other attribute information, can be “mined/published” and        distributed in a distributed, reliable, policy controlled,        and/or secure manner.    -   4. Assiduous, for example, existential, identity capabilities        enabling a distributed environment to have, for example, in the        context of peered arrangements, comparable—and under some        embodiments, significantly superior to cloud service        silo—identity persistence, trustworthiness, resistance to        attack, privacy, situational attribute, management, and other        features. Sets of such features may be important in supporting        user set satisfying interaction among distributed parties        involved in common purpose and “meta” (inter-group) common        purpose activities, including supporting interaction between        unfamiliar (or, as applicable, largely unknown) to each other        user set, as well as unfamiliar (or unknown) to user sets        non-user type resources, in a safe, informed, and contextual        purpose satisfying optimized manner, for example, based at least        in part, upon Repute Cred, EF, FF, and/or the like attribute        information and/or other relevant attribute considerations,        adaptive to user priorities.    -   5. Situational identity supporting capabilities, such as those        that can be supported in some embodiments by PIDMX and PERCos        identity and Coherence Services and/or the like, for effective        resolving to appropriate interaction common purpose computing        situational specifications, including, for example, common        purpose specifications.    -   6. Distributed rights management capabilities where rights        and/or other security, privacy, consequence management, and/or        the like policies can be reliably associated with resource sets        and Participant and/or the like users, and/or Stakeholders        and/or the like, in support of informed evaluation and        management of resource selection, provisioning, and/or        operation, and including, in some embodiments, support for root        and derivative identity assiduous biometric certifying authority        capabilities supported by reliable assiduous, for example,        existential biometric, identity capabilities, whereby authority        to certify a resource and/or otherwise act as an agent for a        resource Stakeholder, may be delegated to one or more agent        party sets such as employees, consultants and other contractors,        family members, and/or other trusted parties.    -   7. PERCos resource provenance capabilities in support of        reliable resource evaluations and distributed interactions and        other operations, for example, informing as to group membership        of parties who are recorded as members of resource Stakeholder        and/or Stakeholder agent provenance sets and situational        attributes relevant thereto.    -   8. And/or the like.

Some PERCos embodiments may support the initialization and use ofcustomized and, in some instances, dynamically formed, and relativelyephemeral to persistent for a time period set to indefinitely persistentpurposeful PERCos social, commercial, and/or the like networks. Suchnetworks, at least in part, may, in some embodiments, not rely upon acentral PERCos authority set such as a cloud service social networkingprovider/controlling and homogenizing authority, and/or relatedcentralized administrative service enforcing a single, for example,generalized, model set, but may work cooperatively with such forcertain, key PERCos related one or more social and/or commercialnetworking interactions and related functions. For example, a group ofpeople, and/or groups of people in the form, for example, affinitygroups, could get together to establish, for example, an ephemeral,temporarily persistent or durable subnetwork, and employ embodiments ofPERCos technology sets, including common contextual purposespecification coherence. Such subnetwork members and/or their computingarrangements may exchange authentication/authorization information,establish and/or otherwise agree upon standardization andinteroperability expression and interaction specifications, and startsuch a network, complete with services such as supporting PERCostechnology compliant resource publishing, user and resource (includingParticipant) identification, authentication, evaluation, validation,provisioning, process management (such as event management), and/orresource related information storage and related policy enforcementarrangements. Such a network could be protected by a variety of means,such as for example, Byzantine fault tolerant protocols, webs-of-trust,locally centralized service management, and/or the like, and can enablesecure, reliable, persistent resource publishing and identity managementsystems. Such a network may interoperate with an existing PERCosinfrastructure arrangement set and, over time, may accumulate itsseparate and/or share with other PERCos networking arrangements, ReputeCreds, EFs, FFs, and/or the like, as well as other PERCos embodimentcompliant resource, contextual purpose, use, and/or the like informationbases regarding resource availability, Quality to Purpose of resourcesets and/or subnetworks, including related reliability, security,trustworthiness, efficiency, and/or other suitability to purposeattributes and related information sources (user set and/or crowdbehavioral, profile, preference, purpose and/or domain class, and/or thelike information sets).

Some such PERCos embodiments may provide one or more standardized andinteroperable Frameworks for organizing, merging, splitting and/orotherwise managing one or more suitable to purposes, that may becustomized, and further may be ad hoc, PERCos distributed arrangementswithout the need to rely exclusively upon one or more centralized PERCosauthority sets, utility sets, and/or coordinator sets (but may workcooperatively with such). Employing one or more Frameworks—for example,common purpose Frameworks for at least in part contextual purpose interuser set environment specification and/or formulation—for suchcircumstances can provide users with editable and/or directly employabletemplate sets for providing and/or specifying (pre-set and/or variablysettable) control and/or capability sets for organizing such distributedarrangements as purpose related distributed environments. For example,such Frameworks and associated support software can support definingtarget situationally appropriate one or more purpose-related policysets, resource evaluation capabilities and processes, user interfacemanagement, resource provisioning, process-related event management,and/or the like, and where such control and/or capability sets may beconsistently or variably distributed, centralized, peer-to peer, and/orthe like.

FIG. 10 is a non-limiting illustrative example for meta socialnetworking context.

Some PERCos embodiments may support the transformation from “simple”social and/or commercial network multi-party sharing to purpose framedcommunities and interaction management. Users can maintain a viewconsistent with their existing social network but gain privileged accessto a larger set of resources and/or experiences (e.g., sharing photos)based at least in part on, for example, user persona and situationalpurposeful computing with associated resource policy management. Suchmodels may enable both individual characteristics and other attributessets of core or atomic or sub plural groupings, such as interfacecharacteristics, policy characteristics, resource employment andavailability, and/or the like, while participating in a multi-party tometa-group environment employing standardized and interoperableinterface, policy, and resource employment and availabilitycapabilities, including for example meta-group implementations specifiedby, for example, contextual purpose frameworks. Such meta-grouparrangements may have standards for translating between atomic groupand/or lower level groupings at least portions of interface, policy,and/or resource employ and availability policies and renderings intocommon format, common purpose computing standardized and interoperablearrangements, enabling groups to have their distinctive characteristicsand meta groups to share and interact using familiar, reliablyconsistent, and appropriately supportive interoperable standards where,for example, certain content, visual arrangements, access to user setsand/or other rights, and/or the like may be available in the commonpurpose standardized “format” and other sets of such content, visualcompositions, access to user sets and/or other rights may not beavailable and/or in respective instances, be conditionally available.Further policies of any given group, in some embodiments, may provideinput to and/or control, for example, by policy and/or by activeselection, regarding what may be made available, by a core group orsubgroup, to common purpose meta-group interfaces, content arrangements,resource, user and/or related attribute availability, and/or the like,from their own such arrangement types, that is certain visualcharacteristics of one group may not be displayed to a meta-group, ormay be displayed in a converted/modified fashion so as to conceal,secure, and/or otherwise maintain proprietary, at least in some manner,to such core or sub group arrangement.

FIG. 11 is a non-limiting illustrative example of creation of purposebased communities using published PERCos Frameworks.

Some PERCos embodiments may support the creations of communities bothtransient and permanent using published Frameworks as templates.Communities may transition from being in a transient state to a durablepermanent state.

FIG. 12 is a non-limiting illustrative example of standardized andinteroperable Framework common interface.

Some PERCos embodiments may support the creation of policy-managed view(walls) and/or based at least in part on existing individual socialnetwork profiles and/or social network communities. In some embodimentssuch views may be enabled by standardized and interoperable Frameworkcommon interface. Further, such distinct character individualizationsfor given user sets (including, for example, large affinity groups,including commercial social networking environments), can include policymanagement for other aspects of content management, such as rightsmanagement concerning access to various content locations (such as webpages), types, specific portions within walls or othercontent/information views, including any user set desired privacy,content presentation, and/or other applicable policy specifications andarrangements. These views may be derived directly or indirectly fromexisting groups and/or individual profiles and interaction with viewscan be, for example, managed by view policy requirements and/orpreferences of one or more participating Groups, such as Group A canaccess x set of information from Group Y's network, but not Group Y's zset of information. Creation of these views (walls) may be based atleast in part on user identity and/or other associated policyinformation, through expression types and/or metrics. Such policyexpressions may be constrained by distributed networks socialinteraction “platform” requirements related to interoperability,including, for example, specifications for presentation throughtransformation into “common” (e.g., standardized) inter-party view sets,such as, for example, resulting from the use of contextual purpose,party identity related, and/or other presentation arrangements.

FIG. 13 is a non-limiting illustrative example of contextual purposesituational interfaces and common interface adaptation.

FIG. 14 is a non-limiting illustrative example of granting of rightsbased on situational adaptation.

Some PERCos embodiments may support the creation of a variety ofresource arrangements that can be grouped into social networkcommunities that exploit resources from a large, disparate universe ofresources and resource set implementations. These arrangements may bederived directly or indirectly from existing groups and/or individualprofiles and configured to policy/purpose priorities of participatingentities (including, for example, individuals). Creation of thesedistributed resource arrangements may be, at least in part, based atleast in part on user identity and/or other policy sets associated withuser context—contextual purpose specifications, profiles, preferences,user historical and/or crowd related information, and/or the like—and/orwith policy sets associated with resources deployed for use in sucharrangements. User set persona, e.g., a user's situational attributerelated set, may be used to automatically designate, select, usespecific interface(s) that may be tailored to the specific purpose(s)associated with, including for example specified by, aspects of a userset's situational adaptations.

In some embodiments, a common meta interface may be used to providepolicy management and content arrangement that may then be updated invarious individual group environments, such as not having certaininformation, such as a portion of an information update, go to a user'sFacebook wall, but have the user's personal, or corporate page updatedwith the full set or variably with differing portions of the updateinformation, and where the foregoing could be based at least in part onsuch updates purpose class information, such as associated the full setto one purpose class, and any portions thereof to be differentiallyhandled as regards to updates and/or other policies regarding updatingassociated social and/or commercial networking user set instances.

FIG. 15 is a non-limiting illustrative example variable, policycontrolled update process between cloud services and PERCos commoninterface.

In some embodiments, coherence processing sets may enable a resource setto determine the efficacy and/or relative optimality of its interactionin pursuit of a target purpose set with other resource sets by coheringand resolving their identity attributes and/or other purpose-relatedspecifications, such as potential operating conditions, as may beincluded in Purpose Statements. Further, for example, various initialcandidate resource sets, when combined, for example, with a usercomputing arrangement Foundation, may be compared to evaluate itsestimated relative performance in Quality to Purpose satisfactionrelative to other potential sets. Also, differing user computingarrangement conditional Foundations may be evaluated as to conditionalresource sets requiring, for example, certain conditions, such as a userdecision to be made before being available (for example, a user has alicense, for example, to cloud service X, which gives a discount tocontent type Z, rather than X making it generally available without auser decision set).

For example, a resource set, RS_(z), may have identity attributes thatspecify constraints regarding resource sets that RS_(z) may interactwith. For example, to construct an optimal resource arrangement, aPERCos embodiment may need to cohere and resolve specifications ofresources in the resource arrangement to ensure mutual satisfaction ofStakeholder purpose specification specified requirements. For example,RS_(Z) may have a specified attribute set that stipulates it willoperate with a resource RS_(X), but not with a resource RS_(Y); and/orresource RS_(z) and resource RS_(X) will have conflicting requirementsregarding reporting aspects of user purpose fulfillment session usageinformation which may support the free availability of resources, wheresuch different resource sets each require exclusive usage rights to suchusage information that characterizes (or otherwise contributes tocharacterizing) a user set's use of a resource set; and/or whereresource RS_(X) has certain interface requirements for interoperatingwith another resource set when resource RS_(X) is functioning inresource arrangement role AB and its operation is dependent oninteroperating with a resource having a resource arrangement role CD andwhere such respective resource RS_(z) and RS_(X) sets both need tosupport the same interface specification MN.

As an additional example, suppose that RS₁ is a highly confidentialproduct development information set. RS₁'s identity, ID₁, may have oneor more identity attributes that express a specification set, SP₁,indicating an authorization set, Auth₁, which any resource set needs tocomply with in order for RS₁ to interact with them. Before RS₁ interactswith any resource set such as, for example, a Participant, Part₁,coherence processing may cohere and resolve RS₁'s identity attributeswith Part₁'s identity attributes, such as, for example, ensuring thatPart₁ has sufficient authorization, such as, Auth₁. In turn, Part₁, mayhave identity attributes that refer to and/or contain one or moreprofiles, preferences, authentication information, authorizations,Repute, and/or the like information, of Part₁'s user or Stakeholderinstance, and a software resource set may have identity attributes thatcorrespond to associated descriptive CPE sets, purpose classes and/orother purpose neighborhoods, Reputes, other attribute, and/or the likeinformation. In such a case, coherence processing sets may cohere andresolve identity attributes by cohering and resolving specification setsthey refer to and/or contain.

In some embodiments, coherence processing sets may perform a wide rangeof operations throughout PERCos purpose cycles from purposespecification related operations, for example, formulating PurposeStatements and purpose operating specifications and/or applyingResonance specifications, to supporting unfolding user purposeformulations such as performing, in response to specifications,background coherence during purpose class application operations, topurpose fulfillment results processing. Coherence operations duringunfolding user purpose formulation on behalf of a user set in pursuit ofa target purpose set may include cohering and resolving the identitiesand situational identity attributes of relevant resources, such asParticipant sets, as they relate to, for example, such user setParticipant identity, target contextual purpose attribute informationrelevant to their situationally specific target purpose fulfillmentoperations, and further evaluating resource set attributes for purposefulfillment consistency (such as, for example, evaluating resonancealgorithms, AI expertise, Frameworks such as purpose class applications,purpose classes and/or other purpose neighborhoods, Reputes, informationresources, cloud services, and/or the like), identities of resourceStakeholders of identified and otherwise consistent resource sets,and/or the like, so as to produce target purpose evaluative and/oroperational resource sets. For example, a user's Participant identityhas a contextual purpose situation-specific related attribute setspecification, requiring a high level of integrity, security, andreliability. Coherence processing may, for example, include ensuringthat resource sets used to support purpose formulation (and theirassociated publisher Stakeholder sets) comply with the respective userset's requirement set.

In some embodiments, coherence processing sets may enable resource setsin pursuit of fulfilling a target purpose set to at least in part assesssufficiency of another resource set by cohering and resolving theiridentity attributes. For example, suppose ID₁ is an identity of aresource set, RS₁, containing highly confidential product developmentinformation. ID₁ may have one or more identity attributes that express aspecification set, SP₁, requiring a condition of trust that any resourceset, RS₂, that interacts with RS₁ will not disclose confidentialinformation from RS₁ and resource set, RS₁'s Stakeholder publisher has asufficient Quality to Purpose trustworthiness aggregate Cred value wheresuch aggregate Quality to Purpose trustworthiness values whereassertions contributed by parties having Effective Fact (e.g., industrycategory, revenue, and/or the like) characteristics similar to theStakeholder publisher of ID₁. Before creating a resource set where RS₁and RS₂ interact, a PERCos embodiment may ensure, for example, using itsCoherence Service set, that the identity of RS₂ satisfies the desired,specified, degree of trust set specified by an ID₁ attribute set.

In some embodiments, a coherence processing set may elevate coherenceresolution to a “higher-order” authority coherence arrangement such as,a network and/or cloud service administration coherence arrangement,which may have further relevant attribute information and/or mayevaluate overall balance of interests, for example, in regards to abalance of trade-offs for target purpose fulfillment. Such“higher-order” authority, for example, an administrative authoritywithin a corporation, may evaluate, given contextual purposespecification considerations and/or the like, whether the corporation'sbalance of interests merits an exception to such an attributerequirement. Such “higher-order” authority coherence arrangement mayresolve sp₁, at least in part, with or without cooperative processing,with such one or more “lower-order” authority Coherence arrangements,such as, for example, user set computing arrangement node Coherenceinstances. Such elevation can be stepped through a sequence of elevationarrangements if a given coherence arrangement instance is unable toadequately satisfy requirements and/or related optimizations inaccordance with specification and/or user set indication/selection. Suchelevation may involve such attribute (and/or other specificationrelated) requirement conflict, for example, a best resource set topurpose, but given one failure related to matching purpose specificationattribute requirements to resource attribute (or related) sets, beingpresented to a higher order authority existentially biometricallyauthorized Participant and/or the like individual for a cross-Edgedecision, such as selecting and authorizing an override to an attributeset requirement set.

For example, in some embodiments, a network administrative or a groupadministrative coherence arrangement may elevate one or more portions(or all) of sp₁ to a cloud service utility set and/or governmentalauthority independent of user and/or associated administrativeparticipants perspectives. In some cases, such resolution may result inrequesting a user for guidance, such as, for example, requestingpermission to acquire the needed resource set (at some cost) or to useother another Framework set that may enable the user set to obtain aresource set having optimal or required performance characteristics, butmay not satisfy at least a portion of the user sets attribute relatedsecurity requirements.

In some embodiments, coherence authority may comprise, at least in part,one or more authorized through certification attributes, humaninstances, which may be plural parties, and where such plural partiesmay function at different authority levels within an organization, andwhere such human instances may directly make coherence decisions, forexample, on behalf of government regulatory, social affinity group,and/or corporate administrative entities (for example, Participants).

In some embodiments, a coherence authority arrangement, requested toresolve a set of situationally specific specifications of one or moreusers and/or Stakeholders in accordance with purpose-specificspecifications and/or some profile specification sets, may negotiatewith multiple “lower-order” coherence authority arrangements, such as,for example, user computing arrangement node coherence instancesnegotiating, in a weighted, by seniority and/or some other weightingscheme set, to produce a democratically, or otherwise equitable oragreed to given the conditions, target purpose-specific specification,profile, and/or other specification set.

In some embodiments, coherence processing in support of unfoldingpurpose development may include resolving input specifications, providedby plural to potentially a large number of sources, such as, userproviding and/or selecting CPE sets, experts providing resonancealgorithms, Stakeholders providing relevant Reputes, Frameworks that mayprovide scaffolding to frame user inputs and provide interactiveinterface environments for contextual purpose sets, other resources,and/or the like. For example, suppose a user wishes to perform onlinebanking related functions. Coherence processing may include resolving auser sets' situational identity attributes, such as attributes thatexpress the user's preferences for privacy with the identity attributesthat express the bank's interests, requirements, and/or the like. Forexample, coherence may configure whether the bank may share informationabout the user to partner organizations based at least in part on userpreferences, and a user may have a subscription to certain investmentadvisory information which may be applicable to certain bankingactivities, and where such investment advisory information applicationset is coherable with, that is consonant with, banking services securitypolicy requirements, since such application set attributes and Credsdescribe satisfactory security characteristics.

In some embodiments, coherence processing may include evaluating andselectively cohering and resolving identity attributes of multipleParticipant identities involved in multi-user common purpose operatingsessions. For example, suppose extended family members of a socialnetwork wish to have a common purpose operating session to exchangefamily news, some of which is confidential. A coherence processing setmay analyze target purpose situationally applicable identity attributes(including those that express preferences, and those that expressEffective Fact filtered Aggregate Creds regarding Quality ofTrustworthiness) of all the extended family members to detect possibleconflicts, and may try to generate a cohered purpose specification thatwould provide optimal results, as well as present, for example, a listof one or more family members that might require, for example, a writtenconfidentiality agreement, or might be precluded from attending thecommon purpose session. For example, some members of the social networkgroup may want to restrict the dissemination of certain information to aspecified collection of other members and/or some members of the socialnetwork may have constraints on what content they want to receive.

For example, suppose a user, U₁, is interested in exploring onlinebrokerage firms. U₁ may have a Participant identity, Pld_(U1), whoseattributes refer and/or contain U₁'s profiles and preferences (such as,for example, U₁'s need for privacy, integrity, preferences for fixedincome investment, preference for a global mixture of assets, specifiedbudget levels, and/or the like), and/or the like. Brokerage firms alsohave Participant identities representing their commercial interests(such as, for example, fees for their services), requirements (such asnon-repudiation, security, integrity, and/or the like), StakeholderParticipant Repute and/or the like information, as well as comparableParticipant information describing their applicable employees and/oragents, and/or the like.

Coherence processing sets may cohere and resolve PId_(U1)'s identityattributes with identity attributes of Participant identities of and/orotherwise germane to, such brokerage firms. For example, suppose abrokerage firm, B₁, may use a proprietary software package, soft₁, toprovide its proprietary services, which are associated with B₁'sParticipant identity PId_(B1). PId_(B1) may have identity attributesexpressing requirements stating that users must be stronglyauthenticated using assiduous existential biometric authentication touse any of its proprietary services and agree to pay associated fees forusing them. Coherence processing set may compare the fees associatedwith soft₁ with U₁'s budget to determine their consistency. Further,Coherence may assess whether a given brokerage firm, and/or itsapplicable one or more employees have sufficient Quality to Purpose Credand/or the like ratings regarding global asset investment, versus aconcentrated knowledge in North American assets. If the applicablecontextual purpose expression, preference, profile and/or likeinformation of both parties is not sufficiently consistent, Coherenceprocessing may exclude B₁ from candidate set of brokerage firms, and ifthe contextual purpose comparison analysis is a comparatively optimalresult, such B₁ may be prioritized as a candidate, most user setcontextual purpose compatible, brokerage firm.

In some embodiments, identity attributes may require updating, forexample, acquisition of more current, and, for example in some casetested for a result set, information such that certain identityattribute information may express situationally-relevant purposespecifications that may require dynamic and/or periodic adjustments.Such adjustment may be applied to ongoing contextual purpose relatedactivity sets through updating attribute information and, if modified,or modified beyond certain specified extent, may notify user sets and/orresource providers, including, for example, requiring user set and/orresource Stakeholder (which may be provided by an authorized agent)input. For example, suppose security experts found securityvulnerabilities in softs. In such a case, identities attributes of PId₁may reflect this change and as a result, its identity attributes may nolonger be consistent with U₁'s identity attributes specifying U₁'ssecurity requirements and, for example, such user set may be notified,and/or the cohered operating specification set will no longer executeunless appropriate modifications and/or further specifications and/orauthorizations are made.

In some embodiments, purpose fulfillment processing in pursuit of asituational contextual purpose set may identity, select, and provisionone or more resource arrangement sets, one or more of which maydynamically and situationally adjust to the requirements specified bythe situational purpose specifications, including specificationssupporting recognition of, and/or response to, event “triggers”precipitated by session information one or more developments.

For example, in some embodiments, during the process of identifying andselecting resources for an operating session, coherence processing mayevaluate, for example, which identified resources both meet therequirements of a user set target contextual purpose expression and/orPurpose Statement and/or the like set and of other selected and/orcandidate resources, for example as combinatorial sets, and may use theresults of such evaluation to guide the selection process, for example,by cohering selected and/or newly assembled contextual purposefulfillment purpose class applications and/or by presenting to such userset a prioritized set of potential contextual purpose resource setoptions, which such prioritized set may include values reflecting one ormore of the information variables and/or coherence employed Quality toPurpose assessment values for user set evaluation and/or modification.For example, a user exploring brokerage firms may have investment budgetpreferences, fee preferences, Quality to Purpose for investment Credand/or the like type preferences, physical proximity to user setpreferences, and/or the like, that may be cohered with the feestructures, locations, Cred Quality to Purpose assessments, investmentportfolio size, and/or other relevant attributes related to accounts atdifferent brokerage firms. Such coherence processing may guide theselection of those brokerage firms that best meet the user purpose.

In some embodiments, coherence processing may process specificationsassociated with an input framing of user purpose and/or with resourcesin a resource arrangement to find “shadow” resources that may beassociated with a resource arrangement for use when adapting to changingsituations and/or for potentiating such resource arrangement performanceeffectiveness quality to target purpose. For example, suppose that abrokerage firm, B₁, has some requirements on the security of the user'scomputing arrangement when the user is interacting with B₁'s software,soft₁. This specification may allow the user to continue working withhis or her general purpose operating system when the threat level is low(e.g., a threat situation less than or equal to 3) (or under certainother potential higher security threat circumstances, such as user setcomputing arrangement being used, for example, at a more vulnerablephysical and network configuration location), and may require a moresecure system when the threat level is higher:

(security contextual variable (seniority = 5)  (if required-rigor-level<= 3 then   (performance >= 8 and ease of use >= 6 and security) >   4and reliability > 5)  else   (required-rigor-level (security) > 7 andreliability > 8 )))

With such a specification, a PERCos embodiment may identify, select andprovision resources from the user's general purpose operating systemthat comply with this specification set in normal circumstances wherethe threat level is low and identify and select (and/or acquire), ifavailable, shadow resources, with a higher degree of security assurance,from and/or for the user's computing arrangement use for such case whenthe threat level is high.

Once a set of resources have been identified, selected and provisionedin an operating session fulfilling a user purpose, situationalparticularity monitoring may invoke coherence to adapt to changes in acurrent situation to ensure that operating resources in the operatingsession are mutually compatible and still meet the requirements of auser set target purpose. For example, consider an operating sessioncomprising a purpose class application, soft₁, provided by a brokeragefirm operating on some general purpose operating system resources from auser's computing arrangement. If the situation changes, e.g., the threatlevel increases to a high level of threat, the user's general purposeoperating system may no longer be compatible with the securityrequirements associated with soft₁'s identity. Particularity monitoringmay respond to such a change in the threat level by invoking coherenceto identify, select and/or provision resources from the user's computingarrangement, and/or, for example, involve the associated user set inevaluation, authorization, and/or selection processes, regardingprovisioning a resource set that is compatible with soft₁'s requirementsrelated to a higher threat level.

PERCos Identity Services (PERID), PERCos Information Management Services(PIMS) and PERCos Identity Matrix (PIDMX) identity managementembodiments can, in some embodiments, provide a wide range of identitymanagement capability sets including tool sets and service sets, and/orthe like for collecting, accepting, organizing, storing, identifying,selecting, retrieving, and/or otherwise managing vast arrays ofidentity-related information sets. These capability sets enableeffective and efficient establishment of reliable situational identitiesthat users, Stakeholders, process sets, resource sets, and/or the likecan use to perform purposeful operations sets in pursuit ofsituation-specific target purpose sets.

For example, consider a CPFF, CPFF₁, that enables advanced students,teachers, researchers, and/or the like to explore physics knowledgesets. An identity management embodiment may collect and/or accept vastarrays of identity-related information sets on CPFF₁ so that when astudent who has both a strong mathematics and general physics backgroundrequests to explore physics knowledge sets, CPFF₁ may establish asituational identity reflective of such student so as to enable thestudent to evaluate and assess CPFFInstance₁'s sufficiency in satisfyinghis/her target purpose.

FIG. 16 is a non-limiting illustrative example of identity attributearrangements.

In some embodiments, as shown in FIG. 16 , identity managementembodiments may separate collection and storage of identity attributeinformation from their usage, such as, creating a situational identity,for example, comprising a resource set identifier set and associatedattribute information substantially germane to such resource setidentifier in the context of a target contextual purpose set and relatedconditions and characteristics (e.g., relevant profile, preference,historical behavior, Cred, user computing arrangement environment(including, for example, other resources) and operating context, and/orthe like), and/or evaluating such identifiers and at least a portion ofsuch attributes to assess resource (including, for example, resourceportion) optimality in pursuit of situational specific target purposesets. Collection of identity attribute information of an instance setincluding, for example, resource sets, including a Participant set;other user sets; contextual purpose sets, including, for example,purpose class sets' user computing arrangement and/or environment sets,including for example, environment sets at given locations (where suchenvironment sets may be any one or more portions of such environmentinstances) and/or the like—may occur during the lifecycle of an instanceset to capture a wide range of operations (such as its creation,modification, interaction with other resources, publication of itsReputes, relationship set with contextual purpose and/or other purposerelated specifications including, for example, relationship set withcontextual purpose classes, and/or the like), and/or the like in avariety of situations. A resource set may, at least in part, beevaluated in accordance with control specifications and any associatedalgorithms and/or values, including, for example, any relevant policiesand/or other rules that may govern access to and/or interpretation ofidentity information in fulfillment of a situation-specific purpose set.

For example, suppose a person registers his/her existential multimodalbiometric information set as a Participant information set using timestamped information instances extracted from an ultrasonic fingerprintscanner, voice scanner, ultrasound receiver, and video camera set,augmented by both pseudo-random ultra-sound emitter information andbiometric timing anomaly analysis. Depending on such person's specifictarget purpose as a user set, the user set and any associated resource,such as cloud service, requirements, such user may need to submit toauthentication of varying strength when subsequently pursuing a givenpurpose set. For casual web browsing in a PERCos environment, the usermight not need to submit to any authentication, whereas for a high-valuefinancial transaction, the user's financial institution, and/or apurpose class, such as one that may be managed by a CPFF, may requirethat such user undergo assiduous, for example existential, liveness,and/or emitter, such as ultrasound at least in part based challenge andresponse and associated timing anomaly, testing authentication.Moreover, for example, in some embodiments and operating models, thefinancial institution may perform further liveness detection (such asincluding challenge questions and response) and/or persistent orperiodic timing anomaly testing to ensure such user's effectivelycontinuous presence during sensitive operations and/or informationdisplay and/or other communications.

In some embodiments, identity framework may enable a user set toorganize his authentication information set at least in part toaccommodate his purposeful activity types, other conceptually logicalorganizational arrangements, and/or as associated with Stakeholderresource related requirements. For example, such a user set may organizeidentities of people based at least in part on user set relationshipswith them, such as, immediate family, extended family, close friends,professional colleagues, acquaintances, and/or the like, and may furtherorganize these groups and/or their members according to contextualpurpose classes, CPE specification sets, and/or other purpose relatedspecifications. In doing so, the user set may be able to create ad hoccontextual purpose networks. For example, a user set may create an adhoc network comprising its extended family members so that the user setcan keep in contact with such members, and such ad hoc network may be atleast in part mutual in that the user set may join with other, in thisexample, extended family member sets, to create an extended familycommon purpose networking arrangement. Such arrangement may organized beas extended family member based network arrangement, with close familyunits functioning as subgroups of such metagroup extended familynetwork, and where each member of a subgroup, each subgroup, and/or themetagroup, may maintain rules and/or other policies regardinginteraction, sharing, privacy, content usage other conditions, and/orthe like common purpose environment policies. Such “compound” networkinggroup and member arrangement may operate in accordance with such memberand group specification sets seniority of rules and controls authorityschema, which may cohere, in given target purpose interactioncircumstances, into, for example, operating target contextual purposespecifications compatible with the contextual purpose specifications setof such metagroup, subgroup set, and/or grouping of individual users, incompliance with the coherable interests of each party, that is eachgroup and members conditions and specifications. In some embodiments, insuch circumstances, conflicts among inter party rules and/or otherpolicies and/or target purpose related specifications may be resolvedby, for example, coherence services and/or group and/or membercorresponding user and/or administrative set input, or such coherencemay declare such coherence resolving process as situationally,operationally invalid due to, at least in part, conflict between suchmulti-party rules and/or other policy instances and/or a lack ofrequired information completeness.

Any such family group may also create a larger ad hoc network that mayinclude user set friends, colleagues, and/or acquaintances. For thislarger network, as for an extended family meta group, a user set may usea template set that allows the user set to establish an authenticationand/or other factor set identity evaluation policy and/or other rule setbased, for example, on user sets relationship with other user sets(including, for example, such groups), and where such relationship setmay be, at least in part, for example, based upon shared usage of,interest in, and/or involved resource set relationship with, contextualpurpose related specifications, such as CPEs, Purpose Statements,operating specifications, and/or the like. For example, suppose a groupof friends decides to have an online video based get together. Giventhat they are all friends and, under most circumstances, can reliablyrecognize each other, the policy may require a relatively weakauthentication process. However, if a get together involved distantacquaintances who may not be well known to other session participants,then a policy set may require a much stronger authentication, and/orevaluation and/or validation of the acquaintance's Participantregistered and published resource set along with applicable, associatedReputes such as Creds, EFs, and/or FFs, and/or the informing reputationand characterization information.

In some embodiments, PERCos may provide flexible capabilities forenumerating and/or characterizing resource sets (such as, for example,purpose sets, purpose classes and/or other purpose neighborhoods,Participants, Frameworks including purpose class applications, attributeresource instances, Reputes, software, documents, databases, devices,resource logical portion sets, and/or the like) and/or portions thereofwith contextual attributes that may be situationally applied, whereinstances of such contextual attributes may comprise any descriptiveconcept or quality of any identifiable subject, whether such instance isa “simple” quality, such as the color “red,” or comprises a pluralattribute conceptual and/or computer interpretable logical arrangement,such as a PERCos descriptive specification, Resonance algorithm, and/orthe like.

For example, consider a PERCos Formal resource. Such a resource has atminimum a persistent identifier, a Stakeholder publisher, a contextualpurpose expression, and a subject matter (which is at minimum some humaninterpretable descriptor of, including a reliable unique identifier ofor reliable pointer to or some indicator that there is no reliableidentifier or pointer for and the subject is defined by the resourcesubject identifier itself and has the indefiniteness of a conceptualabstraction, a quality or thing perceived). Each of these four instancesmay, in some embodiments, constitute attributes, where, for example, theidentifier may be an alphanumeric string, the subject matter might be aname and version, for example, of a software program and a locationpointer, the Stakeholder publisher might be an instance of a Participantresource information set or a pointer thereto, and a contextual purposeexpression comprising at least two attributes, a verb (specified orinferred) and a domain category (noun).

In some embodiments, users and/or user groups (such as, for example,tenured professors of physics, Mercedes licensed auto mechanics, boardmembers of public US companies, members of the AKC, and/or the like)generally have one or more contextual attribute sets that characterizethem. For example, a user who is a tenured professor of physics at MITmay have attributes, such as, the user's academic credentials, rank,and/or the like.

In some embodiments, PERCos attribute capabilities may comprise and/orsupport some or all of the following:

-   -   One or more Unique IDs    -   One or more names for attribute sets    -   “Handle” IDs, which may be employed in different contextual        purposes and have differing associated rights, usage        consequences, privacy considerations, and/or the like    -   Status, such as, whether an attribute set is resolvable, and/or        complete, incomplete, or unknown, where the status of an        attribute set is indicated as:    -   Resolvable of its value set can be, for example, reliably        obtained to a specified degree and/or in accordance with one or        more specified method sets.    -   Complete if its full value set is available.    -   Incomplete of it is known or anticipated that the value set is        not full or finished.    -   Unknown if it is unknown whether it is complete or not.    -   Type, such as Repute Cred Quality to Purpose, Effective Fact,        Faith Fact, authentication, attestation, location, color, size,        interface, and/or the like.    -   Method sets for calculating, evaluating, and/or otherwise        generating attribute value sets and/or value sets representing        at least in part data and/or structured information such as        attribute information, purpose specifications (such as CPEs),        and/or resource sets.    -   Method set for validating attributes, such as, their integrity,        authenticity, reliability, and/or the like.

Integrity, confidentiality, and/or the like protection over attributecontents

-   -   Situational and/or other event attribute management control that        is at least in part responsive to situational contextual purpose        specification information (including, for example, purpose class        and/or operating specification situationally specific        information). Such control capabilities may at least in part        manage attribute set privacy, usage consequence, combinatorial        consequence, CPFF and Awareness Manager, and/or related        operations.    -   Generalized attribute relationship framework for capturing,        storing, and/or otherwise managing attribute relationships.    -   One or more contextual information sets, such as, what (resource        sets), who (Participants), where (environment), and purpose. In        some embodiments, contextual information set may be expressed as        one or more (contextual-axis name: axis value-set) pairs. For        example, an attribute set may have one or more purpose axis        pairs, where value of purpose axis may be a CPE set, purpose        class and/or other purpose neighborhoods set, and/or the like.    -   User and/or network (including cloud services, administrative        and/or communications) environments.

In some embodiments, attributes may be formal (standardized andinteroperable within a group set or globally) or informal (such as, forexample, not PERCos standardized and interoperable free text metadataand/or other attribute information arrangements, in a form PERCos caninterpret and/or otherwise employ, a form does not employ PERCosstandardized expression and/or value set schema(s)). Formal attributesmay be standardized and interoperable through the use of, for example,one or more standardized and interoperable expression elements and anyassociated values employed in understanding, identifying, evaluating,ranking and/or otherwise prioritizing, selecting, arranging,provisioning, and/or otherwise managing one or more resource sets and/orportions thereof in fulfillment of one or more situation-specific targetpurpose sets. Such operations can employ, for example, similaritymatching analysis and/or other association of resource sets with CPEs(employed as framing contextual purpose expressions), PurposeStatements, and/or the like. Such CPE and/or other at least in partpurpose expression information may be augmented by further input from,for example, PERCos resonance specifications, profiles, historicalbehavior information, preference selections, and/or the like, and theforegoing may at least in part provide user set contextual purposeattribute identifying and/or contextually related information for atleast a portion of such matching operations.

In some embodiments, these expression elements may include Dimensionsets, Facet sets, in the form of their applicable instances and anyassociated values whose employment may support in part, one or moreConcept Description Schema (CDSs), which are multi-dimensionalstructures used in expressing and/or organizing, concepts (which may behuman perceived and may correspond to user classes). Such concepts mayrepresent differing relative characteristics (such as, similarities,differences, nearness, clustering, graphing, and/or the like) forproviding elements for user perception, and user and/or computingarrangement evaluation and/or validation.

In some embodiments, acknowledged Domain experts (and/or other as may beapplicable comparable parties) may employ CDSs through, in part, theuse, for example, of Dimensions (Master and/or auxiliary and/or thelike), Facets, and/or the like to represent standardized andinteroperable Domain-related attributes that may be used to expressdirect, asserted, and/or associated qualities of given resource sets.Such employment of CDSs may enable attributes to be declared in theform, for example, of Facets, that are classified into Dimensions, whichin certain embodiments may consist of a conceptual cluster of Facets,and which conceptual cluster may be complemented by other attributeinformation, such as attribute information extracted from resourcemetadata, usage environment, user set, value chain attributes (such asmay be indicated in PERCos provenance information), and/or the like. Forexample, attribute sets that refer to and/or contain Quality to Purposespecifications may be classified as Repute Dimension instances,attributes that refer to direct characteristics of a resource (complex,lengthy, cost over $15.00, and/or the like) may be classified asresource Dimension instances, attributes that refer to and/or containtime-related specifications may be classified as time Dimensioninstances, attributes that refer to and/or contain environment-relatedspecifications may be classified as environmental Dimension instances,and/or the like.

In some embodiments, such classification of attribute sets intoDimension instances can, in certain embodiments, facilitate efficiencyof operations for identifying and/or similarity matching, including, forexample, appropriately prioritizing, resource sets and/or resource setportions in response to user set contextual purpose and/or othersituational specification information. For example, resource sets thatshare a certain quantity and/or quality of attribute instances, as maybe represented by PERCos attribute information (and as may be specifiedin PERCos resonance specifications), such as Facet approximations, mayhave significant value associated with user set contextual purposespecification sets, though such CPE and/or the like purposespecification set have not been directly specified as purposespecification and/or purpose class purpose specification one or moresets of a resource set, though such resource set has a substantialportion, for example, of such attribute characteristics. Examining andcomparing resource shared attributes between attribute profiles ofidentified and/or otherwise known desirable to user set target purposeresource sets (for example, desirable as expressed by Repute Creds), andother resource opportunities, may result, with some PERCos embodiments,in the proffering and relative ranking of candidate resource sets.

In some embodiments, such Dimension sets, Facets, and/or the like, suchas, for example, Repute Quality to Purpose Facets and associated valueattribute information regarding resource sets and/or their Stakeholderparties and/or agents, may enable, for example, approximately,conceptually characterize desirable attribute sets of resource instancesets, in support of applying an approximation of user set contextualpurpose orientation (e.g., reflecting a user set user class throughapproximating specific user set purpose nuances and contextualconditions for a target contextual purpose instance). Suchcharacterizations, enabled at least in part through standardizedcontextual purpose expressions, can be, for example, directly and/orafter transformation, employed in user contextual purpose information(e.g., CPE, Purpose Statement, and/or the like) similarity matchinganalysis and/or other association analysis against resource setattribute information, including at least a subset of applicableresource and/or resource portion set respective CPE, metadata, and/orother attribute related information.

In some embodiments, CDSs may contain as elements, for example, one ormore resource sets associated with attributes and/or attributearrangements, such as contextual purpose specifications (a compound formof attribute set that may have a persistent unique identifier), and/orthey may be in part or whole comprised of attribute arrangements thatmay be associated with resource one or more sets and/or portionsthereof, one or more contextual purpose sets, one or more party sets,and/or one or more environment sets, and/or the attribute arrangementmay be discovered as associated with a resource one or more sets duringa resource set discovery process.

Further, in some PERCos embodiments, at least a portion of resource,environment, user and/or stakeholder instance sets may not only havetheir respective attributes (e.g., “primary, first order attributes),but at least a portion of their attribute sets, such as CDS sets, maythemselves have “secondary” attributes, including in some embodiments,one or more CDSs representing descriptive information that areassociated with a primary, first order attribute CDS sets.

In some embodiments, plural attribute can be encapsulated within one ormore CDS sets, where a CDS can comprise instances of, and convey,attribute set information corresponding substantially, to human conceptsets such as user classes (human perceptual units readily used by, andreadily interpretable by, one or more humans). In some PERCosembodiments, attribute information/value sets can include resource sets,where CDSs are published as, for example, PERCos Formal resources.

In some embodiments, organizations of attributes may take the form ofinformation arrangements, which may be distributed to and stored locallyand/or remotely at user set, at administrator set(s), at networklocations, and/or in cloud service and/or the like arrangements. Theseattribute management and store arrangements can, for example, providerelationship information involving abstraction of resource attributesinvolving Master Dimension Facet types and values, where such attributetype information bases organize attributes in accordance, at least inpart, with resource and/or resource portion instances, parties (usersets and/or, as applicable, their constituent members), contextualpurposes, and/or reputation specifications, and where suchrepresentations can, in some embodiments, support conceptual,perspective schemas that may correspond to user classes and mayrepresent, at least in part, attribute and/or resource/resource portionrelationship sets as such sets are associated with contextual purposes,resource sets, parties, and/or reputation information such as ReputeCreds, EFs, FFs, and/or the like (understanding that any of theforegoing may, in some embodiments, be provided in the form ofrespective resource sets).

When a purpose specification such as a CPE is published as a Formalresource, its subject, the CPE, may be the same as its associatedpurpose specification. CDS instances may be employed to frame conceptsin association with PERCos Frameworks, such as purpose classapplications, and/or Foundations.

FIG. 17 is a non-limiting illustrative example of employing attributesets to frame purposes and match resource sets.

FIG. 17 is an example of using one or more attribute sets (comprisingCDSs, simple attributes), resonance algorithm to generate a purposespecification, PS₁ for a user who likes Audis and perform similaritymatching to identify resource sets, such as, purpose class applications.In this example, an expert may have published a resonance algorithm thatspecifies that users with a moderate budget may like Audi A3 models.Attributes, “fast cars,” “sporty,” “German cars,” “[Quality to Purpose:moderate],” and “Audis” may be cohered and resolved by purpose framingto generate PS₁, which may be similarity matched to one or more PERCosFramework sets, such as purpose class application sets, that can beprovisioned (including being bound to user Foundation resource set) toprovide user with optimal interim results and Outcomes.

FIG. 18 is a non-limiting illustrative example of PERCos organization ofattributes.

As shown in FIG. 18 , some potential instances of PERCos attribute sets,which may include purpose expressions (such as, [verb: find, category:good local hiking companies], Reputes, relationships between attributesets and/or resource sets, Participant instances (including StakeholderParticipants), rule sets, representations of provenance, and/or users(who may also have been registered, and published as user setcorresponding Participant information sets). The example alsoillustrates how one or more attributes may be organized into sets andused collectively in one or more context sets, such as for representingsuch as, for example, representing provenance.

In this example, Acme is a Stakeholder whose Participant representationis a registered, published party that is also the Stakeholder publisherof its Participant representation, with, for example, Jon Doe, CEO ofAcme, as the publishing agent whose existential biometric ID isacquired, encrypted/hashed, and associated with his Participantrepresentation information set (and any tangible world interfaceinformation) and the Participant instance for Acme might containinformation stating that Jon Doe is a registered agent who may act onbehalf of Acme, generally, or in accordance with specific limiting, suchas situation related, specifications, while Jon Doe's Participantinstance may reference Acme as a Stakeholder for which Participantrepresentation of Jon Doe may act as agent, at least under such certaincircumstances. Users who want to use Acme's services might evaluate AcmePERCos resource provenance where such users could identify Jon Doe, thePresident, including his Participant corresponding resource set, suchas, for example, his existential biometric information set, and mayfurther evaluate, for example, Repute Creds regarding Jon Doe asassociated with Jon Doe's Participant representation instance, as aStakeholder who has a Participant representation and unique ID.

Some embodiments may have a rule set requiring that a provenanceattribute set contains at least two Stakeholder instances where theymay, or may not, be the same party—e.g., the two Stakeholders can be thesame party in two roles, the publisher and the provider (for example, aweb service or retailer). Such a rule may be an embodiment widerequirement—a minimum of a publisher and some type of provider—or such arule may be specified as a general, or situationally specific,condition, for example, as set by a user and/or administrator as apreference setting.

FIG. 19 is a non-limiting example illustrating attribute status,comprising complete, incomplete, and resolvable attribute sets.

FIG. 19 depicts a non-limiting example of the status of attributeinstances specifying whether an attribute instance is resolvable,complete, and/or incomplete, or unknown (as to completion). In somePERCos embodiments, an attribute value set may be resolvable but somevalues and/or attribute value contributing information may not belocally present and some PERCos attribute embodiments may supportreferencing external repositories, for example, cloud service databasesand/or other attribute set storage arrangements—which arrangements maybe distributed and respectively under the control of plural differentparties—to fully resolve a given attribute set value set contents, andfurther in some embodiments, one or more aspects related to completelyresolving an attribute set may be conditional, for example, requiringpayment by the user and/or requiring the user have certain specifiedprivileges, such as being a member of a certain group (e.g., a class ofparties, such as subscribers and/or members of an organization (e.g.,IEEE)). If the status of an attribute is incomplete or resolvable, theentire value of the attribute may not be encapsulated within theattribute itself. Instead it may contain a subset and/or transformedinstance of the value set and/or information set.

In some PERCos embodiments, resource sets may have attribute sets whosequalities can vary significantly, for example:

-   -   1. A simple quality expression such as a reliable pointer (such        as URL specification) or unique identifier alphanumeric        expression (though any such identifier may be, at least in part,        for example, comprised of/represent, one or more embedded        attribute sets which have been encoded within an identifier        set),    -   2. A CDS information set, made up of directly interpretable        plural attributes representing a simple to highly compound set        of human conceptual units, such as those comprising a CPE, or    -   3. A structured form, such as a PERCos Formal resource, which        has an organizational schema and various information units.

Any of the foregoing, expressed generally for the instance, and/or as toany set of their respective uniquely identifiable portions, may haveattributes, where such attributes may have further attributes. Forexample, a resource comprising a document and related information, suchas in the form of a PERCos Formal resource, may employ the document'sabstract to represent its subject matter and/or it may provide areliable pointer/locator method to the document's location, where suchsubject matter can be found, and may be further examined or used. Withsuch resource in this example, each of the Formal resource identifier,subject, purpose expression, and Stakeholder information, along with aresource aggregate Cred for Quality to Purpose, can be resource instanceattributes and may be comprised of component attributes, e.g., a purposeexpression with a verb and category, a Stakeholder company with an agentperson's name(s) and biometric information (and/or a Stakeholder setscorresponding Participant registered, published resource), a uniqueidentifier made up of sections representing different identifier pieces,for example, fused together as a naming schema, but readable andmeaningful as to its portions; etc.), and, in this example, a Reputeaggregate Cred published resource instance.

In some embodiments, resource related attribute sets may, at least inpart, embed references to external attribute sets such that such a givenresource set attribute set may be readily resolvable so as to providecomplete resource attribute information provisioning, or may beresolvable, but are resolvable components of declared as incompleteattribute information sets (such completeness or incompletenessrepresenting declarations by direct and/or indirect Stakeholderrespective resource related publishers and/or the like). Suchreferencing as to attribute resolution may be situationally identified,that is as relates to a given purpose related specification set and canbe expressed directly, and/or by reference, in the form of resourceattribute notational expression attributes (for example, complete,complete when resolved, incomplete and/or the like). Such notations fora given resource attribute set may differ as to attribute sets fordifferent purpose expressions, that is a given resource set (and/or userset and/or computing environment set) may have contextual purposesrelated to specific situations (as defined by specifications and/orother input) and which such one or more attribute sets may be, at leastin part, determined as a result of specified method sets, which mayinvolve conditional attribute set compositions that result from eventsets, such as test result values specified by attribute set relatedmethods that produce situationally specific results. As a result, onecomplete set of attributes for a resource associated with one contextualpurpose specification and set of conditions may materially differ from asecond attribute set associated with a different contextual purposespecification and/or set of situationally applicable conditions, and anysuch attribute set may differ at different times, for example, due todifferent, provided input values.

For example, a resource set may directly embed all Stakeholder setresource set (and/or user set and/or computing environment set)specified attribute information sets (recognized as complete attributesets) and/or embed all recognized as relevant, but which are furtherrecognized as not comprehensive, attribute information sets (incompleteattribute sets). A resource set may have attribute sets declared by itsdirect resource Stakeholder set, and/or by an indirect Stakeholder set(such as a Repute instance Stakeholder publisher where the subject isthe resource set and the Stakeholder has an indirect interest in theresource set).

In some embodiments, this ability to flexibly associate resource setswith attribute sets and attribute sets with other attribute sets enablesPERCos based systems and/or their user sets to more effectively evaluateresource sets for situational contextual purpose consequences andqualities to purpose and further can support, for example, capabilitiesfor granting access and/or other rights to use a resource set at leastin part based, for example, on applicable attribute relatedspecification sets and/or user actions. For example, such evaluation of,completion of, and/or use of attributes for user contextual purposefulfillment may be at least in part based on situationally determinedattribute sets derived, at least in part, as a result of purposefulfillment related sets of rules, environmental considerations, userrights and/or profile information, resource and/or other contextualpurpose descriptive elements, and/or any combination thereof, and/oruser selections, biometrically identified user reactions to events,and/or computing arrangement input. Such situational attributes may bepredefined as an attribute set.

In some embodiments, situational resource (and/or user and/orenvironment) identity notations (complete, incomplete, resolvable,and/or the like, along with any associated values, e.g., a 7 on a scaleof 1 to 10, which may indicate an assertion of a nearlycomplete/comprehensive set from attribute Quality to Purpose standpoint)can, for example, inform user and/or their computing arrangement sets asrelated to outcome reliability by enabling decisions to be based atleast in part on completeness state of attribute information estimation(regarding available attribute sets and, for example, in the form ofapproximations of completeness as may be related to user targetcontextual purpose). Such information sets may enable users and/or theircomputing arrangements to evaluate “work” (e.g., overhead) that may berequired, at least as described by Stakeholder(s) so that users,Stakeholders, and/or the like sets can be informed regarding attributeset completeness, readiness, and/or relevance qualities as relates to acontextual purpose specification. Such qualities information may, forexample, be stipulated as generally related to classes of, and/orspecific instance sets of, resources, users, environments, relativeportion sets of the foregoing, and/or the like and such completenessand/or relevance qualities can be expressed as Repute and/or the likeQuality to Purpose, EF, and/or FF specification sets for attribute setsassociated with resource and/or resource portion sets, user sets, and/oruser computing environment sets.

In some embodiments, resource complete and incomplete attribute sets maybe defined as being associated respectively to one or more CPE (e.g.,CPEs for purpose classes) and/or other purpose specification sets. Forexample, a given resource set, RS₁, may have differing attribute setsfor differing purpose specifications, such as, for example, an attributeset AS₁, for one purpose specification set, PS₁, that is operativelydifferent from its (RS₁'s) attribute set, AS₂, for another purposespecification set, PS₂, where both PS₁ and PS₂ may be declared to becomplete or incomplete, and in either case, may involve resolved and/orresolvable attribute sets.

FIG. 20 is a non-limiting illustrative example of relationships betweenattribute sets and resource sets.

FIG. 20 shows an example configuration where a given resource, ResourceX, fully encapsulates an attribute set and also references to externalattribute sets and may have further discoverable attributes, such asAttribute H.

FIG. 21 is a non-limiting illustrative example of publication andre-publication.

FIG. 21 shows an example PERCos embodiment that supports the publicationand republication of attribute sets. In this example, attribute sets maybe republished with additional names and/or with additional and/oralterative existential signatures associated with Stakeholders.

FIG. 22 is a non-limiting illustrative example of attribute and resourceassociations.

FIG. 22 shows a non-limiting example set of a PERCos embodiment thatsupports an intricate web of associations between resources, resourceportions, Compound resources, and various types of attributes. In someembodiments, PERCos supports attributes referencing resources, resourceportions, and other attributes. In some embodiments, PERCos supports thediscovery of attributes and/or resources, which may not have directconnections but indirect connections (secondary or tertiary, etc.relationships, or connections that may be inferred from the relationshipof other sets of resource and/or attribute associations and/or inferredusing semantic and/or artificial intelligence capabilities analyzing asavailable one or more attributes. In some embodiments, users and/orcomputing capabilities may look at an attribute resource set in contextof its resource one or more associations and, as a further step, lookat, and interpret by analysis, such associated resource set and/or setinstances' attributes, and/or any applicable attribute set's and/orassociated resource set's associated one or more associated ContextualPurposes Expressions and/or the like.

FIG. 23 is a non-limiting illustrative example of evaluation and/ordiscovery through attributes.

FIG. 23 shows an example PERCos embodiment that supports discovery ofheterogeneous sets of information and/or data such as attribute sets,resource sets, and resource portion sets via certain PERCos embodimentssystem supported discovery capabilities. To simplify the discoveryprocess, some PERCos embodiments may use PERCos template specificationtypes, such as incorporate the use of PERCos Frameworks and/orFoundations, as well, for example, CDSs, for identifying one or morecontextual purposes and associated attributes, including as applicable,resource sets, which can aid in user and/or computing arrangementdecision processes, including similarity and association analysisemploying conceptual and results approximation related to purpose,resources, and/or attributes.

FIG. 24 is a non-limiting illustrative example of resource set discoverythrough the use of combined attribute sets, including CDS, CDS CPE, andsimple attributes.

FIG. 24 shows an example PERCos embodiment that supports the use ofcombined attribute sets to discover resource sets. In this example, auser may discover resource sets, D and E through the use of CDSs, “fastcars” and “learn to drive” and a simple attribute, “sporty.” In someembodiments, such discovered resource sets can be then filtered basedon, for example, their Reputes, user profiles, user preferences,historical data, resonance specifications, and/or the like to identityand select a resource set that may optimally fulfill user target purposesets.

In some embodiments, relevance of attribute and/or other identifierinformation sets, under many circumstances, may depend in the context ofresource sets, Participants, location, and purpose.

FIG. 25 is a non-limiting illustrative example of relevant attributesets for a given resource set, Participant, CPE, and/or the like.

FIG. 25 illustrates a non-limiting example of identifying and selectinga set of relevant attributes of a given resource set, RS₁, based ontheir relevance to Participants, purpose, and/or location.

In some embodiments, such contextual information may be represented inthe form of (contextual-axis-name, axis value) pair, such as, forexample

-   -   Resource-axis, whose value may comprise one or more published        resource sets and/or any reliably identifiable portions thereof,        for example, PERCos Formal or Informal resource sets and/or        portions thereof, and may also point at the attribute        information sets of other resource sets, for example, pointing        to one or more portions of such referenced resource set        attribute information set as may be considered germane by a        resource set attribute information Stakeholder, such as a        resource direct publisher or publisher of Repute Cred, EF,        and/or FF information on such resource information.    -   Purpose-axis, whose value may comprise one or more contextual        purpose expression (CPE) sets, purpose classes and/or purpose        neighborhoods, and/or the like.    -   Participants-axis, such as, for example, Stakeholder        Participants, user Participants, and/or the like, including for        example, including their respective profiles and/or other        characteristics.    -   Environment-axis, whose value may describe environment factors        and/or conditions. For example, such value may be used to        determine the applicability of an attribute set.

For example, a resource set, RS₁, such as an e-book on group theory, mayhave identity attributes, including the following attributes:

(Attribute 104,     (Identifier: RS102)) (Attribute 105,      (Type:e-book)      (Identifier: RS102)      (Location: URL103 - location forlocating RS₁)    {(purpose-axis: {[learn: group theory], [learn: finitegroup    theory]})})  (Attribute 106,     (Type: Repute)    (Identifier: RS102)    (Quality to Purpose: 8)   { (Repute-axis: {(AggCred:        (Quality to Purpose: 8)        (Subject: RS102)       (Purpose: [learn: group theory])         (Publisher:PublisherID-101)         ({Repute₁, Repute₂, ... Repute_(n)}))      (Cred           (Quality to Purpose: 9)          (Purpose: [learn:finite group theory])          (Subject: RS102)          (Publisher:UID101))})})

where

-   -   Attribute104 expresses a unique identifier for RS₁,    -   Attribute105 expresses location for finding RS₁ in the cloud. It        also has a purpose axis that describes one or more RS₁'s purpose        sets.    -   Attribute106 expresses RS₁'s Quality to Purpose produced by        evaluating two sets of Reputes, one aggregate Cred that RS₁'s        publisher, PublisherID-101, had aggregated Reputes, Repute₁,        Repute₂, . . . , Repute_(n) that have been published by various        mathematicians, and a Cred, published by UID101.

In some embodiments, identity attributes may be attributes, and as such,may be formal (i.e., readily interpretable) or informal (such as, forexample, free text metadata). Formal identity attributes may compriseone or more standardized and interoperable expression elements that maybe used to identify, evaluate, rank and/or otherwise prioritize, select,arrange, provision, and/or otherwise manage one or more resource sets(including, for example, combinations of sets and/or portions thereof)in fulfillment of one or more situation-specific target purpose sets.Some of such processes may involve, at least in part, similaritymatching analysis and/or other approximation computing to associate oneor more resource set instances with CPEs and/or other purposespecifications (for example, Contextual Purpose Expressions, PurposeStatements, and/or the like). In some embodiments, expression elementsmay include Dimension Facet set instances and any associated valueswhose employment may support in part, for example, one or more ConceptDescription Schemas (CDSs).

In some embodiments, identity arrangements may provide organizationalstructures, such as PIDMX, to provide effective and efficientidentification, evaluation, and validation of resource sets, wherevalidation may include assessment of the strength of binding and/orbinding methods among resource identity information, including resourcedescriptive information and associated resource existential Stakeholderbiometric information, and, for example, including any associated rigormetrics for binding among, and/or otherwise assessing, the strength andreliability of any other identity relationship associations. In somecases, assessment of the binding may be based at least in part onsituational responsiveness to contextual purpose specifications, PurposeStatements, and/or the like.

In some embodiments, identities and identity attributes may haveassociated policies and/or other rules that govern their access, wherepolicies may be authorization-based, time-based, and/or the like. Apolicy may also be applicable to all or parts of an identity attributeset and plural different policies may apply to a given attribute set ofa given resource set. For example, a resource set may have an identityattribute set that specifies its Stakeholder information set, some ofwhich (such as its publisher information set) may be public, whereassome of which (such as its creator information) may be private andrequires appropriate authorization, and further, whereas its providerStakeholder information may need to be verified as to its currentapplicability, since provider Stakeholder may change over time (anelapsed provider Stakeholder identity may still be, in some embodiments,maintained in a resource set provenance information set).

In some embodiments, policies may express a time period during which anidentity attribute may be valid. For example, a resource set may have awarranty attribute for a specified period of time, after which theattribute is no longer valid. These identity attributes, individuallyand/or in combination, may be maintained and/or included in PIDMXs orother identification organizational structures to provide evaluators(such as, for example, users, Stakeholders, resource sets, and/orprocess sets) with additional contextual information they may need infulfillment of their purposeful related operations, such as, forexample, resource set identification, selection, and/or management.

In some embodiments, a resource set, RS₁, such as, a Participant, with,for example, sufficient authorization, may retrieve one or more identityattributes and/or other identity-related information sets (such as atleast a portion of related resource purpose classes, interfaceinformation, and/or the like) associated with a resource set, RS₂, froma PIDMX to create one or more designator sets for RS₂, which RS₁ canthen be use to interact with RS₂.

In some embodiments, users, Stakeholders, process sets, and/or resourcesets may maintain their own PIDMXs comprising identifiers, identityattributes, and/or other identity-related information sets, includingfor example, designators they can use to access resource sets. Forexample, suppose a user is in pursuit of exploring restaurants. The usermay evaluate such identity information set in the user's PIDMX todetermine, for example, a restaurant's quality to situation-specificpurpose set (such as, for example, casual dining, special occasiondining, and/or the like), the physical location of restaurants,restaurant's Reputes, reliability of Reputes, and/or the like.

FIG. 26 is a non-limiting illustrative example of a PIDMX embodiment.

In some embodiments, identity manager sets may use multi-dimensionalPERCos Identity Matrices (PIDMXs) to efficiently and effectivelycapture, update, add, retrieve, organize, aggregate, control, persistand/or otherwise store, evaluate, validate, similarity match,prioritize, and/or otherwise manage, in whole or in part,identity-related information associated with resource instance sets(including Participant instances), such as, for example:

-   -   Identities, such as, for example, identifiers, that may be used        to uniquely identify a resource instance set.    -   Identity attributes associated with one or more identities        (identifiers), where identity attributes may refer to and/or        contain any identity-relevant information, such as, for example,        biometric reference data sets, Reputes,        credentials/rights/authorizations, preferences, purpose        specification sets, purpose classes and/or other purpose        neighborhoods, Foundation sets, purpose class applications        and/or Frameworks (including CPFFs), Resonance specification        sets, and/or the like. Identity attributes may have one or more        methods that can be used for their evaluation and/or validation.    -   Identity relationships, such as, for example, relationships        derived from interactions resource instance sets may have had        and/or have with other instance sets.    -   Policies and/or rules for controlling access to identity-related        information. In some embodiments, such policies and/or rules may        include policies for persisting identity-related information,        such as, frequency of persistence, information-set of        persistence, location(s) for storing persisted information sets,        and/or the like. For example, policies may state that certain        information sets related to one particular Stakeholder are to be        persisted daily, whereas certain information sets related to        another Stakeholder are to be persisted weekly. Specifications        may also specify storage strategies such as, for example        centralized, distributed, superior-subordinate, peer-to-peer,        and/or the like, including frequency of persistence, location of        repositories for maintaining the information sets, and/or the        like.    -   Organizational strategies, such as, for example strategies of        aggregating, merging, filtering, distributing, persisting and/or        the like one or more identity-related information sets, such as,        for example, Reputes, Resonances, Frameworks and Framework        classes, biometric representation sets, purpose specifications        and/or classes and/or other neighborhoods, Participant and/or        user classes, environment classes, and/or the like. For example,        identity-related information sets may be organized in a PIDMX,        based at least in part on differing logical dimension        simplification, standardization, and/or approximation aspects,        such as, purpose dimension, reliability dimension, and/or the        like.

For example, an identity manager, Imgr₁ may be provided with:

-   -   One or more control specification that may state that Imgr₁ is        to collect identity-related information for entities, e₁, e₂,        and e₃, where an entity e₁ (for i=1, 2, 3) may be either a user        or Stakeholder as represented by a Participant instance.    -   One or more interface specifications that may specify for each        i, 1≤i≤3, one or more methods, M_(ij)s, that user sets and/or        Stakeholder sets and/or computing arrangement sets on their        behalf, may use to access entity e_(i)'s biometrics identity        representation sets and associated one or more control        specifications that express authorizations/rights required to        invoke M_(ij)s.    -   One or more organizational specifications that may define the        organization of PIDMX, such as organizing identity-related        information based at least in part on a set of dimensions,        distributing them across multiple locations, replicating        strategies, and/or the like.

In some embodiments, a publisher and/or other one or more authorizedStakeholders may specify one or more organization specifications fororganizing their associated resource sets' identity elements. Forexample, consider a Participant identified set providing services as aCPA. Such CPA set may interact with users, who may be potentiallyinterested in such services. The CPA set may express an organizationspecification that specifies that its associated PIDMX create arelationship, called “potential client.” Whenever the CPA set interactswith a potential client, such set may provide instructions to such PIDMXto capture the client's identity and relevant identity attributes (suchas, for example, the client's name, location, and/or the like) andassociate the potential client relationship with CPA set's identityand/or with a CPA associated Participant set (when there are, forexample, plural CPA set Participant sets, for example, as employeesParticipant sets). The CPA set may also specify an interfacespecification that enables the CPA set (and/or, for example, an employeeParticipant set) to obtain a list of potential clients, based at leastin part on time of a certain types of interactions, client locations,CPA set Participant instances, and/or the like.

In some embodiments, PIDMXs may be published as resources. Publishersand/or other authorized Stakeholders and/or the like may associate oneor more control, interface, and/or organizational specifications thatexpress policies, other rules (including, for example, filteringalgorithms) and/or other methods with a PIDMX that govern itsoperations. For example, a publisher may publish a PIDMX as a resourceand associate a control specification that expresses that PIDMX controlaccess rules regarding identity-related information sets, such as, forexample, providing access to a given identity-related information setonly upon presentation of appropriate authorizations and/or completionof specified authentication processes, and/or ensuring that anidentity-related information set is only available to specific otheridentities upon one or more sets of criteria, such as validation ofpresence during information provisioning (such as display) to anauthenticated party employing existential reality integrity analysisand/or presentation of one or more specification satisfying ReputeCreds, EFs, and/or FFs and/or the like.

In some embodiments, PIDMX may, at least in part, organize itsidentity-related information using a set of organizing principles thatenable efficient and effective use of such information sets infulfillment of target contextual purpose sets. Such information sets mayinclude resource related attributes and metadata, including, forexample, information sets organized in accordance with relationship(s)with other resource sets and/or resource related information, such as,for example:

-   -   contextual purpose expression and/or other purpose related        specification sets and/or purpose neighborhoods, such as purpose        classes;    -   user sets, which may include, for example affinity groups and/or        user classes, and where users sets may be Participant resource        sets; and/or    -   resource environments, which may be identified as resource sets,        such as Foundations and/or Frameworks, and/or which may include,        for example, user computing arrangement location (current,        historical, potential, and/or the like), and/or other        environment information such as information regarding tangible        items proximate to such user computing arrangement so as to        inform regarding, for example, user computing arrangement        environment composition information which may be used, for        example, for authentication and/or other reality testing related        processes.

Many current resource information systems, for example,telecommunication network systems, financial transaction systems, and/orthe like, create, to varying degrees, time stamped logs that arecommonly used for debugging purposes and as such are typically organizedbased at least in part on debugging related events. Such systems aredesigned with little or no consideration for, and normally nostandardized and interoperable support for, resource potentialutilization in pursuit of, and/or otherwise associated with, contextualpurpose operations, such as purpose fulfilment optimization. Suchpurpose fulfillment optimization processes may involve PIDMX suppliedinformation that provide, for example, attribute related informationregarding resource set deployment with other resource set combinatorialconsequences. PIDMX information may also, for example, assist CPFFprocesses by providing attribute information informing managingcomputing processing environment minimalism to support optimalcontextual purpose computing session privacy, security, efficiency,and/or outcome predictability. Such PIDMX information may for example,support resource eligibility for use and/or use management during CPFFresource identification, evaluation, and processing instances, forexample, performing CPFF identity and/or identity attribute relatedconstraining and/or other minimizing of resource provisioning and/orselected processing activities.

In some embodiments, PIDMX may compile and associate compendiuminstances with their respective resource sets providing, for example,situationally significant purpose specification—such as CPE—relatedattribute and/or the like information sets informing, for example,regarding purpose related resource sets, where such information may havebeen acquired from expert resources (who published such informationassociated with at least a portion of such purpose expression and/orcorresponding purpose information), who provide or provided suchinformation on an expert consulting basis as, for example, Participantexperts, and/or, for example, as a result of historical (current sessionand/or in the past) user and/or crowd (for example Effective Fact, crowdfiltered) resource usage aggregation of situationally significantassociated attribute and the like information instances. The foregoinginformation may be at least in part organized into logical sets, forexample, as associated with purpose classes, attribute classes, usersclasses, and/or the like, and such attribute and/or the like informationmay, at least in part, be provided in the form of relational instances,associated with, for example, one or more of user target purposespecification sets related to user local and network computingarrangements, device types, and/or tangible environment information,such as user computing arrangement location(s), tangible and/or networkconfiguration and/or identifiers; profile; preference; Foundation;Framework; Repute Cred, EF, FF; user set; and/or the like informationcompilations. Such information may also be organized, at least in part,according to contextual purpose fulfillment sessions dates, timedurations, and/or one or more identifiable consequences, such as cost,delivery, manufacturing event (e.g., quantity), and/or other monitoredevent, such as processing results information. Such informationinstances may be associated with Participant sets (on behalf of users,Stakeholders, and/or process sets, as situationally appropriateidentity-related information sets, that may be organized, at least inpart, as situationally germane attribute and/or the like informationsets and/or information derived therefrom, wherein such information maybe employed in the identification, evaluation, and/or management ofresources in support of optimal user target purpose operations andoutcomes.

Such situationally significant information sets may be associated withspecific and/or classes of contextual purpose sets, where in someembodiments, PERCos operations and/or purpose sets processing may be,for example, important in filtering to identify and prioritize resourcesets (including for example, appropriate portions thereof), such thatusers and/or their computing environments may evaluate, select,provision, validate, and/or manage the resource sets so that usersand/or their computing arrangements may apply best contributing ordirectly purpose fulfilling resources that possess situationallysignificant qualities, relative to other resource opportunity sets,towards purpose fulfilment in a balanced, situation-specific manner,such as, for example, considering functionality, quality of userexperience, and/or qualities of trustworthiness, compatibility withapplicable Foundation sets, cost, reliability, combinatorial (e.g.,consequence effects) appropriateness with other target purpose relevantresource sets, and/or the like.

In some embodiments, PIDMXs information may be employed to manageidentity attributes by at least in part organizing them, at least inpart, using the following concepts as organizational qualities, such as,for example, without limitation:

-   -   Purpose sets, purpose classes and/or other purpose        neighborhoods, and/or the like. Each resource may have one or        more purpose specifications associated with it, for example a        Descriptive CPE, and may have other purpose specifications        associated with its use, for example one or more prescriptive        CPEs and/or other contextually related purpose specifications        such as purpose class specification instances. Such purpose        specification information may include, for example,        specifications incorporating profile, preference, environment,        combinatorial consequence, historical usage, Repute and/or the        like sets, and/or the like information, that may comprise        generally, and/or situationally, relevant resource attribute        and/or otherwise associated information sets.    -   Other purpose relevant organizations, relationships, and roles—A        resource set may have an organizational relationship with other        resource sets, for example a resource set may be part of a        Foundation, Framework and/or other Construct. Such purpose        and/or other purpose relevant relationships may further include,        for example in addition to purpose neighborhoods and/or the        like, classical category Domain, PCA, Framework, Foundation,        resonance, CDS, other Constructs, and/or any other purpose        related information regarding resource interactions with and/or        contemplated as purposefully relevant, and/or otherwise declared        as having a relationship any given with Resource set. Resources        may also have one or more associated Roles, which in some        embodiments may include PERCos standardized resource Roles such        as, a roles as “text editors” and domain reference compendiums        in a Framework, as a main storage device in a Foundation, as        banking service provider in a cloud services related Framework,        and/or the like.    -   In some embodiments, purpose relationships expressions may be        standardized and interoperable and include standardized        expression elements, such as, for example:        -   Comprises (where, for example, one resource may comprise            further resources)        -   Associated with (for example, is or has been operatively            associated)        -   Is part of (for example, is a part of a Construct)        -   Is managed by (for example, has an associated persistent            management instance)        -   Is a parent to/child of i.e. is a Sub Class/Super Class of a            class. For example, a purpose class, such as, “learn group            theory” is a subclass of “learn mathematics” and a            superclass of “learn finite group theory.”        -   Is required by/dependent on        -   Is correlated with contextual purpose (n)        -   and/or the like    -   Operational specification sets—In some embodiments, resource        sets may be associated with one or more operational        specification sets, which for example may include control,        organizational, optimization, and/or interface specifications.        In some embodiments, each contextual purpose and/or organization        instance may have associated specification sets, including parts        thereof. In some embodiments, a resource set, which may be        managed by one or more managers where each may have operational        specifications. For example, suppose a resource set is being        managed by a set of resource manager instances, each having        differing trust and reliability metrics. In such a case, the        resource set may use differing, potentially more constraining        specification sets with those resource managers that have lesser        degrees of reliability or trust than with those managers that        are more trustworthy.    -   Identification elements—In some embodiments, identity-related        information may be represented in terms of PERCos PIMS        standardized identity management elements, such as i-Elements        and designators. In some embodiments, these may be used to as a        means to reference and potentially initiate interaction with        resource instances. For example, consider a document processing        resource set, such as, for example, Microsoft Word, that is        installed on a user's computing arrangement. The user may have a        designator as a means to reference initiate Word instances to        create, modify, and/or the like a Word document. Such instances        may inherit the identity attributes of their parent. Such        attributes may be retained by the instance and in some        embodiments, may include templates for the generation of such        elements as may be used by the instance. For example, the        instance may have a template for a designator that is used in        circumstances where trust levels may vary.    -   In some embodiments, such elements may include one or more        identity information sets, which may be biometric in the case of        human actors. Other information sets may be created as        i-Elements, representing information sets derived from, in part,        resource characteristics specifications and/or PIDMX information        sets, which may, for example be used to facilitate information        management systems, such as, for example, PIMS.    -   Reputes—In some embodiments, Stakeholders may publish one or        more Reputes (such as Creds) about resource sets through        interactions with, for example, one or more PERCos Platform        Services (such as Repute Service, Publication Services, and/or        the like. For example, a resource set, RS₁, may have one or more        Stakeholders publish one or more Reputes whose subject matter is        RS₁. Such Reputes may include one or more standardized metrics,        such as, for example, Quality to Purpose, Quality to Reliability        and the like, as well as further Repute expression metrics,        which may, for example, be specific to the purpose associated        with the instance, to a group, class or other organization with        which the instance is associated and/or the like.    -   Dimensions Facets and metrics and user valuations—In some        embodiments, PERCos Dimension and Facets and/or auxiliary        Dimensions may be associated with resource sets, such as, in        some embodiments, resource Facet examples including complexity,        size, cost, organization (such as, for example, singular or        compound), and/or Repute Facet instances, for example,        standardized quality metrics, such as for example Quality to        Purpose, Quality to Purpose Reliability, Quality to Purpose        Efficiency, Quality to Purpose Cost, and/or the like. In some        embodiments, resource sets may retain metrics for resources with        which they have interacted. In some embodiments, this may        include one or more performance metrics, such as, for example,        user expressed purpose satisfaction, value contributing to        optimization, and/or other user expressions that may be        expressed in standardized and interoperable forms with, as        applicable, associated values. Such user purpose expressions may        include those specific to a particular purpose set, purpose        neighborhood set (such as a purpose class set) group, and/or any        other logically, persistently identifiable or otherwise        computable arrangement.    -   Time—In some embodiments, resource sets and/or operating (i.e.,        instantiated) resource set, and/or processes and/or results        history monitoring services arrangement may retain time-related        information sets regarding their own interactions and/or        interactions with other instance sets. For example instances may        retain the length of a lease, events, time periods and/or any        other pertinent time information associated with any of the        other characteristics they may retain. PIDMX may support the        retention and organization of time information and the        association of that information with one or more other        organizational dimensions such that evaluation of both the        dimensions, for example, the levels of performance, security,        reliability and/or other evaluations may be determined as well        as the time periods, situational events, and/or the like    -   Other History—Instances, in some embodiments, may retain further        characteristics of interactions with other resources, both from        the perspective of the resource itself, that is its own        interaction history, and/or the history, subject to any, for        example, specified as relevant, control specifications of        resources with which it has interacted. In some embodiments this        may include performance information sets, which for example are        specified by the standardized metrics described above.

In some embodiments, a PIDMX may comprise at least one interface, a setof organizing principles, as described herein, and one or morerepositories. A PIDMX interface may, in some embodiments, be similar toa PERCos Resource Interface, in arrangement and instantiation. Forexample there may be control, interface and organization specifications,one or more method specifications and associated method implementations,and a PERCos kernel. In some embodiments, although PIDMX has aPERCos-compliant resource interface (i.e., the interface is based atleast in part on or essentially be the same structure and/ororganization as a PERCos resource interface), only when the published byan appropriate PERCos Publishing service does such an interface and/orthe PIDMX it represents, become a PERCos resource. The utilization ofcommon resource interface templates, in some embodiments, derived fromand/or supplied by PERCos Platform services, for example PERCos IdentityServices, can provide a convenient and effective method supportinginteroperability.

PIDMX organization specifications may, in some embodiments, determinethe locations, schemas, contents and other characteristics ofrepositories associated with and/or controlled by PIDMX, through forexample PIDMX interface and specifications of that interface.

In some embodiments, the relationships between resources that haveinteracted may be retained by information arrangements of one or more ofthe resources involved in such interactions such as in PIDMXarrangements (and/or through other resource information storearrangements, including, for example, resource delegates and/orproxies). Such a retention may take the form of processes that operateto create, retain, and/or augment one or more tokens, which may becryptographically protected and support integrity of one or morepersisted resource relationships. The utilization of such retainedrelationship representations may provide users and Stakeholders with themeans to ascertain whether they (or their delegates) have previouslyinteracted with a resource, and consequently to evaluate that resourcebased, in part, on this representation, for example represented as atoken, and any associated further information sets. In some embodiments,such tokens may include, for example:

-   -   Previously interacted with resources, where such interactions        were positive (PIT-Positive Interaction Tokens)    -   Previously interacted with resources, where such interactions        were negative (NIT-Negative Interaction Tokens)    -   Previously interacted with resources, where such interactions        were neither positive nor negative, but have an associated level        (LIT-Level Interaction Tokens {value})

In some embodiments there may be other tokens which, for example providea reference to one or more policies for processing such resources,including testing of those resources for their authenticity.

In some embodiments, a resource set (including, for example, aParticipant) that has had previous interactions with another resourcesets (including for example other Participants) may generate one or moreappropriate tokens that are associated with those resources. As theinteractions require at least two parties, such tokens may form asymmetric pair, such that both parties in their future interactions mayrecognize the legitimate counter party. These tokens may then becombined with one or more system elements such as CPFF, IF, AM and/orother PERCos enabled hardware and software to invoke appropriatepolicies and/or responses to such recognized resources. In someembodiments these tokenized representations may, for example, beinstantiated as parts of one or more communications protocols.

For example, one or more embodiments may include two or more independentcommunications interfaces, the first of which receives allcommunications and puts these into a secure buffer, and only those thatprovide a suitable token are passed on for further processing. Thosecommunications that do not meet the appropriate policies regarding suchtokens, may then be subject to further identity evaluations, such asliveness detections, for example, through an independent sub systemthat, for example, is isolated through use of a CPFF, or similar,processing isolation set. For example, those communications that meetthe appropriate identity criteria may then be passed through for furtherprocessing, and those that do not are then discarded.

FIG. 27 is a non-limiting illustrative example of communicationsinteractions processing based on, in part, associated resource tokens.

In some embodiments, a PIDMX associated with a resource set, RS₁, thatmay provide its resource manager instance with one or more identityattribute sets and/or the like characterizing information sets for oneor more target contextual purpose operations. Such attribute sets and/orother information sets may include, for example, one or morespecification sets that may provide information the resource managerinstance may need to operate RS₁.

FIG. 28 is a non-limiting illustrative example resource managerarrangement including PIDMX.

In some embodiments, PIDMX information sets may be extracted and/orprocessed by one or more processes to create identity information setsthat are specific to one or more purposes, resource arrangements,constructs or other resource combinations. For example, these identityinformation sets may be i-Elements, designators, provenance identities,and/or the like, and may include existential biometric information sets,where appropriate.

FIG. 29 is a non-limiting illustrative example of resource PIDMX andResource Arrangement (RA) PIDMX.

FIG. 29 is an illustrative example of a resource arrangement comprisingthree resources. Each of the contributing resources, in this example, isan instance of an originating resource and each resource instance has anassociated identity information set, which may be, for example,situationally filtered and/or, if created dynamically, aggregated, andwhich are then aggregated in the resource arrangement PIDMX and wherethe PIDMX may have attribute and/or the like information that furtherreflects certain combinatorial characteristics of such formed resourcearrangement. As the resource arrangement undertakes, or is involved in,one or more purpose operations, the resource arrangement PIDMX may beextended, for example, by, as germane and in accordance with purposeoperating specifications, the information sets associated with thoseoperations. In some embodiments, operating history information may thenbe, subject to the governing specifications, retained, in whole or inpart, by the originating resources (and/or their instances, subject tothe appropriate persistence conditions operating at the time) and/or bythe resource arrangement, if such arrangement is persisted.

In some embodiments a resource set may be operatively associated with aplurality of resource interface arrangements, where each interfacearrangement defines the set of capabilities and/or operations theresource set may provide for one or more specific contextual purposespecification set. For example, consider a purpose class application forlearning physics. Such a purpose class application may have twointerface arrangements, one interface arrangement for interacting withadvanced graduate students, and another interface arrangement forinteracting with undergraduate students. Such resource interfacearrangements may have one or more control, organization, and/orinterface specification sets that define how the resource set can beaccessed, operate, and/or organized.

In some embodiments, a resource set associated with a plurality ofresource interface arrangements may support a plurality of operatingsessions, where operation sessions may have access to differing resourceinterface arrangement in accordance with the operating session's targetcontextual purpose specification set. Such resource interfacearrangement may encapsulate one or more contextual purpose specificidentity attribute sets. For example, this may include providing varyingqualities of identity, for example, having lessor or higher qualitysecurity rigor requirements for a specified less or more secure session,thus, specifying differing resource characteristics and/or operationsand/or providing, during a session, differing specification sets forsuch operations of the applicable resource set, through the resourceinterface set.

FIG. 30 is a non-limiting illustrative example of a single resource withmultiple resource interfaces and associated identity attribute sets.

In the illustrative example shown in FIG. 30 , where the resource has asingle PIDMX from which appropriate identity information sets aredistributed to the appropriate operating sessions. For example in onesession this may comprise a designator, in another a set of existentialbiometric identity information, and/or the like.

Certain PERCos capabilities described herein substantially contribute tocomputing purposeful activity set consequences management. Thesecapabilities include real-world improvements in the reliability ofresource identification; the reliability, flexibility and situationalapplicability of resource information attributes and related evaluationprocesses; and the management of user (and/or Stakeholder) purposerelated resource set deployment and operations, the foregoing in supportof producing optimal user purpose responsive, computing arrangementusage results. Such capabilities can include:

-   -   1. Techniques for optimally assuring the reliability of        persistent identities related to candidate computing resource        sets.    -   2. Techniques for providing situationally appropriate        aggregations of resource set specific, user purpose relevant,        identity attributes in support of contextual purpose resource        identification and evaluation operations, the foregoing        supporting, for example, identifying, selecting and/or managing        resource sets and/or portions thereof having best        qualities—individually and/or in the aggregate—contributing        towards purpose fulfilment (for example, in the balance of        contextual considerations). Such purpose fulfillment processes        may include, for example, situationally evaluating and/or        managing resource sets in relation to other resource sets, their        positive, as well as negative, Quality to Purpose        characteristics, where the latter may contribute to        unintended/undesirable consequences, such as malware results.    -   3. Techniques for specifying resource set deployments, and for        managing resource related operations, in accordance with any        such specifications during user set computing arrangement        contextual purpose fulfillment activity sets such that resources        deployed, and/or operations of any set of such resources, may be        constrained and/or isolated in a manner to provide desirable and        reliable degrees of resource set minimality and/or        trustworthiness so as to optimize computing activity set        efficiency and/or minimize unintended/undesirable consequences.        Such resource constraining may be designed to isolate one or        more purposeful session process sets (and/or, for example,        related information sets) from other session and/or non-session        processes and/or information in accordance, at least in part,        with resource and/or resource portion identity related        considerations.    -   4. Techniques for informing users and/or their computing        arrangements regarding properties (e.g., attributes) of        resources (including, when applicable, one or more portions of        such resources), and/or concerning properties of resources        and/or resource portions associated with other resources (such        as one or more Stakeholders, in the form of Participants and/or        the like who are associated with other PERCos published        resources), wherein such qualities of given resource sets and/or        resource portion sets and/or their associated resources (such as        Stakeholders) may provide information regarding one or more        Quality to Purpose relevant Effective Facts, Faith Facts, and/or        Cred assertions, that may influence the identification of        optimal user purpose fulfillment contributing resource set(s).    -   5. Techniques for managing PERCos identity information arrays in        support of resource and resource portion set identification        and/or evaluation, wherein such arrays include a binding        (combining, direct associating, and/or algorithmic connecting)        of resource identities (such as naming, explicitly locating,        and/or the like) with resource attribute and/or portion sets,        such that responsive to contextual purpose specifications,        Purpose Statements, and/or the like, resource attribute sets,        such as direct, asserted, and/or associated qualities of a given        resource set, are selectively assembled and/or evaluated in        response to such purpose specifications such that an        identity/identity attribute(s) pairing set is based at least in        part, on situationally germane to context, user purpose        specifications (and/or associated actions).    -   6. Techniques for assuring the assiduous (for example, rigorous        and situationally effective) identity reliability of humans, and        associated groups, as resources, for example, as Stakeholders        and Participants, and/or as users. Such parties may be involved        in purposeful computing sessions, for example, directly as        Participants, such as in the role of user expert resource sets        and/or as other user purposeful computing participants, such as        family members, business parties, friends, social networking        contacts, and/or the like, and where such parties have        registered published Participant identity information sets        and/or the like identity resource instances that may be used to        identify, reference, evaluate, authenticate, and/or the like any        such parties, as they may be direct participants in purposeful        computing sessions, and/or as they may be associated with such        sessions as Stakeholder sets associated with computing        arrangement resource sets. When serving as Stakeholder sets,        such parties are attributes of resource sets, such as PERCos        Formal resources, for example, as Stakeholder publishers,        creators, distributors, editors, modifiers, retailors, and/or        the like. Stakeholder identities associated with their        corresponding resource sets, as situationally applicable when        represented by human biometric information, means a Stakeholder        party corresponding human Participant set and/or the like, or        Participant set information for an authorized one or more human        agents who may act on a corresponding Stakeholder party's        behalf, in providing biometric human information representing a        Stakeholder “signing” a Stakeholder published resource.        -   PERCos resource identity information arrangements and            identity evaluation capabilities are, in some embodiments,            based at least in part on highly reliable resource            identifier sets produced, at least in part, for example,            through the use of PERCos assiduous identity techniques.            Such techniques may include assiduous biometric identity            capabilities, whereby the identity of resources can be very            reliably established, persisted, and subsequently            authenticated. Such a Participant identity instance may be            associated with one or more of a resource set's associated            Stakeholder and/or Stakeholder agents' identity information,            where, for example, such Stakeholder is identified, or such            party's identity information is confirmed, through for            example, the use of liveness tested biometrics (e.g., iris,            retina, vascular, eye tracking, 3D facial movement, and/or            the like, which may be existentially reliable when for            example combined with timing anomaly and/or biometric            challenge and response and/or the like existential biometric            analysis techniques), and where such biometric information            may be augmented by environmental and/or historical behavior            related pattern information, as well as by, for example,            other assiduous biometric techniques such as human chemical            molecular pattern set scent sniffing, protein profiling, DNA            profiling, and/or other biometric assessments. Such one or            more PERCos assiduous identity assessment techniques may be            further augmented by, and/or PERCos may alternatively use,            challenge response, multi-factor, and/or other assiduous,            for example existential, biometric, and/or user computing            arrangement environment techniques, sufficient to an            assurance level of rigor situationally required and/or as            specified by a PERCos embodiment. Such assiduous            capabilities, in some embodiments, may involve further            existential biometric liveness testing, including the use            of, for example, situationally specific pseudo-random (may            include any unpredictable) generated (and/or, as may be            applicable, other effectively unpredictable sequences,            bursts, patterns, and/or the like, of) electromagnetic            radiation and/or sound wave emission “information” sets that            may transparently “paint” humans and/or at least a portion            set of their computing arrangement environments with            electromagnetic radiation and/or sound in a form that            creates information specific to such human and non-human            environment portion sets. In some embodiments, one or more            signals produced by one or more emitter sets may be, at            least in part, reflected, refracted, diffracted, scattered,            partially absorbed, re-emitted, and/or the like by such            human and/or environment portion sets, and where one or more            secure sensor sets (e.g., camera sets, microphone sets,            and/or the like) may detect some portion of such redirected            and/or modified signal sets (along with, for example, any            co-present, i.e., background/ambient, radiation and/or            sound) to obtain biometric and/or human computing            environment information.        -   In some embodiments, such emitter signals may be comprised            of one or more frequency range sets which may contain            constant frequency (CF) and/or frequency modulated (FM)            portions, and may, in some instances, be pulsed. Such            embodiments may support a range of detection modalities,            including, for example, those based on timing delays between            sound wave emission events and corresponding sensing events            (using, for example, principles of animal echolocation            and/or other forms of sonar).        -   Such received information sets can then be used to extract            human and/or environment identifying information, such as            biometric pattern information through secure, (for example            transparent to user), sensed user and/or environment            information sets, including information resulting from such            emitter challenge and response means. Such information may,            in some embodiments, be, at least optionally, accumulated            across time interval sets, and may be subjected to timing            anomaly analysis as an aspect of biometric liveness testing.            Such biometric and/or user computing arrangement environment            information extraction techniques can, in some embodiments,            involve hardened hardware and/or software components for            securing emitting, sensing, processing, information storage,            and/or communication functions, which components may be            securely packaged to support the operation of an Identity            Firewall, for example, bus compliant arrangement, other            component arrangement such as an Awareness Manager, and/or a            cooperative arrangement of plural such instances. Identity            Firewall assiduous identity support embodiments, in            combination with appropriate PERCos embodiment network based            identity administrative and/or cloud authority one or more            services and PERCos assiduous biometric identification and            evaluation techniques, enable substantially identity-based            architectures for secure user purposeful operations. Such            embodiments, when further combined with PERCos CPFF            capabilities, can support considerable improvements in the            reliability and trustworthiness of open computing            environments.    -   7. Techniques for assuring the assiduous reliability and        identity of non-human tangible and intangible user computing        arrangement resource sets and environments. PERCos Participant        information sets may reliably identify user sets who have        previously registered their Participant and/or the like identity        information instance with, for example, a cloud identity or        broader identity and resource service. Employing assiduously        reliable Participant human identity information coupled with        unique attribute information descriptive of non-human tangible        and/or intangible resource sets may substantially contribute to        assuring reliability of non-human computing arrangement tangible        and intangible resources. This can be achieved by securely        storing human, for example, authenticable existential biometric        information with uniquely describing key attribute information        of resource sets, where such resource attribute information        corresponds to unique aspects of any given resource set, such as        an identifiable one or more portions of its information content        (e.g., a software application, document, video, database,        portions thereof, and/or the like) and/or its interface        information (hard drive, memory, human Participant, cloud        service, and/or the like). Both such human information and such        resource attribute information can be, for example, represented        by one or more cryptographic functions, including, for example,        hashes. Both such information types, in some embodiments, can be        bound directly and securely together using, for example,        cryptographic hash functions of such information sets that are        representative of at least portions of the corresponding        assiduous human identity information of such resource set's one        or more Stakeholders and such attribute information (which may        include interface information) of such non-human resource set.        Such non-human resource set attribute information shall, in some        embodiments, be sufficient to at least uniquely identify such        resource set, and in some embodiments may, for example, further        be sufficient to access such resource set. Such bindings of such        human assiduous, for example, liveness tested and further        authenticable Stakeholder biometric information, with such        non-human resource information may involve combining into        unified hashes of such resource information and such Stakeholder        biometric information, employing plural corresponding securely        linked hashes, securely referencing corresponding hashes, and/or        the like cryptographic techniques.    -   The bindings of Stakeholder and resource securely represented        metrics, and the availability of such metrics for identification        and/or authentication of the “realness” that any given resource        is at least in part based upon the authentic assertion (such as        certification) of one or more resource Stakeholders        (individually human, or organization and its human agent set),        can enable very highly reliable to effectively foolproof means        to assure a resource is the resource it “claims” to be,        unmodified and as made available and/or otherwise validated by a        valid Stakeholder set. Such Stakeholder sets may, for example,        have been previously existentially biometrically and/or        otherwise assiduously authenticated, for example, as one or more        PERCos embodiment Participants, and, for example, later        authenticated during a PERCos embodiment publishing process as a        Stakeholder set of a given resource set that corresponds to a        stored, registered and published Participant resource one or        more instance. Such authentication of such Stakeholder set may        involve validating such human instance, such as, for example,        establishing an existential biometric information set, or        authenticating such a set against a stored Participant and/or        the like existential biometric information, when publishing a        resource set. Further, PERCos related authentication processes        can be performed at a later date, for example, when Participant        experts are being authenticated as being the valid respective        parties they claim to be and/or when a published, for example        Formal PERCos resource Stakeholder information is being        validated. In such instances, Participant information, as        germane, can be tested to assure it is the same unique        information set as claimed, for example, for a Stakeholder        expert or a Stakeholder expert resource information set as, for        example, stored Participant information held by one or more        cloud service arrangements. Such authentication of Participant        and/or the like information set corresponding to Stakeholder        resource information may be performed when a resource set is        being used or contemplated for use, for example, by a user set        or as relevant, a Stakeholder set. Such authentication processes        may occur when, for example, publishing a resource set such as a        Participant resource, a non-Participant resource containing        Stakeholder information, and/or during later evaluation and/or        use of such set.        -   Such identity information arrangements and identity            evaluation capabilities may involve storing Participant            and/or the like biometric, environmental, behavioral, and/or            other human resource Participant and/or the like Stakeholder            certifying party information, including, for example,            pattern information of the foregoing, in local user            computing arrangement nodes (e.g., smartphone, tablet,            notebook computer, game station, and/or other user device            arrangements) and/or at network locations such as corporate            administrative and/or cloud service one or more locations.            Such stored Participant information, for example, in the            form of assiduously acquired existentially assured, liveness            tested, biometric and environment information (including,            for example, timing anomaly and pseudo-random emitter            challenge and response tested information), and/or one or            more transformations thereof (e.g., cryptographic hash            representations, whether limited to such biometric            information and/or combined with one or more information            components representative of such biometric information            corresponding resource set), can be compared to an            authentication information set securely associated with or            embedded in any such resource set and/or such resource set            interface and/or other resource set attribute information            (including evaluation of a user set during live user            computing arrangement contemplated or active participation),            where the foregoing comparison validates, that is agrees, or            invalidates, that is denies, that a given instance of a            resource set authentically corresponds to the stored            resource set certified by such Stakeholder set and/or human            agents thereof and securely bound with other such resource            set attribute (which may include, for example, interface)            information.    -   8. Techniques that—at least in part, through use of secure        hardware, which may be “hardened”, and/or software components of        user set computing arrangement environments—contribute to        ensuring the correspondence to purpose, reliability, and        security of resource provisioning, as well as the establishment        of identity authenticity. Such arrangements may include device        arrangements, including, for example, arrangements employing        security hardened identity appliances and/or hardware chips        and/or chipsets (and/or portion set) and/or secure software        and/or data management capabilities supporting, in various        embodiments, various degrees of hardened, secured assiduous        biometric and/or other contextual and/or the like identity        establishment, delineation, authentication, and/or other        evaluation. Such hardened environment capabilities may include        in some embodiments securing user and/or user computing        environment related identity and/or computing arrangement        environment/usage attribute information, such as pattern        information (e.g., behavioral and multi-user interaction        patterns, location, gait/motion, and/or the like). Such hardened        environments may, for example, with Awareness Managers, protect        operations that include the testing of human identity, for        example, at least in part, through use of such emitter and/or        sensor capabilities. Further, such hardened environments may        protect identity related user computing arrangement environment        configuration, activity, and/or constituent element sets. Such        testing may involve pattern matching against human user set        specific stored pattern information and/or human “normative”        (e.g., normal liveness dynamics) biometric pattern and/or        related information. Such testing and/or related identity        evaluation capabilities may, in some embodiments, include the        use of secure hardware component included clock functions        (real-time and/or relative time, including duration        information), whereby, for example, anomalies revealed by secure        timing analysis of the sequence (unfolding) of sensor received        biometric data—for example, employing secure time stamped        information—are identified and/or otherwise event indicated        (e.g., suggesting and/or requiring further evaluation and/or        event response) as abnormal and/or inconsistent with anticipated        timing of biometric (such as pattern) information, and/or where        normal unfolding of sensor biometric input data, such as human        3D facial movement dynamics, do not properly correspond to        real-time “normal” information sequencing (e.g., biometric        information fluidity dynamics). Such over-time anomalies can        indicate or demonstrate attempts, for example, by hackers to        spoof the human identity biometric information flowing from,        and/or appearing to flow from, sensor and/or sensor and emitter        operations, since attempts to build and transmit on-the-fly        spoofing misinformation for complex biometric signals, such as        3D facial movements in space over time, will, under many, if not        all circumstances, have one or more discontinuities relative to        normal, real-time signals. Some embodiments may further include        the use of remotely instructed to a user computing arrangement,        session specific, real time, and/or the like, and/or        pseudo-randomly generated (that is, without knowing certain        secret information, unpredictable), for example, ultrasound,        and/or radio waves, and/or the like pattern and/or other set of        “information,” whose reflection is acquired by corresponding        sensor one or more types. Such “lighting up” of users and/or at        least a portion of their environment arrangements with        unpredictable information sets that cause reflection information        can support highly trusted biometric assessment arrangements for        assuring the acquisition of live human and/or such environment        information. In some embodiments, all of the above capabilities        may be supported in Identity Firewall embodiments, for example,        secure Identity Firewall appliances and/or bus resident Identity        Firewall one or more components, including Awareness Manager        (“AM”) implementations incorporating such Identity Firewall        arrangements. Such arrangements, in support of pseudo-random        emitter emission generation may employ, for example, PRNG        (Pseudo Random Number Generator) principles, where a generated        value set is applied to an emitter emission producing algorithm        set for generating a specific result set based on a PRNG seed        set, which seed set may be different, as a unique secret, for        each IF and/or AM arrangement, and may be shared as a shared        secret set with a cloud service and/or administrative        arrangement. Such emitter emission producing algorithm set may        be at least in some manner unique in each IF or AM instance or        instance grouping having a pseudo-random generator set. Such        pseudo-random emissions may be, at least in part, reflected,        refracted, diffracted, scattered, partially absorbed,        re-emitted, and/or the like, and such response to emissions may        at least in part be sensed by its respective, corresponding IF        associated and/or AM included sensor sets.

Such PERCos hardened capability sets, such as Identity Firewallembodiments, include secure communications capabilities used to transmitinformation between user set computing arrangement Identity Firewallplural instances, and between such computing locations and cloud and/ornetwork cloud service(s) and/or administrative nodes. Such hardenedenvironment capabilities may further include control and/or evaluationcapabilities for such arrangements, e.g., identity process awareness andcontrol management, including, for example, management of pseudo-randomemitter signal emissions, and/or combination PERCos CPFF/awarenessmanagement capabilities sets, and/or the like, which such arrangementsmay be internal to one component, component set, plural componentarrangement, connectable appliance arrangement, and/or the like wherethe foregoing may support internal and/or shared and/or redundantcapability/operations sets, including any secure inter and/or intra suchcomputing arrangement encryption and communication capabilities. Theforegoing awareness management capabilities may be employed forassessing and/or managing such hardened arrangement processes, relatedprocess instruction information, and related process results information(for example, including arrangement environment awareness of ephemeraland/or persistently retained (e.g., audit log) input (e.g., from emitterdistributing, biometric sensing, location sensing, and/or the like)where such assessing and/or managing may include analysis of one or morequalities related to hardened arrangement information and/or process setauthenticity, security, efficiency, reliability, and/or the like, forexample, by evaluating biometric input using biometric signal timinganomaly and/or other liveness techniques, evaluation of securityintegrity of one or more such device nodes internal information and/orprocesses, evaluating correspondence relationships between, for example,emitter emissions (such as challenge and response) and acquiredbiometric signal information, and/or evaluating security integrity ofcommunication activities between any set of such nodes, for example, byevaluation of PKI and/or related certificate types, existentialbiometric certificates, and/or the like.

Secure and Reliable Purpose Provisioning and Identity Assurance

Currently, sophisticated cyber criminals, hackers, and/or otherdisruptive humans, have little difficulty, under most circumstances, inspying on and/or breaking into computing arrangements oforganizations—however large or small—and individual users to stealand/or otherwise gain inappropriate access to, and potentially observe,copy, modify, and/or misdirect, sensitive information and/or processsets, as well as spoof identities and create fraudulent communications.Such theft, access, and/or other miscreant activities may be directedtowards, for example, corporate financial-related information sets,sensitive corporate and/or other organization information sets (such asintellectual property, research and development information sets,financial records, and/or the like), individual user credit cardnumbers, transaction histories, and/or other personally sensitiveinformation sets (including, for example, personal correspondences,photos, and/or the like), employment associated personal informationsets (such as, for example, Social Security Numbers, employmenthistories, and/or other highly personal information sets), personalhealth information (involving, for example, diagnosis, conditions,medications, and/or the like), and/or the like by breaching securityperimeters of computing arrangements of organizations and/or users.

Various reasons contribute to the vulnerability of computing basedsystems, and in particular, to network connected systems. Generallyspeaking, malware and other security incursions are the result ofresources having one or more attributes that support and/or otherwiseenable, normally in a hidden manner, a malevolent external (to one'strusted circle) parties' purpose set (and where a resource is anythingthat may be processed, including anything that has computing interfaceinformation supporting interaction with a tangible instance set, such asstorage media or human participants). Since most computing systemsand/or applications provide rich feature sets whose implementations arehighly complex and whose attributes are often in flux as such productsand components evolve, even the most sophisticated users, includingthose within security support divisions of large organizations, havegreat difficulty in thoroughly analyzing and/or otherwise comprehendingthe full scope of both intended, and potential, and often hidden andunknown, unintended to user set consequences resulting from resource useinstances, and resource sets having multiple resources as constituentcomponents.

Reliable, persistent identity and identity awareness/knowledge, and thecapability to manage resources based on such identity information andunderstanding, are underlying root factors for establishing and/ormaintaining effective secure user computing arrangements, and inparticular, arrangements that are connected to the internet and rely onone or more resource types and instances sourced from remote,independently managed locations. Resource identity involves two types ofdomains: the computing domain, comprised of resources employed in thecomputing sessions, and the cross Edge human side, which may include thecross Edge's external environment local to the user computingarrangement. Such cross Edge environment is comprised of human user setsand tangible environment other elements.

PERCos security innovations provide two sets of hardened technologyenvironments, one to address each of these two root constituent domains,with, in some embodiments, CPFFs providing important trustworthycomputing capabilities for managing the computing environment resourcecomposition and its appropriateness to user contextual purpose sets, andIdentity Firewalls and/or Awareness Managers helping establish, andsupport the use of, human identity descriptive related information toensure the integrity and reliable persistent identity of user and/orStakeholder set identification representations.

In some embodiments, Identity Firewalls (IFs) and/or Awareness Managers(AMs) can provide important capabilities that can, to a very high levelof confidence and reliability, assess and contribute biometric forhumans, as well as environment elements depicting user and/orStakeholder set (and/or in some circumstances user environment and/orcomputing arrangement) attribute information from the environment thatcan serve as key, root identifying information sets associated with auser set and/or the like persistent, unique identifier information, suchas may be incorporated in a registered, published PERCos Participantresource information set, and/or may be employed to assure the integrityof non-human resource information by employing liveness tested and/orother assiduous biometrically derived information to be securely boundto their respective, published resource set descriptive information setsin a manner ensuring very highly reliable resource integrity andidentity persistence. By employing both of these capability sets, and inparticular when combined with PERCos and/or the like standardized andinteroperable contextual purpose specification capabilities and relatedfeatures, along with Repute Cred, EF, and FF, and/or the like capabilitysets, user sets can control, or have automatically and transparentlycontrolled by expert, for example Frameworks, resource set provisioningand operations management through use of CPFF arrangements, where CPFFspecifications regarding eligible resource sets (at least in partsatisfying, for example, purpose related specification information) canrely on the highly reliable resource identity and related authenticationcapabilities enabled and/or otherwise supported by IFs and AMs. IFs,AMs, and CPFFs, in some embodiments, can operate in any logicaldistributed arrangement connected by any sufficiently reliablecommunications means.

To manage the economies of power usage, cost to manufacture, size,and/or other considerations, capabilities of any of such PERCos hardenedenvironments may be shared, and/or combined. For example, one IF or AMmay operate as an in part “master” instance, having, for example, a timeclock, time stamping, capability set, pseudo-random emitter pattern orother distributed signal control logic, memory storage, and/or anycentralized, shared processing and communications capabilities that itis logical, for their application, to share in one or more “master”instances. This same sharing of capabilities principally applies, insome embodiments, to CPFF plural instances, and further to any sharing,mixed IF, AM, and/or CPFF arrangements. In some embodiments, certain oneor more IF, AM, and/or CPFF capabilities may be operated on a server andone or more of the respective IF, AM, and/or CPFF instances may functionas a thin, to thicker, client, which other functions operating, orredundantly operating, on one or more server arrangements, whether anadministrator arrangement on a network and/or an independent cloudservice serving a plurality of separate business clients.

FIG. 31 is a non-limiting illustrative example of components of a securearrangement for purposeful computing using a reliable identity-basedresource system.

CPFF sessions may, in some embodiments be spawned as dedicatedcontextual purpose sessions (CPSs) in VMs with the general purposeoperating environment for a user computing arrangement moving intonon-CPFF VM while any one or more CPS sessions are open. When all openCPSs are closed, the general OS VM is closed and the OS is moved backinto its traditional operating mode without VM overhead. In someembodiments, various IF, AM, and/or CPFF hardware implementations mayemploy specialized accelerator components, for example, a VM, othersandbox, and/or other contextual purpose provisioning and resourcemanaging accelerator arrangement, that is adapted in some arrangementsto the capabilities related to opening, closing, process managing,storing, retrieving and/or auditing VM, other sandbox, other contextualpurpose, and/or the like processes.

The assurance of identity reliability and the provisioning ofpersistent, reliably identified, authorized resources for contextualpurpose sessions, is, in various embodiments, an important considerationset. As a result, IFs, AMs, and CPFFs will, in such embodiments, besecured user computing arrangement techniques designed to preventexposing sensitive information and/or processes to outside inspection,copying, modification, repurposing. In some embodiments, some portion orall IF, AM, and/or CPFF capabilities may be provided in hardenedhardware enclosures such as chips, chipsets, computing arrangementattached devices/appliances, directly internet connected appliances,and/or the like. Such arrangements may employ integrated circuit reverseengineering countermeasure techniques. These may include methods tomanage or prevent decapsulations, optical imaging, microprobing, EMA,fault injection, and/or the like, such as employing diffusionprogrammable device techniques, anti-power analysis countermeasurescapabilities (for power, differential power, and/or the like) and/or thelike. Such arrangements may be encapsulated using epoxy and/or otherdecapsulation and/or inspection materials, and such packaging mayfurther include tripwire arrangements and/or other deactivating and/orevent monitoring capabilities. Such hardware instances may includesecure component communication chip set arrangements for securecommunications among IF, AM, CPFF, and/or administrative and/or cloudrelated services.

Currently, most end users who use their computing arrangements for awide variety of tasks have difficulty dynamically configuring theirresource sets for specific tasks in a manner that balances differingsituation-specific considerations concerning resource use risks andconsequences. These risks and other considerations may includetrustworthiness, reliability, cost, privacy, authenticity, efficiency,resource combinatorial processing consequences, Stakeholder interests,and/or the like.

Today's computing environments often have a number of executingprocesses that are not directly, or even to a large extent, indirectly,related to many user target purpose computing objectives. In somecircumstances, resource elements may contribute to an aspect of userpurpose that differs from the central purpose focus, such as having thereduction of the cost to use certain associated resources or, as isargued by certain large computer cloud service companies, help servicesinform users concerning available options. Many computing resources,whether operating or available to operate on a given user computingarrangement, are, from a user standpoint, unknown, unauthorized, and/orpotentially unreliable and/or untrustworthy.

Computing resource sets frequently operate as background process setsthat may directly serve the commercial, or at times the malevolent,interests of other parties. As a result, today's computing arrangementuser sets need practical means to control the resources operating ontheir computing arrangements, particularly when such arrangements areperforming sensitive operations and/or involve confidential information.Currently, computing arrangement user sets have no broad means to ensurethat security, privacy, efficiency, and/or other usage consequencesflowing from the provisioning of various resources, will be reasonablyconsistent with user and/or other party considerations, including theirrespective concerns, requirements, and/or the like.

Generally speaking, today's user sets are ill-prepared to evaluate whatresources should operate in their computing environments at any giventime and, for example, during any given contextual purpose fulfillmentactivity. This challenge set has become profoundly more formidable asthe computer connected world has evolved. This connected universe offersuser sets nearly boundless arrays of resource opportunities madeavailable by a vast, distributed assortment of resource providers who,in many instances, along with their corresponding resource sets, arepoorly understood. Such resources, and their associated Stakeholders,range from unknown or unfamiliar to user sets, to relatively known butpoorly understood by, and/or to unreliably provided and/or described to,users sets. Such unknown, to poorly understood, to unreliably providedand/or described resources, range from emails and their attachments, tosoftware programs, document sets, web pages, cloud services, devices andother hardware, human actors, entertainment instances such as games,movies, and music, and/or the like. All the foregoing types, at leastfrom time to time, present a host of potential liabilities to user sets,particularly when such user sets use typical and relatively open,versus, for example, fixed appliance, computing arrangements.

Given the high level of incidence of malware compromising todayscomputing systems, and given the widespread concern regarding theconsequences of compromising user set information privacy, providingcomputing arrangement solutions for managing the provisioning ofcomputing arrangement resources so as to avoid unintended computingarrangement usage consequences is a major technology challengeconfronting today's computing infrastructure. Such concerns are ofparticular significance when user sets are performing sensitivecomputing activity sets such as those involving confidentialinformation. Such confidential information may comprise many differentforms and compromising these various forms may have quite differentimplications, but may be comparably serious for the one or more partiesinvolved. Such information sets and/or process related types, forexample, and without limitation, may include (and some of which mayoverlap):

-   -   Banking, investment banking, and other related financial        information, for example involving account numbers, passwords,        account balances, transfer information, and/or the like,    -   Credit card numbers and associated passwords and user        identifying information, such as Social Security Numbers and/or        the like, employed and/or otherwise displayed during application        processes, such as for employment, insurance, accounts, and/or        the like and/or employed, for example during online transactions        such as when performing purchasing activities and/or as provided        in the form of transaction information historical details        available during cloud service/user interactions,    -   Sensitive corporate and other organization information, such as,        financial, intellectual property, research and development,        planning, project, product, and/or marketing information, such        as, for example, corporate product planning documents,        technology research project information, investment and related        investment planning information, confidential military        technology designs, product compositions, designs, and/or        release information, and/or the like, as well as, for example,        information related to societal services such as tax authority,        police, defense, and/or diplomatic service activities,    -   Sensitive personal information regarding interests, priorities,        involvements, discovery activities, and/or the like, for        example, the activities of individuals and small groups        involving internet surfing, searching, and/or discovery, as well        as personal interaction and research activities, performing        community and/or fulfilling other responsibilities, and/or the        like,    -   Information storage and processing activities including personal        (local and/or local network and/or otherwise distributed) and/or        cloud service (Dropbox, Box, OneDrive, Google Drive, and/or the        like) documentation and/or records such as emails stores,        financial records, personal pictures, videos, and/or the like,        as well as health information, interpersonal private        communications (e.g., video telecommunicating, messaging, and/or        the like), and/or other stored information, for example,        information associated with personal interaction with others,        personal records, personal beliefs and/or events, and/or the        like,    -   Manufacturing and/or other sensitive and/or valuable process        management activities, such as commercial manufacturing process        control, nuclear power plant operations management, power        electrical grid power management and systems maintenance, water        related infrastructure such as storage, pumping, and        transmission control systems, air traffic control systems        operations, and/or the like,    -   Health-related information sets, contributed to and accessed by        multiple-parties, for example medical history, medications,        and/or the like.

With some embodiments, user relationships to such user activity andinformation sets can be associated with at least in part standardizedand interoperable contextual purpose expressions and/or the like. Byusing such purpose specifications, users can identify and select, and/orhave automatically provisioned, resource sets specifically appropriateto any given purpose fulfillment set. By associating contextual purposeand/or the like specifications with specific candidate and/or selectedresource sets, PERCos provides an ability to limit—when user computingactivities involve sensitive processes and/or information—provisionedresource sets, and/or their performance and operational characteristics,to sets explicitly appropriate to user set contextual purposes.

In some embodiments, PERCos contextual purpose expression and otherstandardized and interoperable contextual purpose capability sets, alongwith other PERCos, such as CPFF, capability sets, support a set ofplatform capabilities that can, under many circumstances, substantiallyto entirely control inappropriate interactions between, and/orinappropriate consequences resulting from, the interaction of computingresources and sensitive user set information and correspondingprocesses. Such provisioning of safe and appropriate to user (and/orStakeholder) contextual purposes resource sets may, in some embodimentsand/or under certain circumstances, operate automatically, dynamicallyprovisioning such resource sets in response to users employing, at leastin part, standardized and interoperable purpose expression instructions.

By contrast, current contextual internet related computing technologiesdo not support simple and well managed computing session selective,contextual purpose related, resource provisioning. As a result, bestresource sets are often not applied towards computing-related purposefulfillment and importantly, most users are often oblivious to theconsequences, such as inefficiencies and/or malicious behavior,resulting from operation of certain one or more resource instance sets.For example, normally only sophisticated computing arrangement user setswould attempt to initiate a target activity specific computingoperations that would potentially undermine and/or otherwise detractfrom computing session outcomes. Further, even a sophisticated userwould need a high level of specific and reliable understanding of theperformance attributes and potential consequences of adoption of eachand every resource set contemplated for use. Given these two demandingconsiderations, user set computer session lack of design sophistication,and the frequent absence of user set informed understanding of resourceusage consequences, new techniques are required in order to ensure undermany circumstances sufficient reliability, security, and efficiency oftarget purpose fulfillment resource utilization.

For example, a computer sophisticated user set that understands thequalities and usage consequences of each and every contemplated for useresource set, decides, for example, to employ a hypervisor supportingone or more VMs for provisioning and managing appropriate tocircumstance set, target purpose session resource usage and associatedprocess isolation. Such user set further employs well understood by userset firewalls, access controls, encryption and communication means, andpurpose related reference information sets and applications, and one ormore cloud services. Given proper implementation of such VM andsupporting environments, including setting associated controls andreliably identifying and thoroughly understanding usage implications(such as no malware impact) of applicable software applications andother resources, a sophisticated computing user set may experience,adequate to their task set, isolation, minimizing, and efficiencybenefits. Unfortunately, even an expert may fail to thoroughlyunderstand all relevant considerations related to resources and virtualmachine organization and protection, and in any event, establishing sucha target activity specific VM environment using current technology may,under many circumstances, require substantial user set effort, and isnot suitable for most user set types (e.g., ordinary consumers, expertsin non-computing fields, and/or the like) and/or for use with a widevariety of different contextual purpose fulfillment activity setscorresponding to the requirements of a spectrum of different user targetcontextual purpose sets.

PERCos capabilities that, in some embodiments, may be employed tosupport instantiating secure and reliable computer operating environmentsessions provisioned with contextual purpose appropriate resource sets,include:

-   -   Assiduous, including for example, existential, biometric        identity capabilities,    -   Purpose class and other purpose neighborhood resource        organization arrangements,    -   Formal and Informal and/or the like resource registration and        publishing, including employing assiduous, persistent        Stakeholder biometric identification information, bound to such        Stakeholder respective resource sets,    -   Identity situational attribute management,    -   Identity Firewall and related Awareness Manager capabilities,    -   Resource situational management standardized and interoperable        capability sets supporting, for example, PERCos Framework and        Foundation Construct resource specification sets,    -   Repute and/or the like Cred, EF, and FF resource evaluation        capabilities,    -   CPFF framework instance contextual purpose resource set        management including target contextual purpose resource        provisioning management and session environment virtual machine        and/or sandboxing (e.g., with multiple different sessions), the        foregoing in accordance with CPFF specification set resource,        process, and/or information isolation and/or other protection        information, as may be applicable.

FIG. 32 is a non-limiting illustrative example of CPFF role manifest andinstance(s).

A Contextual Purpose Firewall Framework (“CPFF”) is a form of PERCosFramework specification set that specifies operating variables for usercontextual purpose fulfillment computing sessions, such that suchsessions may be provisioned with resource sets that comply withspecification requirements of such a Framework, such as resource setsthat correspond to those one or more resource sets enumerated on aspecified target contextual purpose Framework resource set manifestand/or where resource one or more sets attributes are compliant withspecified resource minimalism, isolation, impact on session process setefficiency, and/or other CPFF specification set (which may includeresource combinatorial and/or Role) specifications. The general purposeof a CPFF is to support the provisioning of user target purposecomputing arrangement sessions such that it minimizes or eliminatesunintended consequences, for example, those resulting from the use ofresource sets that provision or enable malware, and/or those that impactoperational efficiency for the specified purpose of one or more portionsof such sessions.

In some embodiments, PERCos CPFF capabilities enable the explicitdelineation and/or other relevant identification of what resourcecompositions may be applied towards, fulfilling given purposefulactivities involving sensitive information and/or process sets. Suchtarget purpose specification may be employed by one or more PERCosservices—as such information may be complemented by certain situationalpurpose input information such as historical behavioral, profile,preference, applicable Foundation, and/or the like information—to, atleast in part, identify, evaluate, select, prioritize, provision,manage, and/or the like, one or more resource sets. For example, suchCPFF capabilities can enable user set specification of a purpose classappropriate computing arrangement resource set as a result of such userset specifying a target purpose objective set that is used by a PERCosservice set to identify a corresponding CPFF set, for example, asassociated with a highly recommended aggregate Cred set from experts.Such CPFF user contextual purpose fulfillment resource sets may beautomatically selected and/or otherwise identified and evaluated, whentheir contextual purpose related specification information sufficientlycorresponds to such user set contextual purpose related information.Such resource one or more sets may be identified by their membership ina purpose class and/or other resource purpose neighborhood having acorresponding contextual purpose specification set to a user targetcontextual purpose specification set, and/or by a resource set, such asa resource Framework, having a directly corresponding contextual purposespecification set as an attribute set (and/or in some other resourcecharacterizing information form). Further, constituent resource sets ofany such Framework, as identified by their specification in such aFramework, can be provisioned in satisfaction of such user targetcontextual purpose due to such Framework relationship to such usercontextual purpose specification set, but such provisioning may besubject to associated Framework, such as resource set specific, and/orother user set purpose related specifications, as may be relevant tosuch resource set and such situation.

PERCos Frameworks provide specifications identifying resource setarrangements to be employed in satisfying associated, specified targetcontextual purposes, and CPFFs provide Framework instances with afurther capability set enabling, at least in part, the control of anoperating environment, and which, in some embodiments, may also, atleast in part, control the operating performance of such specificallyenumerated purpose specification satisfying target purpose resourcesets. As a result, CPFFs can, in some embodiments, through theirspecification information and instantiation mechanisms, constrain acontextual purpose computing session to only employ resource setsauthorized by, and as specified by, any such contextual purposespecification sufficiently corresponding, Framework. Such constrainingof the operating resources authorized for a given contextual purposefulfillment session, can substantially constrain the presence of, and/orunintended consequences resulting from, malware and/or the like. Incombination with other PERCos, including other CPFF, capabilities suchspecification driven contextual purpose sessions can be substantiallymore secure and reliable when compared to today's typical user computingarrangement sessions.

CPFF constraining capabilities are, in some embodiments, achieved inpart through the use of virtual machine capabilities wherein targetcontextual purpose computing environments can operate in virtual machinesets that, for example, at least substantially (as set by specification)isolate approved resource sets and related processes and informationstores from a computing environments user primary, for example open,operating system platform. Such open computing system platform may beoperated as, for example, an underlying platform, or alternatively in aseparate virtual machine. Such virtual target purpose operatingsessions, such as in the form of contextual purpose fulfillment virtualmachine environments, can employ Type 1 or Type 2 hypervisorimplementations, and/or the like.

FIG. 33 is a non-limiting illustrative example of seamless generalpurpose operations while operating CPFF sets.

In other embodiments, (or for other sessions for the same computingarrangement user) such target purpose computing environments may operateemploying, for example in some cases, less isolating sandboxingcapability sets that are not virtual machines, for example, as providedby an operating system such as Windows. In some embodiments PERCos CPFFimplementations that combine such isolation techniques with PERCosFramework authorized resource set and/or resource specificationoperating conditions/functions management, can enable the dynamicprovisioning of secure user target contextual purpose sessions wheresetup of such virtual machine or sandboxed operating environments can beperformed transparently to respective user sets and may be dynamicallyspawned according to, and accommodating any one or more, active usertarget contextual purpose sets. With CPFF instances, such provisioningof Framework associated resource sets within secure session environments(e.g., virtual machines) can be substantially augmented by various otherPERCos capabilities available in some PERCos embodiments.

A CPFF user target purpose resource set may be derived, at least inpart, from one or more process sets involving a user target contextualpurpose expression set, and/or the like, being sufficiently (byspecification and/or evaluation) related to, for example, by beingmembers of, a corresponding to such purpose specification set purposeclass. A user target purpose resource set may also be derived throughidentifying a CPFF Framework instance that has sufficiently matchingcontextual purpose specification attribute information. Such CPFFFramework sets provide specification sets that may provide at least aportion of a user set target purpose fulfilling computing environmentspecification framework. Such Framework may involve an arrangement ofone or more resource sets, and/or target purpose fulfillingspecification set scaffolding for computing arrangement sessioninformation, that, for example, may identify one or more resource setRoles, which such Roles may be respectively filled by Role specificationsatisfying resource sets that can be employed in performing suchspecified one or more Roles and such resource sets may be provided byone or more independent parties. When, for example, a ready to operateFramework corresponding to a target purpose approximation specificationsuch as a purpose class and/or other purpose neighborhood specification,is operated in conjunction with a user computing arrangement Foundation,a user computing arrangement target purpose fulfillment capability setmay be instantiated so as to provide a user computing arrangementprovisioned to be employed in user contextual purpose fulfillment.

In some embodiments, for example, PERCos computing Frameworks areemployed as specification sets, in combination with user computingarrangement Foundations, or otherwise in anticipation of being employedwith a sufficiently compatible such Foundation. As a form of Framework,CPFF instances, also may be used in combination with a user computingarrangement Foundation, and may provide specifications regardingmanaging potential combinations with Foundations. A CPFF, as with otherFrameworks, may include specifications regarding which resource setsand/or resource classes may be employed, for example, as specified byresource Role class sets, and/or by other resource neighborhoods. Forexample, such resource sets satisfying a Framework respective Roleinstance(s) specification requirement set may be provisioned, if othernecessary cooperative and/or complementary other specified necessaryresources are provisionable and/or provisioned, and as may be otherwiserequired by specifications and/or resource attribute combinatorialfunctional evaluation.

In some embodiments, for example, Frameworks published as PERCos Formalresources, such as Formal resource CPFFs, may be either in the form ofready to operate purpose class applications, or ready to be completedpurpose class application Frameworks (e.g., scaffolding) employing, forexample, Role specifications for identifying corresponding,specification satisfying resource sets, which may be in the form, forexample, of PERCos Formal and/or Informal resources and/or the like.

Some PERCos embodiments may employ PERID and/or the like resource setinformation arrangements that may, at least in part, store anyapplicable set of Framework information, for example, CPFF frameworkinstance information, such as Framework associated contextual purposeone or more expressions, purpose class or other Purpose NeighborhoodFramework (for example, as a published PERCos resource) membership(s),associated Purpose Statement(s), and/or any other applicable purposeexpression related specification information such as relevant, forexample, situational attribute set information. A PERID arrangement mayalso store for a Framework published resource, a Framework's compositionof resources attribute, interface, and/or other information, Frameworkand/or such component resource association(s) with other resource setsand/or with attribute sets, and/or the like information. Suchinformation may include, for example, applicable Framework interfaceinformation, constituent Framework resource sets along with, forexample, Resource set one or more Resource Class Roles (e.g., whichclassify Role satisfying members as a Role type, such as a text editor,word processor, and/or the like, with any other applicable, specifiedRole related attribute information, such as Role desired and/or requiredcharacteristic information). Role types, in some embodiments, are, ormay be, standardized and interoperable, such as representing RoleClasses with applicable resource sets as members (e.g., Role class type“word processor” might include specification satisfying, appropriatelycertified, resource sets: e.g., MS Word, Apple Pages, WordPerfect,Google Docs, and/or the like, if so certified), such that a, forexample, word processor published as a PERCos Formal resource havingsuch a Role class as an attribute with, for example, adequate resourceaccompanying certification and/or Repute Quality to Purpose Values(certified and/or otherwise asserted, for example, by either direct orindirect Stakeholders, such as publishers, Cred asserters, and/or thelike), could be provisioned to fulfill a Framework's Role for wordprocessor—given that its attribute set and/or any applicable test setalso satisfies any other applicable Framework specifications. Such CPFFand/or other Framework resource information arrangements may furthercontain assiduous Stakeholder identifying information, such as livenesstested, timing anomaly evaluated, emitter challenge and responseassessed, assertion corresponding Stakeholder related existentialbiometric information conveying human set assertion set informationregarding the integrity and authentic, unaltered composition ofassociated resource sets.

In some embodiments, certain key aspects underlying a contemplatedcomputing session can be securely, reliably, and dynamicallyinstantiated using CPFF instances, for example, employing hypervisorsand session dedicated virtual machines to manage in accordance with user(and/or Stakeholder) sets' target contextual purpose specificationarrangements, and employing capabilities that can include:

-   -   Supporting an organization, other affinity group, and/or global        standardized and interoperable purpose expression implementation        set, along with associated purpose class and/or the like        resource organization infrastructure, which may include purpose        neighborhood generation means (e.g., based on contextual purpose        related specification set resolution), and further supporting        interoperable user contextual purpose and/or the like        specification instruction sets for formulating target purpose        specific, computing session virtual machines, other isolation        strategies and technologies such as process isolation, forms of        sandboxes, and/or the like, provisioned with target purpose        appropriate, user expressly acceptable and/or other authorized        resource sets.    -   Supporting fundamentally reliable, assiduously produced,        persistent resource identity information (identifier set)        reliably bound to descriptive resource representation        information and/or otherwise reliably referencing for        provisioning its corresponding resource set instance set. Such        identity information may include assiduous biometric Stakeholder        information representing the declaration of publishing        responsibility by one or more human individuals and further        including means to bind such assiduous biometric Stakeholder        information to highly reliable and purpose effective        representation and/or location information of its associated        resource set, enabling reliable authentication of such resource        and its integrity based, at least in part, on a trusted        Stakeholder set biometric certification assertion set regarding        such resource and resource representation information.    -   Supporting a, at least in part, for example, user contextual        purpose standardized expression capability set for use in        generating specification sets corresponding to CPFF specific        Frameworks and/or the like specification arrangements,        supporting specifications describing user computing arrangement        contextual purpose environment specification instructions, which        can be employed to define contextual purpose fulfillment session        set authorized resource one or more sets and/or minimalism,        isolation, and/or efficiency criteria for such session set in        support of optimization of an associated user specified and/or        other related purpose specification set, such as a contextual        purpose expression, Purpose Statement, and/or other, at least in        part, standardized and interoperable, contextual purpose related        specification set.    -   Supporting a resource knowledge cosmos arrangement constituting,        for example, a self-organizing and/or expert-facilitated Quality        to Purpose information sets as asserted by direct and/or        indirect resource set Stakeholders, such as provided by Repute        Cred, EF, FF, and/or the like embodiments, whereby resource set        instances may be evaluated by user sets and/or their computing        arrangements regarding their satisfaction of Quality to Purpose        considerations specified by user sets and/or their computing        arrangements regarding one or more Foundation and/or Framework        constituent, and/or one or more other, relevant resource sets.        Such satisfaction may involve, for example, meeting required,        specified criteria and/or calibrating relative value of one        resource set or resource set class in relationship to other        candidate resource sets, or classes and/or other resource        neighborhoods.    -   Supporting contextual purpose, such as Framework based, resource        provisioning and management input for virtual machine contextual        purpose session operation, whereby, for example, a PERCos        compliant hypervisor arrangement may instantiate virtual machine        computing arrangement environments based, at least in part, on        such CPFF Framework and/or the like specifications identifying        specific one or more authorized resource sets and/or providing        minimizing, isolation, and/or efficiency contextual purpose        related operating session criteria.    -   Supporting organization, other affinity group, and/or global        standardized and interoperable resource Role classification        infrastructure, e.g., Role classes and resource members, which        may be employed as specified constituent component resource sets        of Frameworks, including, for example, CPFF Frameworks, where        sufficiently trusted and/or other criteria satisfying resource        sets having a given Role type identification may be employed in        a Role component position within a Framework, such as a CPFF        Framework, given such resource set's satisfaction of any        specified, other evaluation criteria and/or consequent selection        by a user set, Framework Stakeholder set, and/or one or more of        their respective computing arrangements.    -   Supporting hardware and/or hardened software capability sets for        protecting CPFF resource management, communications, and        information process and storage functions, including variably in        some embodiments, direct integration within and/or secure        communication and cooperative processing with, one or more        Identity Firewall and/or Awareness Manager implementations.

Such PERCos embodiment capability sets can effectively categorizeresource sets in a purpose related manner, supporting user sets and/ortheir computing arrangements organizing of resource sets into usercriteria satisfying, resource contextual purpose fulfilling,arrangements employing user directly authorized resource sets and/oremploying minimizing and/or isolating resource provisioning and/orotherwise managing capabilities. Such capabilities can enable users toreduce or eliminate unintended consequences arising from computingresource usage, which such provisioned resource set, unknown, to theirrespective users, have questionable to seriously undesirable usageconsequences. Such questionable to seriously undesirable consequencesmay occur generally with such resource set usage, or more specificallyoccur under certain situational computing sets of conditions. Such usageconsequences may include unintended results that are seriously damagingto the interests of users of computing arrangements and/or parties withwhom they relate. Use of such questionable resource sets may include thealtering, in one or more ways, of forward going aspects of a givencomputing environment's functioning and/or information sets.

Unfortunately, today's computing tools for managing user computingarrangement unintended resource related consequences are generallyproving to be inadequate, with a large percentage of computingarrangements being populated by malware, and with, as a result,sensitive user information being frequently stolen and sensitiveprocesses being interfered with in often seriously harmful manners.Today's tools for preventing computing arrangement unintentionalprocesses and unintended consequences typically involve some set ofcapabilities including one or more of firewalls, malware identificationand removal capability arrangements, internet surfing web pagereputation evaluators, sandboxing and virtual machine isolationtechniques, encryption and related secure communication capabilities,and/or the like. Such tools sets are reliant on the behavior, addresses,and/or composition signatures of software, processes, and/or computingweb page addresses, and/or on relatively time consuming configuration inmanners consistent with user activities and explicitly descriptive ofone or more sets of user computing environment capabilities. As a resultof this signature, behavior, and address analysis approach generallyemployed by firewall technology and malware management tools, resourceswith unknown, uncatalogued, and/or unperceived problems often avoiddetection and control, and constraining environments that provideresource isolation services, such as virtual machines, for example,those implemented through the use of hypervisors, are frequently subjectto malware incidents.

Such VM and the like constraining environments are not adaptive to theshifting composition and related nuances of different user contextualpurpose sessions that have their purpose specific associated security,efficiency, and the like user priorities and resulting balances ofsecurity rigor, risk, efficiency of operation, flexibility, transparencyto user, and/or the like considerations. Such VM and the like capabilitysets, particularly when employed on end user computing arrangements,tend to be used as “open” computing environments, for example supportinga further “open” general operating system environment, at times subjectto some of the same malware incidents as traditional general operatingsystem environments. Today's general computing and/or “open” secondary(e.g., VM) computing environments are not efficiently adaptive to, anddo not support transparent to, or low computing skill level, easy toimplement, adaptable to the highly varied spectrum of consumer, generalbusiness, and specialized user computing activities that may require, orpreferably operate with, reliable security and/or efficiencyperformance. By contrast, CPFF can provide specialized to contextualpurpose computing environments that can dynamically tailor theirconfiguration optimally, and under some embodiments and circumstancestransparently to user, provision their resource sets so as to provide auser set target contextual purpose fulfillment environment that operatesoptimally to user purpose, including providing outcomes, includingmaintaining private information private, and computing resources appliedto sensitive operations, unmodified by malware.

Ideally, securing (and optimizing the efficiency of) computingarrangement environments would operate, in part, based upon:

-   -   Establishing dependably valid, persistent identities of resource        sets employed in computing activities, including the        authenticity of their unmodified composition,    -   Before resource set deployment, having user sets, their        computing arrangements, and/or relevant, trusted cloud one or        more services, evaluate resource identities, and related        resource set attribute metrics (including for example        performance), to ensure that contemplated to be used resource        set usage is consistent with user set contextual purpose set        purpose fulfillment optimization (including efficiency, risk        factor, and/or cost) considerations. This evaluation would        include sufficient understanding of usage consequences of,        and/or the assurance of the absence of unintended consequences        resulting from, use of any given resource set, and, at least        when involving user computing arrangement user proprietary        information and related sensitive processes for any given        session, variably employing only those resource sets that are        consistent with differing user set session specific contextual        purpose considerations, so as to support user approved,        appropriate balances between the “openness” of a given computing        arrangement during a given purposeful computing session, and        management of situationally reasonable efficiency, malware,        and/or other risk factors, and    -   Otherwise securing user computing arrangement operating        environments so as to prevent exposing sensitive information        sets and/or processes to outside inspection, copying,        modification, and/or repurposing, by assuring user purpose        appropriate mixes of secure environment and constituent        component hardening techniques for hardware, software,        communication networks, associated service (for example, cloud        services) and/or the like.

For example, consider a computing arrangement user set who uses his/hercomputing arrangement for participating in social networks, payingbills, investing, banking online, travel planning, occupation relatedwork at home, communication with colleagues, shopping online, and/or thelike. As situationally relevant, such user may select and/or otherwisearrange the provisioning of a resource arrangement that such user setbelieves is applicable for user set target intended activity.

Traditionally, for such computing purposes, a user set may use computingenvironment protection mechanisms, such as one or more of access controlarrangements, secure communication arrangements such as secure TSL/SSLbrowser communication capabilities, encryption capabilities, firewalls,security program capabilities such as non-firewall malware scanning andinspection and web suite reputation monitoring and blocking, and/or thelike, and more sophisticated users may decide, for example, to use ahypervisor and one or more virtual machines. Currently, some mix ofthese tools serve as primary means for protecting user set resource setsfrom unauthorized tampering and/or disclosure. Normally though, inpursuit of user set purpose sets, user sets finds customizing suchprotection mechanisms as too technically difficult, time consuming,inefficient, and/or inflexible. Moreover, such tools lack basiccapabilities that may be necessary to adequately ensure their efficientadaptability to various different computing arrangement users andcircumstances. For example, a user set may find itself unable to, orfinds it too laborious and/or other complicated to, configure and/orreconfigure user set computing arrangement protection mechanisms toenable such user set to secure user video conferencing tools indifferent manners with differing groups of friends and colleagues,depending upon, for example, associated contextual purposes ofrespective conferencing sessions and participating user set composition,so as to achieve correspondingly appropriate, secure, reliable, and/orefficient session properties. Moreover, such tools are more based onidentifying known, unreliable resources and/or behaviors, and far lesson an authentication and/or evaluation of the inherent identity andauthenticity of the resources themselves.

In some embodiments, PERCos CPFF related capabilities provide methodsfor substantially enhancing and ensuring contextual purpose computingsession security, reliability, and efficiency through processes that canautomate the provisioning and management of at least portions of purposerelated computing target environments. Such provisioning and managementmay employ, for example, resource minimalism, operating session resourceisolation, and/or other resource administration/control policies thatare established in response to user set and/or cohered user andStakeholder sets contextual purpose related specifications. Such CPFFrelated specifications, as provided in some PERCos embodiments, canenable, in some embodiments, dynamically configured resource setsestablishing user target contextual purpose fulfillment correspondingresource set environments, where such provision of resources andinstantiating of, for example, a target contextual purpose environmentmay be entirely, or primarily, transparent to user operation setsresponsive, at least in part, to user, contextual purpose expressions.Such configured purpose fulfillment corresponding environments may useCPFF instances that employ session corresponding user computingarrangement Foundation information and corresponding resource sets. SuchFramework instances may employ Foundation constituent resource sets tosatisfy Framework specifications, including, for example, Role resourceinstances, if they satisfy corresponding resource one or more setnecessary conditions, for example, as specified by such Framework and/orFoundation specifications. CPFF specifications may be automaticallyselected, for example, from one or more purpose classes and/or otherpurpose neighborhoods having contextual purpose expression setsufficiently corresponding to a user set contextual purpose expressionset or Purpose Statement or the like, and wherein such CPFF sets(having, for example, superior Repute Cred resource and/or resourceStakeholder aggregate Cred Quality to Purpose and/or the likestandardized and interoperable values relative to other neighborhoodFramework instances and where such Framework set is selected, forexample, as result of resolving a balancing of situational contextualpurpose considerations, where such determination process set, forexample, is operated on such user set computing arrangement, and/or by acloud service Framework selection and provisioning automation servicearrangement, and where such automatically selected set (one or moreinstances as specified and/or qualified) may be subject to final userselection and/or other approval action sets or may be automaticallyprovisioned for ease of acquiring a purpose fulfillment environment forsuch user set.

CPFF arrangements may, at least in part, incorporate, and/or provideinput for, the production of one or more particularity managementsituational target contextual purpose specification sets that CPFFarrangement can employ in managing relevant aspects of resourceprovisioning and/or usage. Such management of resource sets may employexplicitly specified resource sets. A CPFF capability set may also oralternatively, based on contextual purpose related specificationinformation, determine and/or manage resource sets based, for example,on situationally important attribute one or more sets identified incontextual purpose related specification sets (e.g., CPFF specificationinstances, CPEs, Purpose Statements, resonance specifications, profileinformation, preference information, crowd behavior historicalinformation (e.g., as related to use contextual purpose expressions),and/or the like, for example, CPFF arrangements may examine at least aportion of the known behavioral attributes of relevant candidateresource and/or resource portion sets to ensure that one or more suchresource instances will only engage in those behaviors that willcontribute to, not interfere with, and/or not otherwise have undesirableconsequences related to, fulfilling situation-specific target purposesets.

CPFF particularity management arrangements, in some embodiments may usecomputer security, including information and/or process protectioncapabilities, such as access control, hypervisor instantiated VMs,process isolation, firewalls, encryption, PERCos assiduous identitytechnologies and methods, Repute Cred, EF, FF, and/or the likearrangements and information instances, secure communication channels(e.g., to cloud service arrangements), and/or the like. Suchcapabilities, in some embodiment, can, for example, encapsulateprovisioned resource and/or resource portion sets, isolating them frompotential interference caused by other PERCos (and/or, as applicable,non-PERCos (e.g., external to PERCos embodiments)) session process setsand/or resource sets.

In some embodiments, particularity management services may useprotection mechanisms (such as, access control, process isolation,hypervisor, VMs, firewalls, encryption, and/or the like) to encapsulateand/or otherwise isolate CPFF arrangement provisioned resource and/orresource element sets to protect particularity management related one ormore process sets, resource sets, and/or other information sets frompotential interference from other PERCos session and/or non-PERCossession (e.g., external to PERCos) process sets, resource sets, and/orother information sets. For example, particularity management may use,for example, firewalls and secured, hardened (employing secure hardwareand software protection techniques) CPFF silicon chips, chipset, and/orappliance arrangements to protect operating CPFF instances from one ormore aspects of its external, including other PERCos, environment.

In some embodiments, particularity management services may have one ormore processing elements, such as, for example, CPFF (e.g., situational)monitoring, environment management, resource arrangement set (includingCPFF set) provisioning, encapsulation and/or isolation of resource sets,and/or the like. For example, particularity monitoring may monitor theoperating situation (environment and their resource arrangements,including state information, event information, and/or the like) ofprovisioned CPFF (i.e., operating CPFF) instances and take responsive(for example, corrective) actions, as appropriate, such as, for example,through CPFF Service arrangements, Coherence Services and/or otherPERCos Platform Services, to adapt to changing situations to, in someembodiments, for example:

-   -   Optimize interim results and/or Outcomes.    -   Minimize unintended consequences as specified by target        contextual purpose specification sets (and/or as at least in        part derived therefrom), generating optimal results and/or        Outcomes, and, for example, as identified by operating session        consequence management event information sets,    -   Provide isolation instructions, separating CPFF operations        (including operating information), resources, and/or stored        information from non-CPFF target purpose session operations,        resources, and/or stored information, so as to protect the        integrity of CPFF session related sensitive information        (including, for example, resource sets) and/or processes and/or        the like.    -   Invoke one or more further operations in response to variations        in monitored situational conditions, for example an increase in        levels of rigor, specifications from one or more senior        resources (for example those with higher privilege) for        increased rigor, and/or the like.

For example, suppose an acknowledged Domain expert published asituationally relevant contextual purpose specification that expressedthe following:

-   -   when the sensitivity of user set information is low, users can        use, for example, less costly, more flexible sets of, and/or        easier-to-use tools to pursue their target purpose set, for        example, and where the sensitivity of information sets (such as        private information) may be automatically identified by one or        more user sets, user and/or organization preference sets,        published resource sets through attribute information instances,        and/or other information characterizing information, for        example, as may be provided, for example, associated with        resource class Role and where such descriptive information may        be associated with lower levels of standardized and        interoperable threat sensitivity information (such as threat        levels 1-10), degrees of rigor associated with purpose types        and/or document classification. For example, a user preparing        the user's tax return may specify a high degree of rigor.    -   when the sensitivity of user set information is higher, as for        example, as might be determined using the above information        threat descriptive information described with low sensitivity,        the target operating session can be provisioned with higher        levels of constraining of resource sets and resource choice        array, and where such minimization of resource sets may variably        reflect one or more of such specified threat response        standardized and interoperable security levels for, for example,        provisioning resources in a PERCos related hypervisor related        virtual machine.

In some embodiments, a situationally relevant operating specificationset may provide operating CPFF instances with a degree of flexibility inconfiguring their constituent resource arrangement sets by providingseniority values. For example, consider the following contextualrelevance specification:

 (security (seniority = 5)    (if required-rigor-level ≥ 4 then security(resources) ≥ 9     elseif 2 ≤ required-rigor-level ≤ 3 then (security    (resources)) ≥ 7 > 8     elseif required-rigor-level = 1 thensecurity (resources) ≥ 5) and (performance: (seniority = 4)   (ifrequired-rigor-level = 1 and demand = normal then      (Quality toPurpose (performance, resources)) ≥ 8 ))

By specifying that security contextual variables have a higher seniorityvalue set than performance, this contextual relevance specificationprovides operating CPFF embodiment instances with freedom to relaxperformance when required rigor-level is greater than 1 by reconfiguringand/or populating their resource arrangement sets with resource setsthat provide a higher degree of security rigor.

In some embodiments, to ensure operating CPFF embodiment instancescomply with their respective situationally relevant operatingspecification sets, particularity management services may employparticularity monitoring that monitors current threat levels. When, forexample, a threat level goes over a certain threshold, particularitymonitoring may generate an exception causing the operating session togracefully shutdown services that are no longer viewed as necessary(e.g., essential and/or sufficiently secure) and further modifiesisolation mechanisms such as network gateways to ensure that the CPFFarrangement session is properly isolated from the external to CPFFcomputing arrangement, such as external processes and/or informationsets.

In some embodiments, operating sessions in pursuit of asituation-specific purpose set may comprise multiple operatingsub-sessions. In such a case, instantiated operating CPFF embodimentsmay allocate and distribute session processes (including management)into different operating sub-sessions and specify appropriate managementrelationship, such as, for example, supervisor-subordinate,peer-to-peer, and/or the like.

In some embodiments, particularity management instances may operate aspart of PERCos Platform Coherence Services to support PERCos operationsduring PERCos purpose cycles, such as, for example:

-   -   During purpose formulation, framing contextual variables that        balance situationally relevant conditions, such as, for example,        complexity, privacy, integrity, functionality, and/or the like        in pursuit of target purpose sets. For example, suppose a user,        pursuing online shopping, is more interested in privacy than        cost. Particularity management services to formulate a        situationally relevant operating specification that can be used        to provision a CPFF that increases the user's privacy, possibly        at the expense of cost.    -   Provisioning CPFF instances with minimal, cohered, reliable,        efficient, isolated, and/or encapsulated resource arrangement        sets in fulfillment of situation specific target contextual        purpose related specification sets.    -   Supporting in part operating CPFF instances to fulfill their        respective situationally relevant operating specifications by        limiting standard operating capabilities of at least one or more        portions of such user set underlying operating system        arrangement (e.g., Unix, Windows, or the like).    -   Monitoring internal CPFF resource sets and/or external        environments to ensure their adherence to respective situation        specific contextual purpose related specification sets and        taking corrective actions as appropriate.

In some embodiments, particularity management services may provide acore set of processing elements that can be instantiated as a coreparticularity management services layer that operating CPFF instancesmay use to dynamically manage their resource sets. Such a coreparticularity management services layer may provide a unified,standardized and interoperable interface that may hide theimplementation details of the particulars of user computing arrangementcombinations that may include, in addition to a vast variety of hardwareimplementations and hardware platforms (such as, different motherboards,devices, security apparatus and/or the like), many distinct softwarestacks including different operating systems, such as, for example,Windows, OS/X, iOS, Android, other Unix variants and/or the like.

For example, suppose an operating CPFF instance is to comply with asituationally relevant operating specification set that controls accessto networks. When running on an iOS or OS/X platform, such asituationally relevant operating specification set may be implementedusing an iOS or OS/X compatible sandbox. When running on a Windowsplatform, the same specification set may be implemented throughconfiguration of the Windows firewall. The core particularity managementlayer may provide a common interface to both implementations, therebyfreeing the operating CPFF instance from the need to determine how tooptimally implement its situationally relevant operating specificationset on different platforms.

In some embodiments, a core particularity management service layer mayaccept control specifications, perhaps represented as parameterizationsthat are at least in part derived from a contextual user purpose. Insome embodiments such control specifications may be adaptive based onthe values of contextual variables (e.g., threat level, cost parameters,efficiency, reliability, trustworthiness) that are monitored byparticularity management monitoring. For example, consider the followingcontextual relevance specification:

(contextual relevance specification (if threat situation < = 3 then  (performance >= 8 and ease-of-use >= 6 and security > 4) else (security > 7)))

In some embodiments, such a contextual relevance specification maytranslate into a control specification for the core particularitymanagement service layer, which may respond to such a specification bystarting a particularity monitoring and situationally adaptedconfiguration for an operating session based on the information setprovided by the monitoring.

In some embodiments, a core particularity management service layer mayemploy, for example and without limitation, PERCos Platform Servicessuch as, Resource Management Services, Identity Management Services,Coherence Services, Governance Services, Monitoring and ExceptionHandling Services, and/or the like, to provide, for example, coreservices required or otherwise used for CPFF functionality includingparticularity management services (e.g., based on hypervisor services,operating system policy and sandboxing capabilities, and/or the like),and identity management capabilities and/or the like. Such standardizedcore particularity management layers may be customized and/or extendedfor a situation specific target contextual purpose set, such as a, forexample, Coherence resolved Purpose Statement with its own contextualrelevance specifications.

In some embodiments, CPFFs, as with other Frameworks, may be specifiedas having varying degrees of completeness. Particularity managementservices (for example, in the form of Coherence Services specificationresolving), may be integrated into and/or separately managed from CPFFpurpose formulation processing and may support sufficient completion ofCPFFs for provisioning by enabling users to frame one or more contextualvariable sets (such as, for example, trust variables, consequencemanagement variables, and/or the like) to meet their situationallyrelevant contexts (such as, for example, anticipated external threatconditions, performance demands, cost considerations, Quality to Purposemetrics, and/or the like).

In some embodiments, completion of CPFFs may depend on the computingplatform arrangements (i.e., as specified by Foundations) on which theyare to operate. For example, suppose a user, U₁, is interested in usinga CPFF, CPFF₁, published by an acknowledged Domain expert, ADE₁, forperforming online banking that has a set of contextually relevantvariables (such as, security, reliability, integrity) and associatedrecommended values (such as, 8, 9, 8 respectively). Particularitymanagement services may support U₁ to complete CPFF₁ by invoking aresource inspector instance to examine U₁'s computing arrangements anddynamically generate a Foundation that would provide most optimalenvironment for operating a CPFF₁. Based on the generated Foundation,particularity management services may inform U₁ that CPFF₁ can providethe following levels of performance, security, integrity, ease of use,and reliability:

(contextual relevance specification

(performance>=5)

(security>=8)

(integrity>=8)

(ease-of-use>=3)

(reliability=9))

If U₁ decides that the level of service CPFF₁ provides is acceptable,particularity management services may generate a situationally relevantoperating specification set, sros₁, that expresses the specificationelements, such as, for example:

-   -   Virtualization—such as for example, using a virtual machine that        operates on the hypervisor that can run resource arrangement        sets supporting online banking.    -   Policy formulation— such as, for example, policies that express:        -   Encapsulation and isolation of sensitive resource sets and            processes from potential interference.        -   Access control to protection of resource sets from            unauthorized disclosure, tampering and/or the like.        -   Adherence of resource sets to their operating agreements to            minimize unintended consequences.        -   And/or the like.    -   Policy enforcement—such as, for example, using protection        mechanisms to enforce compliance with formulated policies,        including situational operating specifications.    -   Adaptation—such as, for example, adapting to changes in        operational situations, both internal and external.    -   Performing CPFF session monitoring and exception handling—such        as, for example, monitoring operating session resource sets and        their situationally relevant operating specification set and/or        performing corrective actions, including for example,        reconfiguring, replacing, and/or otherwise managing operating        session resource sets in accordance with target purpose set        particularity specification information that may specify        constraints and/or performance parameters.    -   And/or the like.

FIG. 34 is a non-limiting illustrative example of isolation provided bya hypervisor.

FIG. 34 illustrates provisioning of a situationally relevant operatingspecification set, in which security of a CPFF Framework instance is atleast in part ensured by the presence of a secure hypervisor in a user'scomputing arrangement.

Alternatively, in another example, U₁'s computing arrangement does nothave a hypervisor. In such a case, CPFF₁ may not be able to provide ashigh level of performance or ease of use since particularity managementservices may interact with U₁ to consider using another CPFF instancethat may provide for the desired level of security by employing aresource set having lower ratings regarding ease of use and/orperformance. For example, consider, a user, U₂, with a computingarrangement that does not include a hypervisor, such as, a computingarrangement comprising Windows 8 and Secure Boot capability. Such a usermay specify the following contextual purpose specification:

(contextual relevant specification

(purpose: perform financial transaction)

(performance>=3)

(ease of use>=2)

(security>=8))

Based on U₂'s Foundation and U₂'s contextual relevant specification set,particularity management services may identify a CPFF, CPFF₂, which canprovide a high degree of security assurance at some cost in ease-of-use:

(contextual relevant specification

(performance>=7)

(ease of use=2)

(security=8))

FIG. 35 is a non-limiting high level illustrative example of trustworthyconfiguration of an operating session.

As shown in FIG. 35 , CPFF₂ operates by installing a Secure Bootfinancial purpose dedicated operating system, OS₂, with full diskencryption and applications, financial purpose class application(FPCA₁), on U₂'s computer. It also requires that U₂ shut down orhibernate the user's existing operating system, OS₁, before startingOS₂. CPFF₂ utilizes the Secure Boot capability of U₂'s Foundation toprovide U₂ with a specified level of assurance of its tamper-resistance.Although CPFF₂ may have a very good Repute in security, it may not haveas high ease-of-use Repute because of its requirement of a dual boot andconstraints on the applications that can be run while CPFF₂ isoperating.

In some embodiments, particularity management instances may includeinstances of PERCos Coherence Services and, like other PERCos managementinstances, may be provided with one or more control, interface and/ororganizational specifications that define their respective particularitymanagement operations. Particularity management instances may use one ormore PERCos Platform Services, such as, for example, Resource ManagementServices, Evaluation and Arbitration Services, Identity Services, ReputeServices, and/or the like) to support formulation of situationallyrelevant CPE sets that can be further processed to generatesituationally relevant operating specifications for providing optimalinterim results and/or Outcome sets in pursuit of a situational targetpurpose set.

In some embodiments, one or more direct or indirect (e.g., Repute Credpublishers) Stakeholders of a resource arrangement set may performparticularity management on their resource arrangement set, RAS₁, toensure their minimality in achieving optimal interim results and/orOutcomes in pursuit of a target purpose set TPS₁ by performing, forexample, the following actions. First, Stakeholders may formulate adescriptive contextual purpose expression, CPE₁, for RAS₁, describingcontextually related actions RAS₁ may or may not perform in pursuit ofTPS₁. They, and/or their computing arrangements, may then analyzeconsequences, including evaluating combinatorial complexityconsequences, of removing and/or constraining each resource set and/orits constituent parts (and/or evaluate substitutions and/or at least inpart alternative arrangements) in RAS₁'s adherence to CPE₁. For example,they may determine the type of behaviors of each resource and/or itsconstituent parts and how such behaviors may be restricted and theconsequences of constraining them may affect RAS₁'s ability to complywith CPE₁, which in turn ultimately affect RAS₁'s ability to achieveoptimal interim results and Outcomes in pursuit of its target purposeset, TPS₁. Such an evaluation set may be performed against various CPEsets, where such sets may comprise differing applications of such RAS₁.

For example, suppose a resource arrangement set, RAS₂, whose purpose isto provide a secure proprietary product development environment, has adescriptive specification set, CPE₂ that specifies a set of actions thatRAS₂ may or may not perform. A Stakeholder may check if behaviors ofeach resource set and/or one or more of resource set constituent partsin RAS₂ are compatible with actions specified by CPE₂. For example,suppose RAS₂ contains a possibly insecure, or not known to be secure,web browser plugin (such as, for example, Adobe Flash) that allows usersto explore the internet. Stakeholders may analyze the browser's behaviorto determine if it would cause unintended consequences, such as,importing certain malware into the product development environment andif so, remove it from RAS₂ specifications and replace it with a moreappropriate constituent resource.

In some embodiments, creators and/or other Stakeholders of a resourcearrangement set may use a wide variety of assurance techniques todeterminate the behaviors of one or more of its resource sets and/ortheir constituent parts, such as, for example:

-   -   Design analysis and review.    -   Code development methodologies, such as, for example, the use of        type-safe coding language which may guarantee that a resource        may not “crash.”    -   Code walkthroughs, including automated code analysis.    -   Testing methodologies, including white box testing, black box        testing, unit testing, penetration testing, and/or the like.    -   Formal verification methodologies.    -   And/or the like.

Stakeholders of a resource arrangement set may publish one or moresituational target contextual purpose particularity managementspecification sets to be associated with their resource arrangement set,expressing their assertion of the resource arrangement set's minimality,documentation of minimality assurance, which may include one or moremethods that can be used to evaluate assertions of minimality ofresource arrangements and/or parts thereof.

In some embodiments, acknowledged Domain experts and/or otherStakeholders may authenticate and validate such particularity managementspecifications of a resource arrangement set, RAS₃, and publish one ormore Reputes (such as, for example, Cred assertions, Effective Facts,Faith Facts) which may then be associated with RAS₃ in the form of oneor more identity attributes. For example, an acknowledged Domain expert,ADE₁, may authenticate and/or validate the adherence of the standardizedsecurity protocol specification, such as, TSL/SSL, to its descriptivesituationally relevant CPE set and publish one or more Reputes assertingADE₁'s certification, which may then be associated with one or moreidentity attributes of the TSL/SSL specification. Such certification ofa resource arrangement set's adherence to its particularity managementspecification may be published as a PERCos, for example, Formalresource, which may be published as a Repute Cred or Effective Factand/or the like with the ADE₁ as the Cred or EF creator and publisher,and further may depend on validating and/or authenticating, for example,as specified in an associated particularity management specification:

-   -   Provenance identities of the resource set, including        situationally related, that is attribute relevant, identities of        one or more of its direct Stakeholders (such as, its publisher,        creator, distributor, and/or the like).    -   One or more test harness suites and/or any other        validity/authenticating testing specifications and/or        embodiments that may be used to validate the resource        arrangement set's particularity management specification sets.    -   And/or the like.

In some embodiments, the assessment of a resource set's adherence to itsparticularity management specification set associated with a resourcearrangement, RAS₄, may depend on measurability of RAS₄'s intended andunintended consequences. For example suppose a resource arrangement set,RAS₁, has a specification set that specifies that any information RAS₁may receive (for example from a storage system) will be encrypted andonly be available to authorized parties (such as authorized users,Stakeholders, process sets, and/or resource sets) that, for example,hold/control encryption keys. In such a case, the positive aspect of theconsequences can be tested in binary yes/no manner, where consequencesare: i) information set arrived encrypted; ii) the key held by anauthorized party provides access to the information set and correspondsto an identity instance on a list of all identities of parties havingauthorized access rights (for example, in the form of PERCosParticipants expressed as PERCos Formal resources); and iii) theinformation set is identical to that provided by the resource set's oneor more Stakeholders.

In some embodiments, measurability of unintended consequences ofresource arrangement sets is subjective and based on the opinions oftheir evaluators, and, for example, such opinions may be expressed inthe form of Repute Creds and/or the like. For example, demonstratingthat a resource arrangement set does not or may not to a certainstandard of rigor, generate unexpected consequences may be equivalent torelying on assurance methodologies as, for example, code walk-throughs,design analysis and/or formal verification and/or one or more operatingmonitors, such as for example network monitors (e.g., packetinspection), process monitoring and the like, to confirm that resourcearrangement set adheres to a specification set stating that certainbehaviors do not occur.

In some embodiments, metrics of expected and unexpected consequences ofa resource arrangement set may be expressed in terms of trust variables,where the values of a trust variable may comprise one of the followingstandardized and interoperable values and may in some embodiments beexpressed in the form of Repute Facets of Quality to Purpose, forexample:

-   -   (reliability: 8 on a scale of 1 to 10),    -   (security: 7 on a scale of 1 to 10),    -   (trustworthiness: 9 on a scale of 1 to 10),    -   (authenticity: 0 on a scale of 1 to 10 to where 0 is unknown and        10 is the highest level of authenticity),    -   And/or the like.

In some embodiments, CPFFs may employ particularity management servicesto construct a cohered minimal resource arrangement set in pursuit of,that is, employed in the fulfillment of, target contextual purpose sets.Particularity management services for a CPFF fulfilling a targetcontextual purpose set, PS₁, may identify a set of candidate resourcearrangement sets and then analyze their suitability based on a combinedweighted degree of, for example,

-   -   Degree of similarity matching of a resource arrangement's set's        one or more descriptive CPE sets with PS₁;    -   Degree of reliability of identities, identity attributes, any        other relevant data, and/or relevant Reputes Creds and/or EFs        and/or the like published by their indirect Stakeholders;    -   Degree of minimality of candidate resource arrangements in        fulfilling PS₁, where the degree of minimality is the resource        arrangement obtained from applying particularity management        services;    -   and/or the like.

FIG. 36 is a non-limiting illustrative example of isolation managed byparticularity management employing hibernation.

The weighting may be used for combination may be in accordance withsituation-specific specification set. For example, FIG. 36 illustrates acoherence particularity manager instance fulfilling a situationallyrelevant operating specification set that enables users to securelyexplore new types of games. For example, a coherence particularitymanager instance may protect confidential resource sets, sensitiverelated processes, and proprietary Stakeholder resource sets fromunauthorized disclosure and/or modifications. In some embodiments, sucha particularity manager instance may examine each candidate resourcearrangement set to assess the consequences of removing and/orconstraining a resource and/or resource element set.

For example, suppose a candidate resource arrangement, RAS₁, forprovisioning a CPFF includes an advanced highly configurable networkgateway, NG₁. If such a network gateway has an excessive number offeatures to satisfy a situationally relevant operating specification,SROS₁, particularity management services may examine RAS₁'sparticularity management specification set to assess the consequences ofreplacing NG₁ with a simpler (e.g., perhaps IP level) network gateway orconstraining the functionality of NG₁ to the minimal set required tofulfill SROS₁. Based on the assessment, particularity managementservices either replace NG₁ or constrain its behavior.

In some operating CPFF instances, a situation-specific CPE set mayspecify balancing of one or more contextual variables on the basis ofcurrent and/or anticipated future environmental situations. For example,consider an operating CPFF instance, OCPFF₃. Particularity managementservices may govern operations of OCPFF₃'s operating resource sets andenvironment to assess its situational conditions and perform correctiveactions as needed. For example, particularity management services mayreconfigure OCPFF₃'s operating resource sets to adapt to varyingoperating environmental situations, such as, for example, varying threatlevels.

In some embodiments, particularity management services of an operatingCPFF instance, OCPFF₄, may be parameterized to detect changes inOCPFF₄'s operating environment and if appropriate, take correctiveaction(s). For example, suppose a user set has a purpose of exploring anew type of game, and formulates a contextual relevance specificationset that requires the game to preserve the integrity of critical userfiles and protect confidential user data from unauthorized access. Insome embodiments, the user set may frame his/her/their input in a mannerthat balances security and performance to generate a situationallyrelevant operating specification set, SROS₄, for a CPFF, CPFF₄, or suchuser set optionally acquires SROS, for example, in response to a CPEresource identification activity, where such SROS has been published byan expert well regarded by the user set and/or a user set computingarrangement processes strong Repute Quality to Purpose aggregate Credsfor user set game evaluation contextual purpose set. SROS₄, may includein part, for example, a specification set of, or otherwise expressing:

-   -   When the threat level≤6 (on a scale from 1 to 10), then an        operating CPFF₅ instance should provision itself so that its        integrity ≥7, privacy ≥7, and the performance level ≥8.    -   When the threat level ≥6, then an operating CPFF₅ instance        should provision itself so that it integrity strength ≥9 and        privacy ≥7 (which, for example, may have an impact on        performance).

FIG. 36 illustrates one possible operating embodiment of CPFF₄. SROS₄specifies that operating CPFF₄ instance is initialized by putting thegeneral purpose operating system into hibernation and then running on atrusted (gaming) operating environment, which may spawn one or moreoperating sessions. Such operating sessions may satisfy SROS₄ by, forexample and without limitation:

-   -   Meeting the user contextual purpose specification sets of        privacy and integrity by suspending the general purpose        operating system and running a trusted operating environment        configured to protect privacy and integrity of the user resource        sets.    -   Meeting the Stakeholder contextual purpose specifications of        non-disclosure of proprietary gaming data and algorithms, by        running an operating environment which is configured in a way        that is satisfactory to both the Stakeholder and the user and        which may be authenticated by the Stakeholder through, for        example a remote attestation protocol.    -   Meeting performance specifications of the user and the        Stakeholders by ensuring that the only resources executing in        the operating session are those that are essential to the gaming        purpose.    -   Monitoring the operating CPFF₄ instance's threat environment        (both internal and external) and performing needed actions, as        appropriate, including taking corrective actions, such as,        reconfiguring the resource arrangement set of the operating        CPFF₅ instance, notifying appropriate coherence and/or the like        process sets, which may in turn, take corrective actions, such        as, for example, notifying the user, Stakeholders, and/or the        like.

In some embodiments, particularity management services may utilize oneor more PERCos Platform Services (such as, for example, CoherenceServices, Governance Services, Evaluation and Arbitration Services,and/or the like) to encapsulate an operating session, such as, anoperating CPFF embodiment instance, so as to protect it from undesirableconsequences, as defined by the user purpose.

For example, consider a user who wishes to perform sensitive financialtransactions. Such a user may formulate, select and/or otherwiseidentify a situation specific CPE set that may include a specificationset that requires protection of financial information from disclosureand further ensuring protection of, including ensuring no unauthorizedmodifications to, financial instructions communicated to a financialinstitution such as a bank, investment fund, and/or the like. In someembodiments, Coherence Services may translate this situation specificCPE set into a situationally relevant operating specification set thatincludes policies for controlling access to user related sensitiveinformation sets and policies for user interface, user instructionprocessing, user instruction communication security, and/or the like. Insome embodiments, an operating CPFF embodiment instance may comply withsuch access control and user financial instruction policies by usingGovernance Services to, as applicable, mediate and enforce access touser sensitive resource sets, and manage resource configuration and/orprocessing related to user financial instructions.

In some embodiments, operating CPFF instances may dynamically adapt tochanging operating situational conditions to produce contextual purposeoptimized interim results and/or Outcomes through, in part, the use ofparticularity management, and/or the like, services. For example,suppose an operating CPFF instance, OCPFF₁, is fulfilling a target CPEset that includes a requirement to balance contextual variables, suchas, for example, security, cost/budget, performance, and ease-of-use. Insome embodiments, particularity management services may support OCPFF₁to adapt to changing environments by monitoring OCPFF₁ operatingbehaviors (such as intended and unintended consequences) and conditions(such as demands for its services, security threats, and/or the like)and if appropriate, taking actions (such as, for example, reconfiguringOCPFF₁'s operating resource sets, including replacing one or moreresource and/or resource element sets).

For example, suppose an operating CPFF instance, OCPFF₂, is developed tofulfill a situation-specific target CPE set that balances security,performance and ease-or-use based on desired rigor level, such as, forexample:

(contextual relevance specification

(if threat level ≤3 then

(performance ≥8 and ease-of-use ≥6 and rigor level (security)l≥4 andrigor level (reliability)≥5)

else

(rigor level (security)≥7 and rigor level (reliability)≥8)))

This contextual relevance specification states that if the threatenvironment of operating session is relatively benign, then rigor levelsof security and reliability can be relaxed, whereas, if threat levelincreases, the operating session has to maintain high rigor levels forsecurity and reliability.

In some embodiments, OCPFF₂ may satisfy such a situation-specific targetCPE set by employing particularity management services that monitorOCPFF₂'s operating threat level and trigger a response when the threatlevel rises above 3 or descends below 3. For example, suppose the threatlevel rises from below 3 to higher than 3. Particularity managementservice may reconfigure OCPFF₂'s operating resource sets, such as, forexample, reconfigure OCPFF₂'s network gateways to minimize networkaccess, turn off those services that are less secure but contributetowards providing higher performance, and/or the like.

In some embodiments, the responses to changes in situational conditionsmay be pre-calculated for efficiency prior to launching an operatingCPFF instance. In such a case, backup resource sets may be provisionedand made ready (or otherwise be at least in part readied) but inactiveso that when required they can be easily and efficiently activated toreplace existing operating resource one or more sets that no longer meetthe requirements of a situation's changed conditions. Alternatively,some embodiments may, at least in part, dynamically calculate anappropriate response to changing situations as they occur, for example,particularly in cases where changes occur rarely or slowly over a periodof time or the impact of changing is acceptable given the CPFFspecification set, for example, such change set is consistent with usertarget purpose objectives. These two strategies may be combined in anycombination. In some embodiments such strategies may be implemented byCoherence Services.

In some embodiments, a user set, or, in this example, a Stakeholder set,STK₁, may use a divide-and-conquer software development approach todevelop a CPFF in pursuit of a target contextual purpose specification,CPS₁ by performing a series of actions. First, STK₁ may generate acohered and resolved specification set, CPS₂, comprising, for example:

-   -   Refinement specification sets that are refinements of CPS₁ to        facilitate discovery of applicable resource arrangement sets.    -   Functional specification sets that may express enabling and/or        contributing capabilities for generating functional results. For        example, functional specification sets may express capabilities        needed to provide Stakeholders with support for publishing        resource sets for users to support securely performing social        networking interactions involving sensitive information,        performing online banking, developing sensitive intellectual        property, and/or the like.    -   Situational relevance specification sets for provisioning        operating sessions with resource sets that balance contextual        variables (such as, reliability, ease-of-use, performance,        trustworthiness, and/or the like). For example, situational        relevance specification sets may describe conditions that        resource sets may need to satisfy, such as having specified        encryption, firewalls, hypervisors, and/or the like to provide        required CPFF instance characteristics.    -   Monitoring specification sets to monitor resource set behaviors        and/or operating environments and notify relevant processes,        such as, for example, particularity management services, which        may, in some embodiments, operate as part of and/or in        conjunction with Coherence Services.    -   And/or the like.

In some embodiments, STK₁ may next decompose PS₂ into an ordered set ofcomponent specification sets, PS_(2,1), PS_(2,2), . . . , PS_(2,n), thatis strictly hierarchical by eliminating circular dependencies,hierarchical dependencies, and/or overlapping dependencies by employingservices and/or techniques, such as, for example, particularitymanagement service and/or other software development techniques tominimize the resulting resource set.

STK₁ may then identify and selects resource arrangement sets, RA_(2,1),RA_(2,1), . . . , RA_(2,n), that satisfy ordered set PS_(2,1), PS_(2,2),. . . , PS_(2,n).

STK₁ may then recursively composes component resource sets, RA_(2,1),RA_(2,1), . . . , RA_(2,n) to form a composite resource arrangement set,RA₂.

STK₁ may then perform both unit testing of component resourcearrangements (i.e., RA_(2,1), RA_(2,1), . . . , RA_(2,n)) and integratedtesting of RA₂, which can then be used to generate test harness suchthat other Stakeholders (such as experts) may validate (or havevalidated) the testing harness and publish their results or users canevaluate it in pursuit of their purpose set.

Finally, STK₁ may generate one or more, for example, resultscorresponding identity attributes associated with CFPP₁.

In some embodiments, Stakeholders may use published CPFFs, such as, forexample, CFPP₁, to publish more capable CPFFs. For example, suppose atax expert published a CPFF, CPFF₂, for preparing tax returns. OtherStakeholders can use CPFF₂ as a framework to construct a new, forexample modified, CPFF₃, providing it with additional features, such as,the ability to trade-off between differing contextual variables, suchas, for example, balance between costs, security, performance,functionality, reliability, and/or the like. The security expert maythen publish CPFF₃.

Some PERCos embodiments may involve coordinating the generation of, andresolving to, situationally relevant one or more operatingspecifications that, given available specification and associatedinformation sets, are resolved in a manner that produces a balanced,optimally responsive to user contextual purpose, computing arrangementoperating set. For example, Purpose Statement and/or other contextualpurpose specifications sets may be similarity matched to one or moreFrameworks, such as CPFFs, published, for example, by acknowledgedDomain experts and/or other experts who may have sufficient expertise tomerit highly valuing Repute Creds, where such Frameworks that canprovide scaffolding for generating one or more situationally relevantspecification sets, and/or for provisioning operating contextual purposesessions, that may, depending on specification specifics including forexample:

-   -   Balance operating variables, such as, purpose specific results,        complexity, trustworthiness, cost, performance, time duration,        and/or other variables, certain of which may be reflected in        Quality to Purpose Creds and/or other contextual purpose        specification input;    -   Support provisioning/initiating operating sessions in support of        satisfying situationally relevant purpose-related specification        information through the use of at least in part, corresponding        cohered, reliable, efficient, encapsulated and/or otherwise        isolated, one or more functionally cohesive resource arrangement        sets comprising situationally and/or combinatorially reliable,        tested and/or otherwise assumed to operable, resource sets that        operate at least in part in one or more secure hardened        computing environment sets in accordance with one or more        situationally relevant specification sets; and    -   At least in part be used to manage and/or monitor contextual        purpose computing session consequences by managing not only        purpose fulfillment contributing identified resource sets but        also effectively managing one or more aspects of the underlying        operating environment (e.g., Unix, Windows, iOS, and/or the        like) by limiting standard operating capabilities of at least        one or more portions of such user set underlying operating        system arrangement.

In some embodiments, key aspects leading to provisioning and/orinitiating a CPFF Framework instance are the identification andselection of optimal (or estimated best) resource sets by evaluatingand/or validating the qualities of persistent situationally relatedidentity attributes of relevant candidate resource sets to ensure thattheir deployment is in accordance with user set contextual purposespecification and/or other relevant contextual input information,including specification sets that may express balancing of operatingvariables. In some instances, validating such qualities of a resourceset may include evaluating and/or validating one or more Stakeholderand/or related provenance information sets to assess the authenticityand/or other attribute one or more qualities of a resource set, and, insome embodiments, may further include assessing the means used toassiduously bind the resource set with its one or more Stakeholder setinformation, such as existential biometric information, to assuresufficiency of binding characteristics to any associated contextualpurpose user set binding characteristics requirement information.

In some embodiments, Stakeholder information be bound to a resource setinformation set and may reference and/or include one or more chain ofStakeholder authorities identity information sets that include biometricinformation for one or more human Stakeholders, such as resource set oneor more resource Stakeholder publishers. Such Stakeholder publishers mayhave registered their human “root,” for example, liveness tested,existential biometric and/or other sufficient to specificationStakeholder identity information sets with one or more trusted identity(and/or resource) managers (such as cloud service and/or networkadministrator) where at least a portion of such resource set publishedStakeholder identity information may be similarity matched against anysuch registered, for example, biometric, identity information, such asprovided in the form of a PERCos Participant published identity resourceinstance. For example consider a resource set, RS₁, published by aStakeholder, STK₁. STK₁ may reference and/or contain a chain ofStakeholder authorities that include, for example, a human manager,MGR₁, that has the rights/authorization to publish RS₁ as well as thedelegation authority to authorize STK₁ to act as MGR₁'s delegate.

Some PERCos embodiments may enable users and/or Stakeholders to maintaintheir biometric and/or contextual information sets in a varied set ofcomputing arrangements. Users and/or Stakeholders may store suchinformation sets in their local computing arrangements, register themwith one or more trusted third party identity and/or the like managementservices, provide (and/or establish again, as may be current and/orauthenticated by a given, for example, such information receiving party)at least a portion of such information sets to one or more organizations(such as, banks, employers, publishing services, and/or the like),and/or any combination thereof.

Regardless of where such biometric and/or contextual information setsare to be stored, some PERCos embodiments may provide one or moreIdentity Firewall (IF) and/or Awareness Manager (AM) sets that may beused in supporting sufficient to contextual purpose relatedspecification, rigorous registration- and/or authentication-relatedoperations regarding tangible identities, such as, for example, humanparticipants in a PERCos Cosmos embodiment, in pursuit of one or moresituationally relevant target purpose sets, establishing a newParticipant and/or the like biometric identity information setassociated with the installation environments of such IFs and/or AMs,and/or for environment, sensed, at least in part biometric auditing ofat least a portion of human activity in such associated environments.

Some embodiments of IF and AM sets, such as hardware protectedembodiments thereof, may provide a minimal set of capabilitiescomprising time-related operations and secure communication capabilitiesto securely transmit and/or receive, correlated including, for example,time stamped, biometric and/or other user computing arrangement sensorand/or related emitter information sets (e.g., regarding when suchemitting and/or sensing occurred as well as at least specificationsatisfying (such as contextual purpose set and/or general settingsatisfying) descriptive information regarding and/or any, at least inpart, transforming of, any such emitted and/or received applicableemitter and/or sensor information). In some embodiments and somecircumstances other IF and AM sets may provide a richer set ofcapabilities, in addition to, for example, supporting identityacquisition, time stamping, and secure communication service, where suchfurther capabilities may include at least in part analyzing suchacquired identity information, such as performing timing anomalyanalysis and/or performing authentication services involving matchingacquired identity information with stored identity information todetermine validity of identity assertions, or to otherwise recognize the“name” and/or other identity information corresponding to such acquiredidentity information. Such hardened IF and AM sets may further providecontrol arrangements for providing instruction sets to their respectiveemitter sets regarding initiating, including otherwise describing,situationally specific emitter activity sets, where such instructionsmay be, for example, at least in part produced by an emitter instructiongenerator arrangement, such as a pseudo-random emitter patter generationset, and where such pseudo-random arrangement may employ pseudo-randomgeneration techniques at least in part comparable to techniques employedby pseudo-random number generators. Such arrangements, such as, forexample, hardware packaged embodiments, may further support CPFFoperations, such as, for example, supporting PPE and associatedcapabilities for initiating CPFF contextual purpose sessions throughsupport of, for example, particularity management, PIMS, other identitymanagement related services, and/or the like.

In some embodiments, AM sets, AM₁, may be an arrangement set rangingfrom a thin AM client to core AM set (comprising one or more trustedclocks, one or more sensor sets, and a secure communications services)to a full AM set (comprising, for example, correlation systems, anomalydetection systems, one or more pseudo random emitter generator sets, oneor more emitter sets, one or more authentication and/or reliabilityintegrity processing and/or management sets), where AM₁ elements, suchas, for example, trusted clocks, pseudo random generators, and/ormanagers for controlling authentication and/or reliability integrityprocessing, may be installed in different locations as long as they arelocally or otherwise dependably available and connected through asufficiently reliable and secure communications pathway, such as, forexample, a wireless connection employing, for example, encryptedsufficiently reliable Bluetooth communications. For example, a pluralityof AM and/or IF sets may use the same trusted clock for example,embedded in a “master” AM or IF, a router, access point, firewall and/orthe like. AM and/or IF sets may have one or more pseudo random generatorsets that may be also available for shared use (pseudo-random emitterinstruction sets may, for example in some embodiments, be received froma remote location, such as non-local (for example, local vicinity)network administrative and/or cloud service arrangement). An AM or IFmay serve as a “master” AM or IF providing pseudo random emittergeneration and time services to other securely connected “thinner” AMsor Ifs, and in some embodiments, a plurality of “master” sucharrangements may operate, at least at times, and at least for some oneor more functions, redundant and/or cross-evaluation manner.

FIG. 37 is a non-limiting illustrative example of a user registeringsuch user's biometric and/or contextual information sets in multiplelocations.

For example, FIG. 37 illustrates a user, X₁, registering X₁'s biometricand/or contextual information set in four locations: X₁'s Mac Laptop,X₁'s mobile phone, X₁'s bank kiosk, and a trusted third party servicethat X₁ uses to authenticate himself or herself so that the service cangenerate cryptographic tokens that X₁ may use as needed.

In this example, X₁ may be an employee of a company, where the company'smultistory building may have a distributed AM set to manage situationalawareness of the entire building. Such a distributed AM set may comprisea master AM set, AM_(X), may coordinate a plurality of AM, core AM, thinAM-client, and/or IF sets in any combination thereof. AM_(X) maycomprise one or more sensor sets, pseudo random generators,tamper-resistant repository system(s)—that may have one or more backupsin the cloud—, HMS for managing information stored in thetamper-resistant repository system, secure communication services thatthe master AM set (and/or any combination of instances) may use tointeract with an identity management system in the cloud (and/or forexample, at a network location in the company's headquarter buildinglocated elsewhere), authentication and/or reality integrity analyzerarrangement, trusted clock service that can perform a range oftime-related operations (such as timing anomaly analysis, time-stampingsensor information and/or emitter instruction sets, time-relatedcorrelation analysis, and/or the like), one or more load module sets,LM_(x), that may at least in part coordinate and/or otherwise manageAM_(X)'s subordinate AM, thin-client, core AM and/or IF sets. Inparticular, LM_(x) on behalf of AM_(x) may, in some circumstances,coordinate the following:

-   -   Entrance AM sets, where each entrance of the building has an AM        set comprising, unless the specific capability instance is        available from portion of the building AM set arrangement, one        or more pseudo random generator sets, emitter sets, sensor sets,        and/or timing anomaly sets that communicates their information        sets using the building's wireless connection to authenticate        users coming into the building or leaving the building. For        example, suppose X₁ wishes to enter the building at entrance E₁,        AM₁, which is E₁'s AM set, may capture X₁'s biometric/or        contextual information set (for example, existential liveness        tested) and transmits it to AM_(X). AM_(X), after processing the        transmitted information set, a decision is made, by AM_(X)        and/or by an associated operator and/or computing arrangement,        to obtain further authentication by initiating a challenge, such        as a controlled ultra-sound emission, using AMC s pseudo random        generator to “paint” the user using AM₁'s emitter set. If the        response, which may be transparent to the user, similarity        matches the stored response information set corresponding with        the challenge and/or otherwise contains information indicative        of appropriate characteristic set for X₁, then the door will        open so that the user can enter the building.    -   Stairwell thin AM sets, where entrances to each stairwell has a        thin AM set comprising one or more sensor sets and secure        communication sets (may also have one or more secure clocks).    -   One or more core AM and/or IF sets at public areas, such as,        lobby, conference rooms, and/or the like. For example, the lobby        has an IF that uses the sensor and emitter set located in the        main entrance, whereas a large conference room may have a        plurality of core AM sets provided through multiple sensor sets        deployed throughout the rooms enabling a full, effectively        unobstructed view of the room using one or more of the sensor        and emitter capability sets.

For example, FIG. 37 illustrates a user, X1 registering X1's biometricand/or contextual information set in four locations: X1's Mac Laptop,X1's mobile phone, X1's bank kiosk, and with a trusted third partyservice that X1 uses to authenticate himself or herself so that theservice can generate cryptographic tokens that X1 may use as needed,which such tokens may be associated with or otherwise represent and/orinclude at least a portion of X1 Participant identity information, suchas X1s existential biometric information used for authenticationinformation matching.

FIG. 38 is a non-limiting illustrative example of AMs and IFscommunicating with each other to monitor a user set.

FIG. 38 illustrates how differing AM and/or IF sets may use locallyavailable communication media to communicate their information sets toassiduously authenticate users. For example, suppose a user, X₁, usingX₁'s Mac Laptop to communicate (via https) with an on-line store, S₁. S₁has only a thin AM client that does not have sufficient capability toassiduously authenticate X₁. Instead, S₁ uses a cloud service toauthenticate X₁'s existential biometric and/or contextual informationset.

In some embodiments, resource sets selected to provision a CPFFFramework instance may be compartmentalized into one or morefunctionally cohesive resource arrangement groups and allocated tooperate in one or more secure hardened computing (including, forexample, appliance) environments, such as hardware protected processingenvironment (PPE) sets, virtual machine (VM) and/or isolation technology(e.g., sandbox) sets running on top a trusted virtual machine monitor(such as, a hypervisor) and/or a trusted operating system.

FIG. 39 is a non-limiting illustrative example of multiple contextualpurpose resolutions on a single device.

FIG. 39 shows two users, X and Y, interacting with the same brand mobiledevice, PHN₁, which comprises an Identity Firewall and sensor/emitterset with two distinct situational purposes. In order to initiate aninteraction with the mobile device, both X and Y must submit to aninitial simple biometric test involving, in this example, a measurementof a fingerprint. At this point, the behaviors of X and Y diverge basedon their situational purpose.

X is pursuing a purpose of cooking the evening meal and therefore speaksthe phrase “make lasagna.” In response to this request, PHN₁ interactswith PERCos services to refine the target user purpose (in FIG. 39 apurpose class, Cooking C, is identified as a close approximation to theuser purpose) and help the user select appropriate resources (in FIG. 39, the user selects a purpose class application, Cooking 1). X thenprovisions and operations the Cooking 1 purpose to find the rightrecipes to use PHN₁ to help cook a lasagna.

The processing of Y's purpose proceeds in a similar manner, except thatY's purpose involves contextual relevance specifications requiring atrusted to purpose operating session. Y speaks the phrase “pay bills”.In this example, there exists a policy that requires an additional layerof user authentication to occur when financial purpose related resourcesare involved, at this point Y must enter a passcode as part of theadditional layer of required authentication. As Y's purpose unfolds,PERCos coherence services determine that this purpose requires a trustedto purpose operating session utilizing CPFF support. In this example, Yselects a CPFF arrangement for banking which provides some support toavoid unintended consequences such as, for example, requiring assiduousexistential authentication of Y and/or monitoring the sessionenvironment for anomalies.

In some embodiments, such identified and selected reliable resource setsmay be compartmentalized into one or more functionally cohesive resourcearrangement groups and allocated to operate in one or more securehardened computing environments, such as hardware protected processingenvironment (PPE) sets, virtual machine (VM) and/or isolation technology(e.g., sandbox) sets and/or the like, for example, as may be employed ina CPFF supporting hardened component and/or other device arrangement.

In some embodiments, such secure hardened computing environment sets mayprovide tamper-resistant environments, (for example, tamper-resistant,hardware packaged environments, and wherein components, circuitry, andsoftware therein may be respectively hardened individually andcollectively) that protect and/or isolate their operating resource setsfrom corruption, misdirection, subversion, observation, and/or otherforms of interference and/or interference of rights, using externalresource sets. Such secure hardened arrangements may adapt to changingsituational conditions by reconfiguring, updating, and/or replacingtheir associated load module sets in accordance with one or moresituational conditions, as specified by, for example, CPFF specificationsets.

For example, suppose a user employs a local computing environment thathas a single CPFF hardware PPE arrangement, PPE₁. Depending on theuser's current target purpose set, PPE₁ may load and operate one or moredifferent load module (LM) sets that enable the user to securely andoptimally engage in different activities, such as online banking, secureonline purchasing, PERCos resource publishing (as a Stakeholder), and/orthe like. As a user purpose session unfolds, PPE₁ may, in someembodiments, update, replace, and/or reconfigure its load module setsand/or resource sets depending on its environmental conditions, such asa threat detection event that may change the degree of encapsulationand/or isolation needed to perform purpose operations with sufficientrigor, security, and/or the like, to avoid subversion by malware,potentially disruptive humans, and/or the like. For example, suppose ahardware PPE₁ is installed in a user's mobile phone. When the user isusing the phone in a crowded area, PPE₁ may load a load module set thatrestricts the set of sensitive operations that the user may perform inorder to prevent the disclosure of sensitive information. However, whenthe user is in a safe area (such as, his office), PPE₁ uses a differentload module that allows the user to perform sensitive operations withless rigorous restrictions.

In some embodiments, particularity management services may be multiplyinstantiated, so that some instances can be integrated into CPFFevaluation processing, whereas others may be managed separately. Suchparticularity management service instances may enable users to accept,add, modify, refine, resolve, cohere, and/or otherwise manipulate—singleinstance or iteratively—their prescriptive Purpose Statements (and/orlike, purpose specification) sets that can be similarity matched toidentify and select a Framework, such as, a CPFF, that can be used as ascaffolding and/or other environment to produce a situationally relevantoperating specification set. Such similarity matching may includecohering CPFFs and/or other Frameworks with user Foundation resourcesets to ensure that provisioning of CPFF Framework instance would becompatible with user Foundation resource sets. Particularity managementservices may provision and/or otherwise instantiate an identified CPFFFramework instance with an optimal resource set whose operation setwould satisfy produced, situationally relevant, operating specificationset.

FIG. 40 is a non-limiting illustrative example of an operating CPFF thatemploys a unified hardware appliance.

In this example, an operating CPFF, CPFF_(z), which, as illustrated inFIG. 40 , is a CPFF Framework instance is used with a user Foundationresource set that enables users in a user set, U₁, to securely andreliably use development tools to develop a software system. Softwaredevelopment tools (such as compilers for converting source files intoexecutable modules, build tools, revision control systems that manageversioning and/or resource sets in a manner that is convenient forsoftware developers, and/or the like) are, in general, large, complex,and dynamically evolving. In current practice, such tool sets arecommonly run in untrusted computing environments that are at risk tomalware and other (for example, human) security threats that can taintthe end result of software development processes. This exampleillustrates how CPFF_(z) provides users in user set U₁ with secureprocessing environments by using operating session resource setsdistributed across a plurality of computing environments, withoperations in computing environments secured, at least in part, bysecure hardened hardware appliance such as, for example, a unifiedappliance, UA₆, with AM and, at least in part, CPFF functionality.CPFF_(z) operating arrangement may employ, and where applicable,operate, the following secure hardened processing environments:

-   -   UA₆, a tamper-resistant hardware appliance that operates a LM        set, LM₉, to manage an application that Sandbox₁₀ and UA₆ share.        In the current example, UA₆'s capabilities include:        -   Assiduous biometric-based procedures for existential            authenticating U₁.        -   Secure communications with cloud resource sets.        -   A trusted path for reliable communications from U₁ to UA₆            via AM₅'s sensor/emitter set.    -   Sandbox₁₀, a sandbox provided by the trusted to purpose        operating session, OS₁₁. By operating on top of OS₁₁, Sandbox₁₀        provides a reliable environment to support software development        and collaboration, via source control, chat, e-mail, screen        sharing, and/or the like, with other developers.    -   A computing environment in the cloud, such as, for example, a        software PPE (SPE), for evaluating cloud resource sets. For        example, developers can explore the internet to find new tools        they may be interested in using. After evaluating cloud resource        sets, a developer may, in some instances, choose to install one        or more tools into Sandbox₁₀.

In some embodiments, LM₉ operating in PPE₉ may also provide monitoringof OS₁₁ and applications that run in Sandbox₁₀. When the laptop bootsOS₁₁, its TPM device may be able to measure the boot code and attest tothe status of OS₁₁ when OS₁₁ has initialized. The TPM may then attest tothe state of the laptop to LM₉ by sending it the measurement, which LM₉verifies with its stored code. LM₉ in turn instructs an LED display inBSE₂ to display a message indicating its verification of the state ofOS₁₁ boot, thereby providing U₁ with a reliable means of knowing thehealth of OS₁₁ when it boots. Similar measurements, attestation anddisplay may be applied to the initialization of Sandbox₁₀.

By compartmentalizing user resource sets into two environments, UA₆ andSandbox₁₀, CPFF_(z) satisfies least privilege principle that may limitthe consequences of any disruptive software development tools developersmay install into their development environment. By cooperating togetherUA₆ and Sandbox₁₀ may obtain capabilities that cannot be provided byeither environment alone. For example, resource sets operating inSandbox₁₀ may integrate screen sharing with a rich developmentenvironment and UA₆ may add assurance that the screen may only be sharedwith authorized developers. Sandbox₁₀ may provide source code controland UA₆ may ensure that assiduous (for example liveness testedbiometric) authentication, which is described in more detail in theexample illustrated by FIG. 42 that uses the same appliance UA₆ as thisexample, meets the requirements of the source code control server.Sandbox₁₀ may provide a secure environment for development work and UA₆may monitor that environment and provide U₁ with status updates on anLED display.

In this example, in order to access some resource sets, such as, forexample, RS₁₂, their Stakeholders may require that U₁ assiduously bebound to U₁'s existential identity to demonstrate U₁'s authorization toaccess RS₁₂. In such a case, U₁ may use of authentication appliance,UA₆, to provide the sufficient to purpose degree of authentication.

In some embodiments, for reasons of architectural optimization,convenience, cost, and/or other situational conditions, CPFF Frameworkinstances may employ differing arrangements of secure hardened computingenvironments. Some embodiments may use an arrangement comprising one ormore hardware PPE sets operating in a CPU set, whereas others may use anarrangement comprising one or more hardened software environment, suchas sandboxes that operate as part of an operating system set, a VMoperating on top of an operating system, and/or the like. Such differingarrangements may provide differing degrees of rigor, reliability,security, and/or, for example, other Quality to Purpose Facetconsiderations. Some example illustrations of such differingconfigurations are as follows.

FIG. 41 is a non-limiting illustrative example of a CPFF operatingsession that uses a hardware PPE set in a CPU set to manage intendedand/or unintended consequences.

FIG. 41 illustrates a non-limiting example of an operating CPFF,CPFF_(x), that operates a functionally cohesive resource arrangementcomprising one or more highly rigorous and reliable processing sets in ahardware PPE set, PPE₁, in a CPU set to manage intended and/orunintended consequences. PPE₁'s associated load module, LM₁, has its owndedicated memory, which LM₁ uses to implement a set of PPE₁'s systemcalls, such as, system calls that implement, whole or in part,particularity management services including, for example, particularitymonitoring services, and/or other coherence services, and/or otherPERCos services. LM₁ may utilize a variety of resources sets to performits operations, such as, for example, informational resources, such as,for example, resources specifying and/or supporting the management ofoperating systems and/or applications that execute in the generalpurpose CPU operating environment. LM₁ may also have access to mainmemory so that LM₁ can monitor and, if needed, modify operations of thegeneral purpose operating system. In some embodiments, PPE₁ may beimplemented through a combination of, hypervisor technologies such as WMroot mode, to provide a memory space that is isolated from tampering bythe general purpose operating system together with a mechanism by whichPPE₁ may authenticate its load modules.

In some embodiments, LM₁ may cooperate with and/or support CPFF_(x)'sother operating resource sets, such as particularity management servicesand/or other PERCos services that operate on top of OS₂. In some suchembodiments, such cooperation may allow CPFF processing to continue tooperate correctly even when an operating system running on top of theCPU set is compromised. For example, in cases where OS₂ and/or theapplications supported by OS₂ are infected with malware and/or otherwisebecome unreliable, particularity monitoring service operating in PPE₁ inthe CPU set may detect, or suspect, such failures and take correctiveactions, such as, for example, restart the operating system and/orreplace faulting resource sets with alternate resource sets.

In some circumstances, user sets (for example, corporations for theiremployees) may not want their banks and/or certain one or more otherparties to have direct access to their biometric and/or contextualinformation sets and, further, may not want to store such confidentialone or more information sets in their mobile phone and/or other portabledevices where it might be lost, stolen, and/or penetrated by malwareand/or humans acting in a manner inconsistent with banking agreementspecifications. Such user sets, and/or computing arrangements acting ontheir behalf, may negotiate or otherwise agree with a banking resourceset representing their banks to use a third party (for example, abanking transaction authentication utility performing acting on behalfof many banks) that they both trust to act as an intermediary tosecurely and reliably authenticate all parties involved in a bankingtransaction, and as may be applicable, provide appropriate furtherinformation. In some cases, such negotiation or other agreement processmay be elevated to a higher order authority, such as, an operationsmanager, MGR₁, at the bank who may explicitly authorize such use of athird party. In some instances, however, such as for high valuetransactions, MGR₁ may insist that users register their existentialbiometric identity information set (including performing processes toacquire their relevant biometric information) with the bank's identitymanagement system and assiduously authenticate themselves usingbiometric sensor/emitter devices authenticated and evaluated by MGR₁ assufficient to perform banking transactions.

FIG. 42 is a non-limiting illustrative example of a hardware unifiedappliance.

FIG. 42 illustrates a non-limiting example embodiment of a trusted thirdparty that services users who have a hardware appliance plugged intoand/or otherwise in sufficient close proximity to securely interact withtheir respective local computing environment (e.g., mobile phone) tosecurely bank on-line using their potentially untrusted mobile phoneand/or other portable devices.

In this example, the appliance used by the trusted third party iscomprised of an Awareness Manager, UA₆, which includes CPFF managementcapabilities and securely supports a distributed CPFF operating session,CPFF_(y). CPFF_(y) enables users to bank online via securecommunications to remote banking resource, RS_(B). Although UA₆ supports(or otherwise includes) CPFF_(y) to manage intended and unintendedconsequences by enforcing least privilege principle, in which it uses ahardened hardware arrangement comprised of a plurality of hardware PPEsets, other Awareness Manager instances may use a single secure hardenedcomputing arrangement to provide its services.

In this example, each PPE set is provisioned with a minimal resource setit needs to perform its operations. For example, CPFF_(y) minimizesunintended consequences by using a PPE, PPE₉ (and a corresponding loadmodule, LM₁₀), to manage its elements and a separate PPE, PPE₁₀, tooperate a load module (a web container) for interacting with U₁'s mobilephone. In this example, UA₆, which is the same as UA₆ illustrated inFIG. 40 , is comprised of the following elements:

-   -   A core Awareness Manager, AM₅, that manages the following        components:        -   Biometric sensor and emitter set (BSE₂), where BSE₂ emitters            include a small LED display and a speaker and BSE₂'s sensors            are sufficient to perform assiduous authentication of U₁'s            one or more identities and/or other reality-integrity            validation.        -   Trusted clock set, CLK₃, that performs/supports time-related            operations, such as, for example, time-stamping relevant            events, interacting with BSE₂ and AP₄ to perform timing            anomaly analysis, correlating sensor and/or emitter            information sets, and/or the like.    -   In some embodiments, accuracy of said trusted clock set may be        calibrated, tested, and/or adjusted using a variety of methods,        such as, for example, through interaction with an authenticated        clock set, for example, hosted by a remote cloud service        arrangement. Such calibration, adjustments and/or testing may        take, for example, the following forms:        -   Calibration, adjustments and/or testing of absolute time,            establishing that the absolute time provided by clocks is            accurate to within a desired (or at a minimum known)            tolerance, which may support, for example, appending            absolute time-stamps to data; and/or        -   Calibration, adjustments and/or testing that time intervals            (i.e., relative times) calculated by clocks are accurate to            within a desired (or at a minimum known) tolerance, which            may support, for example, temporal anomaly detection even in            the case where absolute times are not (and/or are not known            to be) accurate.    -   Authentication and/or reality-integrity testing process set        (AP₄) providing validation of a user set's liveness, using voice        commands and/or other existentially measurable actions to        confirm banking transactions, and/or the like.    -   A secure communications component (SC₇) which is a PPE, that        operates a load module set that signs and/or encrypts all        communications between UA₆ and external Stakeholder resources        (such as resources that provide banking services to their        clients). Such communication using a well-known protocol, such        as TLS, includes providing evidence of the security and/or        reliability of situational identities of UA₆ (e.g., that may in        some instances vary, for example, according to load module        updates) where such evidence may be established by demonstrating        that UA₆ holds the private key for a cryptographic certificate        issued by its manufacturer. CPFF_(y)'s operating specification,        in this example, instructs that communications processing        resource sets operate in a separate hardware PPE from other        hardware PPEs (such as, for example, AM₅, PPE₉, and PPE₁₀) to        exercise least privilege principle that ensures that load module        sets operating in other PPEs do not to know SC₇'s private key.    -   Protected tamper-resistant repository set, PRs, that persists        some portion of information sets between service invocations and        may include access controls wherein information sets are only        released to authenticated and authorized load modules operating        in, for example, PPE₉ and PPE₁₀. PRs may contain various        information sets, such as:        -   Identities of one or more user sets authorized to use the            appliance,        -   Load module programs for loading PPEs (e.g., AM₅, SC₇, PPE₉            and PPE₁₀),        -   Bank account information sets of users,        -   Billing information sets,        -   And/or the like.    -   In some embodiments, user biometric information sets may not be        stored locally. Instead, such information set may be stored in a        tamper resistant repository system maintained by a third party        cloud service and downloaded as needed.    -   A TPM or other such technology with similar capabilities that        manages private keys for PPEs to attest their authenticity and        releases a private key after properly authenticating the        associated LM set. In some embodiments, such a TPM may be a        component of a PPE.    -   PPE₉, in this example, operates LM₁₀ in accordance with        CPFF_(y)'s situational operating specification. In particular,        LM₁₀ manages UA₆'s components by providing each component with        authorization/rights it needs to perform its service sets. When        a user, U₁, invokes UA₆'s services with a request, LM₁₀ may        coordinate actions performed by a range of UA₆'s elements. Such        coordination may include, for example, at appropriate times,        instructing:        -   PR₈ to retrieve relevant information sets, such as, U₁'s            banking information sets.        -   AM₅ to initiate authentication of U₁ if the authentication            is to be performed locally, otherwise, LM₁₀ requests AM₅ to            capture U₁'s biometric information set and forwards it to            SC₇ so that it can be sent to the trusted third party            server.        -   SC₇ to initiate communication with U₁'s banking resource set        -   PPE₁₀ to load a web container (e.g., Apache web server), for            interacting with U₁'s mobile phone.    -   PPE₁₀ that operates a load module set, such as a web container,        for interacting with users.

This example assumes that the bank agrees to allow U₁ to locallyauthenticate U₁'s identity. In such a case, user, U₁, who uses thetrusted third party services, selects a CPFF, to provision andinstantiate an operating CPFF, CPFF_(x), using U₁'s Foundation resourcesets, such as U₁'s mobile phone and browser and/or other computingdevice that has browser and/or the like, and may employ a componentCPFF. U₁ may then associate an icon so that whenever U₁ wishes to bankon line with the banking institution represented by RS_(B), U₁ can usethe icon to initiate a CPFF_(y) operating session.

Such initiation may comprise the following steps:

-   -   Step 1: AM₅ assiduously authenticates U₁ using BSE₂ to capture        U₁'s biometric and/or environmental information sets and        comparing the captured information set with one or more        reference information sets stored in PR₈.        -   Since the web container does not trust U₁'s mobile phone, it            requests AM₅ to initiate reality-integrity (for example,            including existential biometric) testing to validate U₁'s            physical presence.        -   AM₅ directs its pseudo random emission generator (which            comprises its pseudo random generator together with one or            more emitter sets in BSE₂) to paint U₁ and, in some            instances, U₁'s physical environment, and directs its            sensors to capture the response so that AP₄ can analyze for            U₁'s tangible presence (i.e., liveness)    -   Step 2: UA₆ initiates a validation of RS_(B)'s certificates by        issuing a request through SC₇ to RS_(B).    -   Step 3: RS_(B) assiduously authenticates UA₆, where such        authentication process may vary depending on rigor level        situationally warranted, and may, for example, include UA₆        demonstrating its possession of relevant private keys (for        example, private keys held by PPE₉ and/or SC₇) such as a        cryptographic certificate of the identity of UA₆ signed by its        manufacturer (Stakeholder). This step includes UA₆'s TPM        measuring LM₁₀ and then securely sending such measurement        information to RS_(B). RS_(B) then validates the sent        measurement with its identity manager, IDM_(B). In addition,        RS_(B) determines that the signature on the secure        communications from SC₇ to RS_(B) is consistent with the        identity of UA₆.    -   Step 4: RS_(B) assiduously assesses UA₆'s situational identity,        which may include validating and/or having one or more of its        attributes validated previously, that one or more of the        following:        -   UA₆'s situational identity is sufficient to purpose for the            bank (e.g., Stakeholder) interests as represented by            RS_(B)'s situational control specification set. In some            circumstances, assessment of UA₆'s identity may include            validating attributes describing UA₆'s provenance            information, such as identity information sets associated            with its one or more Stakeholders (such as its manufacturer,            installer, distributor, and/or the like), attributes            describing UA₆'s internal configuration, such as the fact            that UA₆ is configured to provide least privilege by using            separate PPEs to operate awareness management,            administrative management, communications, and interaction            with users' mobile environments, and/or the like.        -   LM₅'s identity is suitable to banking Stakeholder purpose as            represented by RS_(B)'s control specification set, where            such identity may describe the degree of rigor with which            LM₅ (through AM₅'s services) binds users to their            corresponding Participant identities.

After performing these steps, UA₆ may be initialized and ready tointeract with U₁'s mobile phone, which, in this particular embodimentand context, is not trusted.

-   -   Step 5: U₁'s mobile phone communicates user's financial        transaction request to the web container (e.g., Apache web        server) that operates in PPE₁₀.    -   Step 6: PPE₉ communicates the transaction request to RS_(B)        using SC₇'s services. Based on request details, in some        instances RS_(B) may require different and/or additional user        set authentication means, which it may communicate via SC₇ to        UA₆, which in turn, may communicate to U₁ via AM₅'s speaker set.    -   Step 7: Prior to completing the transaction, the bank, through        the services of RS_(B), requests that UA₆ perform a protocol to        obtain U₁'s confirmation of the transaction.    -   Step 8: LM₅ in AM₅ uses its LED device in BSE₂ to: i) display a        brief summary of the transaction to be performed; and ii) use a        speaker (in BSE₂) to request that U₁ confirm or deny the        transaction in progress. AP₄ then analyzes the information sets        generated by sensors (such as microphone) in BSE₂ to ensure that        the response was, in fact, generated by U₁.    -   Step 9: The results of AP₄'s evaluation of U₁'s response (i.e.,        confirmation or denial) are sent to RS_(B), which in turn, may        notify any additional banking resources necessary to complete        the transaction.

FIG. 43 is a non-limiting illustrative example of an operating CPFF thatemploys a hardened device and a secured software computing environment.

FIG. 43 illustrates an operating CPFF, CPFF_(x), that compartmentalizesits resource sets into two secure hardened computing environments

-   -   A hardened device in U₁'s hardware computing arrangement to        operate resource sets that perform CPFF_(x)-related        administrative operations, such as tangible identity acquisition        and/or authentication-related operations, particularity        monitoring operations, and/or the like, that support CPFF_(x) to        managing intended and unintended consequences.    -   VM₇ a virtual machine customized to support CPFF_(x) operations        to operate resource sets that perform purposeful operations that        support CPFF_(x) achieve optimal interim results and Outcomes.

In some embodiments, one or more secure hardened computing environmentsmay be, arranged hierarchically, in a client/server manner, peer-to-peerand/or otherwise in a distributed fashion, and/or any combinationthereof to coordinate their respective operations in pursuit of targetuser set purpose set. In such embodiments, secure hardened computingarrangements may have differing seniority (or privilege) levels in achain of command, where one hardware PPE set may have management rightsover one or more subordinate hardware PPE sets, where management rightsinclude assigning their seniority levels and/or authorities.

For example, as illustrated in FIG. 43 , suppose a hardware PPE set,PPE₅, has a seniority level, 3, and access rights (authorization) setincluding management rights over PPEs, PPE₃ and PPE₄. In such a case,PPE₅'s management rights may include rights (authorizations) todynamically assign seniority levels to PPE₃ and PPE₄ as well asassigning PPE₃ and PPE₄ rights (authorizations), including rights(authorizations) to perform PERCos operations. For example, PPE₅ canassign the same seniority levels or differing seniority levels to PPE₃and PPE₄, where these levels may change in accordance with situationalspecific context. PPE₅ can specify their relationships, such as,expressing that they operate as peer to peer or superior-subordinate (bygranting the superior hardware PPE (e.g., PPE₃) management access rightsover the other hardware PPE (e.g., PPE₄).

In some embodiments, hardware PPE sets can assign their associated LMsets access rights/authorization they may need to perform theiroperations, such as, for example:

-   -   Administrative rights over other load module sets.    -   System privileges such as control over I/O operations and        control over various CPU sets.    -   And/or the like.    -   For example, in the example illustrated by FIG. 43 , PPE₃,        responsible for managing its biometric sensor/emitter set, BSE₂,        has authorization to add cryptographic protections to BSE₂        information sets and instructions. In such a case, PPE₃ grants        such authorization to its load module set, LM₃.

In some embodiments, PPE₃ and another PPE set, PPE₄, may have the sameseniority. In such a case, PPE₃ and PPE₄ collectively (orcollaboratively) may provide a set of capabilities that is a superset ofcapabilities of either PPE₃ or PPE₄.

In particular, FIG. 43 shows a hardened device, providing capabilities,such as, Awareness Manager capabilities (such as, biometricsensor/emitter set services), particularity management services, and/orother PERCos services and/or the like, is comprised of the followingelements:

-   -   BSE₂ comprising biometric sensor/emitter set.    -   PPE₃, which is directly connected to a biometric sensor and        emitter set,    -   BSE₂, is assigned seniority level 1. PPE₃ operates a LM, LM₃,        which may be configured to monitor and/or modify communications        coming from or going to BSE₂. In some embodiments, LM₃ may        perform various functions such as, for example:        -   Securing communications to and from BSE₂.        -   Granting authorized external resource sets exclusive, for            example, access to BSE₂.        -   Performing validity checks on commands made to BSE₂ (such            as, for example, emission generation instructions) and/or            data generated by sensor sets.        -   Managing cross-edge interactions between BSE₂ and computing            arrangement user, U₁, in support of, for example,            existential registration, authentication, and/or reality            integrity testing.        -   And/or the like.    -   PPE₄, comprising a hardware PPE set that operates a load module        set, LM₄, that provides a set of CPFF_(x) operations (such as,        for example, particularity management services for CPFF_(x),        and/or the like) that requires highest level of security,        reliability, and/or Quality to Purpose, is assigned seniority        level 1. PPE₄ may configure LM₄ so that LM₄ can interact with        the device sets on the bus to, for example, examine logs being        stored on a storage device, and/or interact with the CPU and        main memory. LM₄ may perform CPFF support operations, such as,        for example:        -   Particularity management services accessible from the main            CPU. The set of particularity management services provided            by LM₄ may coordinate, at least in part, with the set of            particularity management services provided by particularity            manager process set, PM₈, to CPFF_(x) functionality            operating in the virtual machine, VM₇.        -   Authentication of one or more resource sets running on the            main CPU through interactions with, for example, a TPM.        -   Responding to particularity management events, where a            response may include, for example, resetting and            reprogramming the main CPU.    -   PPE₅ operates a load module set, LM₅, for providing        administrative services, such as, for example, coherence,        monitoring and response operations, and/or the like. PPE₅ is        assigned seniority level 3 and managing access rights        (authorizations) over IF₃ (and hence over LM₃) and PPE₄ (and        hence over LM₄). For example, a coherence manager instance in        LM₅ may perform operations such as, for example, cohering,        installing, replacing, monitoring, reconfiguring, resetting,        and/or otherwise managing LM sets in IF₃ and PPE₄. For example,        LM₅ may direct LM₃ how to configure BSE₂ to enable assiduous        authentication processes, interact with the trust clock to        express the set of time related operations, such as, for        example, time stamping sensor generated information set and/or        emitter instruction set, performing correlations and/or timing        anomalies analysis, and/or the like.    -   Pseudo random generator that may generate instruction for        emitters, communicate with authorized process sets (such as        authentication process sets) for correlating emitter        instructions with tangible response sets detected by BSE₁'s        sensor set, and/or the like.    -   A trusted clock for performing time-related operations.

In this example, CPFF_(x) is configured also to include a software layeroperating on top of the U₁'s hardware arrangement comprising, forexample:

-   -   OS₆, a trusted to purpose operating session that is operatively        arranged in accordance with CPFF_(x) management specifications        (e.g., minimality, isolation, constraint management, other        security, efficiency, Foundation, Roles, profiles, preferences,        Stakeholder interests and/or the like information). It enforces        control specifications restricting how applications and virtual        machine operating on top of OS₆ may interfere with or be        interfered with by resource and/or process sets including those        resource and/or process sets provided by OS₆.    -   A virtual machine, VM₇, operating a virtual operating system        which may provide a rich virtual environment for the operation        of virtual operating resource sets. In particular VM₇ may        operate a particularity manager process set, PM₈, which operates        on VM₇, coordinates its operations with particularity management        services provided by LM₄.

FIG. 44 is a non-limiting illustrative example of an IF in a CPU set.

FIG. 44 illustrates a CPU set, CPU₁, that supports an on-board IdentityFirewall, IF₁. In this example, IF₁, comprising one or more hardware PPEsets, encapsulates its associated load module, LM₁, to isolate it frominterference from other resource sets, such as a general purposeoperating system running on the general purpose processing cores of theCPU set. In this example, LM₁ has direct access to I/O registers and I/Ointerrupts, and through the manipulation of these registers, LM₁orchestrates the activities of a device set, on an I/O bus set directlyconnected CPU₁ which may include, for example, sensor/emitter sets(BSE₁) including traditional HMI devices such as touch devices,keyboards and display adapters, storage devices, network devices (NIC₁),bus controllers and/or bridges and/or the like. Manipulation of suchdevice sets may include, for example,

-   -   Management of secure communications between BSE₁ and external        authorized resources accessed through a network card, NIC₁. LM₁        may ensure that all such communications are cryptographically        protected when they reach NIC₁ and may ensure that information        from external resource sets must be properly signed before it        may be delivered to the BSE₁. LM₁ may ensure that such        communications may or may not be seen by the general purpose        processing units in CPU₁. In some embodiments, LM₁ may perform        validation of instructions sent from an external process to        BSE₁.    -   Management of direct memory access between devices and memory.        In some embodiments, LM₁ may redirect direct memory access from        a device to IF₁ controlled memory where LM₁ may process such        transferred memory without interference.

Based on its ability to interact with sensors and/or emitters, LM₁ may:i) perform registration, authentication and/or reality integritytesting; ii) mediate general purpose operating system's access to I/Oactivities on CPU₁ managed bus set. For example, in some cases, LM₁ mayprevent general purpose processing on a CPU set from having any accessto a biometric sensor while the sensor is being used for authentication.Such mediation may prevent general purpose operations from interferingwith and/or detecting registration, authentication and/or realityintegrity processing.

In some embodiments, users and/or Stakeholders and/or computingarrangements operating on their respective behalves in pursuit of targetsituational contextual purpose sets may assess the reliability of, inthis example, a device arrangement, DEV₁, by authenticating the identityof DEV₁ (is the device actually what it claims to be), and evaluatingother aspects DEV₁'s identity (is the identified device suitable topurpose). For example, suppose DEV₁ is an Awareness Manager being used,for example, to existentially authenticate a user set for a cloudservice, CS₁, that provides, for example, banking services. CS₁ mayevaluate DEV₁'s identity to assess its sufficiency regarding a targetcontextual purpose related assiduous authentication specification set,where such evaluation may include evaluation of DEV₁'s provenanceinformation set, including, for example,

-   -   Identities of one or more direct Stakeholder sets, STK₁,        including, for example, its manufacturers, distributors,        retailers, installers and/or the like. The identity of STK₁ may        further contain a variety of general and/or situational        attribute (and/or for example metadata) information such as STK₁        own provenance related information set, including, for example,        Effective Facts and/or aggregate Creds asserted by, for example,        Acknowledged Domain expert sets, Cred asserters regarding STK₁        direct Stakeholders, and/or the like.    -   Creds asserted by indirect Stakeholders who have used the DEV₁        device. As with any PERCos and/or the like resource, such Creds        may have their own provenance information, including, for        example, aggregate Creds, Creds on Creds (or aggregate Creds),        Creds on the Cred Stakeholder sets (e.g., Cred creator,        publisher, distributor, retailor, user, and/or the like and any        which Cred instance may be in framed in reference to specific        one or more contextual purpose specifications, including the        resource).    -   Creds asserted by acknowledged Domain experts regarding, for        example, the design of DEV₁, and/or any other constituent        resource set component, service, and/or combination thereof    -   And/or the like.

For example, FIG. 42 , illustrates a banking resource arrangement set,operating on behalf of a bank, that may assess the reliability of ahardware unified appliance, UA₆, to support authentication of a user andCPFF functions. In some embodiments, the assurance of UA₆ may depend onhardware device components, such as, for example, a core AwarenessManager, AM₅, and other components, and related processes, where theforegoing may be assiduously bound to one or more PERCos Formal resourcesets, as relates to their identities and the following:

-   -   Establishment of the provenance of a hardware device set. In        some embodiments, identity attributes relating to a hardware        device set's provenance may be provided by its Stakeholders,        including its manufacturers, installers, consumers and/or the        like, and/or by one or more Stakeholder sets of one or more        computing arrangements containing the hardware device set.    -   Authentication, which in some embodiments may be provided by,        for example, attestation protocols in an interface set of a        hardware device set to produce a binding between the hardware        device set and its corresponding PERCos resource set.    -   Evaluation of Quality to Purpose of the hardware device set,        which may involve various, differing, or different contextual        purposes, as associated with differing Quality to Purpose values        for different purposes. Such evaluation may assess one or more        attributes of the hardware device set independent of environment        and/or within current and/or potential (computing and/or        tangible world) operating environment sets that may, for        example, complement, extend, and/or otherwise modify one or more        hardware device set attributes, and may include specifications        and/or other performance metrics within the context of, for        example, local hardware and/or software arrangements, external        (such as cloud based) resource sets, known or potential user        usage patterns, tangible world environmental attribute sets,        and/or the like. Such Quality to Purpose evaluation may, for        example, assess attributes such as device tamper-resistance,        reliability of services provided by the device (e.g.,        existential authentication, CPFF support) within differing        tangible world environments (e.g., under various background        lighting and/or auditory conditions), and/or the like.    -   Dynamic establishment of situational identities whose attributes        may reflect the device's current load modules and firmware        updates.

FIG. 45 is a non-limiting illustrative example of a hardware resourceset and associated identities and attributes.

FIG. 45 illustrates an example in which a resource, RS₁ (a resource thatis a representation of a physical device, PD₁) is a member of a resourceclass, RSC₁ (e.g., a resource class that represents biometric sensors ofa particular model provided by a particular manufacturer). RSC₁ may haveone or more class attribute sets that specify one or more attestationprotocols for assiduously binding devices to RSC₁'s member resources.PD₁ may use such an attestation protocol to bind itself to RS₁, whichmay specify that PD₁ prove its possession of the private key of acertificate signed by its manufacturer.

Once RS₁ is bound to PD₁, in some embodiments, RS₁'s identity may beevaluated and/or validated, where RS₁'s identity may have attributesand/or other identity-related information sets (such as metadata)comprising, for example:

-   -   RS₁'s provenance information,    -   One or more Reputes for RS₁ that may assert RS₁'s Quality to        Purpose for a particular set of purposes.    -   Situational information sets describing environmental conditions        of PD₁'s internal components, such as temperature of a        processing unit and/or the like.    -   Attributes describing PD₁'s computing environment, which may be        situational, such as relationships PD₁ may have with other        devices.    -   Other relationships, such as indirect Stakeholders, PD₁ Roles.

In some embodiments, RS₁'s identity attributes may be:

-   -   Retrieved from one or more identity manager sets for RS₁.    -   Inferred from attributes associated with a resource class, RSC₁,        that contains RS₁ as a member. For example, suppose RS₁ is a        device type, DT₁. RS₁'s manufacture may have created RSC₁,        representing all devices of DT₁. The manufacturer may have        described RSC₁ in terms of a set of attributes that are common        to DT₁ such as, for example, attributes characterizing DT₁        devices, such as their interface sets, recommended uses and/or        the like.    -   Retrieved from tamper-resistant repository sets on-board PD₁. In        some instances, cloud based identity managers that have RS₁'s        identity information sets may not accessible, sufficiently        reliable and/or sufficiently efficient. In such instances,        ability to retrieve identity attributes from such        tamper-resistant repository sets may enable other resource sets        to reliably assess RS₁'s identity attributes.    -   Calculated and/or measured on-board PD₁, such as, for example,        temperature measurements or logged data of PD₁'s uptime, usage,        health checks, and/or the like.    -   Retrieved from local storage and/or generated by process sets in        U₁'s computing arrangement.

FIG. 46 is a non-limiting illustrative example of authenticated andevaluated device in operation.

In some embodiments, evaluation of the suitability of a physical deviceset, PD₂, for a given purpose set may involve the evaluation of identityattribute sets. For example, FIG. 46 shows a third party publishingutility service, PUS₄, assessing the reliability of the device, PD₂,that a Stakeholder, STK₁, may use to bind to STK₁'s existentialbiometric identity, where assessment includes the relationship betweenPD₂ and the sensor/emitter set, BSE₃, that STK₁ may use to provideSTK₁'s biometric information sets.

STK₁ may establish and/or validate a trust relationship—sufficient forPUS₄ purpose—between PUS₄ resources and PD₂ and BSE₃ on STK₁'s hardwarearrangement by:

-   -   Authenticating STK₁'s computing arrangements (e.g., STK₁'s        laptop), resulting in a binding components in the laptop, such        as, for example binding of:        -   PD₂ to a resource set, RS₂, which is PD₂'s PERCos            representation, through cryptographic attestation protocol            using private encryption keys installed as part of PD₂'s            manufacturing.        -   BSE₃ to a resource set, RS₃, which is PD₂'s PERCos            representation.    -   Evaluating Quality to Purpose of resource sets bound to STK₁'s        computing arrangements, such as, PD₂ and BSE₃. Evaluation may        include assiduous evaluation of identity attributes associated        with RS₂: i) at the time of PD₂ manufacturing including Reputes        asserting the list of sensor/emitter sets that PD₂ can use to        provide assiduous authentication; ii) at the time of        installation of PD₂ into laptop, including a direct        tamper-resistance connection between PD₂ to BSE₃. In some        instances, manufacturers of BSE₃ may also publish Reputes        asserting BSE₃'s capabilities to support PD₂ to perform        assiduous authentication. Coherence managers may establish        and/or validate additional attributes for RS₂ from its        relationship with RS₃, that reflects the direct relationship        between PD₂ and BSE₃ and one or Reputes associated with RS₂ by        Stakeholders of PD₂ and/or BSE₃.

In some embodiments, evaluation of identity attributes may assessqualities of PD₂ independent of details regarding its operation within asituationally specific instance of an encompassing computingarrangement. For example, manufacturers of PD₂ may associate a set ofidentity attributes at the time of manufacturing. For example,manufacturers may associate identity attributes specifying how well PD₂may perform when it is installed one or more sets of hardware models,software sets, and/or other resources.

In some embodiments, RS₂'s identity attribute set may be derived and/orinferred, at least in part, from details of PD₂'s installation processand interactive effects resulting from use of PD₂ with one or morerelevant other components within PD₂'s computing arrangement (e.g.,sensor and emitter sets with which PD₂ interacts and/or the like) and/orwith one or more external resource sets. Such interactive effects may,for example, depend on intrinsic attributes of said other componentsand/or external resource sets, and/or system attributes that may resultfrom a combinatorial set of interactions between two or more computingarrangement components and/or external resource sets.

In some embodiments, a computing arrangement, such as a laptop, may besubject to control specification sets that restrict the availability ofsome portion of PD₂ information (such as identity attributes thatdescribe details of manufacturing) to some user sets. In such instances,an evaluator of a computing arrangement may, for example:

-   -   Evaluate one or more Reputes, such as Creds and/or EFs that, for        example, describe one or more capability and/or quality sets of        a computing arrangement as a composite resource without having        access to information regarding any one or more internal        hardware related information sets of the computing arrangement.    -   Employ services of trusted third party utilities who are        allowed, at least in part, access to information about the        internals of the computing arrangement for evaluation purposes.        Such at least in part trusted third party utilities, after        evaluating and/or validating one or more aspects of the        computing arrangement, may publish one or more Repute sets        regarding their assessments expressed for example as Quality to        Purpose with value ratings (e.g., 1-10) that users may        subsequently use.    -   Enable a Stakeholder to selectively control evaluation aspects        of their respective resource set by establishing specifications,        such as CPFF specification set, that provides instructions for        enabling operation of their respective resource set, including,        for example, the selective provisioning of resource set        capabilities and/or associated information, such as descriptive        information, so that such Stakeholder may allow their resource        set to be evaluated in a practical manner without exposing        information and/or capabilities in a manner such Stakeholder        wishes to prevent or avoid.    -   And/or any combination thereof.

FIG. 47 is a non-limiting illustrative example of evaluation andauthentication of one or more load module sets.

FIG. 47 illustrates an example of a computing arrangement and procedurethat a user, U₁, may employ to perform online banking in a securefashion. In this example, a CPFF, CPFF_(x), may enable a user, U₁, tosecurely bank on-line with U₁'s bank by interacting with B₂, a resourceset used by U₁'s bank for servicing its clients.

In this example, CPFF_(x) may perform the following steps:

-   -   Step 1: U₁'s Identity Firewall, IF₁, which is a hardware PPE in        U₁'s computing arrangement: i) authenticates and evaluates B₂'s        Identity Firewall, IF₂; and ii) validates B₂'s certificates,        which may be stored in a tamper-resistance identity store in        IF₂'s computing arrangement. IF₁ evaluates IF₂'s identity to        ensure that IF₂ and, in particular, IF₂'s associated identity        store, is indeed tamper resistant (thereby ensuring the        integrity of B₂'s certificate).    -   Steps 2 and 3: IF₂, on behalf of U₁'s bank, validates        sufficiency of U₁'s IF₁ for authenticating U₁ by performing:        -   Step 2: assiduous authentication and evaluation of IF₁'s            identities, which may include assiduously evaluating IF₁'s            provenance, Stakeholder identities, and/or the like.        -   Step 3a: identification and selection of one or more IF₁'s            identity attributes that refers to or contains one or more            methods for authenticating IF₁'s load modules (e.g., LM₁ in            this instance).        -   Step 3b: assiduous authentication of LM₁'s identity using            one of the methods selected in step 3a.        -   Step 3c: assiduous evaluation of LM₁'s identity for its            suitability in U₁'s bank's interest.    -   Step 4: Having assiduously evaluated and authenticated IF₁ and        LM₁, IF₂ uses LM₁ to authenticate U₁ on behalf of B₂. In this        example, LM₁ uses U₁'s biometric information set stored in a        tamper-resistant store, however, in some embodiments, LM₁ may        interact with a remote identity manager set to obtain U₁'s        biometric information set.

In this example, B₂ may invoke a challenge response protocol using apseudo random generator instruction set and communicate it to U₁'s BSE₁.In some embodiments, such emission instruction sets may be stored sothat they can be used at a later time.

The capacity to perform trusted resource identity, authenticity,evaluation, and related resource provisioning and computing sessionenvironment management operations are key to optimal consequencemanagement of PERCos contextual purpose fulfillment computing sessions.Individuals seeking to publish PERCos compliant resource sets, as wellas those performing computing arrangement operations involving sensitiveinformation and/or processes, may be faced with the twin tasks ofreliably establishing their identities, for example, at potentiallydiffering, standardized and interoperable levels of rigor, and/orperforming resource related processing dependent on accurateidentification of resources and the performing of resource relatedoperations consistent with user purposes and free from unintended, andin particular, malicious and/or inefficient, operations.

Mechanisms by which an individual, or a non-human resource set,establishes identity may vary substantially, and in some instances, maybe determined by specifications regarding the interests of pluralindependent parties. Such processes may involve PERCos coherenceservices that consider requirements and/or preferences specified by anycombination of a user set, other parties engaged in, or otherwisesupporting, computing sessions where associated contextual purposerelated specifications may be associated not only with user sets (andwhich may differ among users), but with non-human resource sets, forexample, as expressed by resource Stakeholder sets and/or the like.

When interacting with diverse PERCos and/or non-PERCos resource sets, anassiduous understanding of user and/or resource identity, includingassociated identity and identity attribute reliability, quality and/ortrustworthiness, may depend on a computing arrangements capacity toreliably assess such identities—that is, the set of attributes, whichmay be target contextual purpose specific as to a subset of identityattributes or may be a general and consistent set. For example, targetcontextual purpose provisioning, and an operating sessions capabilitiesand/or potential risks, may at least in part arise from, that is beinfluenced by, the operating computing environment as regards bothtarget situationally relevant PERCos contextual purpose sets and/ornon-PERCos resources, processes, information, and/or the like. In someinstances, it may be necessary to evaluate trade-offs between potentialfunctionality on the one hand, and concerns relating to security risksand/or other forms of unintended consequences on the other, to achieve adesired balance that satisfies minimality, isolation, and/or efficiencyconsiderations.

In some embodiments, Identity Firewall (IF) sets may support evaluationof identities by providing capabilities that support tangibleenvironment element identity related operations, by providing a range ofcapabilities. Such capabilities may, for example:

-   -   Provide secure communications (e.g., trusted paths) between: i)        Local computing environments and humans through, in part,        management of biometric and/or other sensor and emitter sets.        Some instances of IFs may support hardening and/or otherwise        securely enhancing biometric and/or other sensor and/or emitter        sets operations; ii) Local identity-related resource sets (such        as local biometric sensors and/or emitter sets) and external        resource sets (such as, for example, cloud registration and/or        authentication services, PIMS, administration and/or other        utility services, and/or the like).    -   Perform time-related operations, such as: i) time stamping        information sets sent to and/or received by sensor sets,        instruction sets sent to emitter sets, acknowledgements from        emitter sets, duration periods, correspondences between emitter        and sensor activities, and/or the like; ii) performing timing        anomaly analysis, such as, for example, ensuring that responses        to existential challenges unfold in accordance with “normal”        temporal realities, such as normal unfolding of corresponding        biometric event sequences; iii) and/or the like.    -   Generate pseudo random pattern and/or other formulation sets        instructing exposure of human user set and/or non-human tangible        environment set to one or more emitter sets emitting, for        example, electro-magnetic radiation, and/or ultrasound and/or        other sonic emissions and/or the like.    -   Extend capabilities of sensor and emitter sets, such as, for        example: i) encrypting, compressing, extracting, transforming,        signing data, and/or the like data related functions, between        sensors and/or emitter sets and resource sets, such as employing        sensor processing sets, registration processing sets,        authentication processing sets, external systems, and/or the        like; ii) correlating multimodal and/or multi-sourced sensor        data, such as, for example, correlating facial expressions with        speech, environmental sound and/or lighting and/or other sensing        environment input; and/or iii) correlating sensor data with        emitter instruction sets and/or otherwise interpreting emitter        emission information through analysis of sensor sensed        information. For example, an IF may use a pseudo random emitter        generator to produce an instruction to an emitter set to        transparently “paint” a subject and/or physical environment with        ultrasonic emission set. The use of such secure, external to        system unpredictable, pseudo random generation techniques may        make it very difficult, if not impossible, for disrupters to        generate fake response sets within a timeframe necessary to        effectively spoof identity operations, such as, for example, as        related to registration, authentication, reality integrity        testing, and/or the like. Such issued instructions, together        with the information sets provided by sensors, may then be        time-stamped, correlated, and/or assiduously analyzed for        temporal anomalies, consistency human (and/or individual person)        physiological response unfolding sequences and/or otherwise with        the nature of human physiology and/or the laws of physics and/or        the like.

Some PERCos embodiments may provide commonly packaged Awareness Managersets that include one or more IF and at least one or more sensor sets,and/or alternatively, one or more IFs and associated sensor sets, toreliably sense at least one or more portions of a tangible environmentin support of existential identity authentication, registration,evaluation, validation, reality integrity analysis, and/or the like.

FIG. 48 is a non-limiting illustrative example of an Identity Firewallembodiment with PPE.

In some embodiments, an Identity Firewall embodiment, as illustrated inFIG. 48 , may support establishment of a root of trust biometric and/oruser computing arrangement environment information set for identityoperations by employing one or more load module sets that operate in oneor more hardware protected PPE sets (for example, hardened enclosureand/or chip arrangement). Such an IF embodiment may support assiduous,tangible identity acquisition and/or authentication-related operations,such as, reliable sensor and/or emitter processing, existentialbiometric authentication and/or registration of users and Stakeholders,other reality-integrity testing, and/or the like in support of one ormore CPFF framework instances. In this example, an IF embodiment iscomprised, for example, some or all of the following elements:

-   -   Tamper resistant IF enclosure packaging.    -   Cryptographic services.    -   Sensor and/or emitter processing for IF_(x)'s sensors and        emitters, comprising, for example, pseudo random generator, a        trusted clock that perform time-related operations (such as time        stamp relevant events and information sets, perform timing        anomaly analysis, and/or the like), and any other applicable        processing capabilities.    -   Registration and/or authentication services.    -   A hardware-based PPE (HPE), PPE₁, secure tamper resistant        component that has administrative control over IF_(x)'s        elements, such as sensors/emitter sets, trusted clock, and        identity related information manager.    -   Protected repository set (e.g., includes secure memory        arrangement) for storing confidential information sets, such as,        for example, biometric and/or contextual information sets,        environmental information sets, cryptographic keys, and/or other        identity-related information sets, and/or the like.    -   Identity related information manager arrangement that interacts        with IF_(x)'s protected repository sets to store, retrieve,        update, organize, and/or otherwise manage, as applicable,        information sets in support of IF_(x)'s operations.

In this example, IF_(x) may, provide one or more of the followingcapabilities:

-   -   Attestation using one or more method sets that enable PPE₅ to        assiduously attest the identity of IF_(x).    -   Cooperation among IF_(x)'s services. For example, a trusted        clock may communicate with registration, authentication,        provisioning services, and/or the like, related to timing        anomaly analysis.    -   Time-related processing, such as, for example, time stamping        sensor generated biometric and/or contextual information sets,        timing anomaly analysis, and/or the like.    -   Validation of liveness of tangible parties (and/or non-living        environment item sets) by, for example, painting them using        pseudo randomly generated emission signal set and observing        (e.g., sensing information regarding) at least one or more        portions of their reflections, refractions, diffractions,        re-emissions, partial absorptions, and/or the like responses.    -   And/or the like.

In some embodiments, AM sets may enhance the capabilities of IdentityFirewalls by providing sensor, and may further provide emittercapabilities to be assiduously aware of one or more tangible partiesand/or tangible environment elements, thereby enabling participantand/or the like registered users (in some embodiments may includenon-register users) and/or Stakeholders to provide sufficiently reliableand/or rigorous evidence of their respective existential identities tosatisfy situationally specific conditions. For example, consider JohnDoe, who wishes to publish a resource set, through a trusted on-linepublishing service, PS₁, using his laptop. PS₁ may inspect the laptop todetermine that it has a hardware-based Awareness Manager, AM₁,comprising one or more IF sets. PS₁ may obtain sufficient to purposeassurance level it requires of the reliability of AM₁'s assiduousauthentication of Mr. Doe's existential identity (including hisliveness) by authenticating and evaluating AM₁'s identity, where PS₁authenticates AM₁'s identity by having AM₁ demonstrate its possession ofits private key signed by its manufacturer using an attestation protocoland PS₁ assiduously evaluates AM₁'s identity by evaluating AM₁'sprovenance information sets, identity information sets of AM₁'s one ormore Stakeholder sets, AM₁'s Reputes, and/or the like.

In some embodiments, tangible parties may deploy one or more AwarenessManager sets, where some Awareness Manager sets may comprise pluralitiesof sensor sets to obtain reliable awareness of tangible parties and/orenvironmental element sets. For example, an Awareness Manager may managesituational awareness of a conference room by strategically placing oneor more sensor sets to achieve comprehensive coverage of such conferenceroom.

FIG. 49 is a non-limiting illustrative example of an Awareness Managerembodiment.

FIG. 49 illustrates a non-limiting embodiment of an Awareness Manager,AM_(x), that in addition to including the capabilities of IdentityFirewall embodiment, IF_(x), that is illustrated in FIG. 48 , includessensor/emitter sets (motion sensor, ultra sound arrangement, audiblemicrophone and speaker, finger print scanner, and camera) that mayenable AM_(x) to be aware of one or more tangible parties and/ortangible environments elements by deploying one or more sensor sets. Forexample, AM_(x) may use one or more sensor sets to monitor tangibleevents that may potential disrupt user fulfillment, and take correctiveactions, such as block, re-route, encrypt, decrypt, initiate, and/or thelike traffic in accordance with situation-specific or defaultspecification sets.

FIG. 50 is a non-limiting illustrative embodiment of an I/O bus with AMs(Awareness Managers), IFs (Identity Firewalls) and PPEs.

In some embodiments, as shown in FIG. 50 hardware embodiments maycontain one or more AM and/or IF sets at differing points in the I/O bustopology, such as, for example, directly connecting to sensor andemitter device sets, to NIC sets, and/or the like.

This hardware embodiment example has the following IFs, AMs and PPEs onan I/O bus:

-   -   AM₁, comprising an IF, IF₁, that operates a load module, LM₁,        that manages AM₁'s sensor and emitter set.    -   AM₂, comprising two IFs, IF₂₁ and IF₂₂, where IF₂₁ operates LM₂₁        that manages AM₂'s emitter and IF₂₂ operates LM₂₂ that manages        AM₂'s sensor.    -   IF₃, that operates LM₃ that secures communications to and/or        from sensor S₁.    -   PPE₄ that operates LM₄ to secure communications to and external        resource sets through (NIC).

In some embodiments, placement of IFs, AMs, and/or hardware PPE sets atdifferent points in an I/O bus topology may provide differingcapabilities in support of CPFF operations (and/or any other identityrelated operation set, as may be applicable in an embodiment). A summaryof several example variants of hardware IF, AM, and/or hardware PPEplacement and corresponding capabilities are provided below, followed bya more detailed explanation of each example.

-   -   Secure communications: FIG. 51 illustrates secure communications        paths from devices, such as sensors and/or emitters, to external        resources, such as services for registration, authentication,        reality integrity testing, existential evaluation and/or        validation, and/or the like. This figure also illustrates an        authentication process having exclusive access to a sensor        and/or emitter device set, in accordance with one or more        situational specification sets provided by a higher authorized        process set, such as, for example, a coherence manager.    -   Device virtualization: FIG. 53 illustrates virtualization of        physical device sets to enhance their capabilities to support        biometric registration, authentication, and/or reality-integrity        testing.    -   Network firewall services: FIG. 54 illustrates an embodiment of        a hardware PPE set can validate, filter, block, redirect and/or        the like network traffic to and from a NIC. Validation may        include for example, validating the consistency of sensor        information against the challenges instructed by pseudo random        generator.

FIG. 51 is a non-limiting illustrative example of an Identity Firewallrunning on top of a trusted operating session.

FIG. 51 illustrates a non-limiting example in which a CPFF that enablesusers, U₁ and U₂, interested in pursuit of social networking experience,to assiduously authenticate each other using a third partyauthentication service using their respective Identity Firewalls. Inthis example neither U₁ nor U₂ wishes to provide the other party withhis or her biometric identity information sets. Instead they agree toregister their biometric identities with a trusted third party, A_(p),to perform authentication on their behalf.

PERCos embodiment helps U₁ and U₂ to select a CPFF, CPFF_(x) that can beprovisioned with resource set comprising resources from U₁'s and U₂'srespective computing arrangements and a set of PERCos cloud resourceservices including an authentication service set, A_(P), that cooperatetogether to provide mutual authentication and/or other services suitableto common user (U₁ and U₂) purpose. Such resource sets may include U₁'sand U₂'s IFs, IF₁ and IF₂, that are provisioned to enhance assurance ofexistential authentication by providing a secure communications pathbetween a sensor and/or emitter device set and an A_(P). IF₁ is providedby tamper-resistant hardware that includes a trusted clock and operatesa load module, LM₁. IF₂ is implemented as an application and/or systemprocess executing on a trusted to purpose operating session and/orhardware. IF₂ may operate a software plugin and/or other component, LM₂,to provide U₂'s tangible identity acquisition.

In this example, CPFF_(x) may enable two users, U₁ and U₂, to reliablyinteract socially by performing through the following actions:

-   -   Action 1: U₁ and U₂ mutually agree that a trusted third party        process, A_(p) can authenticate all relevant Participants,        including U₁ and U₂, for their common purpose. For example,        A_(p) may have one or more Repute attributes that assert A_(p)'s        reliability and/or Quality to Purpose in authenticating users.        U₁ and U₂ may assiduously evaluate and/or validate A_(p)'s        Reputes to assess A_(p)'s reliability. In some variations of        this example, an A_(p) instance may be running in either (or        both) users' computing arrangements and/or A_(p) may operate        externally of CPFF_(x).    -   Action 2: A_(P) evaluates and authenticates biometric sensor and        emitter sets, BSE₁ and BSE₂ and their associated IF's, IF₁ and        IF₂, respectively, where BSE₁ is directly connected to IF₁ and        BSE₂ is directly connected to IF₂. In this example, IF₂ is a        software arrangement environment, whereas IF₁ is a        tamper-resistant hardware component. This difference between        these IF's may mean that A_(P)'s authentication of IF₁ and IF₂        may proceed in a somewhat different manner:        -   To authenticate IF₁, A_(P) may verify that IF₁ is the holder            of the private key for a cryptographic certificate of            authenticity signed and sealed in IF₁ by IF₁'s manufacturer.            Since IF₁ is a tamper-resistant device, this may be a            sufficient proof of IF₁'s identity for the target user            purpose.        -   To authenticate IF₂, A_(P) may first need to authenticate            U₂'s trusted to user purpose operating session on which IF₂            operates. Without such authentication, IF₂ may not perform            in a reliable fashion because malware and/or other            unreliable software in U₂'s trusted to user purpose            operating session may corrupt the performance of IF₂. In            some embodiments, such authentication of IF₂ may, in whole            or in part, be provided by the services of a U₂'s TPM. Such            a TPM may measure the boot of U₂'s trusted to purpose            operating session and follow such measurements by            measurements of the initialization of IF₂. After performing            both measurements, U₂'s TPM may be able to attest to the            measurements of U₂'s operating session and of IF₂ where such            measurements may be strongly associated with the identities            of U₂'s operating session and IF₂.    -   Action 3: A_(P) evaluates and authenticates LMs, LM₁ and LM₂,        that operate in IF₁ and IF₂, respectively, including validating        that they are configured in accordance with control        specifications associated with the authenticating process,        A_(p). For example, LM₁ may provide:        -   A secure, cryptographically protected communications path            between BSE₁ and A_(p) that ensures integrity and/or            confidentiality of communications. IF₂ may rely on the            services of U₂'s trusted to purpose operating session to            provide appropriate control over the sensor devices and            provide IF₂ with secure access to cryptographic materials            needed to encrypt and sign the connection.        -   Correlation of one or more sensor information sets with one            or more emitter instruction sets and/or other sensor            information sets.        -   And/or the like.

In some embodiments, CPFF_(x) may include other resources and/orprocesses supporting user purpose including, for example,

-   -   U₁'s and/or U₂'s trusted to purpose operating session sets,        which may, due to their reliability, provide a foundation for        other process sets in U₁'s and U₂'s software environment        including, for example, particularity management processing        and/or social networking purpose class applications.    -   Situational particularity management operating on U₁'s and/or        U₂'s trusted to purpose operating session sets which may monitor        U₁ and/or U₂'s situation and generate responses to exceptional        conditions. For example, if U₁'s situational particularity        management processing is informed by cloud services that the        threat level has increased, perhaps because of a class of        attacks against reliable authentication, CPFF_(x) may regard as        no longer being sufficiently secure to purpose and cause U₂'s        resource sets to be removed from the CPFF_(x) embodiments until        U₂ may support a more reliable arrangement.    -   Social networking class applications operating on behalf of U₁        and U₂ may provide services specific to social networking such        as, for example, video chat, access to social networking        resource repositories and/or the like.    -   PERCos cloud resource service sets which may provide PERCos        and/or other services such as identity management, particularity        management, and/or the like in support of a target (social        networking) user purpose.

In some embodiments, LM₁ may grant A_(p) exclusive access to BSE₁ byestablishing an exclusive cryptographically protected communicationspath between BSE₁ and A_(p). In particular, LM₁ may monitor allcommunications traffic to and/or from BSE₁ to ensure that they are fromand/or to A_(p). This may prevent external resource sets interferingwith BSE₁'s configuration and/or protect biometric information sets fromunauthorized disclosure.

FIG. 52 is a non-limiting illustrative example of an Identity Firewalloperating as part of a trusted to user purpose operating session.

FIG. 52 illustrates a non-limiting example in which a social networkingCPFF enables participants in a social network to mutually assiduouslyauthenticate each other using a third party authentication service usingtheir respective Identity Firewalls. FIG. 52 is a variation of a similaroperating CPFF instance shown in FIG. 51 except that U₂'s IF, IF₂,operates inside U₂'s trusted to purpose operating session set instead ofoperating as a service on top of U₂'s trusted to purpose operatingsession set. In some embodiments, operating IF₂ inside U₂'s trusted topurpose operating session set may allow IF₂ to perform better—byreducing context switches—and may be provide IF₂ more efficient (direct)access to hardware such as, for example, to assiduous biometric sensorand emitter sets.

FIG. 53 is a non-limiting illustrative example of an Identity Firewall(IF) enhancing capabilities of a physical sensor/emitter set.

FIG. 53 illustrates how an Identity Firewall, IF₃, that is a hardwarePPE on an I/O bus, may use a load module, LM₃, to enhance thecapabilities of a physical sensor/emitter set, BSE₃, such as providingsecure communications, correlation of different sensor data (e.g., voiceand facial biometrics), and sanity validation (i.e., checking for datacorruption) in support of assiduous registration and/or authenticationand/or reality integrity processing. For example, LM₃ may:

-   -   Convert instructions sent to VSE₃ into instructions to be        forwarded to BSE₃.    -   Transform BSE₃ generated information sets to VSE₃ generated        information sets.        In some embodiments, VSE₃ may have, for example, the following        characteristics that differentiate it from BSE₃:    -   VSE₃ may be able to attest to its identity, which may in turn        have identity attributes that assert its reliability and trust        characteristics.    -   VSE₃ may provide security and/or other features not provided by        BSE₃ such as, for example, providing signed and/or encrypted        information sets.

FIG. 54 is a non-limiting illustrative example of PPE providing firewallsupport.

FIG. 54 illustrates how hardware PPE sets on an I/O bus may controlincoming and outgoing network traffic in accordance with a situationalspecification set, provided by an authorized process set, such as, forexample, a coherence manager set that coheres one or more specificationsets representing interests of one or more involved parties, such as,for example, U₁ and resource set Stakeholders.

For example, consider a LM, LM₄, running in a PPE, PPE₄, whichintercepts all internal user computing arrangement communications to andfrom a network interface controller, NIC₄. LM₄ may act as a networkgateway by, for example,

-   -   Blocking all messages to and from NIC₄ that do not comply with a        situational specification set.    -   Performing application level testing of the contents of messages        to and from NIC₄. For example, such testing may identify any        network traffic that may potentially contain malware and forward        traffic to one or more authorized processing sets (e.g.,        isolation sandbox in FIG. 54 ) that may perform protective        and/or corrective actions, such as, sanitizing, deleting,        sending to an isolation sandbox set, and/or the like traffic.    -   Forcing use of certain protocols by, for example, adding        encryption or forcing the use of a Tor network.    -   And/or the like.

In addition, LM₄ may interact with biometric sensor/emitter sets toenhance sensor/emitter information sets being sent to an externalregistration, authentication and/or reality-integrity testing services(A_(P)) by, for example,

-   -   Utilizing timing and biometric unfolding anomaly detection        services to pre-process received sensor and/or related emitter        information sets and raise an exception if inconsistencies are        observed. For example, timing and biometric unfolding anomaly        detection services may detect discontinuities and/or excessive        elapsed time periods suggesting that video frames from different        sources are being spliced together, suggesting an attack in        progress. In such a case, LM₄ may raise an exception to be        handled by A_(P).    -   Utilizing cryptographically secure pseudo random emitter        generator services (or other one or more forms, if available and        applicable, for example, of external to system unpredictable        and/or the like emitter signal generator services) to add        liveness detection information to sensor information sets. For        example, LM₄ may use the pseudo random generator arrangement to        generate patterns and/or other formulations for emitters and        analyze the reflections and/or other responses to such emissions        to see if they are consistent, for example, with identifying one        or more individuals and/or reality testing, such as existential,        analysis. If an inconsistency is detected, LM₄ may raise an        exception to be handled by A_(P).

In this example, LM₄ may function on a device such as, for example, amobile phone or a laptop, and may, for example, be insulated throughhardware PPE based hardware protection, from interference from, forexample, the operating system, even in the case that the operatingsystem has been corrupted by malware. For example, in some embodiments,PPE₄ may only accept load module instances that are loaded directly intothe hardware, e.g., through BIOS mechanisms before the system is booted,and such load module instances may be inaccessible to an executingoperating system.

What is claimed is:
 1. A system for establishing a secure, tamperresistant resource stakeholder identity, and stipulated stakeholder factattribute, system, the system using secure one or more test methods andtamper resistant components for validating stipulated resourceassociated stakeholder fact attributes, the system comprising: one ormore computing arrangements, respectively including one or moreprocessors, for use in providing standardized at least one of resourcesand specifications that enable securely producing resource stakeholders'respective biometric identification information, and the resourcestakeholders' respective stipulated as fact attribute information sets,wherein the one or more computing arrangements are employed to enable:securely providing at least in part biometrically based identificationinformation of a computing resource's one or more stakeholders using oneor more secure electromagnetic radiation sensor arrangements and one ormore tamper and inspection resistant secure computing chip or chipsetidentification information processing arrangements; securely stipulatingby a fact originating authority at least one fact information setestablished by the originating authority, the fact information setsecurely comprising one or more stipulated attribute information sets ofthe computing resource's one or more stakeholders; securelycommunicating to a computing arrangement user, the resource's securelyassociated, stakeholder characterizing, one or more stipulated as factattribute information sets securely respectively associated with the oneor more stakeholders' biometrically based identification information;and securely confirming, for a computing arrangement user, that the oneor more stipulated as fact attribute information sets authenticallycharacterize respective one or more stakeholders of the resource, theconfirming using at least one secure standardized test method, whereinthe at least one test method employs secure communication during a liveuser computing arrangement session to communicate cryptographicallyprotected stipulated as fact attribute, and securely associatedstakeholder biometrically based identification, information to the factoriginating authority's computing arrangement to confirm, through use ofthe at least one test method, the authenticity of the fact informationthat characterizes the one or more stakeholders.
 2. The system as inclaim 1, wherein the providing of standardized at least one of resourcesand specifications enables storing the fact information set on at leastone of a user computing arrangement smartphone, tablet, notebook, othercomputing arrangement, and/or network location.
 3. The system as inclaim 1, wherein the providing of standardized at least one of resourcesand specifications enables the producing of the computing resource's oneor more stakeholders' biometrically based identification information,wherein the producing of biometrically based identification informationrequires liveness testing demonstrating stakeholder physical presenceduring respective biometric identification information acquisitionprocesses.
 4. The system as in claim 3, wherein the providing ofstandardized at least one of resources and specifications enablesdemonstrating stakeholder physical presence by employing unpredictableelectromagnetic radiation emission, and sensor acquisition of emissioncorresponding electromagnetic signal information, wherein radiationemission and sensor acquisition events are (1) time stamped using asecure clock arrangement, and (2) timing analyzed for excess time ofemitter radiation emission to sensor signal acquisition overhead.
 5. Thesystem as in claim 1, wherein the providing of standardized at least oneof resources and specifications enables hashing at least a portion ofthe cryptographically protected stipulated fact and the stakeholderbiometrically based identification information, and using the hashedidentification information in the test method to confirm theauthenticity of the fact information set.
 6. The system as in claim 1,wherein the providing of standardized at least one of resources andspecifications enables the computing arrangement user to cause identityinformation operations that operate in a hardened identity devicearrangement that comprises (1) a secure communication arrangement, (2) asensor/emitter processing arrangement, (3) registration and/orauthentication service arrangements, (4) a protected repository foridentity-related information, (5) one or more trusted clocks fortime-stamping sensor and emitter events, and (6) a protected processingenvironment that manages the arrangement's elements.
 7. The system as inclaim 1, wherein the providing of standardized at least one of resourcesand specifications enables forming of an identification information setcomprising the securely bound stipulated as fact information set and thebiometrically based identification information, wherein the factinformation set is securely stipulated through the use of an encryptedhash certificate issued by, and subsequently confirmed by, one or morefact stipulation value chain participants and/or an authorized, trustedagent.
 8. The system as in claim 1, wherein the providing ofstandardized at least one of resources and specifications enables usingthe securely bound stipulated as fact information set to filter aresource set, wherein the stipulated as fact information set informsregarding the presence or absence of an attribute for each resource ofthe resource set, and the resource set is filtered to produce one ormore resources that possess the attribute.
 9. The system as in claim 1,wherein the providing of standardized at least one of resources andspecifications enables characterizing the computing resource's one ormore stakeholders as possessing the stipulated as fact attribute, andthe attribute can be is validated during a computing session by a userusing a test method provided by an external authority.
 10. The system asin claim 1, wherein the providing of standardized at least one ofresources and specifications includes providing one or moreidentification information specialized hardware components for enablingusers to securely process at least in part biometrically basedidentification information within their respective tamper and inspectionresistant hardware component arrangements.
 11. The system as in claim 1,wherein the providing of standardized at least one of resources andspecifications includes communicating stakeholder biometrically basedidentification information, and stakeholder corresponding, securelyassociated stipulated as fact information, to a remote cloud service forverification of the association of the biometrically basedidentification and stakeholder corresponding, securely associatedstipulated as fact information, wherein the communication forverification involves performing at least one information verificationtest method.
 12. The system as in claim 1, wherein the providing ofstandardized at least one of resources and specifications enablesstandardized expression of stipulated as fact information wherein suchstandardized expression employs one or more standardized stipulated asfact categories.
 13. A method for establishing a secure, tamperresistant resource stakeholder identity, and stipulated stakeholder factattribute, system, the system using secure one or more test methods andtamper resistant components for validating stipulated resourceassociated stakeholder fact attributes, the method comprising:providing, through the use of one or more computing arrangements,respectively including one or more processors, standardized at least oneof resources and specifications, to enable securely producing resourcestakeholders' respective biometric identification information, and theresource stakeholders' respective stipulated as fact attributeinformation sets, wherein the one or more computing arrangements areemployed to enable: securely providing at least in part biometricallybased identification information of a computing resource's one or morestakeholders using one or more secure electromagnetic radiation sensorarrangements and one or more tamper and inspection resistant securecomputing chip or chipset identification information processingarrangements; securely stipulating by a fact originating authority atleast one fact information set established by the originating authority,the fact information set securely comprising one or more stipulatedattribute information sets of the computing resource's one or morestakeholders; securely communicating to a computing arrangement user,the resource's securely associated, stakeholder characterizing, one ormore stipulated as fact attribute information sets securely respectivelyassociated with the one or more stakeholders' biometrically basedidentification information; and securely confirming, for a computingarrangement user, that the one or more stipulated as fact attributeinformation sets authentically characterize respective one or morestakeholders of the resource, the confirming using at least one securestandardized test method, wherein the at least one test method employssecure communication during a live user computing arrangement session tocommunicate cryptographically protected stipulated as fact attribute,and securely associated stakeholder biometrically based identification,information to the fact originating authority's computing arrangement toconfirm, through use of the at least one test method, the authenticityof the fact information that characterizes the one or more stakeholders.14. The method as in claim 13, wherein the providing of standardized atleast one of resources and specifications enables storing the factinformation set on at least one of a user computing arrangementsmartphone, tablet, notebook, other computing arrangement, and/ornetwork location.
 15. The method as in claim 13, wherein the providingof standardized at least one of resources and specifications enables theproducing of the computing resource's one or more stakeholders'biometrically based identification information, wherein the producing ofbiometrically based identification information requires liveness testingdemonstrating stakeholder physical presence during respective biometricidentification information acquisition processes.
 16. The method as inclaim 15, wherein the providing of standardized at least one ofresources and specifications enables demonstrating stakeholder physicalpresence by employing unpredictable electromagnetic radiation emission,and sensor acquisition of emission corresponding electromagnetic signalinformation, wherein radiation emission and sensor acquisition eventsare (1) time stamped using a secure clock arrangement, and (2) timinganalyzed for excess time of emitter radiation emission to sensor signalacquisition overhead.
 17. The method as in claim 13, wherein theproviding of standardized at least one of resources and specificationsenables hashing at least a portion of the cryptographically protectedstipulated fact and the stakeholder biometrically based identificationinformation, and using the hashed identification information in the testmethod to confirm the authenticity of the fact information set.
 18. Themethod as in claim 13, wherein the providing of standardized at leastone of resources and specifications enables the computing arrangementuser to cause identity information operations that operate in a hardenedidentity device arrangement that comprises (1) a secure communicationarrangement, (2) a sensor/emitter processing arrangement, (3)registration and/or authentication service arrangements, (4) a protectedrepository for identity-related information, (5) one or more trustedclocks for time-stamping sensor and emitter events, and (6) a protectedprocessing environment that manages the arrangement's elements.
 19. Themethod as in claim 13, wherein the providing of standardized at leastone of resources and specifications enables forming of an identificationinformation set comprising the securely bound stipulated as factinformation set and the biometrically based identification information,wherein the fact information set is securely stipulated through the useof an encrypted hash certificate issued by, and subsequently confirmedby, one or more fact stipulation value chain participants and/or anauthorized, trusted agent.
 20. The method as in claim 13, wherein theproviding of standardized at least one of resources and specificationsenables using the securely bound stipulated as fact information set tofilter a resource set, wherein the stipulated as fact information setinforms regarding the presence or absence of an attribute for eachresource of the resource set, and the resource set is filtered toproduce one or more resources that possess the attribute.
 21. The methodas in claim 13, wherein the providing of standardized at least one ofresources and specifications enables characterizing the computingresource's one or more stakeholders as possessing the stipulated as factattribute, and the attribute can be is validated during a computingsession by a user using a test method provided by an external authority.22. The method as in claim 13, wherein the providing of standardized atleast one of resources and specifications includes providing one or moreidentification information specialized hardware components for enablingusers to securely process at least in part biometrically basedidentification information within their respective tamper and inspectionresistant hardware component arrangements.
 23. The method as in claim13, wherein the providing of standardized at least one of resources andspecifications includes communicating stakeholder biometrically basedidentification information, and stakeholder corresponding, securelyassociated stipulated as fact information, to a remote cloud service forverification of the association of the biometrically basedidentification and stakeholder corresponding, securely associatedstipulated as fact information, wherein the communication forverification involves performing at least one information verificationtest method.
 24. The method as in claim 13, wherein the providing ofstandardized at least one of resources and specifications enablesstandardized expression of stipulated as fact information wherein suchstandardized expression employs one or more standardized stipulated asfact categories.